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Abstract
This thesis is concerned with how multiple identities are perceived to interrelate and 
the functions they may serve for the individual in the context of stability, change and 
identity threat. The research focuses on the interrelationship between national and 
religious identities in Greece. It drew on Identity Process Theory (Breakwell, 1986), 
Roccas and Brewer’s Social Complexity Model (2002) and the work of Kay Deaux 
(1993; Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi and Ethier, 1995) to investigate three ways that identities 
might interrelate: structure, content and motivations.
Using self-completed questionnaires with some open-ended measures, and 7 semi­
structured interviews. Study 1 investigated the relationship between the strength of 
identification, centrality and content of national and religious identity elements. The 
sample consisted of 107 adult Greeks. Strong relationships were found between the 
levels of identification and centrality of the two identity elements as well as a large 
overlap in terms of content, both at an individual and the social representational level.
In Study 2, a repeated-measures experimental design was used to investigate the 
relationship between the two identity elements before and after threat was induced in 
the principles of national distinctiveness and continuity. The sample consisted of 258 
Greek students. It was shown that although the level of identification with each of 
the national and religious identities is predicted by their respective motivations, the 
same motivational principles (continuity and self-esteem) predicted levels of 
identification with the two identities. Furthermore, the motivational principles 
relating to each of the identity elements were strongly related to each other. Threat to 
national identity did not only affect the relative contribution that national identity 
made to the maintenance of the motivational principles but also affected the relative 
contribution made by the religious identity. Religious identification increased after 
threat, but most importantly, the relative contribution of its motivational principles 
changed as a response to the particular type of identity threat induced in the national 
identity.
Study 3 examined the extent to which levels of perceived overlap between national 
and religious identity elements influence Greek nationals’ acculturation preferences
11
from the state and the immigrant/minority groups contextualised also for different 
domains (citizenship, education and intermarriage) and for different target groups 
(Albanians, Russian and Greek Moslems of Thrace). It obtained questionnaire data 
from 316 Greek adults. The results showed that levels of perceived overlap between 
the two identity elements, was strongly and positively associated with perceived threat 
to national identity and prejudice and affected differently the levels of endorsement of 
host majority acculturation in relation to the immigrant/groups and the state.
The findings of the thesis are discussed in relation to how the relationships between 
multiple identities could be usefully conceptualised and how they may be used by 
individuals as coping strategies under the context of change and/or threat. It is also 
argued that inter-group perceptions can be better explained by taking into account 
multiple identities rather than the relative salience of single identities at a particular 
time.
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Ithaca
When you set out on your journey to Ithaca, 
pray that the road is long, 
full of adventure, full of knowledge.
The Lestrygonians and the Cyclops, 
the angry Poseidon -  do not fear them:
You will never find such as these on your path, 
if your thoughts remain lofty, if a fine 
emotion touches your spirit and your body.
The Lestrygonians and the Cyclops, 
the fierce Poseidon you will never encounter, 
if you do not carry them within your soul, 
if your soul does not set them up before you.
Pray that the road is long.
That the summer mornings are many, when, 
with such pleasure, with such joy 
you will enter ports seen for the first time; 
stop at Phoenician markets, 
and purchase fine merchandise, 
mother-of-pearl and coral, amber and ebony, 
and sensual perfumes of all kinds, 
as many sensual perfumes as you can; 
visit many Egyptian cities, 
to learn and learn from scholars.
Always keep Ithaca in your mind.
To arrive there is your ultimate goal.
But do not hurry the voyage at all.
It is better to let it last for many years; 
and to anchor at the island when you are old, 
rich with all you have gained on the way, 
not expecting that Ithaca will offer you riches.
Ithaca has given you the beautiful voyage.
Without her you would have never set out on the road.
She has nothing more to give you.
And if you find her poor, Ithaca has not deceived you.
Wise as you have become, with so much experience, 
you must already have understood what Ithacas mean.
Constantine P. Cavafys (Alexandria, 1911)
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview of the Thesis
“In this way I  would not have come to shed my father's blood, or 
been known among men as the husband o f  the woman from whom I  
was born. Now I  am forsaken by the gods, son o f a defiled mother, 
and successor to the bed o f the man who gave me my own wretched 
being: i f  there is a woe surpassing all woes, it has become Oedipus's 
/of. "
(Sophocles, Oedipus Tyrannus, EpisodeVII -Choral v.1360-1365)
The journey for an identity search is insightfully depicted in Sophocles’ theatrical 
play ‘Oedipus Tyrant’, The writer discusses the urge of human beings to answer the 
question ‘Who am T, followed by what it means to belong to several groups at the 
same time, especially in a context of conflicting identity meaning. The tale of 
Oedipus discusses the way the self is comprised of multiple identities/roles and how 
these are related. It focuses on the incompatibility between some of these multiple 
identities/roles. As Oedipus discovers the ‘truth’ about himself, he is confronted by 
the reality of his complex identity structure where being a ‘son’, a ‘king’, a ‘husband’ 
and a ‘hero’ are not easy to reconcile in terms of meaning and membership.
Obviously, Oedipus is a character that has already been used in psychology-related 
analyses before. Psychoanalysis is an obvious and well-known example. However, 
from a social psychological perspective, the multiple identities of Oedipus can also be 
read in a different way emphasizing their role and function within identity structure in 
the context of a changing social-psychological reality that challenges and destroys the 
associated meanings, psychological functions (motivations) as well as the affective 
importance attached to those familiar identities. The tale of Oedipus ‘invites’ us to 
conceptualise identity structure in terms of a complex set of relationships that may 
exist among a number of categories claimed by an individual. The main question in 
this respect concerns the relationship between multiple identifications within 
individual constructions of self, and how they may change over time. However, it is 
not the complexity of his identity system per se, nor the features associated with his 
personal and/or social identities that are inherently unattractive and threatening; it is 
the events happening in his immediate social environment after the revelation of the
‘truth’ which change the meanings of these identities and construct the structural 
relationships among them in such a way that they are perceived as incompatible to 
each other and consequently threatening to their beholder.
This analysis can be extended to any individual who holds a number of identities and 
may find himself/herself as a member of these groups in social contexts that invite the 
redefinition and the re-construction of identity, as a dynamic whole (structure and 
content), in a new but alien manner compared to the past identity system (Liebkind, 
1983 'Breakwell, 1986). Each one of us may face changes happening in the social 
environment that go beyond our control and even sometimes against our will. These 
changes would not always be experienced as threatening but they would instigate 
mechanisms (cognitive and motivational) that would help us adapt into and cope with 
the new reality. The question that still remains at the heart of social psychological 
research interest and in some cases an enduring theoretical challenge in the study of 
identity, of its structure, content and processes is: How do individuals deal with and 
use their multiple identifications when the social context may challenge the structural 
properties and the associated meanings o f  these identities? This is one of the main 
questions addressed in this thesis. Changes of identity structure and processes are 
studied by focusing on the relationship between national and religious identities in 
Greece. This is a social context where these social categories have been historically 
and culturally inter-related for a long time and therefore makes the study of changes 
in identity structure under threat particularly pertinent and interesting.
When one finds themselves in situations of instability and major social change such as 
the creation of super-ordinate categories (e.g. European) or changing trends in 
immigration flows, the fact that they belong to an array of social groups equips them 
with many potential collective representations to draw upon, to construct the 
meanings attached to particular identities and the relationships between them.
Living in multicultural societies moves to the psychological foreground the need to 
negotiate the number of different identities one holds and the interrelationships 
between them. As the systems of meaning and cultural representation multiply, 
individuals are invited to accommodate new group memberships (i.e. European) in 
their identity structure and to reconsider the meanings and importance attached to
their old memberships (i.e. national, religious). Changes in social identity imply 
changes in how we view ourselves as members of these groups, and who is seen to 
share the common ingroup membership (Brewer, 1999a). However, the way that 
individuals would respond to this call for change is likely to require the examination 
of both the identity whose content and/or value has been threatened or challenged as 
well as other identities to which this identity is related.
Based on the notion that individuals in real-life contexts may classify themselves (or 
be classified by others) as members of many social groups raises a number of 
questions about the conceptual as well as the psychological boundaries between these 
numerous ingroup identities. For example,
>  How are they organised within identity structure?
>  In what way and to what extent do they relate to each other (in terms of salience, 
centrality and meaning)?
>  Do they jointly operate to influence behaviour, and in what contexts?
> What are the implications of holding multiple identities that interrelate for either 
intra-group and inter-group attitudes, especially when the individual as a group 
member experiences a short-term or a long-term threat to one of the important 
related identities?
> Does this mean that changes in the identity processes (strength of identification, 
salience of principles-motivations) of one identity element would induce 
simultaneous changes in the other?
These are the main research questions that this thesis addresses in the context of 
national and religious memberships. It will investigate the strength and function of 
their interrelationship within identity structure, under conditions of stability, change 
and identity threat. In order to better understand the conditions under which this 
relationship is formed and the function it may serve within identity structure in the 
presence (or not) of major threats, the thesis draws on literature from more than one 
discipline and uses a multi-methodological research approach. The thesis reports the 
findings of three empirical studies which employed survey, qualitative, and 
experimental research methods. The first study was designed to understand the 
relationships of national, religious and other relevant identity elements in the identity
structure amongst Greek people. The second study examines how these relationships 
change under conditions of threat induced in an experimental context whilst the third 
examines how the perceived relationship between national and religious identities 
may influence inter-group perceptions.
1.1 Theoretical concerns
1.1.1 Conceptualising the structural relationships between identity elements
A central theoretical concern of this thesis is how best to conceptualise and represent 
relationships between different identity elements. In social psychology, there has 
been an emphasis on the hierarchical arrangement of identities, with the particular 
identity placed at the top being theorised as the most prevalent across situations, in 
both identity theory (ICT) (Stryker, 1987; Stets and Burke, 2000) and self­
categorisation theory (SCT) (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, and Wetherell, 1987; 
Turner, Oakes, Haslam, and McGarty, 1994). As a consequence, much of the 
research has focused upon a single category of identification in a situation (Stets and 
Harrods, 2004). However, it has been shown that any one social identity does not 
necessarily reside and function in isolation from other identities within the overall 
identity structure. Instead, they occupy a relative position to each other, both in terms 
of structure and content (Breakwell, 1986; Deaux, 1992, 2000; Cinnirella, 1996; 
Burke, 2003).
Once one acknowledges the issue of interrelationships between identities, the question 
of how the relationship between identities may be subjectively represented by the 
individual when they become simultaneously activated (salient) becomes relevant. 
Hierarchical nesting, which suggests that self-categories exist at different levels of 
abstraction organised in hierarchy of inclusiveness (Turner, et al., 1987) is regarded as 
one of these types, but necessarily not the only one (Brewer, 1999a; Roccas and 
Brewer, 2002). The type and strength of the relationship among them is also 
determined by the type of identities under consideration, and is historically and 
socially specific (Breakwell, 1986). For instance, research has indicated that in the 
context of inter-group conflict, nationality often intersects strongly with a number of 
other social categories such as religion and ethnicity (Cassidy and Trew, 1998;
Freeman, 2001, 2003). This suggests that there may be a shared and an enduring 
perception that some identities are perceived to be related (Moscovici, 1988). 
However, there may also be short-term or long-term changes (i.e. the transformation 
of a previously homogeneous society to a multicultural one) in the social structure 
that are likely to serve to modify a pre-existing type of relationship or create one that 
did not exist before.
Many theorists studying identity structure and change have suggested that the 
interaction of different identifications may change their overall position and 
importance, as well as the meaning of each other (Ethier and Deaux, 1994; Hedge, 
1998; Timotijevic and Breakwell, 2000; Chryssochoou, 2000a; Cassidy and Trew, 
2004; Burke, 2006). Following this line of thought and the existing evidence, it can 
be suggested then that the fact that a given identification may become salient is not 
only a function of how accessible it is and how much it fits the relevant context 
(Oakes, 1987); it may also be determined by its relative position and the strength of its 
association with other identifications.
1.1.2 Motivational identity processes guiding the relationships between multiple 
identities
Multiple social identities and their interaction hold a double standard role in an 
individual’s identity structure. They can be either the source of threat (Settles, 2004) 
or potential resources to deal with the threat (Breakwell, 1986; Linville, 1987; Ethier 
and Deaux, 1994; Settles, 2004; Shih and Sanchez, 2005, see also relevant literature 
on negative social identities-stigma, e.g. Finlay, Dinos and Lyons, 2001). Social 
psychological research has mainly focused on the first role, in attempts to develop 
models such as the Common Identity Inter-group Model (Gaertner, Dovidio, 
Anastasio, Bachman and Rust, 1993) and Mutual Inter-group Differentiation 
(Hornsey and Hogg, 2000) that would promote a more harmonious relationship 
between these identities (e.g. European-national), thereby reducing their perceived 
incompatibility both at the individual and the group level.
This thesis argues that in order to fully understand how the identity structure changes 
in contexts of salience and social change, one needs to investigate the degree to which
these identities are incorporated into the identity structure, and most importantly what 
functions they fulfil.
The first issue (to what extent certain social identities become part of the overall 
identity structure) can be addressed by focusing on the process of social identification. 
Identification can be defined as the degree to which a group membership holds 
enduring psychological significance for the individual or as the degree to which a 
particular group membership becomes part of the self-concept (Tajfel and Turner, 
1979). With this definition in mind, I would like to suggest that we specifically refer 
to identification with a social group as a psychological state, which is very different 
from being identified as a member of a particular social group. In other words, it 
differs from just being designated in some cases beyond one’s choice as falling to one 
category or the other (Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Verkuyten, 2005). Even in the case 
of visible identities (gender, race, age), where it may not be always possible to deny 
category membership, individuals have the power via identification process to 
minimise the importance of such an identity by shifting it to a low position in their 
identity hierarchy (Ethier and Deaux, 1994). The same holds true for an individual’s 
evaluation of how central this identity(s) may be for self-definition (perceived- 
centrality). The importance of studying strength of identification and/or perceived 
levels of centrality (sometimes used interchangeably) as dimensions of subjective 
identity structure resides in the fact that both these processes are major determinants 
of the accessibility (Turner et al., 1987) or perceived readiness as defined by Turner, 
Oakes, Haslam and McGarty (1994), contributing to the salience of identity(s).
Clearly then, if we talk about group identification as a process that would reflect the 
degree to which a social classification is internalised and perceived as occupying a 
relatively central or peripheral position within an individual’s overall identity 
structure, we need to take one step back and consider which processes would instigate 
individuals to identify to a greater or lesser extent with that social category.
Thus, the second issue refers to the motivational basis of identity, and points to the 
study of the specific functions that identification with a particular group(s) may serve 
for the individual. So far, the most prevalent explanations given for why individuals 
choose to identify with certain groups more than others have been the ones originally 
proposed by social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel and Turner, 1986): the
maintenance and enhancement of the fundamental needs for high levels of self-esteem 
and positive group distinctiveness. According to the tenets of the theory, individuals 
would choose to identify with groups that bring positive identities. In addition, they 
would employ a wide range of behavioural strategies such as inter-group 
differentiation, even outgroup derogation sometimes (when there is a pressure for 
inter-group comparisons), to establish and secure (when threatened), this sense of 
positivity (Brown, 1995). The cognitive and behavioural processes, like stereotyping 
and depersonalisation (group conformity), that operate in support of these collective 
identity functions were better elaborated by self-categorisation theory (Turner, et al.,
1994). There is no doubt that the inclusion of this motivational assumption (that is to 
achieve and strive for positive identity) as well as the psychological focus on the 
interplay of these two motivational constructs (self-esteem and distinctiveness) with 
the cognitive processes (social categorisation), has advanced our understanding on the 
important role of group identification as an antecedent of intra-group and inter-group 
behaviour. However, the pervasive role of these two motivations and their treatment 
as dominant and universal processes in theories of self and identity has long been 
questioned.
Increasingly, identity theorists note the conceptual and empirical values of 
establishing models that would account for the contribution of other motives, and on 
how these may interplay in guiding group identification processes (Breakwell, 1986; 
Abrams and Hogg, 1988; Luhtanen and Crocker, 1992; Brewer, 1993; Hogg and 
Abrams, 1993; van Knippenberg and Ellemers, 1993; Cinnirella, 1996; Aharpour and 
Brown, 2002; Vignoles, Chryssochoou and Breakwell, 2002). Besides self-esteem 
and in some instances the distinctiveness motive, there is little consensus among 
identity theorists on the set of motives involved in order for group identification to 
produce a psychologically meaningful important identity for the individual and the 
group (see for a review, Vignoles, Regalia, Manzi, Colledge and Scabini, 2006).
In addition, there are conceptual and measurement issues about these motivational 
constructs. Theorists have posed fundamental questions of whether a) the same 
motivational constructs would be relevant to individual and group levels of identity 
(Luhtanen and Crocker, 1991; Hogg and Abrams, 1993) and whether b) these 
motivations should be measured at the global or specific level and/or as traits or states
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(Rubin and Hewstone, 1998). For instance, some suggest that little explanatory 
ground is gained by invoking global measures of motivations when trying to explain 
why people choose a specific group membership, and how they would experience and 
respond to situations that put the value of this group and/or its defining characteristics 
at issue (Abrams and Hogg, 1990; van Knippenberg and Ellemers, 1993; Long and 
Spears, 1997). There is no definite answer to these questions. Driven by their 
theoretical expectations the researchers address each of the above mentioned issues to 
a different extent. The work of Deaux and her colleagues (1995,1999) also 
emphasises the importance of theorising how different types of social identities may 
differ in the functions they serve or to the extent they may satisfy the same motives.
Overall, a review of the theoretical models addressing the motivation question will 
help to identify some points that are important to take on board, and will also facilitate 
the investigation of research concerning the motivational assumptions of group 
identification process. Firstly, motives other than self-esteem and distinctiveness 
should not be treated a priori by the researchers as sub-motives, additional to self­
esteem, but they need to be given an equal status. It is the relevant social context and 
the type of identification that would determine which these motives are, their relative 
salience and what role (primary or secondary) they may play in shaping identity 
processes (Breakwell, 1986; Deaux, 2000a; Vignoles et al., 2006). Secondly, 
membership in different groups may satisfy different needs or even the same needs 
but to a different extent. Thirdly, the study of group motivations and of their interplay 
can contribute a lot in understanding the nature of the interrelationships between 
multiple identities. A strong and positive relationship between two social 
identifications may suggest that these identities are perceived by the individual or the 
group to serve complementary or similar psychological functions. On the contrary, a 
negative relationship or the absence of a relationship between them at this point in 
time may suggest that they pose conflicting or distinct demands respectively. 
Regarding this point the evidence is very limited so our discussion starts getting more 
speculative (Hofman, 1988; Calhoun, 1994; Brewer, 1993, 1999a; Cinnirella, 1996). 
Although there is extensive literature on motivation, with few exceptions (Ethier and 
Deaux, 1994; Timotijevic and Breakwell, 2000; Vignoles et al., 2006), the study of 
the interrelationship between identities based on motivational assumptions remains 
rather under-explored (Deaux, 1992; Deaux, et al., 1995; Burke, 2003). The position
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taken in this thesis is that looking at just the strength and direction (positive, negative) 
of correlation between two or more identities based on identification and/or perceived 
centrality measures may provide us with the information of whether or not they could 
coexist harmoniously within an individual’s identity structure. It does not say though 
the whole story of how these two identities relate. Therefore, in this thesis it is 
suggested that the relationship between identities should be examined in all three 
levels: structure, functions (motivational processes) and last but not least in terms of 
content.
1.1.3 The importance o f meanings attached to multiple identities
Using the example of ethnicity and gender, Verkuyten (2005) suggests that when 
identities interact it may be because they are articulated in relation to each other. 
Literature concerning the interrelationships between identities based on whether they 
do or do not share common meanings (traits) suggests that these identities would be 
closely aligned to an individual’s identity structure, and are likely to be activated 
together in situations where these meanings are relevant (Hoelter, 1985; Deaux et al., 
1995; Burke, 2003). In general, the content of social identities has been given a minor 
strand in the research informed by social identity theory (Duveen, 2001; Reicher and 
Hopkins, 2001). Within self-categorisation theory the content of social identities is 
somehow addressed more with the concept of group stereotypes (stereotypical 
attitudes of the group). Recent developments of the theory focus more on explaining 
the processes involved that would make an individual to consent with the cultural 
definitions of the group and adopt them as self-defining (Haslam, Turner, Oakes, 
Reynolds, Eggins, Nolan and Tweedie, 1998; Haslam, Rothschild, and Ernst, 2002). 
Finally, the theory of social representation, as articulated by its originator (Moscovici, 
1988), adds significantly to the study of identity content, providing a viable account 
of the reciprocal relationship that may exist between the individual and society. Â 
social representation includes all the relevant stereotypes (traits), values, beliefs, 
symbols that may be associated with membership in a social category within a 
specific structural system. In other words, representations are socially constructed 
and shared systems of beliefs (Duveen, 2001). Individuals do not just internalise 
these social representations. Instead they position themselves in a discursive way. 
Therefore, within this framework, the content of identity is constructed and contested.
reflecting always the extent to which, and the way an individual adopts the shared 
meanings and combines it with the idiosyncratic elements (Breakwell, 1986,2001; 
Billig, 1995; Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins, 2004; Wallwork and Dixon, 2004).
1.2 Identity Process Theory: An integrative model of identity
The discussion of the theoretical concerns of this thesis together with the review of 
the relevant literature led to the adoption of a theoretical framework of identity. 
Identity Process theory (IPT) (Breakwell, 1986,1992, and 1993). This framework 
was preferred over others given that it focuses on the dynamics of identity itself, 
including the processes of identity as well as its structure and content.
The theory specifies a set of processes based on which a new identity element, or 
information altering the existing status quo may be incorporated within identity 
structure (accommodation, assimilation and evaluation). It recognises that identity 
structure is comprised of multiple loosely or tightly interrelated identity elements that 
are hierarchically arranged based on relative salience and/or centrality. The term 
elements o f identity (or aspects of identity) is preferred to the term identities, as the 
former seems to connote the inclusive definition of identity adopted in the framework. 
An individual has one identity comprised of a number of personal and social identities 
that have a continual and dialectical relationship between and among them. Any 
change in one identity aspect will impact upon the changes in the overall structure and 
the meanings of the other identity elements residing within it.
Another core proposition of this theory is that strength of identification and/or 
perceived centrality of identity elements would be guided by more than one or two 
motivations (guiding principles of identity). Empirical work testing the hypothesis of 
multiple motives using this framework has demonstrated the influence of other 
motives beyond self-esteem (distinctiveness, continuity and self-efficacy) in identity 
construction (Vignoles et al., 2002). There is a dynamic interplay between these 
principles and their relative salience is context specific and culturally prefabricated. 
Recent developments in this theory combine social representation and identity 
processes (Moscovici, 1988; Breakwell, 2001). Identity structure is shaped but at the 
same time is selective, responsive and adaptive to the social context where it is
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situated. The way that identity structure is generated according to Breakwell (1986) 
has a functional utility for the individual. It aims to achieve and sustain the pre-stated 
psychological needs.
In the present thesis the operation of a set of identity-principles guiding identification 
with the identity elements under investigation is seen as a particular identity state of 
continuity, distinctiveness, esteem and efficacy. Threats to these principles are both 
conceptually and empirically distinct from the state of these motivations. Moreover, 
the present thesis tests the theory’s applicability at the group level (Lyons, 1996). 
Thus, instead of using global measures (frequently used for assessing individual 
processes and motivational principles), it transposes these principles to the group 
level, identifying the extent to which membership in specific group categories like 
nationality and religion may satisfy similar or different needs.
1.3 The focal identities of this research: National and religions identities
Until recently, the interrelationship between religion and nationality tended to be 
regarded as an artefact of an outmoded past. It remained at the centre of academic 
interest only in contexts of migration and enduring national and international 
intergroup conflict (stretching from the Middle East, to the Balkans, up to the social 
context of Northern Ireland) informing public policies about ways to understand 
better the origins of these violent incidents and suggesting potential ways of resolving 
them (Cassidy and Trew, 1998; Fox and Squires, 2001; Freeman, 2001, 2003;
Kelman, 2001). The events of September the 11^\ the London bombings and the 
continuation of conflicts in the Middle East and Asia (ie. Palestine-Israel, Sri-Lanka) 
brought to the foreground the idea that the relationship not only did not cease to exist 
but it can still be utilised in masking the underlying issues of power in the minority- 
majority intergroup relations. The majority of sociologists, political scientists and 
anthropologists propose that the resurgence of religious nationalism and religious 
fundamentalism demonstrates by evidence the failure of globalisation and 
secularisation processes to relegate the strength of nationality-religion relationship 
(Dorraj, 1999; Spohn, 2003). In the words of two anthropologists, “ Instead it (the 
phenomenon of globalisation) has brought about a proliferation of cultural, ethnic and
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religious differences at local levels, which in turn, has induced competing claims of 
cultural authenticities and identities” (Van Meijl and Driessen, 2003, p. 17).
However, in some social contexts the strong association between nationality and 
religion is not a new phenomenon. It is historically contingent, linked with a time of 
identity development and with a politically oriented project, that of nation formation. 
In this sense, the type of structural relationship one may find between national and 
religious identity elements is a culturally fabricated relationship. It is an enduring 
social representation embedded in the social context possibly diffused through the 
channels of education and media. Both national and religious identity elements are 
bound in alignments of culture comprised of symbols, collective myths and traditions 
providing a behavioural script to all those individuals who are members of these 
categories. Their ‘aim’ is to unify in a single community of the faithful/nationals 
those who feel they share this common part of value and belief systems. Both 
religions and nationalistic ideologies provide a fi*ame of reference for understanding 
and interpreting the world.
Studying the strength and functions of nationality-religion relationship is particularly 
eminent in multicultural societies, as it would provide a better understanding of the 
social and political relations between the contending groups. A strong interplay 
between nationality and religion may essentialise the boundaries of the national 
ingroup and barricade the successful integration of immigrant and religious minority 
groups in the society. It may also connote the reluctance of nationals to accept the 
multicultural character of their society and may be a subtle way of expressing 
exclusionist attitudes. Extensive research has shown that both identities have been 
associated with prejudicial beliefs against different target groups (religious, ethnic and 
racial groups) (see Hunsburger and Jackson, 2005, for a review). In the present 
research the aim is to examine how the perceived strength of the nationality-religion 
relationship may affect host majority’s acculturation theories especially when 
immigration is perceived to pose a threat to the content and value dimensions of 
national identity. In such situations, acculturation strategies can be seen as ways of 
coping and adjusting with the novelty of living with the ‘ Other’.
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1.4 The context of the empirical work presented in this thesis
The Greek context is considered to be particularly interesting for studying the 
strength, function and impact of the interrelationship between national and religious 
identifications on both intra-group and inter-group attitudes, mainly for four reasons. 
Firstly, Greece is one of the few countries in the EU where religion (Christian 
Orthodoxy) has sustained the status of a state religion. The majority of Greek 
nationals (approximately 97% according to the US Department of State International 
Religious Freedom Report, 2002,2006) identify themselves as Christian Orthodox.
Secondly, the relationship between the two is of historical importance and dates back 
to the nation-building and national identity formation process. During this time 
religion was used as a basis of national differentiation from the Ottoman occupiers 
(Mavrogordatos, 2003; Chryssoloras, 2004a).
Thirdly, throughout history Greece had to struggle almost constantly against different 
enemies for securing its political and territorial sovereignty and, quite recently, its 
cultural heritage. This instigates a sense of chronic threat on national identity. Greek 
people feel that on both cultural and territorial grounds their nation runs the risk of 
being attacked by its neighbours or other prospective enemies (Triandafyllidou, 
Calloni and Mikrakis, 1997).
Finally, it was only during the period of the major political reformation following the 
Fall of the Berlin War (1989) that Greece joined the list of immigrant-recipient 
countries. Its sudden transition to a recipient country required the redefinition of its 
past ethno-genealogical conception of the Greek national identity previously based on 
notions of cultural (religious, linguistic) and ethnic homogeneity. Recent research 
carried out in Greece (European Social Survey on Society, Politics, and Values, 2003) 
on attitudes towards economic immigrants has revealed high levels of anti-immigrant 
sentiments. These sentiments are justified on the notion that the presence of these 
groups generates greater competition over scarce resources (e.g. fewer jobs, lower 
wage rates), and that they threaten cultural and national homogeneity. The feeling of 
cultural threat, mainly expressed in their exclusionary attitudes towards religious and 
cultural diversity, reflected their fear of the intrusion of values and practices. In these
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terms, immigrants are perceived as alien and potentially destructive to the national 
culture.
1.5 Aims of the thesis
Thus the present thesis aimed to examine:
1. how national and religious identity elements relate amongst Greeks in 
terms of the relationship between levels of identifications of these two 
identity elements, overlap of the meanings attached to them and the extent 
to which levels of identity principles of each of the two elements 
contributes to levels of identification with the other;
2. how these relationships change under the context of threat to one of these 
identity elements;
3. the role of the relationship between national and religious identity 
elements in explaining inter-group relations, in particular prejudice and 
acculturation attitudes towards three immigrant/minority groups which 
vary in perceived similarity with the ingroup based on these two group 
memberships (nationality and religion).
1.6 Overview of the thesis
Following this introductory chapter. Chapter 2 reviews four bodies of literature and 
outlines the theoretical framework of Identity Process Theory (Breakwell, 1986, 1992, 
and 1993) adopted in this thesis. Firstly, it discusses issues concerning the 
conceptualisation of the relationships of multiple identities in the identity structure. 
Secondly, the discussion centres on theoretical debates surrounding the process of 
social identification and the motivations that guide this process. Thirdly, it considers 
the concept of threat and its impact on identity structure and processes. Lastly, it 
examines literature focusing on the relationship between multiple group memberships, 
prejudice and inter-group attitudes such as preferences for particular acculturation 
strategies.
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Chapter 3 examines the implications of conceptual issues involved in the study of 
multiple identities discussed in Chapter 2 for the appropriate methods of measuring 
the core theoretical constructs in this area. In particular, firstly, it considers the 
multidimensionality of the concept of social identification in relation to existing 
measures of this construct. Secondly, it examines the conceptualisation and 
measurement of identity motivations, focusing on two issues which are often debated 
in the literature in relation to self-esteem; a) whether self-esteem should be considered 
as a trait or a state, and b) whether it should be conceptualised as a global or 
domain/identity specific construct. It suggests that the relevance of these issues 
extends to other identity motivations as well. Thirdly, it considers the methodological 
implications of data driven and theory driven models of identity structure as well as 
examining the different ways concepts of salience and centrality have been used and 
measured in the literature.
Chapter 4 draws on literature from different disciplines to discuss the relationship 
between nationality and religion and the functions it may serve for the individual and 
the society. It is argued that the first function of this relationship concerns the role 
that religion often plays in the political project of nation formation. The chapter also 
provides theoretical and empirical evidence which suggests that the interaction 
between religion-nationality and/or religion-ethnicity (in relation to immigrant 
groups) has strategic functions as well. It consolidates the ingroup boundaries helping 
the individuals belonging to a minority or a majority group to maintain a sense of 
distinctiveness and continuity in changing multi-cultural and multi-faith social 
contexts.
Chapter 5 focuses on the Greek context in which the empirical work of this thesis 
was carried out, explaining how the relationship between religion and nationality was 
originally established, how it is manifested at a political and a cultural level, and 
whether and why it has maintained its strength over time.
Chapter 6 reports the first empirical study which examined the extent to which 
national and religious identity elements relate within the identity structure of Greek 
nationals and in the latter’s subjective representations of their national group’s 
identity. The relative strength of identification and perceived centrality of these
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identity elements as well as those of the gender identity element were assessed.
Gender identity was shown in the literature to relate to national identity so it was used 
as a basis of comparison to examine the relative relationship between the two target 
identity elements, religious and national. In addition, the meanings attached to these 
identities by Greek nationals were explored by using two different methods of data 
collection, self-completed questionnaires with open-ended questions and in-depth face 
to face interviews. The findings showed that nationality relates strongly and equally 
to both religious and gender identity elements. In terms of relative hierarchy, religion 
seems to be perceived as the least important compared to the other two. National and 
religious identities seemed to overlap in terms of content. The category most often 
mentioned was that religion is perceived as a cultural element of Greekness either 
being constructed as playing a significant role in the historical development of 
national identity or as a defining part of national tradition. There also seemed to be an 
extensive overlap in how some participants perceive memberships of the two 
categories, thus rendering the inclusion of ‘Others’ (e.g. immigrants) in these groups 
less likely.
Chapter 7 reports an experimental study designed to explore identity structure and 
processes under the context of threat. Based on the notion that identities do not exist 
in isolation from each other and that their interrelatedness should be incorporated in 
the models of identity change, the main aim of this study was to investigate potential 
changes in one identity (religious) when changes in a related identity element 
(national) occurred as a result of perceived threat. This study also examined the 
strength of the relationship between levels of identification with the national and 
religious identity elements as well as the relationship of the motivational bases of 
these identities. Threats to Greek national identity were directed at the motivational 
principles of distinctiveness and continuity. Threats to the Greek national identity 
were designed to derive from the simultaneous membership of the Greek national 
group and the EU community. Findings of this study showed that different identity 
elements seem to satisfy different identity motivations to varying degrees and 
partially supported the main hypotheses of this study which concerned the likely 
impact of threat to one identity on the motivations and relationships between identity 
elements. The emerged complex picture lent partial support to theoretical arguments
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about the motivational assumptions and to the necessity of not neglecting the 
interrelationships between identity elements when studying identity change.
Chapter 8 discusses the last empirical study of the thesis which focused on the 
relative strength of the relationship between national and religious identities and inter­
group perceptions. In particular, it investigated the extent to which perceptions of 
identity threat emanating from different immigrant and minority groups in Greece and 
the relative strength of the relationship between multiple identities influenced the 
acculturation orientations participants would prefer immigrant/minority groups and 
the Greek state to adopt. One of the main problems in acculturation literature is that 
although the items measuring acculturation orientations are always contextualized 
using domains relevant to migration contexts, researchers in their analysis tend to 
construct ‘generic’ acculturation orientations based on a cross-domain stability 
assumption. In this study, acculturation orientations have been studied in relation to 
particular domains and different target groups as suggested by Montreuil and Bourhis 
(2001 ) and Van de Vijver and Phalet (2004). The domains were education, 
intermarriage and citizenship and the target groups were Albanians, Russians and 
Moslem Greeks. These groups shared either nationality or religion with the 
participants (majority group). Based on questionnaire data, it was found that levels of 
‘nationality-religion relationship’ and perceived threat relate to prejudice and the level 
of endorsement of different acculturation orientations. Furthermore, the results 
showed significant interactions between levels of adoption of acculturation 
orientations, domains, target groups and perceived expectations from the state and 
immigrant/minority groups.
In Chapter 9 the main findings of the empirical studies presented in the thesis are 
drawn together and are discussed in relation to the extent to which the main aims of 
the thesis have been achieved. Having studied the interrelationships between identity 
elements at all three proposed levels (structure, functions and content) under the 
context of stability, threat in both experimental and real life contexts, the issue of how 
these interrelationships should be conceptualised and incorporated into further 
research and theorising is addressed. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the 
methodological challenges and limitations encountered during the journey of this 
enquiry.
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Chapter 2: Conceptualising Multiple Identities and Its
Consequences for Self-definition and Inter-group 
Perceptions
As stated in the previous chapter, this thesis aims to develop a better understanding of 
the type of relationship that exists between national and religious identities amongst 
Greek nationals, both in the context of the absence and the presence of threats. In 
addition, it is concerned with the impact of the relationship between these identities 
on inter-group perceptions of immigrant and minority groups varying in perceived 
similarity with the ingroup (Greek national group) in terms of ethnicity and religion.
This chapter reviews social psychological theoretical models which are concerned 
with the conceptualisation of the relationships between multiple identities within the 
individual identity system. In addition, it focuses on the literature examining the 
relationship between multiple identities and inter-group relations and perceptions.
Thus, the present chapter aims to address how social psychological and sociological 
theories, such as identity theory (Stryker, 1987), have dealt with the following 
questions:
• How do multiple identities relate in the individual identity system?
• How do individuals manage their multiple identities in situations o f salience 
and/or threat to identity at the individual and/or the group level?
• How do individuals manage their multiple social identifications in 
multicultural contexts, where there are competing cultural identities? What is 
the link between different modes o f multiple ingroup representations, 
prejudice and acculturation theories?
Consideration of the above questions will show that firstly, to date, much research has 
neglected the importance of the content of identities. Yet, it will be argued here that 
an investigation of the meanings attached to each of the multiple identities an 
individual has, and of their respective motivational principles, is likely to facilitate a 
better understanding of the relative position identities may occupy in an individual’s
18
identity system and how they are interconnected (strength and perceived 
compatibility). Secondly, it will be suggested that bringing together some of the core 
concepts in both hierarchical process and structure models, such as the concepts of 
centrality and salience, provides a comprehensive way of describing the structure of 
an identity system compared with using either of the concepts individually. Thirdly, 
it will be demonstrated that social identification is a multi-dimensional concept and 
this needs to be taken into account when studying multiple identities. Fourthly, when 
examining the relationships between identities it is necessary to study the motivations 
that are satisfied by identifying with each of the target identities, as it my contribute to 
our understanding of both the strength of the relationship between identities and the 
strategies individuals may employ when faced with threat to one or more identities. 
Finally, it will be suggested that, in culturally diverse contexts, taking into account the 
relationships between two or more identities, rather than just focusing on single 
identities, enables us to shed light on the preferences that people have in relation to 
the way different cultural groups should relate to each other.
2.1 The multiplicity premise and its significance for the individual 
identity system and inter-group perceptions
Irrespective of the theoretical framework, or even the discipline within which identity 
is studied, the premise that individuals are simultaneously members of multiple social 
groups (multiplicity) has been widely acknowledged and accepted by a wide spectrum 
of social scientists (James, 1890; Markus, 1977; Tajfel, 1978; Rosenberg, 1979; 
Breakwell, 1986; Thoits, 1986; Hoelter, 1985; Linville, 1987; Turner et al., 1987; 
Stryker and Serpe, 1994; Deaux, 1996; Cinnirella, 1997; Brewer, 1999a; Hewstone, 
Islam and Judd, 1993; Roccas and Brewer, 2002). James (1890) was the first to 
propose that an individual has as many selves as the number of people with whom 
he/she interacts with. Similarly, Mead (1962) suggested that “we divide ourselves up 
in all sorts of different selves with reference to our acquaintances” (p. 142). In these 
two approaches the social basis of self-knowledge and the embedded-ness of identity 
in the social structure are emphasized. ^
In addition, multiplicity also refers to the conceptual and empirical dichotomy 
between personal (idiosyncratic characteristics) and social memberships (Deaux,
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1992). This distinction has become central to theorising about the self and a point of 
considerable disagreement among identity theorists. The level of interplay between 
and within personal and social identities and their empirical treatment as distinct, 
autonomous or as related elements of the self-concept resulted in the emergence of 
different theoretical and empirical representations of identity structure such as Self­
categorisation Theory (Turner et al., 1987), Identity Theory (Stryker, 1987) and 
Identity Process Theory (Breakwell, 1986).
The consequences of belonging to multiple group memberships may be either positive 
or negative. Arguably, holding multiple identities (personal and/or social) may have 
numerous benefits for the individual such as opportunities for social interaction and 
mobility when the boundaries are permeable. It may also act as a buffer for stresses, 
or a coping strategy, when one of the identity elements in the existing identity 
structure is threatened (Breakwell, 1986; Thoits; 1986; Linville, 1987). For instance, 
in her model of identity complexity, focusing on personal rather than social identities, 
Linville confers that multiple role identities may act as a buffer in extremely 
threatening situations. Brewer (1999a) suggested that, when an individual’s ingroup 
membership (e.g. national) is threatened, identification with a superordinate category 
(e.g. European or Christian) may help the individual to cope with the threat and 
smooth inter-group relations. This is because members of a previously considered 
outgroup (e.g. another national group) may be perceived as members of an ingroup 
under one or more inclusive categories. Nested memberships can also be considered 
as an effective group-protective strategy that individuals adopt to deal with 
membership in a low-status or stigmatised group (Crocker and Major, 1989; Finlay, 
Dinos and Lyons, 2001). Mlicki and Ellemers (1996) found in their study that Polish 
students, despite their high levels of national identification, tend to ascribe more 
negative than positive traits to their national group. Category mobility and rejection 
of the negative attributes may not always be plausible because it may represent denial 
of an important membership or exclusion from a highly valued group (Tajfel and 
Turner, 1986). In the case of the Polish data, participants identified strongly with the 
European identity which they perceived as being more valued than their national one. 
The authors concluded that, leaving aside the mobility option, considering the type of 
category of interest (nation), nested memberships is a rather effective strategy in
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coping with a low-status group membership (see also Biemat, Vescio and Green,
1996 on selective self-stereotyping and nested memberships).
Moreover, Breakwell (1986, 1992) also suggested that multiple group memberships 
can be used by individuals as a means of ameliorating the threat derived from a single 
group membership. However, how an individual negotiates their multiple group 
memberships and which memberships they see as (in-) compatible and/or salient is 
likely to be influenced by a cost-benefrt analysis where the individual weighs up the 
advantages and disadvantages of this coping strategy. There may be circumstances 
under which any two memberships may be perceived as mutually exclusive and 
conflicting with each other either in terms of their associated meanings or 
psychological processes (motivations) or both. In other cases, due to its chronic 
accessibility, the type of identity (e.g. an ascribed category such as gender) may 
constrain an individual’s choice to abandon the threatened category or cut across 
boundaries (Deaux, 1993; Ethier and Deaux, 1994).
Concerning the likely impact of multiple categorisation premise on inter-group 
perceptions, previous research has indicated that cross-cutting ingroup boundaries 
may accentuate perceptions of inter-group similarity and may offer a potential to 
reduce categorical differentiation and prejudice (Byrne, 1971; LeVine and Campbell, 
1972; Descamps and Doise, 1978; Diehl, 1990; Hewstone, Islam and Judd, 1993; 
Crisp, Hewstone and Caims, 2001).
However, in certain circumstances, multiple group memberships may have negative 
consequences for the individual. For example, it has been argued that especially in 
contexts that two or more identity elements would become equally salient, hybrid 
identity increases the chances of identity interference (Settles, 2004). That is, hybrid 
identities may lead to perceptions of incompatibility between identity elements based 
on their associated normative beliefs, values, ideologies and behaviours. In an inter­
group context, in situations when identity is threatened and inter-group differentiation 
becomes a highly salient psychological process, individuals may employ different 
strategies. They may choose to avoid blurring of ingroup boundaries with one salient 
identity perceived as drawing clear boundaries for a particular ingroup, thus affording 
priority to those identities which are not perceived as shared by members of the
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ingroup and ‘others’ (Brewer, Ho, Lee and Miller, 1987). Even in instances where 
cross-cutting is a preferred coping strategy, its employment may lead to the 
expression of ambivalent attitudes towards the single ingroup and stronger 
discrimination towards those who are evaluated as double outgroup members on two 
or more criteria (Brown and Turner, 1979; Urban and Muller, 1987; Vanbeselaere, 
1987a).
These mixed findings regarding the positive and negative effects of multiple- 
categorisation draw attention to the complexities of cross-categorisation situations. 
They point to the importance of examining which particular category memberships 
are combined and the functions they may serve for individuals and groups in the inter­
group contexts under investigation.
The study of how multiple group memberships interrelate within an individual’s 
identity structure in terms of meanings, structure and motivations is expected firstly to 
further our understanding of how people cope with threat, and secondly to contribute 
to our understanding of differences in inter-group perceptions in relation to different 
outgroups.
2.2 Identity structure and multiple identities
In this section, the theoretical propositions of social psychological and sociological 
theories on identity structure, which are also referred to in the literature as the 
‘hierarchical process’ vs. the ‘hierarchical structure models’, will be reviewed 
(Abrams, 1996). The main differences between the process and the structure models 
of identity structure lay in their theorizing about
a) the stability of self,
b) the upholding of ‘antagonistic’ boundaries between and among personal and 
social identities, and
c) the dimensions along which the different identities (personal and/or social) are 
organised within identity structure (salience and/or centrality) and their 
antecedents.
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2.2.1 Hierarchical process models: Social Identity (SIT) & Self-Categorisation 
(SCI) theories
As part of Tajfel’s (1978) attempt to explain the atrocities that humanity witnessed 
during the World War II, he put forward Social Identity Theory (SIT) which 
conceptualises identity as having three aspects; cognitive, affective, and behavioural. 
SIT, as exemplified by the work of Tajfel and Turner (1979,1986) and Hogg and 
Abrams (1988), was concerned with addressing three main questions: why 
(motivational processes/identity function/group processes), how (cognitive processes) 
and when (context) an individual’s membership in a social category may lead them to 
exhibit discriminatory behaviours.
Within this approach, society is viewed as an amalgamation of social categories that 
acquire their meaning via the existence of antithetical and conceptually opposable 
categories shaped and developed in specific socio-historical contexts: e.g. Christian 
vs. Muslim or Greek vs. English. These categories pre-exist individuals and they are 
hierarchically structured. They are perceived as relatively different to each other 
based on two dimensions: status and power (Hogg and Abrams, 1988). Two 
processes are involved in social identity formation: self-categorization and social 
comparison - each one of these processes being associated with different outcomes.
The long-established cognitive process of categorization (Bruner, 1957; Doise, 1978) 
enables individuals to abbreviate the complexities of their environment and to 
establish their ingroup and outgroup boundaries with the accentuation of perceived 
similarities within and differences between categories (social comparison process). 
Whilst social categorization generates the search for distinguishing features, social 
comparison and the need for positive identity ensure that:
a) the followed accentuation process enhances ingroup identity as the dimensions of 
comparisons favour the ingroup over the outgroup (ingroup bias), and
b) intra-group variability is reduced (Abrams, 1992).
Level or strength of ingroup identification and inter-group differentiation are 
correlated, as they both aim to satisfy the need to achieve and maintain a positive self­
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esteem {self-esteem hypothesis) by being positively distinct from ‘others’. In a later 
section of the present chapter, the extent to which social identification should be 
considered multidimensional is addressed. In addition, the motivational hypotheses of 
social identity theory and its extensive focus on the role of self-esteem and positive 
distinctiveness as the core motives in guiding the social identification processes will 
be further discussed in Section 2.3 below.
SIT focuses mainly on the study of the social facet of identity defined by Tajfel 
(1981) as “ that part of an individual’s self concept which derives from one’s 
knowledge from one’s membership of a social group (or groups) together with the 
value and emotional significance attached to this membership” (p. 255) (my own 
emphasis). The notion that individuals have multiple social identities is inherent in 
this definition. Nevertheless, most studies which adopted the theoretical framework 
of SIT examined a single social identity at a time, and its respective processes, in 
isolation from those of other identities residing in an individual’s identity structure.
Moreover, the SIT approach proposes that there is a conceptual and empirical 
distinction between personal (personality traits) and social identity (group 
memberships), whereas their relationship within identity structure is functionally 
antagonistic, meaning that the salience of one of them may inhibit the others 
(Abrams, 1996). However SIT does not introduce a detailed portrayal of how a 
number of different personal and social identities are structured and related within an 
identity system. This issue is further elaborated by self-categorization theory (SCT).
SCT has developed some of SIT’s tenets, focusing more on the cognitive element of 
the categorisation process rather than on its motivational factors, and has provided a 
more meticulous structural representation of self-organization (identity structure) 
(Turner, 1987). The self is treated as a non static (context specific), multifaceted 
(personal vs. social) and multileveled entity whose structure and content are 
influenced by the dimensions of the relevant comparative context in which it is 
temporarily embedded. A sense of stability and continuity is experienced in the self- 
concept only when the same social comparisons are repeated over time.
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One of the basic principles of SCT is that the self is a cognitive structure comprised of 
numerous conceptually distinct individual and group-based categorizations organized 
in a hierarchical system of classification varying along the dimensions of abstraction 
or inclusiveness (Turner et al., 1987). The theory suggests three levels of abstraction 
exemplified in different patterns of inclusion based on which individuals can 
categorise themselves:
a) the superordinate level (emphasis on similarities among individuals - inclusive 
level of categorization),
b) the intermediate level (emphasis on ingroup similarities and inter-group 
differences), and
c) the inter-individual level (emphasis on ingroup differences).
Personal identity, which represents the ‘individuated self and aims to differentiate the 
individual from others within a given social context, would appear in the third level of 
abstraction (inter-individual). On the other hand, social identities, which represent the 
‘depersonalized self, depending on their level of inclusiveness (varying from high to 
low) are expected to appear either in the first or in the second level of abstraction 
(Brewer, 1999a).
Drawing attention to the effect of immediate social contextual factors, an identity’s 
content and position varies depending on the comparative context and is determined 
by its relative salience over the other identities along these dimensions. The salience 
of one identity/category over the others depends on the individual’s “readiness to 
adopt the particular identity and the extent to which that identity fits as a meaningful 
self-definition in the given social context” (Simon, 2004, p. 38). Readiness, which 
sheds light on when an identity/category becomes accessible and ultimately activated, 
depends on a person’s past experiences, current goals and on the probability that 
certain objects or events will emerge, so as to become relevant in the specific context 
(Oakes, 1987). An identity/category ‘fits’ the relevant situation and turns out to be 
salient:
a) when it accentuates the inter-group differences and attenuates the ingroup 
similarities (meta-contrast principle), and
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b) when its content is defined in a normative, stereotypical way (Bruner, 1957;
Turner et al., 1987, Hogg and Abrams, 1988).
The meta-contrast ratio is defined by Turner (1987) as “a ratio of perceived inter­
group differences to perceived intra-group differences” (p. 52). The larger this ratio, 
meaning the greater the perceived variability between different groups and the fewer 
the perceived intra-category differences, the more likely it is that the relevant category 
is cognised as an entity and therefore being relatively more salient.
Within SCT, the multiplicity premise within the self-concept is addressed with the 
concept of nested identities. Multiple social identities are thought to be organized 
based on a hierarchy of inclusiveness. More specifically, it is argued that identities 
are hierarchically arranged (high and low order identities) according to their relative 
salience, with one or more identities being nested under a more inclusive identity. For 
example, my identity as a Greek (higher order) encompasses my identity as a 
Macedonian (lower order). Usually, nested identities are schematically represented as 
concentric circles with a lower order category always being at the centre as eore and 
the successively higher order eategories surrounding it (see Figure 2.1)\ However, as 
Breakwell (1986) argued, models which represent identity structure in concentric 
cycles often do not specify the processes that link the circles.
Figure 2.1: Schematic representation of nested identity structure in concentric
circles
Regional
National
European
 ^Personal and social identities are also sometimes represented as concentric circles with personal 
identity being at the centre and social identity or identities surrounding it
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Due to the primary conception of nested identities as being mutually exclusive in the 
sense that they can coexist in an individual’s identity repertoire appearing at different 
levels of abstraction (e.g. European vs. national vs. regional identities), much research 
has been devoted to understanding why (motivations) and when (context) individuals 
identify with successively high or low inclusive categories and choose one identity 
over the other. Theorists like Lawler (1992) suggest that, usually, lower order 
identities are more salient within identity structure and are preferred over the 
superordinate ones, because they tend to generate a stronger sense of control and 
positive emotions. However, the extensive focus on the hierarchical ordering of 
identities based on their relative salience and their empirical treatment as mutually 
exclusive, as a matter of choice, seems to neglect the perspective that under specific 
contexts it may be important and psychologically relevant to identify, simultaneously, 
with two or more identities. For instance, relevant research in the Spanish context 
(Basque/Catalan region) revealed that when given the option individuals tend to 
identify with both their regional and national identities (Diez, 1999 cited in Medrano 
and Gutierrez, 2001; Barrett, 2007) and treat them as equally important in their self­
definitions.
Both Calhoun (1994) and Brewer (1991,1993) provide relevant theoretical 
fi-ameworks discussing the functions that different types of identities (superordinate 
and subordinate) may serve within identity structure. Calhoun proposes that 
identification with different nested identities is anchored in the individual’s basic 
range of needs from differentiation to equivalence, whereas Brewer suggests that 
identification with these memberships depends on the competitive needs for 
differentiation (distinctiveness) and inclusion respectively (Optimal Distinctiveness 
Theory). It is implicit in both these approaches that as long as identification with 
higher and lower order categories satisfy a set of different and complementary 
psychological needs, it is possible for individuals to identify simultaneously with both 
social identities, albeit in different degrees, and for these identities to be represented 
at different levels of abstraction. According to Brewer (1999a) the relative 
importance of superordinate social categories in relation to the subordinate ones 
depends on which need (inclusion or differentiation) is psychologically primed in the 
relevant context. In that sense, nesting retains the hierarchical arrangement of 
identities, with one identity being psychologically dominant (salient) over the others
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in the given context, influencing in absolute terms an individual’s intra-group/inter­
group perceptions and behavioural responses. However, it seems that although these 
theorists have acknowledged in principle the dual role of nested identities, their 
explanations seem to be quite generic as they have not elaborated on how the context 
dependence of social identifications and the content variation of identities (referring 
to the inter-individual variations in the definitions of these categories across and 
within contexts) may also influence the perceived compatibility between these 
identities and their respective motivational processes. In a way, it could be argued 
that Calhoun’s and Brewer’s conceptual treatment of nested identities at the time was 
based on the presumption that there is an a priori compatibility between them since 
the psychological processes (motivations) that guide identification with lower and 
higher order categories are different (i.e. differentiation to equivalence, inclusion to 
differentiation respectively).
Cinnirella (1997) and Medrano and Gutierrez (2001) draw our attention to this 
argument, noting that some combinations of superordinate and subordinate identities 
are not always easy to negotiate. In some instances, the employed level of abstraction 
may be perceived as posing a threat to the content of these identities and to the 
respective motivations determining the degree of identification with the lower or 
higher order categories respectively. This is especially the case when these two 
categories are subjectively represented at the same level of abstraction within an 
individual’s identity system. Thus, they argue that in order for identification with 
both the lower-order and the higher order categories to occur, the construction of 
these categories must be perceived as compatible and their respective psychological 
functions (motivations) either as unrelated (non-overlapping, distinct), or as 
complementary to each other (mutually reinforcing).
The level of perceived compatibility (or incompatibility) between the multiple social 
identities may be initially inferred from the interrelationships that exist between them, 
based on levels of identification. Hofinan (1988) proposes that multiple social 
identifications may relate to each other in three different ways: consonant 
(compatible), dissonant (incompatible) and indifferent (unrelated). The study of the 
strength and direction of their interrelationships is an indication of their harmonious 
nesting (or not) within identity structure and will be determined by the relevant
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comparative context. More specifically, when nested identities’ content and 
psychological functions (motivational processes) are perceived as complementary to 
each other, then the relationship between higher order (superordinate) and lower order 
(subordinate) identities, on the basis of the levels of identification, should be positive. 
On the other hand no relationship, or a negative one, should be expected between the 
•two when identification with one may be perceived as posing a threat to the respective 
associated meanings and psychological processes of the other (see Brewer, 1999a).
Much research exploring nested identity structures has focused on the identification 
processes with European, national and regional identities, since the different levels of 
abstraction as proposed by SCT theory are very well exemplified by these three 
identities (Smith, 1992; Mlicki and Ellemers, 1996; Cinnirella, 1997; Rutland and 
Cinnirella, 2000; Medrano and Guttierrez, 2001). In all these studies it was evinced 
that the degree of identification with the EU category depended on the meaning that 
Europe had for the individuals and on its perceived compatibility with the other sub­
categories such as national or regional. In his study on national and European 
identification among Italian and British students, Cinnirella (1997) found that, in the 
case of Italian participants, these social identities were simultaneously salient at 
different levels of abstraction (national and supranational) and harmoniously nested 
(positive related) based on the fact that their meanings were perceived to be mutually 
compatible. Similarly, Mlicki and Ellemers (1996) showed that Polish students were 
motivated to identify strongly with both their national and European identities as the 
former were perceived to operate at different levels of abstraction, national and supra­
national respectively.
However, this is not always the case. According to social research (Cinnirella, 1996, 
1997) and trends prevalent in the Eurobarometer polls (1992) in contexts like Britain 
the construction of meaning of the European identity as incompatible to the national is 
based upon the perception that the former operates at the same level of abstraction 
with the national category threatening national distinctiveness. Cinnirella’s studies 
(1996,1997) indicated that this perceived antagonistic relationship not only hindered 
the strength of identification with the broader category (European) but necessitated 
the choice of one identity over the other. In addition, with respect to the motivational 
bases of European and British identifications, participants enlisted similar sets of
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motives. In our opinion, if one takes into consideration the fact that there is a 
prevalent negative social representation of European identity within the British 
society, this finding may further support why these two are perceived to be as 
mutually exclusive.
These findings show that, in opposition to the categories artificially constructed in 
laboratory settings (minimal group paradigm), in naturalistic contexts there is a great 
variation attributed to the meanings, value and the emotional significance individuals 
attach to social categories (Deaux, 1993; Ethier and Deaux, 1994; Billig, 1995). 
Therefore, the level of abstraction of a social category is not a fixed property of a 
category, but it is both socially construed and negotiated by individuals and, 
according to SCT, is responsive to its comparative context. As Abrams and Hogg 
(2001) propound “meaning, level and content of self-categorisation are not 
determined by the category label, but by the comparison categories with which they 
are linked in memory and in the particular context” (p. 436).
2.2.2 Comparative Identity Model
Based on SIT and SCT, Ross, Cano and Huici (1987) developed the comparative 
identity model, which emphasized the need to take into account different categories 
and the interrelationships between them. They operationalised the relative salience of 
different identities in relation to the relative reported degrees of identification with 
each category. Following SCT assertion that self-categorisations and each level of 
abstraction are formed with respect to the next higher-order level providing the 
context within which the lower order categories can be defined, the approach 
acknowledges that there is a hierarchy of categories and that the meaning and 
relevance of the lower-order category (e.g. Basque) depends on the degree of 
identification with the higher-order category (e.g. Spanish) (Huici, Cano, Hopkins, 
Emler and Carmona, 1997).
An individual’s comparative identity can be calculated after subtracting an 
individual’s identification with the lower level category from identification from the 
higher (Ros, Huici, Gomez, 2000). In case that individuals identify to the same 
degree with both national (high order) and regional (low order) categories, the two
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will be harmoniously integrated with the latter being ‘absorbed’ by the former and not 
being salient to any further extent. On the contrary, when identification with the 
regional identities (low order) is stronger than with the national, incompatibility 
between the two identities may arise and this degree of tension would give rise to a 
higher comparative identity. Cross-national research (Huici et al., 1997) provided 
support for the utility of comparative identity model in predicting the differentiated 
attitudes towards socio-political change based on the level of interplay between these 
different levels of nested identities (e.g. regional and national).
2.2.3 A critical evaluation o f SIT and SCT approaches to defining identification 
and conceptualising relationships between multiple identities
2.2.3.1 Distinction between the concepts o f identification and identity
Before discussing some criticisms levelled against nested models of identity, it is 
important to note that there seems to be some confusion regarding how social 
identification and identity have been defined within the social psychological literature. 
Often, these two terms are used interchangeably and this lack of conceptual 
distinction is also reflected upon their empirical assessments (Wentholt, 1991; Deaux, 
1996; Verkuyten, 2005). Within social identity and self-categorization theoretical 
frameworks, the relationship between identity and identification has been theorized as 
a consequential one since social identity is defined as the end product of an 
individual’s total sum of social identifications (see Hogg and Abrams, 1988).
Social identity and identification are unquestionably closely connected and often 
coincide with each other. However, they still need to be treated as related, but 
separable, concepts since “identification is a psychological process, whereas social 
identities involve processes of social construction” (Verkuyten, 2005, p. 65). An 
approach which fails to make a clear distinction between the two terms arguably 
undermines a key aspect of identification as a psychological process; the ability to 
enhance or weaken the relative importance of a particular social identity to an 
individual’s overall self-definition. The role of identification as a process resides in 
fulfilling the personal needs and expectations, and adding emotional significance to a 
membership (Tajfel, 1981). In other words, it is the medium by which a social
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identity changes from ‘objective designation’ (Verkuyten, 2005, p. 61) to a subjective, 
internalized and psychological meaningful category for the individual.
This issue becomes pertinent when it comes to social categories that are ‘ascribed,’ 
socially imposed to the individuals (such as ethnicity and gender) (e.g. Brown and 
Williams, 1984; Skevington and Baker, 1989; Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi and Ethier,
1995). In the case of social identities, like ethnicity, race or gender, where individual 
choice is limited (‘ascribed’), or in the case of other categories like religion and 
nationality that also tend to be reified and psychologically essentialised (Medin and 
Ortony, 1989; Billig, 1995; Haslam, Rothschild and Ernst, 2002; Chryssochoou, 
2004), individuals may still not espouse the culturally shared representations of the 
category and not comply with the allied behaviours that would classify them as 
‘prototypical’ ingroup members (Turner, 1987; Deaux, 2000a). Therefore, in both 
these cases the process of identification or dis-identifrcation with these social 
memberships, endows the individual with a certain degree of agency, and empowers 
them to negotiate the importance of these categories within identity structure.
2.2.3.2 A critical evaluation o f nested models
Nested models have been frequently criticised in that they ‘strive’ for a single 
cognitive structure and they treat multiple social identities, in most cases, as mutually 
exclusive (Roccas and Brewer, 2002). Identifications with multiple memberships can 
occur at the same time, but with each identity being represented at a different level of 
abstraction (hierarchy of inclusiveness). However, as Freeman (2003) rightly points 
out, not all identities are likely to be related within an individual’s identity structure in 
a nested manner. This may be due to the types of identities under investigation and, 
most importantly, on how they are constructed by individuals in the relevant social 
contexts.
In addition, this particular emphasis placed on the contextual specificity of social 
identities and their hierarchical arrangement under a state of salience has led to the 
unfortunate effect of the majority of studies focusing only on single ingroup and 
outgroup identifications. Cinnirella (1996) argues that this ignores the important role 
that the relationships between identities may have as a determinant of salience.
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Moreover, studying identities only under the context of salience does not explain what 
happens to these identities and to their interrelationships within identity structure in 
situations when they are not salient (Billig, 1995).
The context dependency and the responsiveness of the categorization process suggest 
that identity properties are more relational and comparative in nature, rather than 
being stable and fixed. This implies that a specific identity’s value fluctuates from 
positive to negative depending on the context. Moreover, its content is not “a fixed 
set of attributes applied in an all-or-none-manner but is shaped selectively by the 
context of its application” (Turner et al., 1994, p. 457). It is also recognized that a 
sense of stability in the self-conception may be only possible based on the frequency 
and richness of particular social comparisons which will consequently affect the 
relative accessibility of different self-categorisations. This means that it is not 
necessarily the type of identity, but the sameness of the social comparison context, 
that will determine whether individuals will conform to the same norm and group 
prototype developing more or less consensual meanings of identification (Haslam, 
Oakes, Reynolds, and Turner, 1999).
SCT has been subjected to major criticisms for this assumption. Firstly, it does not 
seem to acknowledge the cognitive processes of adaptation and the need for 
individuals to maintain a sense of continuity through time and situations (Browning, 
1980; Breakwell, 1986, 1996). A continuous process of reconstruction and 
revaluation of the content of an identity as a response to immediate situational factors 
would put the individual under highly threatening and stressful situations. Secondly, 
the interpretation of the new category in terms of content and its functional 
importance would vary a lot across individuals. This would preclude the possibility 
of broadly shared meanings, suggesting a more idiosyncratic approach to the theory 
(Hogg, 1996; Deaux, 2000a). This assertion seems even harder to defend in the light 
of widely shared social identities, like national and religious identity, whose content is 
informed and shaped to a great extent by myths, collective memories and cultural 
representations developed in the society (Moscovici, 1988; Duveen, 2001). Billig 
(1995) builds his argument against SCT and SIT claims with reference to national 
identity, arguing that “the salient situation does not suddenly occur, as if out of
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nothing, for it is part of a wider rhythm of banal life in the world of nations. What 
this means is that national identity is more than an inner psychological state or an 
individual self-definition: it is a form of life which is daily lived in the world of 
nation-states” (p. 69).
Turner et al. (1994) do acknowledge that there is a dynamic relationship between the 
individual and the society, though at the same time stating that SCT is not a theory of 
social embeddedness, but an exploration of the cognitive processes involved in 
determining changes in the self. The individual has agency in the social context and 
“unlike symbolic interactionism [...] appraises self in relation to others and not from 
the perspective of others” (p. 460). However, the process of social interaction is not 
functionally important only because it provides a dimension of subjective 
differentiation. It also offers a template for shared meanings to emerge and to be 
negotiated via communication with others (Reicher, 1996; Hopkins and Reicher,
1996; Reicher and Hopkins, 2001). This would make us aware of the position we 
hold in society in relation to others, and some agency in contributing to the meaning- 
making process of the category or categories we belong to and identify with. The 
latter points are at the heart of symbolic interactionism and of identity theory, which 
are also discussed below with respect to the definitional and empirical approaches 
they put forward in relation to salience and its antecedents.
Undoubtedly, strength of identification is an indication of how much an individual 
endorses this category as self-descriptive, shares it with the other ingroup members 
and agrees with the stereotypes bounded within this category. However, in the 
research presented above, it was revealed that a superordinate category like European, 
or a large social scale category as nationality, may share the same label within and 
across member-states, but be perceived in a totally different way in terms of meaning 
by its beholders within and across these contexts (Breakwell, 1996; Reicher and 
Hopkins, 1996; Chryssochoou, 1996, 2000c; Cinnirella, 1996; Condor, 1996).
All the studies cited above have emphasised the importance of studying both the 
cognitive processes and the content of social identities. Studying the meanings that
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individuals associate with their identities can help researchers understand the 
psychological boundaries between them, and facilitate a better understanding of the 
nature (positive/negative) and direction of the obtained interrelationships between 
these identities, based on levels of identification. Recently, the majority of the studies 
following SIT, and mainly the SCT tenets for exploring the intersection of different 
types of social identification, use a multi-methodological (attitudinal measures, open- 
ended measures and interviews) and sometimes an integrative theoretical approach 
(e.g. combining SIT and/or SCT with Social Representation Theory developed by 
Moscovici (1972, 1984, 1988) to capture the underlying processes of identity 
construction (e.g. those of the formation of stereotype consensus and/or social 
representational processes) (Cinnirella, 1997; Chryssochoou, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c; 
Hopkins and Cable, 2001; Condor, 2003, 2006; Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins, 2004).
Before we conclude this section on how SIT and SCT have addressed multiplicity 
within identity structure in contexts of salience, one other question that seems to 
remain unanswered so far is: What happens when two or more identities are o f equal 
psychological significance in an individual’s identity structure?
Proponents of SIT and SCT suggest that when two or more identities are equally 
salient there would be an intersecting or an additive pattern according to Brown and 
Turner (1979) (see Figure 2.2 below). The ‘new’ convergent category that occurs in a 
cross-categorisation context would appear on the top of the identity hierarchy. In the 
last section of this chapter we elaborate more on this type of representational 
structure, and examine the conditions under which this may affect, in a positive or 
negative way, inter-group perceptions.
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Figure 2.2: Intersecting identities
$National ReligionsIdentity Identity
2.2.4 Hierarchical structure models
Many identity theorists challenged the idea of the single cognitive structure of identity 
suggested so far by the hierarchical process models, and put forward a far more 
complex and all-encompassing model of identity structure (Rosenberg and Gara,
1985; Breakwell, 1986; Stryker, 1987; Deaux, 1992, 1993; Stryker and Serpe, 1994; 
Reid and Deaux, 1996; Burke, 2003, 2006). They have argued that the separation 
between personal and social identities seems ambiguous and non-fimctional. Instead, 
they claimed that personal and social identities would be better portrayed as 
interrelated, based on their content (meaning) and structural representation (structure). 
Researchers working with hierarchical structure models of identity acknowledge the 
simultaneous existence of several social identities within identity structure and 
employ a set of different methodologies to assess empirically their relative 
importance, salience and the interrelationships between them.
2.2.4.1 Identity Theory (IT)
From a sociological perspective. Identity Theory (Stryker, 1980, 1987), an integrated 
model of symbolic interactionism and role theory, postulates that individuals have
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personalized, but socially constructed, multiple identities due to their memberships of 
“multiple sets of structured role relationships” (Simon, 2004, p. 23). The theory 
emphasizes the dynamic interaction between the individual and the society, and views 
the individual as a reflective agent of their environment capable of shaping the 
content and the structure of their identities via behavioural choices and negotiated 
social interaction. More specifically, individuals occupy and act out different roles 
(role and group identities) that acquire their meanings through constant negotiation 
with other individuals holding differentiated positions within the society (Stryker, 
1987). Thus, identities are relational and organized according to a salience hierarchy.
In opposition to the hierarchical process models such as SIT and SCT discussed 
above, identity theory distinguishes between the concepts of salience and activation. 
Salience refers to the likelihood of an identity to be activated, whilst activation refers 
to its actual activation (Stets and Burke, 2000). Another concept central to identity 
theory is that of commitment, which refers to the impact of losing a specific role when 
having a particular identity and has two distinct types^: the ‘affective’ and the 
‘interactional’ (Stryker, 1980,1987; Stryker and Serpe, 1982, 1994; Callero, 1985). 
Affective commitment corresponds to the strength of ties with individuals who share 
the same identity, whereas the interactional type refers to the amount of people with 
whom someone is attached to who have the same identity. Furthermore, Identity 
Theory proposes that the structural organization of identities is based not only on their 
relative salience, but also on their relative centrality (i.e. the relative importance an 
individual attaches to a particular identity), determined by the variations in 
commitment (Stryker and Serpe, 1994). Centrality is operationalised in a different 
way from salience, since centrality implies that an individual is self-aware of the 
importance of a particular identity.
According to Identity Theory, the activation of a particular identity depends on the 
relative salience of the identity which in turn is dependent on its level of commitment. 
It is perhaps worth noting that the theory does not make any clear predictions under
 ^Stets and Burke (2000) refer also to these two types as ‘qualitative’ and ‘quantitative’. In addition, in 
their recent publication (2003), citing Stryker’s and Serpe’s (1982) research on the role of commitment 
in relation to religious role identity, they use the terms intensiveness and extensiveness of commitment 
respectively.
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what conditions each type of commitment (affective or interactional) would be the 
stronger predictor of salience (Stryker, 1987; Stets and Burke, 2000).
Although the concepts of salience and centrality could be thought of as being very 
similar, the value in introducing and testing empirically the concepts of both salience 
and centrality in order to predict which identity would be activated, was recognized 
by many theorists and researchers (Luhtanen and Crocker, 1992; Sellers, Smith, 
Shelton, Rowley and Chavous, 1998; Rane and McBride, 2000; Settles, 2004). Here 
it is, perhaps, worth rehearsing some of the theoretical arguments and empirical 
evidence concerning the relationship between the concept of salience and centrality.
The two concepts could be thought as being conceptually related in the sense that both 
attest to the assumption that there is an antagonistic relationship between identities, 
resulting in their hierarchical or central/peripheral organization within identity 
structure. The strength of the relationship between measures of salience and 
centrality would be moderated by the type of identity under investigation. An identity 
that is chronically accessible, such as gender or race, may:
• be perceived as more self-defining and thus expected to have priority over the 
others,
• be evaluated as more central within an individual’s repertoire of identities and
• be less or not affected at all by changes occurring in the relevant context 
(Oakes, 1987; Stryker, 1987).
However, research conducted in examining the strength of their association is very 
limited. Serpe and Stryker (1994) were the first ones to explore how salience relates 
to centrality and their relative significance in mediating the relationship between 
commitment (affective and interactional) and role behavioural choice. Although they 
suggested that both salience and centrality mediated the relationship between 
commitment and behaviour, they did not specify whether commitment is differentially 
linked to the one or the other. In their article, they proposed two conditions under 
which salience and centrality may be totally independent of each other or whether 
they overlap extensively with each other. If the individual has a limited degree of
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behavioural choice, whilst holding a particular identity, then salience and centrality 
are expected to be independent of each other. This assumption was tested by Cassidy 
and Trew (1998) in a study investigating the national and religious identities of 
Catholic and Protestant students in Northern Ireland. With respect to national 
identity, the findings indicated that salience and centrality were positively and 
moderately related in both samples. Nonetheless, in the case of religious identity, the 
relationship between the salience and centrality measures was significantly lower for 
Catholic students from the one obtained for the Protestants. The authors linked this 
result to the fact that Catholic students perceived less behavioural choice in relation to 
their religious identities (identity choice measure). The relatively weak association 
demonstrated between the two concepts (salience and centrality) was explained by the 
authors as an attempt made by the Catholic respondents to separate the public and 
private evaluations of their group (Cassidy and Trew, 1998).
Stryker and Serpe (1994) also proposed that, in situations that an individual is aware 
of identity salience, the two constructs (salience and centrality) are expected to 
operate in an equivalent way. In their concluding remarks the authors emphasise that 
psychological centrality should also be included as a hierarchical component of 
identity structure, since it affects an individual’s behavioural choices.
With respect to the distinction between personal, role and group identities, some 
identity theorists (Burke and Tully, 1977; Stets, 1995) suggest that the different types 
of identity may be linked through a common system of meaning. The meanings 
associated with personal identities (idiosyncratic characteristics) may overlap with the 
meanings of role and group identities. In the case where the associated meanings are 
in conflict, the person would engage in a process of negotiation to balance the 
demands posed by the different types of identity (see also Stryker, 2000). This 
process of negotiation is supposed to be guided by the motive of self-verification. It 
needs to be noted that within social and personality psychology, self-verification has 
been traditionally and consistently viewed as one of the three distinct but related 
motives (self-enhancement, self-assessment and self-verification) that direct self- 
evaluation processes. Based on these motives, individuals strive to achieve 
consistency between their self-beliefs and the feedback (positive or negative) they
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may receive in a specific situation that an identity or a number of identities, personal 
or social, become salient and/or challenged (Swann, 1983,1990; Chen, Chen and 
Shaw, 2004). Within identity theory, self-verification has also been conceptualised as 
a cognitive, self-regulatory process, on which individuals aim to restore congruence 
between the self-relevant meanings in the situation and the meanings attached to a 
specific identity (identity standards).
Identity theory also integrates the self-esteem, and to some extent the efficacy motive 
(Bandura, 1997), and discusses their close and variant relation to verification process 
as its outcomes, buffers and motives. More specifically, according to Cast and Burke
(1999) and Cast (2002), verification of role identities has been found to increase 
feelings of the two distinct types of self-esteem (worth-based or efficacy based self­
esteem). Nevertheless, in the context of identity change, or when verification process 
fails to occur, high levels of self-esteem, which had been built up by verification, can 
act as a buffer. Finally, the need to maintain high levels of self-esteem, which is 
partly influenced by self-verification process, is what is conceived as being a strong 
motive for the establishment and maintenance of those relationships that would verify 
identity (s) (for a detailed discussion on the theorised types of self-esteem and its 
differential status in relation to self-verification process, see Stets and Burke, 2003, 
and Stets and Harrods, 2004).
Identity theory (Stryker, 1987) as a structural model captures both theoretically and 
methodologically the identity multiplicity premise, since it explicitly addresses the 
structural representations of multiple identities. The theory refers to the relational 
nature of identities and suggests that “each role is related to, but set apart from, 
counter roles” (Stets and Burke, 2000, p. 234). However, the strength and the 
direction of the relationships between these roles are not clarified.
Research carried out in the context of Northern Ireland (Caims, 1982; Trew and 
Benson, 1996; Cassidy and Trew, 1998, 2004) has demonstrated the usefulness of 
examining the identity structure in terms of the characteristics postulated by Identity 
Theory, rather than just examining the relative strength of identification with the 
target social categories. For instance, Cassidy and Trew’s (1998, 2004) work on 
Northern Irish students’ national and religious identities revealed that the salience and
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centrality of both identities was relatively low compared with other identities residing 
within the hierarchical identity structure (e.g. student identities). Moreover, quite 
importantly, the findings exploring the relationships between identity dimensions 
(affective and interactional commitment), salience and centrality revealed some 
differences based on the types of identities examined and the two religious groups 
involved (Protestant vs. Catholics). More specifically, with respect to the question 
previously raised as to which types of commitment may become better predictors of 
identity salience and when, the results from their latest study (2004) examining the 
role that the two types of commitment may have in predicting change in identity 
salience in relation to five different identities (family, friend, student, national and 
religious) indicated that affective commitment seems to have a relatively stronger 
impact on identity salience compared to interactional commitment, which in turn 
revealed to be a significant predictor only for student identity (see also Stryker, 1987).
2.2.4.2 Identity Process Theory (IPT)
In the majority of the theoretical perspectives discussed so far, the context seemed to 
be emphasized as the most important factor for shaping identity and for understanding 
the variations occurring within identity structure. Identity Process Theory (IPT) 
(Breakwell, 1986), a conceptual framework that examines identity dynamics in the 
context of change (threat), also views identity as a multifaceted, dynamic and 
reflective product of the interaction between the individual and the societal context in 
which they are embedded. According to Breakwell (1986, 2001), context can be 
schematically represented “along two dimensions concerning structure and 
processes”. The distinction between personal and social identities is also abandoned 
in this identity model. Personal and social identities are seen as having a continuous 
dialectical relationship between them.
The theory defines identity in terms of structure, content and a set of cognitive 
processes that are guided by a set of motivational principles. Structure, which 
consists of group memberships, inter-group relationships and interpersonal networks, 
both defines and is defined by a set of processes, which are developed within a time 
continuum.
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Structure can be conceived as having two facets: the content and the value. The 
content dimension is cumulative and entails both personal and social memberships 
organized in a hierarchical structure. The theory postulates that identity elements are 
not isolated within identity structure, but they are related together. However, there is 
not much empirical evidence on the strength and direction of these relationships, nor 
does IPT suggest how one operationalises the relationship between different identity 
elements. In the present thesis, IPT is employed as a theoretical framework and a 
more detailed approach to the description of such relationships is proposed. Indeed, 
one of the aims of the present thesis was to shed light into the nature and the functions 
that the relationship between identity elements may serve when threat is directed at 
one of two identity elements which are either strongly or weakly related to each other.
The organization of the structural components of the content dimension depends on 
the strength of the relationship between identity elements and on their relative 
centrality and salience. Similarly to other theories (SCT, SIT, IT), salience is 
conceived as being context specific, signifying that the organization of the content 
dimension is non-static. The second facet of identity structure is the value dimension 
in which each identity element is ascribed a positive or a negative value that needs to 
be revaluated or devalued according to the social circumstances. As Breakwell 
(1986) suggests “on both counts, content and value, the identity structure is seen as 
fluid, dynamic and reactive to its social context” (p. 19).
The cognitive processes which control the structure of identities are: accommodation, 
assimilation and evaluation. Assimilation refers to the cognitive process of absorbing 
new components into identity structure, whilst accommodation is the adjustment of 
the identity structure to incorporate these new components. The evaluation process 
involves the allocation of value to the new and old identity elements. According to 
Breakwell (2001) the first two processes, which are independent of each other, are 
responsible for establishing values within the identity and set the grounds for the 
evaluation process to occur. The processes produce the content and value dimensions 
of identity and do not change across time.
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One of the main propositions of the theory that differentiates it from other 
motivational theories is that it suggests that social identification processes are guided 
by more than two motivational principles: self-esteem, self-efficacy, distinctiveness 
and continuity. According to Breakwell (1986) the importance of each one of these 
principles in shaping the structure is culturally specific and varies across time and 
context.
The theory suggests that identification with different categories may be related, to a 
greater or a lesser extent, to each of the identity principles (Breakwell, 1986). 
Additionally, it was later argued by Lyons (1996) that each identity element could be 
expected to be associated with different levels of continuity, distinctiveness, self­
esteem and self-efficacy. For example, I can be very proud of my nationality as a 
Greek, raising my levels of self-esteem, but my nationality might make me feel quite 
inefficacious at the same time. Therefore, identification with each identity element is 
expected to contribute differentially in the maintenance of identity motivations. For 
example, my religion as Christian Orthodox might provide me with a sense of 
continuity, but not make me feel distinctive in any way whilst my nationality might 
make me feel both continuous and distinctive. This issue will be further elaborated on 
in a later section in this Chapter, when the motivational basis of identification is 
discussed in detail. Motivational principles, as the desirable end states of an identity, 
are both the start and the end point for social identification processes, whilst the order 
of their relative importance depends both on the type of identity element under 
investigation and the context in which it is developed and/or challenged.
IPT focuses on identity dynamics within the context of change and especially under 
conditions of threat, and lists a range of coping strategies available to an individual to 
cope with unexpected forms of change. Threats are defined as challenges to the 
principled procedure of identity processes. Threats to continuity and distinctiveness 
are especially thought to threaten the content dimension of identity structure, whereas 
threats directed towards self-esteem and efficacy pose severe challenge to the value 
dimension, which is responsible for ascribing a rate of importance to the elements that 
comprise identity structure. Originally, Breakwell (1986, 1992) mentioned three
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motivational principles: distinctiveness, continuity and self-esteem, but later on 
perceived self-efficacy was added in the list of motives. She suggested that, when 
self-esteem is threatened, efficacy may take its place. This distinction between self­
esteem and self-efficacy mirrors identity theory’s assertion that it is useful to 
distinguish between self-esteem based on judgements of self-worth and self-esteem 
based on judgements of competence. However, it should be noted that IPT does not 
intend to develop an overarching account of all human motives (Breakwell, 1986).
Thus, IPT. provides an integrative framework which takes into account both the 
structure and processes of identity, acknowledges the multiplicity premise both in 
terms of multiple group memberships and doubts the usefulness of distinguishing 
between personal and social identity elements. This issue of the relationship between 
personal and social identities is the focus of the following section which discusses the 
work of Deaux and colleagues (Deaux, 1992, 1993, 2000; Ethier and Deaux, 1994; 
Reid and Deaux, 1996; Deaux and Ethier, 1998).
2.2.4.3 Integrating identity structure and content: the work o f Kay Deaux and 
colleagues
Influenced by the two previously discussed frameworks (Identity theory and Identity 
Process theory respectively), the work of Deaux and her colleagues aimed to 
empirically test both the accuracy of the functional antagonism existing between 
personal-social identity supported by SCT and SIT, and the homogeneity assumption 
relevant to the content of identities. With respect to the latter, the aim of the 
researchers was also to identify whether identities are relational in nature, and most 
importantly the parameters that set them apart or group them together under the same 
cluster.
Is the distinction between personal and social identities meaningful?
In her analysis of social identity using different methodologies (interviews, 
questionnaires) and analytic techniques (Conditional Probability Scores: Trafimow, 
Triandis and Gotto, 1991; Hierarchical classification Analysis (HICLAS): Rosenberg 
and Gara, 1985; DeBoeck and Rosenberg, 1988, Cluster analysis: Blashfield and
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Aldenderfer, 1988), Deaux (1993) proposed that, although these two aspects of 
identity (personal and social) may subsist as distinct in a theoretical level 
(definitional), in reality their relationship should be portrayed as a dialectic one since 
they interact to the extent that they grant each other meaning (i.e. my national identity 
as a Greek might be associated with traits such as being hospitable and self- 
conscious). Following this line of thought and based on the research conducted 
earlier on by Trafimow et al. (1991), who tested two models of organization of self­
cognitions (‘one basket’ vs. ‘two basket’ models), Reid and Deaux (1996) opposed 
the idea of a ‘segregated’ model of identity structure (as suggested by SIT and SCT) 
and proposed an ‘integrated’ one. Within this model an individual should have as 
many structures as his/her identities, which would be connected with a set of self­
defining characteristics (simple version of identity structure). In the case where two 
or more social identities are allocated the same attributes, then these identities would 
be combined in a single structure (complex version of identity structure). The 
association between social identities and attributes derives from an individual’s 
experiences ascribing a personal meaning in a category, and from the culturally 
shared representations providing a common basis for construing the meanings 
attached to these social identities. An individual’s several identity structures are 
graphically represented in Figure 2.3 below. As it can be observed, identities (social) 
which are described in a similar way and share the same personal features would be 
clustered together. The first set of results provided support for the segregation model, 
as identities and attributes clustered separately. However, the suggested integration 
model was supported in the second stage of analysis when the associations between 
identities and attributes were considered by calculating the sequence of items in 
recall, using an adjusted ratio of clustering (Roenker Thompson and Brown, 1971, 
cited in Reid and Deaux, 1996) and the HICLAS technique. The results questioned 
the assumption brought forward by Trafimow et al. (1991) who suggested that 
personal and social identities are stored separately in individuals’ memory. The 
authors proposed that, although there is a conceptual distinction between the two and 
in some cases (when the meaning of an identity is embryonic) one may exist in 
isolation from the other, a model that takes into account their dialectic relationship 
would be more accurate in representing an individual’s identity structure.
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Figure 2.3: The segregation and integration models of identity structure
The Segregation M odel 
Collective Self
Activist
Brother
Friend
Student
Advocate
Atheist
The Integration Model
Private Self
Advice giver 
Disciplined 
Good Listener 
Not gifted 
Skeptical 
Concerned 
Logical 
Fun
Not satisfied
Cluster I Cluster II Cluster III
Brother Student Activist
Friend Not gifted Advocate
Good Listener Logical Atheist
Advice giver Disciplined Skeptical 
Concerned 
Not satisfied
How this relationship between the two (attributes and social identities) is developed 
remains a valid question. Regarding our own interest in the overlap of multiple social 
identities’ content, their data provided evidence that some social identities share some 
attributes while others do not. What links these identities together or sets them apart? 
This may be better answered below after discussing the findings from another study 
conducted by Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi and Ethier (1995).
To what extent are social or collective identities distinct or relational?
Several researchers have attempted to investigate how similar or different are the 
types of identities based on their meaning and function within identity structure 
(Brown and Williams, 1984; Stryker, 1987; Hinkle and Brown, 1990). Hinkle and 
Brown (1990) distinguished identities based on their individualistic and collectivistic 
nature. Frable’s (1993) research on stigmatised vs. non-stigmatised identities 
suggested that the identities may differ based on evaluative terms.
46
Based on the previously discussed findings Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi and Ethier (1995) 
designed a series of studies to examine whether there are distinct types of identities in 
a student sample using both cluster-analysis and plots representing, spatially, the 
structure of an identity (MDS). In their first study, 50 participants were asked to sort 
64 social identities on the basis of their similarity. The type of identities used varied 
(e.g. personal relationships, religion, ethnicity and stigmatised such as alcoholic). In 
Study 2, 171 participants rated similarities between identities within a specific cluster 
and 193 in total were asked to ascribe 15 trait properties to these identities (e.g. 
public-private, ascribed-acquired, individual-collective, relational-non-relational).
The results from the cluster analysis (Study 1) revealed that there were five types of 
social identities: personal relationships, vocations, political affiliations, 
ethnic/religious groups and stigmatised groups. Based on the individualist-collectivist 
dimension some identities (i.e. ethnic-religious, stigmatised and political identities) 
were perceived similar because they were considered to be collective when they were 
contrasted to identities (relationship identities) which were considered as more 
individualistic. In opposition to Hinkle and Brown’s (1990) earlier findings, the 
autonomous -  relational distinction was not an important dimension for accentuating 
differences and similarities between identities.
Furthermore, using plots that represent spatially the structure of an identity (MDS), it 
suggested that different sets of traits were relevant within and among these groupings 
of social identities. For example, the identities previously classified as “stigmatised 
identities” contrasted with other identities, such as relationship identities, based on an 
evaluative dimension (threatening, unpreventable, passive). However, the within 
cluster analysis of dimensions suggested that social identities which fall under the 
same cluster also differed in other dimensions such as threatening /dangerous vs. non­
threatening/harmless. Ethnic and religious identities, the relationship of whom both 
in terms of structure and content is the main aim of this thesis, were perceived as 
collectivistic, whilst identities within this cluster seemed to differ based on the 
colour/non-colour and visible/not visible dimensions. The authors suggested that the 
findings from this cluster are not very illuminating and that if more relevant
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dimensions to religious identity were introduced, this may have elicited more 
differences.
Overall, these findings contributed to the idea that the generic assumption that all 
social identities are collective and relational as SIT proposes is not always true.
There were clear and consistent differences between the cluster labelled as 
relationship identities (including identities such as gender, occupation, relationship) 
and the other forms of social identity. According to Deaux et al. (1995), the former 
are conceptually more related to role-based identities (McCall and Simmons, 1978), 
also reflected in some of their uniquely defined trait properties (e.g. ascribed- 
achieved, youth-old).
The fact that two or more identities fall under the same cluster does not equate them 
in terms of content, but it may suggest that the “satisfactory expression of one identity 
within the cluster might reduce needs for expressing other identities within the same 
cluster” (Deaux et al., 1995, p. 289). However, due to the fact that dimensions (trait 
properties of identities) also seem to differentiate identities within clusters, the authors 
suggested that the levels of their interchangeability will be determined by their 
proximity in terms of the defining dimensions. In other words, for functional 
substitution to occur, two or more identities should be positioned at the same end of 
the relevant dimension. The theoretical contribution and empirical implications of 
these findings were discussed by the authors in relation to the prediction of attitudes 
and behavioural outcomes, based on the relevant type of identities and in light of the 
threat to identity. Deaux et al. (1995) suggested that acknowledging that there are 
variations in identity categories may facilitate a better understanding of the self­
enhancement strategies used by individuals when their identities are threatened. It is 
argued here that developing our knowledge about how two or more identities, 
clustered together prior to facing a threat, relate or cease to relate with each other 
under conditions of threat can also help us to understand some of the factors likely to 
influence the choice of strategies employed by individuals to cope with threat.
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2.2.5 Summary o f conceptual issues concerning hierarchical process and 
structure models o f identity
To recapitulate at this point, after acknowledging the variety of social identities or 
social roles that an individual possesses, the theorists established a theoretical and 
empirical terrain for studying not only how these set of identities were organized 
within identity structure, but also in what way they are related, based on their content 
and psychological significance. All ‘structure models’ (Deaux, 1992, 1993;
Breakwell, 1986; Stryker, 1987) retain the idea of a hierarchical organization of 
identities within identity structure based on their relative salience, and state explicitly 
or implicitly that identity elements/ identities/role identities are related. Their point of 
differentiation from the theories previously described as ‘hierarchical process models’ 
(Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 1987) is that they acknowledge that two or 
more identities (both personal and social) can be meaningful and salient in a given 
situation and it may not always be possible for them to be represented at different 
levels of abstraction. Moreover, they put more emphasis on the role of societal 
networks and on the social context for not only defining, but also in sustaining, the 
meaning of identities.
On the other hand, the hierarchical process models focused more on the cognitive and 
motivational processes involved in identity processes. The role of context is eminent 
in their theories, as it affects which identities will become salient and determines the 
relative dimension of comparison. The interrelationships between identities in both 
hierarchical process and structure models are always measured based on their relative 
salience and/or relative importance (centrality) within identity structure. A more 
detailed discussion of the methodological issues involved in studying multiple 
identities and their interrelationships follows in the next chapter.
However, in agreement with Deaux (1993) we suggest that the overlap between 
identities/identity elements may occur in terms of their content as well. The findings 
from the previously discussed studies (Reid and Deaux, 1996; Deaux et al., 1995) 
provide empirical support to the theoretical assertion that either looking at the 
distinction between personal or social identities, or the distinction between multiple
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social identities based on shared traits or on the typology of identities, their meanings 
appear to be relational and overlapping to a certain degree. It is the social context in 
which these identities develop and operate that may determine and moderate the 
extent of their overlap (Roccas and Brewer, 2002). A manifestation of this overlap 
may be when the same traits would be used by individuals to describe membership in 
the two social categories or if the values and norms of one of the two may contribute 
to defining the content of the other. This is especially the case if these identities have 
developed, or are being developed, at the same time and place. Moreover, it may be 
possible that identities that share traits serve similar psychological fimctions within 
identity structure. In the section that follows we discuss in much more detail the 
process of social identification focusing on the conceptual issues that have been raised 
from time to time in relation to its motivational basis.
Overall, our review of the theories suggested that there is a debate regarding the 
primacy of identity content vs. identity processes. However, we believe that there is 
room for both levels of analysis. As Jost and Krulanski (2002) proposed, 
“understanding both the specific content and the general processes of social 
construction, our ability to address social phenomena will be greatly enhanced”
(p. 181). This level of analysis becomes more eminent with regard to multiple 
identities and their relationships. The present thesis contributes to this area and 
explores the nature of the relationships between identity elements, both in terms of 
content and structure, using a combination of methodological approaches (quantitative 
and qualitative).
Having considered some of the main ways theorists have conceptualised identity 
structure and the relationships between identity elements. Identity Process Theory 
(Breakwell, 1986) was thought to be the most appropriate framework within which 
the research questions of this thesis could be addressed for the following reasons.
This was despite its limitations mainly stemming from a lack of detailed definitions of 
the conditions under which different processes will take place, or when different 
motivations will assume primary importance.
Firstly, IPT provides an integrative approach to conceptualising the relationships 
between multiple identities. According to the theory, identity elements are not
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isolated within identity structure but they relate to one another, albeit to different 
degrees. Identity elements are also perceived as being hierarchically arranged. The 
assumption of the theory as to how the structural relationships between them need to 
be explored combines both the SCT and IT perspectives:
1) the relative salience and centrality of each element and
2) the tightness and looseness of the relationships between them.
In the work presented in this thesis, the relationship between national, religious and 
gender or student identities are examined both in terms of their relative salience and 
centrality and the correlations between them.
Secondly, IPT emphasises the need to examine both the content and value dimensions 
of an identity element. As was discussed above, the content of identity elements is 
likely to play a crucial role in the way the relationship between two identity elements 
is constructed, both at the individual and group levels. Yet, to date, many a 
theoretical model has either neglected or downplayed the role of the content of 
identities. Study 1 in this thesis examined the content of the main target identities, 
national and religious, and the extent to which there is an overlap in the meanings 
Greek nationals attach to these identities.
Thirdly, identity dynamics are likely to be guided by multiple motivational principles, 
not only by self-esteem and distinctiveness, which are the most commonly studied 
motivations within SCT and SIT. Study 2 examined the relationship between each of 
the four motivations and the strength of identification with each of the target 
identities, as well as the extent to which motivations relating to one identity (e.g. 
religious) contributes to the level of identification with another (e.g. national).
Fourthly, IPT recognises the role of the social representational processes in the 
particular socio-historical contexts in which identities are formed and studied. It 
argues that the relative salience of each of these motivational principles, as well as the 
content and value dimensions, are considered to be both culturally specific and 
context dependent. Moreover, the content and value dimensions of identities all relate 
to social representational processes. The relationship between them is mediated by
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the identity processes (assimilation, evaluation and accommodation) responsible for 
determining and sustaining these dimensions. Social representations relate to these 
identity processes in a dialectical way. Identity processes may be shaped by culturally 
shared beliefs, but at the same time they are often customised to be assimilated in an 
individual’s self-representation. In addition identity processes can influence the 
development of new social representations of the relationships between categories at 
the societal level. Acknowledging the importance of the influence that societal 
representations of the relationship between national and religious identities on the 
way these identities are organised and experienced at an individual level, this thesis 
has paid attention to the historical development of the relationship between national 
and religious identities in the Greek and other contexts (see Chapters 4 and 5).
2.3 The role of motivations in explaining the relative importance of 
identities and inter-group attitudes
In the previous sections attempts to describe the relationships between identities in 
terms of relative salience, centrality and their content were considered. The present 
section focuses on the role of motivations for explaining 1) an individual’s relative 
strength of identification with particular categories, and 2) when and how certain 
identities become salient and are experienced as being related to each other to a 
varying degree. In addition, it considers the role of motivations for explaining inter­
group attitudes.
The need to understand the motivational aspects of social identification was addressed 
by two main questions. Firstly, what motivates individuals to engage in the process of 
social identification and to choose particular group identities, and, secondly, what 
functions these group identities serve in their identity structure in relation to the self, 
the group and to ‘others’. The most prominent explanation emphasized mainly in the 
social identity theory tradition (Tajfel and Turner, 1979), and less in the self­
categorization framework (Turner, Oakes, Reicher and Wetherell, 1987) where 
theorizing on categorization processes is prioritized over the motivational, is the need 
to maintain or enhance self-esteem by being positively distinct from others (members 
of ingroup or relevant outgroups).
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However, research so far has identified some conceptual and methodological 
problems relevant to this argument based on two reasons: 1) the equivocal findings in 
relation to the so-called self-esteem hypothesis and 2) the failure of most motivational 
theories to acknowledge that, depending on their type and content, identities/identity 
elements might serve different functions for their beholders (Hogg and Abrams, 1990; 
Mullin and Hogg, 1998; Brown, 2000; Deaux, 2000a; Vignoles, Chryssochoou, 
Breakwell, 2002). The aim in the subsequent sections is not to devalue the role of 
self-esteem as a motivation guiding identity processes, but to elaborate on the 
theoretical arguments and empirical evidence supporting why and when a wider range 
of motivations should be given an equal consideration to self-esteem in explaining 
identity dynamics.
2.3.1 Revisiting the need for positive identity and the self-esteem hypothesis
According to social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) “when social categories 
are operating, self-enhancement is best achieved by the adoption of strategies that 
achieve or maintain a sense of group superiority relative to the outgroup” (Hornsey 
and Hogg, 2000, p. 948). The most common form of ingroup favouritism, derived 
from inter-group evaluations-comparisons, is the need for positive distinctiveness.
The need for positive identity helps individuals to boost their self-esteem and to 
maintain or strengthen a positive image, not only about themselves but also about the 
group they belong to. This image will be achieved when individuals engage, and can 
access, favourable evaluative comparisons between members of ingroup and relevant 
outgroups (e.g. religious groups, ethnic groups), and when they identify strongly with 
that particular group.
Mullen, Brown and Smith (1992), after using the results of 42 minimal group studies, 
came to the conclusion that, at least in the minimal group setting, ingroup biased 
evaluation is a robust phenomenon as individuals tend to perceive their ingroup in a 
more positive light than the outgroup. Based on SIT claims, the expression of this 
strong ingroup preference might be explained by the need for positive distinctiveness. 
Relevant studies (e.g. Rubin and Hewstone, 1998) examining the motivational role of
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positive distinctiveness revealed that individuals feel better about their group and 
themselves after engaging in such discriminatory behaviour.
In support of this argument suggesting that the need for positive distinctiveness 
motivates and justifies the development and expression of forms of ingroup bias, the 
self-esteem hypothesis was developed. This hypothesis suggests that, except for the 
need to be positively distinct fi*om other groups, a second motivation that might result 
in expression of bias towards outgroups is the need for positive self-esteem. Based on 
this assumption, inter-group bias is expected to occur only:
1) when there is potential for social change
2) under a specific social state of self-esteem (Rubin and Hewstone, 1998) and
3) when identification with the threatened membership is high.
Hogg and Abrams (1990) using the self-esteem hypothesis proposed two corollaries:
1) ingroup-outgroup bias enhances self-esteem and 2) threatened self-esteem results in 
ingroup - outgroup bias. This argument seems quite tautological. In other words, 
what Hogg and Abrams (1988,1990; Abrams and Hogg, 1988) and other researchers 
(Crocker and Schwartz, 1985; Brown, Collins and Schmidt, 1988) advocated was that 
the theory does not clarify the conditions under which individuals might feel 
threatened and whether ingroup - outgroup bias is the source of positive self-esteem 
or its effect.
The failure of the self-esteem hypothesis to provide consistent findings has attracted 
the attention of several researchers (Abrams and Hogg, 1988; Hogg and Abrams,
1990; Breakwell, 1993; Brewer, 1993; Mullin and Hogg, 1998; Rubin and Hewstone, 
1998) who argued against its overimplication in theories explaining inter-group 
behaviour. It was also argued that other factors such as the levels (high versus low) of 
self-esteem, degree of identification and levels of perceived threat may moderate the 
relationship between self-esteem and group behaviour. Some theorists also 
emphasised that self-enhancement is a more distinct motive than self-protection and 
that levels of self-esteem may affect differently inter-group differentiation. More 
specifically, although the need to enhance the self is common between high and low
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self-esteem individuals, the latter (low) are more concerned with protecting 
themselves, while the former (high) are more concerned with enhancement and 
positive affirmation of the ingroup (Baumeister, Tice and Hutton, 1989). Verkuyten 
(1997) in his study on Dutch youth, evaluating the ethnic minority groups living in the 
Netherlands, provided empirical support for this distinction between self-protection 
and self-enhancement processes and how the two interact with levels of self-esteem. 
Individuals, who reported high collective self-esteem levels, expressed more positive 
ingroup evaluation. On the contrary, it could be argued that others who scored low in 
the collective self-esteem scale did that as a strategy to protect the self from the 
expressed outgroup bias.
2.3.2 When self-esteem is not enough: Other motivational theories
In this section, we briefly outline the tenets of alternative motivational theories also 
developed to address why individuals identify with a particular category, the functions 
that social identifications may serve and the implications of these processes. The first 
two motivational models (i.e. Optimal Distinctiveness and Subjective Uncertainty 
Reduction Theories) were originally developed in the context of explaining levels of 
ingroup identification and the phenomenon of inter-group bias that may stem from 
one’s identification with different social memberships. However, although it does not 
delineate the conditions under which intra and inter-group evaluations may lead to 
discrimination, the third motivational model (i.e. Identity Process Theory) proffers a 
detailed account for the changes occurring in individuals’ identity systems, and in 
particular in the motivational processes, in the context of threat.
Optimal Distinctiveness Theory
Brewer (1991, 1993) in her attempt to explain the process of social identification 
developed a new motivational theory. Optimal Distinctiveness Theory (ODT), 
suggesting that individuals have interchangeable needs for differentiation and 
inclusion and that they continuously seek optimal balance. Brewer (1991) 
emphasised that these needs may be related, to some extent, to self-esteem
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maintenance, but at the same time they need to be treated both in a conceptual and an 
empirical level as distinct theoretical constructs. “Optimal distinctiveness is 
independent of the evaluative implications of group membership, although, other 
things being equal, individuals will prefer positive group identities to negative 
identities” (p. 478). Equilibrium might only be achieved through identification with 
groups that satisfy and fulfil both needs at the same time. Based on this theory’s 
claims, the need for inclusion is satisfied through assimilation processes, while the 
need for exclusion is satisfied by inter-group distinctions. It needs to be noted that 
ODT was based on another theory earlier developed, the uniqueness theory (Snyder 
and Fromkin, 1980). The main proposition of this theory is that different degrees of 
perceived similarity to others are variously accepted by individuals, with: perceptions 
of moderate similarity being the optimal whereas very low similarity (high 
distinctiveness) and high similarity (low distinctiveness) being considered as the 
worst case scenarios. However, uniqueness theory was not used in relation to group 
memberships.
In what sense is ODT theory useful in explaining inter-group bias (prejudice)? The 
theory identifies two motivations responsible for the development and expression of 
inter-group bias. Firstly, the need to establish the satisfaction derived from 
identification with an optimal distinct group motivates bias (Leonardelli and Brewer, 
2001). Secondly, when there is a certain degree of group identification, inter-group 
bias is motivated by the need for inter-group differentiation. In order to be able to 
understand and explain the motivational need to stand out and feel distinctive, it is 
essential to conceptualise the meaning and the importance of the concept of 
differentiation. The existence of this principle, and its importance, was initially 
proposed and empirically tested by Campbell (1956), who observed that the formation 
and existence of stereotypes was a type of enhancement initiated by the contrast 
between social groups.
Empirical results supported the contribution of both motivations in conceptualising 
inter-group bias (Leonardelli and Brewer, 2001). Minority groups (strictly referring 
to relative group size) revealed higher ingroup identification, greater satisfaction and 
higher self-esteem than more inclusive groups (majority groups). Moreover, in line
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with the affirmation motive, a positive and strong association was demonstrated 
between ingroup satisfaction and inter-group bias whilst for majority groups the same 
relationship was revealed to be negative (differentiation motive). Hornsey and Hogg
(2000) conducted a study examining the effects of perceptions of similarity on 
relations between subgroups that share the same superordinate category. Their results 
indicated that participants were motivated to retain group distinctiveness by 
expressing high levels of bias. Sub-group members reacted against being categorised 
at the superordinate level, since their group distinctiveness was seriously challenged 
and their differentiation motive was not fulfilled.
Therefore, existence of these needs seems to limit the extent to which “strong social 
identification can be indefinitely extended to highly inclusive, superordinate social 
groups or categories” (Brewer, 1999b, p. 4). As Hewstone, Rubin and Willis (2002) 
argue, optimal distinctiveness theory proposes a dual process model for understanding 
the motivational forces behind the emergence of inter-group bias, but more 
elaboration and empirical testing is needed.
Subjective Uncertainty Reduction
Abrams and Hogg (1998), mainly using self-categorization theoretical tenets from 
social identity theory, suggested another aspect of motivation, apart firom the need for 
positive identity and self-esteem, in guiding social identification and predicting 
ingroup bias: the subjective uncertainty reduction motive. Individuals have a basic 
need to feel certain about the aspects of life they classify as important. In Mullin and 
Hogg’s own words “subjective certainty renders existence meaningful and thus gives 
one confidence about how to behave, and what to expect fi*om the physical and social 
environment within which one finds oneself’ (1998, p. 347). Similar to Bartlett’s 
(1932) approach that individuals aim to simplify their experiences, Abrams and Hogg 
(1988) proposed that, in some ways, simplification contributes to maintain high levels 
of certainty.
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Uncertainty is an aversive state, which arises when individuals feel that their belief 
systems, attitudes and sets of behaviours do not comply with those of the other 
ingroup members and is resolved by identification. In order to reduce uncertainty, 
individuals form new, or join existing groups, where ingroup members share similar 
ideas and attitudes. More specifically, depersonalization, a process associated with 
identification, is ideal for uncertainty reduction since during this process the 
individual perceives the group membership in normative aspects and identifies with 
its prototypical features.
Using both artificially constructed (minimal group paradigm) and real groups, the 
postulations of this theory were tested in a number of studies, which revealed that 
categorization produced discrimination and elevated the levels of identification only 
under the condition of high subjective uncertainty (Noel, Wann and Branscombe, 
1995; Mullin and Hogg, 1998; Hogg and Grieve, 1999). In addition, Jetten, 
Branscombe and Spears (2002) provided some empirical support for another 
assumption of the uncertainty reduction model, suggesting that under some conditions 
uncertainty reduction may fimction as a motive on which self-esteem may rest (see 
also Mullin and Hogg, 1998). More specifically, in their study they examined 
collective and personal self-esteem as a function of anticipated changes in one’s 
prototypicality within a valued group, and revealed that future expectations affected 
self-esteem only among those who reported an insecure identity. Furthermore, those 
individuals also expressed more ingroup favouritism.
Therefore, in contrast to the context dependence of most motivations like self-esteem, 
subjective uncertainty is associated more with stability. On that basis, it could be 
argued that it is similar in some ways to the self-verification process and to the needs 
for. meaning and continuity (Breakwell, 1986; Swann, 1987; Baumeister, 1991; Stets 
and Burke, 2000) that aims to provide a sense of connection and congruence across 
time and context within an individual’s self-perceptions and identity structure.
In agreement with what Deaux (2000a) also argues, it can be suggested that subjective 
uncertainty reduction motivational theory does not account for the fact that in real life 
contexts, individuals belong to many categories at the same time. In the case that 
these multiple identities are contradictory, in the way they are defined (prototypes)
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and articulated, the desirable sense of coherence cannot be achieved. Thus, 
identification with these categories may become really problematic. As long as this 
motivational need is studied within settings that emphasize short-term salience, this 
might not be a problem. However, consideration of the long term effects may pose 
serious conceptual and methodological problems in the theory (Deaux, 2000a).
Identity Process Theory
Identity Process Theory (Breakwell, 1986,1993), which studies the effect of 
contextual change on the cognitive identity processes of assimilation -  
accommodation (absorption of new information and reconstructing of identity 
structure to accommodate this information) and evaluation (allocation of meaning and 
value to identity content both before and after the change), proposes that identification 
with an identity element may be guided by additional principles (distinctiveness 
continuity, self-efficacy) to self-esteem. In their study Vignoles, Breakwell and 
Chryssochoou (2002), using multilevel regression models, tested the self-esteem 
model against all four other motivational principles (IPT model) in predicting levels 
of perceived centrality of multiple elements of identity in a sample of Anglican 
priests. Their results demonstrated that the other principles should be considered, not 
just self-esteem, as they contributed equally well in predicting the centrality of the 
examined multiple elements of identity. Breakwell (1986) argued that the theory does 
not provide an exhaustive list of identity motivations and that other principles may be 
important with respect to the type of identification studied in different contexts. The 
four principles proposed by the model are: distinctiveness, continuity, self-esteem, 
and self-efficacy and, according to the author, they guide intra-individual processes 
but are also socially-established.
Distinctiveness Principle: refers to the individual’s need to feel unique and be 
differentiated from others. As we discussed before, the distinctiveness principle is a 
core motivation in all motivational theories. In their article, Vignoles, Breakwell and 
Chryssochoou (2000) provided a systematic literature review of the different 
assumptions about why distinctiveness is important to identity and whether 
distinctiveness should be conceptualised:
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1) as a culturally specific social value
2) as a means of self-enhancement in the context of social comparisons and/or
3) as a universal distinct human need.
Its importance seems to lay in its contribution to providing identity meaning by 
constructing a representation of the identity in relative terms (the fact that I am A 
means that I am not B), whilst introducing a degree of similarity with all those who 
belong to this category (see also Codol, 1981).
With respect to the first assumption (distinctiveness as a social value) the authors 
discussed its contextual importance in relation to the individualism-collectivism 
classification of cultures. After enlisting different sources of distinctiveness relevant 
to the context studied, position held in social relations, and the meanings attached to 
separateness and difference they discussed how the above can affect differently 
identity (both at the individual and at the group level), intra-group and inter-group 
perceptions and behaviour.
Based on the fact that there was no empirical investigation addressing the social value 
assumption, they suggested that this assumption will only be supported if  a study 
shows that differences in the levels of distinctiveness were accounted for by existing 
experimentally induced differences in the social value of distinctiveness. The second 
study of the present thesis addressed this issue, not only in relation to group 
distinctiveness, but to continuity principle as well. Their levels were examined before 
and after the experimental manipulations (vignettes) were introduced, which 
threatened the cultural importance of maintaining these two national principles in the 
context of European integration. In inter-group contexts, perceptions of threat to the 
distinctiveness principle are most often discussed as a function of inter-group 
similarity, and are associated with the elevation of ingroup bias and antagonism 
between groups (van Knippenberg and Ellemers, 1993; Jetten, Spears and Manstead, 
1997).
Continuity Principle: refers to an individual’s desire to maintain a sense of 
consistency regarding their identity across time and situation. We believe that there is 
a conceptual analogy between the concepts of possible selves (Markus and Nurius,
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1986) and the continuity principle. The first one refers to individuals’ ideas which 
derive from “representations of the self in the past and they include representations of 
the self in the future” (Markus and Nurius, 1986, p. 954). Similarly, maintaining 
continuity enables individuals’ to construct an account for their identity not only in 
relation to their past and/or present, but also to their future. Relevant research has 
shown that, after a change occurs for example after migrating, people would try to 
recreate their social contexts (Swann, 1983, 1987; Ethier and Deaux, 1994).
Moreover, in some studies the significance of the environment and the role of 
monuments, symbols (Billig, 1995; Devine-Wright and Lyons, 1997) or the role of 
myths and history (Liu and Hilton, 2005) in providing a sense of continuity with 
national or ethnic categories have been examined. All these (e.g. environment, myths, 
commemorations, social rituals) can be classified as sources of the continuity 
principle. Finally, it also needs to be mentioned that new information that is classified 
as similar or congruent to the already existed identity, tends to be perceived as less 
threatening and be absorbed better within an identity structure (Swann and Read, 
1981).
Self-Esteem: may be defined as the desire of the individual to evaluate himself/herself 
positively. “It is the evaluative aspect of reflexive consciousness: it makes a value 
judgement based on self-knowledge” (Baumeister, 1998, p. 694). As previously 
discussed, the popularity of self-esteem and its treatment as the primary motive 
guiding identity process is evinced in the number of studies, theories and perennial 
debates around its optimal assessment (for a detailed discussion see Chapter 3).
Self-Efficacy: can be defined as one’s own personal judgement about his/her 
capability to execute the actions required to deal with prospective actions (Bandura, 
1997). In the present thesis, participants’ self-efficacy was measured at the group 
level. Bandura (2000) defined collective efficacy as a shared belief in a group’s 
capability to execute a course of action effectively and to override any difficulties that 
may challenge the positive outcome of this collective effort.
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2.3.3 The content variation o f  identities and its impact on motivation
The content of identity has been a long neglected aspect in most theories of self and 
identity. It can be suggested that the content of social identities has been addressed to 
some extent by self-categorisation theory in relation to the group stereotypes (for a 
review see Fiske, 2000). Social representation theory (Moscovici, 1972,1988) 
focused more on the study of the content of identities, treating them as constructed 
representations, responsive and flexible to the social world (context) they are trying to 
make sense of. A more detailed discussion on the content of social identities is 
presented in Chapter 6. In the present section, our aim is to discuss briefly how 
giving a minor role to identity content, and to variations between identity categories, 
has narrowed our understanding as to which motivational needs lead to identification 
with different social categories. This is particularly important when one wants to 
study the type of relationship (reinforcing, unrelated or conflicting) that may exist 
between two or more identity elements based on their respective motivational 
principles.
To start with, most motivational theories seem to treat empirically the content of each 
group membership in a similar way, disregarding the fact that each identity might 
serve a different function within identity structure. Supposing that each membership 
is guided by the same motivational principles, and that a group is a group as far as 
content, value and in general social psychological processes are concerned, seems 
theoretically unsound (Brown, 2000). Many social theorists started questioning this 
equivalence between social categories in terms of meaning and salience suggesting 
that identities are different, based on their psychological significance and their role 
within identity structure (Brown and Williams, 1984; Stryker, 1987). In support of 
this argument, Breakwell (1986) and Deaux (2000a) suggest that in the case of 
ascribed and early-developed identities such as gender and ethnicity, identity seems to 
precede self-esteem, while it may be guided by a different set of motivational 
principles derived from the socio-historical context in which the specific identity is 
shaped and developed.
As already mentioned the research by Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi and Ethier (1995) 
revealed that individuals from different cultures identify different clusters
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(classification of memberships) and they ascribe different psychological and 
contextual meanings to group memberships.
In another line of research, Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi and Cotting (1999) asked different 
groups to rate important aspects of their group membership. Factor analysis of the 
data revealed seven different functions (such as self-insight, inter-group comparisons) 
whilst different groups stressed different motivations. More specifically, religious 
groups highlighted self-insight, self-esteem and cohesion, whereas sports team 
emphasized inter-group comparison.
Based on the findings from the previously discussed studies one may suggest that 
identities serve different functions within identity structure and, depending on their 
content, they may be associated more or less with specific motivational processes.
For example, the national identity element may be more associated with the continuity 
motivational principle, whilst being a doctor may be more associated with self- 
efficacy. These findings suggest that motivational theorists need to broaden their 
theories to include more motivations relevant to the content and the function of the 
social identities/elements studied.
It is our assertion that each identity element may be guided by its own corresponding 
identity principles. Moreover, due to the fact that identity elements are not isolated in 
identity structure, a partial but most importantly an extensive overlap between the two 
in terms of meaning (e.g. values, norms) may also imply an overlap at the level of 
their motivational processes. To the best of our knowledge this later assumption has 
not yet been empirically investigated.
Thus far, this chapter has reviewed literature concerned with the consequences of 
conceptualising categorisation within single and multiple identities and identity 
structure for self-definition. The following section turns our attention to the 
implications of the multiplicity premise for inter-group perceptions.
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2.4 Threat to identity and multi-cultural societies: Managing multiple 
identities in the context of inter-group relations
Categorisation with single and multiple social categories is not only important for 
auto-perception within the context of intra-group relations (individual in relation to 
the group), but also has a crucial impact on inter-group cognitions (hetero­
perception), attitudes and behaviour (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). If the multiple criteria 
individuals use when classifying themselves and others are understood, variations in 
social judgements and inter-group attitudes (prejudicial and acculturative attitudes) 
may be better explained (individual as a group member in relation to ‘others’).
Therefore, in this last sub-section of the present chapter we shift emphasis to inter­
group context and discuss how ingroup perceptions with reference to one’s 
membership in multiple social groups may affect the way individuals relate to one 
another as members of different social groups. Our discussion centres around two 
broad questions:
a) how different forms o f identity structures may be linked with inter-group 
perceptions and levels o f inter-group bias (prejudice) and
b) to what extent one’s organisation o f multiple identities and their 
interrelationships may reflect the attitudes a person may hold towards his/her own 
culture and also in relation to the other groups living in their society 
(acculturation theories).
Prior to addressing these questions, one also needs to investigate the possible threats 
that people may experience on their identity systems in the advent of a short or a long 
term contextual change (e.g. situational changes or migration respectively), and the 
strategies (coping mechanisms) employed in a later stage by individuals and/or groups 
to ameliorate their impact.
Threat has a key role influencing intra-group and inter-group perceptions and 
attitudes. Responses to threat may lead to outgroup derogation, especially when the 
outgroup is held responsible for the negatively perceived valued status of the ingroup 
identity. Moreover, as mentioned in the preceding sections, multiple categorisations
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(simultaneous or not) and the way they relate to each other, may be a source of threat 
in contexts that identification with one may be perceived by the individual as having 
important repercussions for the other (s) identities residing within identity structure.
In the present section, the role that multiple identities and their interrelationships may 
have as coping strategies in the context of high levels of threat is also discussed. To 
this end, the present section starts of with a brief overview of threatened identities, 
referring to the types and conditions under which it may have a strong impact on 
identity structure ingroup/inter-group perceptions and attitudes.
2.4.1 Threat and identity
Individuals live in multicultural and multi-religious contexts, where new identities are 
constantly manufactured whilst old identities are reformed or abandoned (if possible). 
As Moscovici rightly points out “society is constantly producing new representations 
to motivate action and make sense of human interaction that spring from peoples’ 
everyday problems” (1988, p. 217). Under what conditions do these processes o f  
social identity redefinition and negotiation (identity change) pose a threat to 
dimensions o f self-evaluation affirmed by group identities? How do individuals 
respond to social change? These issues are the topic of the following sections.
Understanding the concept of threat and its influence on intra and inter-group attitudes 
has been and still remains a key issue in the field of inter-group relations. Different 
theoretical perspectives that try to identify the reasons behind the persistence of 
prejudice as a social phenomenon have included the concept of identity threat as an 
antecedent in their theoretical models (e.g. Stephan and Stephan, 1996, 2000a). 
Nevertheless, answering the question of what constitutes a threat does not seem to be 
an easy task, especially when it comes to group identities. A threat to an individual 
may not be perceived as a threat by all group members and vice versa. Breakwell 
(1986) emphasizes that no generic definitions of threats can be used and that it can 
usually be inferred from its short-term or chronic effects on identity systems.
Much research in the SIT and SCT tradition examines the effect of threat and the 
different behavioral responses that individuals adopt to ameliorate its consequences
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on identity structure, when the threat is predominantly directed towards social 
identification processes (Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Oakes, Haslam and Turner, 1994; 
Spears, Oakes, Ellemers and Haslam, 1997). Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, and 
Doosje (1999) proposed four types of social identity threat. The first type of threat, 
categorization threat, occurs when individuals are categorized by others as members 
of groups beyond their choice (see also Ethier and Deaux, 1994, and Deaux, 2000a, 
for discussion on ascribed category memberships). The second type occurs when one 
is denied access to the ingroup or when one’s current position in the group is 
undermined {acceptance threat). The second and third types occur when the value of 
the ingroup identity is questioned and when the group loses or better perceives itself 
as losing its ability to remain positively distinct from other groups. Responses to 
threat relating to the quest for positive ingroup evaluation and inter-group 
distinctiveness have remained so far at the centre of academic interest. In most 
studies manipulating threat, respondents are led to believe that their current 
memberships (usually artificially constructed categories) lack their value dimensions 
as a result of unfavorable intra-group and/or inter-group comparisons (Branscombe 
and Wann, 1994; Burris and Jackson, 2000). The findings from these studies suggest 
that responses to threat vary depending on the levels of identification with the 
purportedly inferior group (Doosje and Ellemers, 1997; Branscombe et al., 1999). 
High group identifiers usually increase or sustain their levels of identification via self- 
stereotyping, thereby enhancing self-esteem levels. On the contrary, low group 
identifiers, in their attempt to enhance identity motivations, incline to distance 
themselves even more from the membership that is being challenged and/or 
questioned. Therefore, levels of ingroup identification would determine both the 
levels of threat experienced (i.e. the more you identify with that social category, the 
more susceptible you are to threat) and the choice of responses for overcoming the 
negative experience and for improving the integrity of the identity(s).
One problem frequently mentioned in relation to SIT’s and SCT’s approach on 
threatened identities is that, with the exception of some studies that examine threat 
relating to uncertainty reduction motivation (Hogg and Abrams, 1993, 1998; Hogg, 
2000), the impact of threat is studied only in relation to distinctiveness and self­
esteem motivational processes. This is part of the broader conceptual debate,
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discussed in the previous section that questions the treatment of distinctiveness as part 
of the evaluative dimension of identity. Many theorists opposed the idea of 
distinctiveness being conceptually and sometimes methodologically subsumed under 
self-esteem (positive distinctiveness) (see for discussion Breakwell, 1986; Brewer, 
1993 and Vignoles et al., 2000). As a response to this criticism, Branscombe et al. 
(1999), in their analysis of social identity threat differentiate between two types of 
distinctiveness threat: one relating to the maintenance of a distinct social identity for 
self-definition and the other for inter-group distinctiveness.
Threat may be directed to the value of an identity after unfavorable inter-group 
comparisons, but it can also be a result of change in the context, in the broader 
environment in which this identity is embedded and operates (Chryssochoou, 2004). 
Social change may initiate changes in patterns of identity and challenge the already 
established ones. The forms of change and their impact on the existing identity 
structure vary. It may mean “a change in the category or the claim to a social identity, 
or a change in the meanings associates with identity” (Deaux, 1992, p. 27). This type 
of identity threat is discussed in more detail by Identity Process Theory (Breakwell,
1986).
According to Breakwell (1986) changes in the environment are likely to initiate 
changes in identity based on:
1) their personal relevance,
2) the immediacy of involvement in them,
3) the amount of change demanded, and
4) how negative this change is for the individual or the relevant group.
Moreover, threat can emanate also from the individual or firom other people who we 
may perceive as having the status, power and a legitimate right to pass on this 
judgment.
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As discussed previously, the theory postulates that threat to identity may occur when 
the cognitive processes of assimilation and accommodation are not compliable with 
the identity motivational principles. This would cause a rearrangement in the relative 
salience of the four motivations: distinctiveness, continuity, esteem and efficacy. 
There is also a distinction between an experience of threat and a threatening position. 
To be in a threatening position does not necessarily mean that you experience threat. 
Threat needs to be consciously received in order to evoke action. Any change 
occurring in the levels of identity principles, conscious or unconscious, is a coping 
strategy. For the evoked coping strategies to be effective, one needs to take into 
consideration, the type of threat, the societal context, the organization of identity 
structure, and finally the cognitive and emotional constraints.
Researchers in another line of research, mainly in migration literature, have developed 
different typologies of threat: realistic and symbolic threats. The first type refers to 
threats directed towards the economic, political, and physical well being of the 
ingroup, whereas the second one refers to the challenge to a group’s system of values, 
beliefs and morals (Stephan, Boniecki, Ybarra et al., 2002). Additionally, feelings of 
inter-group anxiety experienced during the inter-group contact (Stephan and Stephan, 
1985) and negative outgroup stereotypes (Allen, 1996) could be associated with 
expression of negative prejudice attitudes towards the outgroup. Whatever typology 
of threat may be used, what is important is that a threat experienced either at the 
individual or at the group level seems to influence the relationship between ingroup 
favouritism and outgroup derogation (prejudice).
2.4.2 Threat, inter-group bias and levels o f  ingroup identification
SIT suggests that a positive social identity is based on favourable inter-group 
comparisons. However, evidence testing the identification-bias hypothesis, which 
implies an association between the two concepts, is far from conclusive. Hinkle and 
Brown (1990), in their review of laboratory experiments relevant to the relationship 
between these two concepts, proposed that the correlations are either of modest or 
negative size. On the other hand, a number of studies looking at how strength of
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group identification is associated with prejudiced attitudes revealed that identification 
is a strong predictor of prejudice (e.g. Abrams and Hogg, 1990; Duckitt and 
Mphutting, 1998).
SIT theorists have suggested that the association between group identification and 
prejudice is expected to be stronger under the context of threat, since under this 
condition individuals are motivated to elevate their identities by expressing negative 
attitudes towards a specific outgroup (Brown, 1995; Branscombe and Wann, 1994; 
Jetten, Spears and Manstead, 1997; Verkuyten and Nekuee, 1999a). The results of the 
studies examining this hypothesis did not show consistent support., The main reason 
for this inconsistency may be the fact that threat to identity leads the more strongly 
identified individuals to behave in prejudiced ways (Operario and Fiske, 2001). Level 
of identification is a good predictor of ingroup bias (Crocker and Luhtanen, 1990).
Spears, Doosje and Ellemers (1997), following SCT claims about the context 
dependence of social categorisation, emphasised the role of self-stereotyping process 
as being responsible for the development of prejudiced attitudes. Deaux (1996) 
argued that the relationship between identification and self-stereotyping might be 
conceptualised in terms of category-salience, suggesting that people who commit or 
identify strongly with the group might engage more in self-stereotyping behaviour. 
Therefore, in a perceived or an actual threat condition, identification is expected to 
moderate self-stereotyping, revealing that high identifiers in the face of identity threat 
support their membership by increasing their self-stereotyping levels (Spears, Doosje 
and Ellemers, 1997).
2.4.3 Structural representations o f  multiple identities and inter-group bias
Although there was an early dated consensus and interest in the study of multiple 
identities and on their effect on inter-group attitudes, few theorists have addressed it 
empirically, using mainly cross-cutting categories (Hewstone, Islam and Judd, 1993; 
Migdal, Hewstone and Mullen, 1998; Urban and Miller, 1998). The majority of 
researchers focused their studies on the context of single ingroup-outgroup 
identifications.
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Drawing on different theoretical approaches on identity structure, Roccas and Brewer 
(2002) emphasized the necessity for the development of a generic theoretical map to 
examine the subjective representations of multiple ingroup identities and their 
interrelationships. In their model of structural representations of multiple identities, 
four different types of identity structure were presented (intersection, dominance, 
compartmentalization and merger) which were classified based on their levels of 
complexity (high or low). Their model also suggested that representations of multiple 
memberships are context specific, temporal and guided by the psychological states of 
the beholder. In the next section, we review the structural representations of social 
identity complexity model, as suggested by the authors, and we explain how different 
types of structure were used by identity theorists in relation to expressions of inter­
group bias.
2.4.4 Research on multiple categorizations and inter-group bias
Reviewing the literature on multiple identities/cross-categorizations and their effect 
on inter-group bias, it became apparent that in being strictly based and ToyaT to their 
theoretical tenets (structure vs. process models), identity theorists approached the 
concept of multiple identities either accepting or neglecting the variety of the 
proposed forms of identity structures.
Intersection: When a number of cross-cutting categories are salient at the same time 
an individual identifies with a prime social identity, which may be a combination of 
two or more identity elements. In this way, a new category is established where 
ingroup members are defined on the basis of sharing all the relevant identity elements 
(Roccas and Brewer, 2002).
This form of identity structure was extensively discussed within different frameworks 
studying models of cross-categorization contexts, such as Social Identity (Tajfel and 
Turner, 1978), Category Differentiation Model (Dechamps and Doise, 1978; Doise, 
1978; Vanbeselaere, 1987) and Optimal Distinctiveness Theory (Brewer, 1991, 1993, 
1999a). Based on this structural approach, multiplicity within identity structure 
reflects a specific social context (experimental vs. real) where at least two
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dichotomous dimensions of personal and/or social identities function simultaneously. 
Crosscutting categories might be schematically represented as two orthogonal lines 
that cross cut each other resulting in four groups: double ingroup, double outgroup, 
and two crossed conditions.
Cross-categorization occurs along two axes: 1) social comparison (ingroup similarity 
vs. dissimilarity) and 2) self-esteem processes (Crisp and Hewstone, 2000). Doise’s 
(1978) category differentiation model suggests that, whilst simple categorizations 
stress differences and similarities between groups, multiple categorizations result in 
“convergence” between the categories and “divergence” within each category 
(Hewstone et al., 1993). A series of studies, that were conducted to examine the 
above theoretical assumptions, resulted in two versions of category differentiation 
model. Based on Diehl’s findings (1989,1990) members of double ingroups and the 
single outgroups were positively evaluated and discrimination was eliminated, whilst 
double outgroups where evaluated negatively. However, based on Vanbeselaere 
(1987a, 1987b) findings it was suggested that inter-group bias was reduced with 
double ingroup being evaluated positively, double outgroup negatively whilst single 
outgroup was perceived as extremely different.
Following a different theoretical path, social identity theorists (Brown and Turner, 
1979; Tajfel and Turner, 1979) emphasized that expression of ingroup bias and inter­
group derogation is still present in cross-categorisation contexts, due to the existence 
of underlying motivational processes or needs, such as positive distinctiveness and 
self-esteem. More specifically, they proposed that, if  both categorizations are equally 
relevant to identity, all outgroup members would experience discrimination, but forms 
of biases would be stronger towards double outgroup members due to the fact that 
differences are identified in more than one dimension (additive pattern).
The idea that cross-cutting categories can reduce levels of prejudice and smooth inter­
group relations was originally supported by anthropologists (LeVine and Campbell, 
1972; Murphy, 1957). However, research on exploring the effectiveness of contexts 
of moderate similarity (due to the existence of shared social categories) in reducing 
inter-group bias and conflict is far from conclusive. Contrary to SIT’s claims, in a
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series of studies it was revealed that groups that perceive themselves as more similar 
by sharing group norms, status, and power, show more inter-group attraction and less 
bias than dissimilar groups (Bume, 1971; Brewer and Campbell, 1976, Doise, 1978, 
Turner, 1987). However, there are some studies supporting SIT’s prediction that inter­
group similarity increases inter-group differentiation, but not necessarily hostility, 
especially if the groups are alike and were developed in the same context (Brown and 
Abrams, 1986). Studying the impact of inter-group similarity on inter-group 
relations, Roccas and Schwartz (1993) demonstrated that high levels of perceived 
inter-group similarity had two opposing effects. On the one hand, they increased 
ingroup favouritism in evaluations. On the other, they increased readiness for social 
contact with the outgroup. These effects were found to be moderated by levels of 
individuals’ identification with the ingroup (see also Jetten, Spears and Manstead, 
2001).
In an attempt to explain these empirical and theoretical inconsistencies (whether the 
context of similarity or difference increases inter-group bias-prejudice). Brewer 
developed (1991, 1993) a new motivational theory (Optimal Distinctiveness Theory). 
The theory argued that individuals have an interchangeable need for differentiation 
and inclusion, and that they continuously seek an optimal balance. Equilibrium might 
be achieved through memberships that satisfy both needs at the same time. According 
to Brown (2000) the same pattern might be applicable at the inter-group level where 
groups try to find moderately similar and different groups. Other theoretical claims 
make different predictions, such as the displacement in fiustration-aggression theory 
(Dollard, Doob, Miller et al., 1939) which suggests that in contexts of moderate 
similarity individuals express higher levels of inter-group bias. Jetten, Spears and 
Manstead (1998) proposed that group variability tends not to be at the two ends of the 
scales. However, they argued that inter-group bias (not outgroup derogation) was 
evident in moderate cases of similarity. It might be interesting to look at whether this 
appears in affective and evaluative measures of groups.
The validity of all the above empirical and theoretical claims remains questionable, 
since most empirical evidence on cross-categorizations and inter-group bias has been 
based on experimental manipulations (minimal group paradigms), tested in artificial
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settings controlling for equal salience and real-world influences. However, in the 
majority of studies reviewed so far it was demonstrated that adding a cross-cutting 
category is likely to reduce ingroup bias and to increase more positive attitudes 
toward crossed category members compared to the simple ingroup and outgroup 
distinction. Moreover, as Deaux (2000b) argues in cultural diverse contexts, the 
simple and prototypical distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ neither is psychologically 
meaningful, automatic nor reflects the social reality. The designation of ingroup and 
outgroup is more complicated, which makes cross-categorisation context much more 
relevant in influencing and explaining social perceptions.
Nevertheless, cross-categorisation does not always manage to reduce prejudice. For 
instance, if  categories are correlated (Eurich-Fulcer and Schofield, 1995) or when 
multiple ingroup identities may be perceived under the context of threat (or not) as 
embedded in the other (social exclusion pattern). Convergence of identities may 
result in much more exclusion than considering each category in isolation (see Brewer 
and Gaertner, 2001). Moreover, if  one category distinction is relatively more 
chronically salient, socially meaningful and functionally dominant than others, the 
existence of cross-cutting memberships may not be considered as a criterion in inter­
group evaluations. Brewer, Ho, Lee and Miller (1987) suggested alternative models 
such as category dominance, category conjunction and hierarchical ordering 
applicable in contexts of unequal category salience. In the following sections, we 
revisit two such models of identity structure: dominance and compartmentalisation.
Dominance and Compartmentalization; Dominance is a structure, in which the 
primacy of one social category (salience) over the others results in the perception of 
other identifications, which are less salient, as subordinate, embedded in the dominant 
category and potentially “absorbed”. Therefore, ingroup members are defined by 
their sharing of the defining characteristics and behavioural patterns associated only 
with this prominent category (Urban and Muller, 1998). However, it is proposed that 
the fact that ingroup members are defined by the salience of one dominant category 
does not suggest that differentiations based on other categories do not exist (Roccas 
and Brewer, 2002).
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A typical example of this form of structure can be found within study designs based 
on social identity (Tajfel and Turner, 1979), self-categorization theories (Turner,.
1987), identity process theory (Breakwell, 1986) and, from a sociological perspective, 
in identity theory (Stryker, 1980, 1987).
Based on all these theoretical frameworks, it was suggested that multiplicity within 
identity structure, as a result of multiple memberships, is explained by the rationale 
that identities/identity elements are organized in a hierarchical order structure based 
on their relative salience and/or centrality. The main predictions of social identity and 
self-categorization theories were used as a theoretical and empirical terrain for 
studying the role of multiple categorizations in relation to ingroup perceptions and 
inter-group evaluations (Oakes, Haslam and Turner, 1994; Rutland and Cinnirella, 
2000).
More specifically, SCT refers to issues of complexity and multiplicity within identity 
structure as a source of single and multiple memberships organized in a hierarchical- 
order structure (salience). Based on the theory’s presumption, the self concept is 
perceived as “a dynamic process of reflexive judgment” (Onorato and Turner, 2001, 
p. 159) thus tolerating the existence of variation and fluidity in terms of content and 
structure attributable to the differential comparative contexts that a personal or social 
identity is exposed to, and to the motivational and cognitive processes involved 
(Kinket and Verkuyten, 1999).
When two or more identities overlap, and their content as well as the purpose they 
serve (enhancement strategies) within identity structure is perceived as mutually 
exclusive and threatening, then the structure of compartmentalization might be 
preferred. This suggests that the primacy of one identity depends on the specific 
context, whilst social identities function independently from each other, without being 
simultaneously salient. Therefore, an individual who is a member of multiple social 
and/or personal categories defines the ingroup/outgroup members only based on the 
category which is relevant in the specific situation. For example, during a football 
game (context), an individual may consider as fellow ingroup members only the 
supporters of the same team.
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In diverse societal contexts though, where more than two identities are salient at the 
same time and exist in the same level of abstraction, it is not always possible to 
achieve a simple identity structure, i.e. national and religious identities. As previously 
mentioned. Brown and Turner (1979) suggested that, under such contexts, equally 
salient categories are “combined” setting out additive criteria for the evaluation of 
outgroup members.
Merger: This model of multiple identities’ structural representation suggested that an 
individual establishes a more inclusive definition of the ingroup/outgroup boundaries, 
since identities irrespective of their content (convergent or non-convergent) or 
structure are combined to formulate a single and diversified category. As Roccas and 
Brewer (2002) argued, an individual’s “social identity is the sum of one’s combined 
dimensions” (p. 91). Emphasis on the development of more inclusive categories, 
potentially shared among individuals from different socio-cultural contexts, seemed 
very promising within the area of inter-group relations. A relatively recent theoretical 
framework studying social phenomena such as prejudice, racial and ethnic stigma, the 
Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner et al., 1993; Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000) 
proposed that if individuals perceive their multiple memberships not as a source of 
differentiation but as a basis for developing broader and more inclusive categories 
(superordinate categories), lower levels of inter-group bias should be expected.
However, the notion that re-categorization with an all inclusive undifferentiated group 
representation might decrease the levels of inter-group bias was not new, whilst the 
findings are inconclusive. Urban and Miller (1998), in their paper about the 
theoretical analysis of cross-categorizarion effects, referred to this type of structure as 
equivalent pattern in which an individual perceives target groups as equals on the 
basis of this single categorization. Hewstone (1996) suggested that establishing more 
unitary-superordinate categories might not “overcome powerful ethnic and racial 
categorizations on more than a temporal basis” (p.351). The findings of Hornsey and 
Hogg (2000), investigating the effect of common ingroup identity on university 
students, also revealed that this categorization increased their levels of bias. This 
supports the theoretical claims of social identity theorists that these types of groups 
pose a threat to maintaining a sense of distinctiveness (Brewer, 1993). Moreover, the 
work of Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel and Weber (2003) contrasts the idea of all
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those models that propose that, just by altering the salience of the subgroup category, 
inter-group conflict will be reduced. In addition, the authors suggest that in real life 
contexts it may not always be possible to alter the level of categorization and reduce 
its salience.
In our opinion one important contribution that is potentially promising for the study of 
inter-group relations is the dual-identity model or multicultural identity that combines 
the effects from, common ingroup identity (Gaertner and Dovidio) and mutual- 
differentiation models (Horsney and Hogg, 2000). According to its tenets, individuals 
may identify with one broader category, while at the same time their subgroup 
identities would remain salient functioning as the basis for ingroup differentiation. In 
other words, as Roccas and Brewer (2002) propose there may be a 
compartmentalization-merger type of identity structure.
To conclude this section, it needs to be mentioned that the type of models reviewed so 
far should not be viewed as antithetical and mutually exclusive. As Brewer and 
Gaertner (2001) and Hewstone, Rubin and Willis (2002) argue, each one of them may 
be applicable and effective under particular contact conditions. Their effectiveness in 
reducing inter-group bias depends on the type of identities that are made salient, the 
definitions of these social categories in the contexts of interest whilst the successful 
implementation of their outcomes also requires the absence of perceptions of threat 
and chronic inter-group conflict between the contending groups.
2.4.5 Structural representations o f multiple identities, inter-group bias and
acculturation theories
To date, much of the research examining the impact of how multiple identities are 
organised at the individual level on inter-group relations has focused on the study of 
ingroup favouritism and/or levels of prejudice. The focus of the empirical work 
reported in this thesis is on identity dynamics in the context of culturally diverse 
societies. Acknowledging that both members of the majority and minority/immigrant 
groups in multi-cultural societies belong to multiple groups, it is argued that it is 
interesting to examine the extent to which the closeness of the relationship between 
multiple identities will impact on what members of the majority are likely to expect
76
from their own state, and members of the minority/immigrant groups with regard to 
how majority and minority groups should relate to each other. In particular the target 
identities (religious and national) of this thesis are likely to be relevant, as debates of 
inter-cultural relations within multi-cultural societies often evoke these social 
categories. It is claimed that such an approach may enable us on one hand to further 
our understanding of the relative impact of how multiple identities are subjectively 
represented on inter-group relations. On the other hand, it is expected to make a 
contribution on our understanding of which social psychological factors and processes 
are likely to facilitate or hinder social cohesion in multi-cultural societies.
Traditionally the way individuals position themselves in relation to their own culture 
and that of the host society and how individual members of the host society are likely 
to be affected by their contact with members of minority/immigrant groups was 
studied within the frameworks of acculturation theories (Berry, 1990, 2001, 2006; 
Hutnik, 1991; LaFromboise, Coleman and Gerton, 1993; Liebkind, 1996, 2001; 
Bourhis, Moïse, Perreault and Senécal, 1997).
Starting as an anthropological term, acculturation is defined as the process that 
entails:
“those phenomena which result when groups of individuals having different 
cultures come into continuous first hand-contact with subsequent changes in 
the original culture patterns of either or both groups”
(Redfield, Linton and Herskovits, 1936, p. 149)
Although the notion of a bi-directional change between the cultures in contact is 
inherent in this definition, the study of acculturation models had initially focused on 
exploring the level of adaptation and the psychological processes that immigrant and 
minority groups engage in after their settlement in the host society (Berry, 1990; 
Hutnik, 1991; LaFromboise, Coleman and Gerton, 1993; Liebkind, 1996). The need 
to include the host majority’s acculturative attitudes in the study of acculturation 
process became more apparent, as integration was revealed to be the preferred 
acculturation strategy by most non-dominant groups (Berry, Kim, Power Young and 
Bujaki, 1989; Berry, 1997; Horenczyk, 1997; Liebkind, 2001; Zagefka and Brown,
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2002; Jasinskaja-Lahti, Liebkind, Horenczyk and Schmitz, 2003). Nevertheless, the 
successfiil implementation of integration orientation, that fosters the ‘borrowing’ of 
cultural elements between the two interacting groups and tolerates the development of 
new-mixed cultures, can only be attained when the state and its citizens value the 
philosophy of cultural diversity and do not express negative attitudes towards the 
immigrant and the minority groups living in the society (Moghaddam and Taylor, 
1987; Berry, 1999, 2001; van Oudenhoven and Eisses, 1998).
Bourhis, Moïse, Perreault and Senécal (1997) criticized the excessive focus of 
acculturation models on minorities and, based on Berry’s heuristic model of 
immigrant acculturation (IAS), proposed the Interactive Model of Acculturation 
(LAM) that studies acculturation phenomena as a dynamic process between the 
contending groups. The model aims to integrate both immigrant and majority 
perspectives and emphasizes that consideration of inter-group and interpersonal 
outcomes of both immigrants’ and host members’ acculturations might set the basis 
for interethnic and intercultural communication. So far, empirical studies, conducted 
in societies where issues of migration are considered central socio-political issues, 
have revealed that the ‘relative fit’ between immigrants’ and host majority’s 
acculturation preferences was a strong predictor of the status of inter-group relations 
(Lalonde and Cameron, 1993;van Oudenhoven, Prins and Buunk, 1998; Phinney, 
Horenczyk, Liebkind and Vedder, 2001; Jackson, Brown, Brown and Marks, 2001; 
Zagefka and Brown, 2002; Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2003).
The different acculturation models put forward by researchers in this field (e.g. 
Gordon, 1964; Berry, 2001; La Fromboise et al., 1993; Bourhis et al., 1997) are 
discussed in some detail in Chapter 8, where the study of the relationship between the 
overlap of national and religious identities and preferred acculturation is reported. 
These models vary in terms of their focus on either members of the minority group or 
members of both the minority and majority group and in the exact acculturation 
strategies they employed. The present research drew on the Interactive Acculturation 
Model (Bourhis et al., 1997; Montreuil and Bourhis, 2001, Bourhis and Montreuil, 
2002) focusing on the preferred acculturation orientations of the majority. These 
orientations include:
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1. Assimilation: host members expect immigrants to relinquish their cultural 
identity for the shake of adopting the host majority culture
2. Exclusionism: host members who endorse this orientation are intolerant of 
immigrants who maintain their culture of origin, but at the same time they 
refuse to allow immigrants to adopt features of the host majority culture
3. Segregation: host members accept that immigrants could maintain their 
heritage culture as long as they do not adopt or mix their culture with that of 
the host majority.
4. Individualism: for host members who endorse this orientation, personal 
characteristics of individuals count most, rather than belonging to one group 
or the other.
5. Integration: host majority members value a stable biculturalism amongst 
immigrants that, in the long term, may contribute to cultural pluralism as an 
enduring feature of the host society.
(Bourhis et al., 1997, p. 380-381)
Researchers have identified a number of factors likely to be related to the choice of 
acculturation strategy from the majority perspective. These include socio­
demographic factors such as the level of educational attainment, gender, age and the 
regional origin of the host majority, as well as other social psychological factors such 
as levels of prejudice, national identification, perceived threat, the length of stay of 
the target group in the country, and the amount of contact with members of the target 
immigrant group (Jackson, Brown, Brown and Marks, 2001; Montreuil and Bourhis, 
2001; Zick, Wagner, van Dick and Petzel, 2001; Breugehnans and van de Vijver, 
2004). Of particular relevance to the work in this thesis is research looking at the 
relationship between strength of national identification and choice of acculturation 
strategy.
Levels of national identification were found to be strongly associated with 
acculturation preferences and choices. From the majority perspective, research 
conducted by Montreuil and Bourhis (2001) suggested that the more that individuals 
identify with the country, the less likely it is for them to endorse strategies that would 
encourage intercultural contact. In another line of research, Billiet, Maddens and 
Beerten (2003), testing the relationship between national identification and attitudes
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towards foreigners in a Belgian sample, demonstrate that the direction and the 
strength between the two variables varies based on the representations of the nation 
(i.e. the strength of the relationship between regional and national identity). Research 
on religions identity has revealed that it is also strongly related to inter-group 
discrimination (Hunter, 1998; Cairns, Kenworthy, and Campbell, 2006), but usually it 
is not used as a dimension for examining the majority acculturation expectations.
With the exception of research conducted in Northern Ireland, religion is frequently 
studied in isolation from national identification whereas it is usually subsumed under 
cultural identity. In Chapter 4 we discuss further the nationality-religion relationship 
and its repercussions for the inter-group relations.
This body of research provides some insight into the relationship between national 
identification and preferred acculturation strategies. However, it is argued here that, 
by neglecting to examine the relationship between religious and national identities on 
such attitudes, it is limited in its scope. Religious identities are often an equally 
salient identity, both in terms of how individual members of majority and minority 
groups’ subjective self definition, and also in terms of the identities members of the 
majority ascribe to members of minority groups. It is therefore likely that the 
perceived relationship between these two identities may contribute to the explanation 
of the choice of certain acculturation orientations.
In line with Roccas and Brewer (2002) and literature on cross-categorisation, we 
expect that, when someone perceives their ingroup membership as an intersection 
between two categories (national and religious), it is likely that they would favour 
strategies such as assimilation, exclusion and segregation, especially when they 
perceive the presence of these groups as threatening the meaning and the value of one 
of the two identities (national). In this case the categorisation process is still used to 
make social judgements and for drawing ingroup boundaries (Crisp, 2002).
On the contrary, when an individual endorses a more complex identity structure and 
perceives his/her ingroup identity as a combination of many group memberships 
where the ingroup members are not always the same, the categorisation process is 
much more complex; thus it may be abandoned for making social judgements and for 
defining self. In this case, the individual may endorse strategies that favour
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intercultural contact or that go beyond the dimension of culture and view people as 
individuals and not as cultural representatives and carriers (integration and 
individualism respectively).
2.5 Concluding remarks
This chapter has reviewed the literature on social psychological theoretical models 
concerned with the conceptualisation of the relationships between multiple identities 
within the individual identity system, and on the relationship between multiple 
identities and inter-group relations and perceptions. Following our discussion of 
theoretical conceptualisations of multiple identities and their relationships, the next 
Chapter critically considers the main methodological approaches to operationalising 
and studying the main concepts evoked in this body of literature.
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Chapter 3: Revisiting the Concepts of Social Identification, Identity 
Motivations, Salience and Centrality: Methodological 
Implications
The aim of this chapter is to examine the implications of conceptual issues involved in 
the study of multiple identities discussed in Chapter 2 for the appropriate methods of 
measuring the core theoretical constructs in this area. It will also discuss the 
implications of the methods often used to measure these constructs for the 
development of theory in this area.
The Chapter comprises three main sections. In the first Section, the 
multidimensionality of the concept of social identification is discussed in relation to 
existing measures of this construct. Section 2 is concerned with the conceptualisation 
and measurement of identity motivations. The discussion in this section centres on 
the two issues which are often debated in the literature in relation to self-esteem. First, 
whether self-esteem should be considered as a trait or a state. The second issue refers 
to whether it should be conceptualised as a global or domain/identity specific 
construct. It will be argued that the relevance of these issues extends to other identity 
motivations as well. Section 3 of this Chapter suggests that attempts to measure how 
multiple identities are organised in the identity structure are underlied by data driven 
or theory driven models. The methodological and theoretical implications of each of 
these approaches are considered. This Section also discusses the different ways 
concepts of salience and centrality have been used and measured in the literature.
3.1 Unravelling the concept of social identification and its multidimensional 
character
The multidimensionality of social identification - the cognitive, affective, behavioural 
aspects, and the lack of consensus as to its conceptual and empirical measurement has 
been well documented (Tajfel, 1978, 1981; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and 
Wetherell, 1987; Luhtanen and Crocker, 1992; Phinney, 1992; Deaux, 1996; Klink, 
Mummendey, Mielke and Blanz, 1997; Ellemers, Kortekaas and Ouwerkerk, 1999; 
Ashmore, Jussim, Wilder and Heppen, 2001; Jackson, 2002; Cameron, 2004). There 
is a fair degree of confusion and disagreement among identity theorists regarding the
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different aspects of social identification process. The key role of identification in 
explaining the intra-group and inter-group relations is acknowledged in all theories 
but following their tenets, identity theorists focused more on some aspects of 
identification and neglected others (Ashmore, Deaux and McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004).
The importance of parsing out the social identification process was initially suggested 
by Freud (1955) and Stone (1962) who distinguished between 1) the cognitive aspect 
of identification, which involves the process of identifying/categorizing self as a 
member of a social category and 2) the affective aspect of identification, that goes 
beyond labelling oneself or being labelled by others as a member of a social category 
(identification with) and brings emotional significance in holding this membership. 
The later process results in the establishment of feelings of belonginess and bonding 
with other group members (Brewer, 1991; Baumeister and Leary, 1995).
Identification has also behavioural implications. For example, wearing a scarf, a 
national dress or church attendance can also function as a reflection of one’s group 
membership. All these different components of identification although related, may 
operate independently of each other (Ellemers et al., 1999).
Defining, measuring and disentangling the sub-elements of identification process still 
remains far from an easy task. Several researchers mainly employing factor analytic 
techniques have attempted to explore all these different facets of identification and the 
strength of their potential interrelationships (Hinkle, Taylor, Fox-Cardamone and 
Crook, 1989; Karasawa, 1991; Luhtanen and Crocker, 1992; Prentice, Miller, 
Lightdale, 1994; Klink et al., 1997; Ellemers, et al., 1999; Cameron, 2004; Obst and 
White, 2005). However, there is no agreement on the conceptual structure of social 
identification construct since a number of different dimensions were revealed in their 
factor solutions.
Most theoretical frameworks focus on the cognitive aspect of self, based on the dual 
processes of self-categorization and social comparison (Tajfel and Turner, 1979), and 
its conceptualization as the antecedent of all other aspects of identifications 
(motivational, affective) resulting in the relegation of the role of the latter (Phiney,
1992) especially of the affective component. Paradoxically, Tajfel (1978) in his 
definition of social identity proposed that three components may contribute to one’s
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social identity (tripartite model of social identity) and emphasized the strong role of 
both the value and emotions. However, he argued explicitly against affective 
explanations of formation of group consciousness (interpersonal attraction 
explanation). Consequently, social identity theorists (SIT) have focused mainly on 
the evaluative aspect of social identification process (motivational processes) and 
have subsumed “the affective processes within identity” under the notion of self­
esteem.
More specifically, it has been suggested that levels of emotional involvement and the 
value (positive or negative) connotation of a group membership covary (Ellemers,
1993). This conceptual analysis also had repercussions for the operational treatment 
of the two constructs. For instance, Klink et al. (1997) put forward the notion that 
identification is comprised of two distinct components: the cognitive and the 
evaluative-emotional. In their analysis, the substantial intercorrelations between the 
latter two aspects were used as an indication that a common factor solution can be 
acceptable. On the other hand, Ellemers et al. (1999) as part of their attempt to 
investigate to what extent factors like relative status (high versus low), relative size 
(minority versus majority) and group formation (ascribed versus self-selected 
membership) affect strength of identification, demonstrated that both on a theoretical 
and on an operational level identification should not be conceptualized as a single 
construct as it is comprised of three distinct components: the cognitive (self­
categorisation), the evaluative (group self-esteem) and the emotional (commitment to 
the group). In their study, these three components were differentially affected by the 
above mentioned experimentally manipulated factors with group self-esteem only 
being affected by the relative status whereas affective commitment depended on both 
the relative status and group formation. Jackson (2002) presented also evidence for a 
three-factor solution: self-categorisation (cognitive), evaluation of the group 
(affective) and perceptions of solidarity (ingroup-ties). The findings from all these 
studies emphasize the utility of a multidimensional analysis of social identification 
process and that clear distinction should be made on the operationalization of each 
component.
However, as long as theorists and researchers limit themselves to minimal group 
situations, where variations in group identifications are not evidenced as much as in
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socially constructed groups, the main focus on the evaluative basis of identification 
runs the risk of being contained to positive differentiation and self-esteem while the 
affective element of identification will remain understudied and neglected (Brown and 
Williams, 1984; Ethier and Deaux, 1994). Groups based on real affect laden 
categories such as nationality and/or ethnicity, are considered a “fertile ground to 
study affect in relation to social identification” (Deaux, 2000a, p. 8).
Furthermore, as discussed in Section 2.3.3 in Chapter 2, based on their type (ascribed 
versus acquired) and their associate meanings (content) identities might serve a 
different function within identity structure (Deaux et al., 1995; Deaux, 2000a). 
Ellemers et al. (1999) in their study integrated these two research designs (natural 
versus artificial groups) and introduced the distinction between ascribed and self­
selected groups in an experimental setting. The fact that group commitment was 
higher in the self-selected groups corroborates the theoretical argument that the type 
of a group membership is an important factor when someone studies the process of 
social identification.
Recently, the need to revisit the role of affect and emotions in the process of social 
identification as independent firom both self-esteem and categorization has been 
emphasized (Brown, 2000; Deaux, 2000a). It has been demonstrated that even if  a 
group membership is negatively evaluated, individuals might acknowledge the 
negative characteristics of their group and still feel emotionally attached and express 
loyalty to this group membership (Mlicki and Ellemers, 1996; Doosje, Branscombe, 
Spears and Manstead, 1998; Branscombe, et al., 1999; Doosje, Ellemers and Spears, 
1999; Ellemers et al., 1999).
Baumeister and Leary (1995) posit that individuals establish strong emotional ties 
with important reference groups due to their need to belong. In the case of real affect 
laden categories, such as nationality and religion even the sight of symbols, buildings 
(ie. church, mosque, ancient monuments) landscapes and flags intensify 
connectedness with these, in Anderson’s terms, ‘imagined communities’ (1983). The 
emotional component of identification was also conceptualized and operationalized 
with ‘introjection’ a term borrowed by Rosenberg (1979) which refers to the 
“emotional fusion or mergence in which the self and this other are experienced as
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inextricably intertwined” (Verkuyten, 2005, p. 67). The failure, success and criticism 
of the group are internalized to such an extent that we could argue that there is an 
absolute state of depersonalization. Kinket and Verkuyten (1997) who used this term 
for measuring strength of identification in ethnic groups (‘ethnic group introjection’) 
proposed that while high introjection implies that there is a positive evaluation of the 
category by its members, the reverse was not true. Their findings further support that 
the emotional component of identification should not be subsumed under the 
motivational psychological process of self-esteem.
Other theorists focused more on the role of emotions as predictors of inter-group 
orientations. Smith (1993) was one of the first researchers that integrated appraisal 
theories in the SIT tradition and explored the role of emotions (fear, disgust, 
contempt, jealousy and anger) in relation to expression of inter-group bias. He 
suggested that individuals who belonged to the lower status groups expressed feelings 
of jealousy and fear while disgust and anger were more typical of dominant groups 
(cited in Brown, 2000). Fiske, Xu, Cuddy and Click (1999) commented on the 
ambivalent nature of the content of group stereotypes (positive and negative traits) 
and discussed how other factors such as interdependence and relative status can be 
predictive of inter-group attitudes (see also Campbell 1958 for a discussion on the 
concept of common fate). Recent empirical research on verbal form of discrimination 
illustrated that emotions like pride and anger accompanied reactions to threat like 
strong ingroup favouritism (identity confirmation) and outgroup discrimination 
(instrumental function for coping in a threatened condition) respectively (Scheepers, 
Spears, Doosje and Manstead, 2003).
Ashmore et al. (2004) in their recent publication provided a critical overview of the 
different terms and measurements used by theorists and researchers in tapping each of 
these components of social identification. Their conclusion was that researchers 
driven fi*om their theoretical expectations focused more to some aspects of 
identification than others. In the present thesis, we used a multidimensional measure 
(Cinnirella, 1997) to assess the strength of identification (or group commitment as 
termed by Ellemers et al., 2002) with the social categories of interest (national, 
religious, gender and student). The use of this measure was part of our attempt to
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acknowledge the multidimensionality of identification when studying identity 
dynamics.
3.2 Conceptual and methodological issues concerning identity motivations
In the previous Chapter, the supremacy of self-esteem was challenged. It was shown 
that theorists have pointed to the necessity to theorise about additional motivations 
that could be satisfied by identification with particular types of categories (Hogg and 
Abrams, 1990; Breakwell, 1986, 1992; Brewer, 1993). Such an approach reflects a 
conceptualisation of identity as a flexible and dynamic system, better able to cope, 
adapt and attend to social changes.
In this Section, some of the main methodological issues concerning all identity 
motivations will be discussed by focusing first on two of the main debates 
surrounding the concept of self-esteem. These debates concern whether self-esteem 
should be 1) regarded as a trait or a state, and 2) measured as a global trait/state or in 
relation to specific domains. Moreover, it is argued here that such debates are 
relevant to other identity motivations such as those postulated by IPT - 
distinctiveness, continuity and self-efficacy.
State or trait?
There are competing views as to whether self-esteem should be conceptualised as a 
state or a trait. State-esteem refers to the self-perception of self-worth that varies 
across time and contexts (Heatherton and Polivy, 1991). Conversely, trait-esteem is a 
more enduring aspect of an individual’s perception of self-worth and is considered 
relatively resistant to change (Butler, Hokanson and Flynn, 1994). Therefore, by 
definition it can be inferred that trait-esteem is unlikely to change in a response to an 
individual’s momentary failure or success as it lacks the power to generate internal 
rewards and punishments to influence behaviour. On the contrary, as Crocker (2002) 
argued, state-self esteem is responsive to events that are related to one’s contingencies 
of self worth and is associated with affective reactions; thus, it is expected to 
influence behaviour. The fact that the two (state-trait) revealed to be strongly 
correlated has been used by some researchers (see Baumeister, 1998; Baumeister,
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Bratslavsky, Filkenauher and Vohs, 2001) as an indication that individuals have a 
stable baseline of self-esteem and that their self-appraisals fluctuate around that 
baseline.
Recently, Crocker and Park (2004) after reviewing the self-esteem literature proposed 
that self-esteem is better perceived as a dynamic human striving rather than as a 
passive state or a personality trait. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to elaborate 
further on the origins and on the ramifications of this controversy; however what 
needs to be mentioned is that taking under consideration the contextual influences on 
self-definition (Turner et al., 1987) we suggest that motivations may stay stable as 
long as there is no change in the context and that identity has a peripheral rather than 
central role in the overall identity structure. In the present thesis, fluctuations on the 
levels of several motivations (distinctiveness, continuity and efficacy) in addition to 
self-esteem are examined under the context of threat. For instance, with respect to 
self-esteem, our focus is to measure state self-esteem(s) that derive(s) from being a 
member of two or more social groups (national, religious, and student) and to test its 
importance in predicting strength of identification with the examined identity 
elements before and after invoking threat in one of the identity elements. However, it 
should be noted that although we expect context specific fluctuations, we also believe 
that there may be some stability as well, given that people are unlikely to experience 
continuously various feedback (for a discussion on the cognitive process of adaptation 
see Breakwell, 1986).
Global self-esteem or specific self-esteem ?
Another area of controversy has been the emphasis and measure on the global or 
specific dimensions of self-esteem. Global self-esteem is a general evaluation of the 
self while specific refers to self-evaluation derived from the domain (task) or 
membership in a social category (see Rosenberg, Schooler, Schoenbach and 
Rosenberg, 1995).
A number of researchers (Hogg and Abrams, 1990; van Knipperg and Ellemers, 1993; 
Brewer, 1993; Long and Spears, 1997; Rubin and Hewstone, 1998) suggested that the 
limited support for the motivational basis of inter-group differentiation and the 
inconsistent findings evinced in studies may be due to the inappropriate use of global-
88
esteem measures (e.g. Rosenberg’s Global Self-Esteem scale, 1965) in research 
designs where specific social identities are measured. Hogg and Abrams (1988) 
suggested that the study of inter-group comparison effects requires separate individual 
self-esteems for each group membership.
A solution to this problem may be sought in the partition of self-esteem into personal 
and collective. Luhtanen and Crocker (1992) suggested that there are different 
sources of esteem based on two aspects of self-concept (personal versus social). 
Personal self-esteem refers to the self-evaluative component of personal identity while 
collective refers to the self-evaluative aspect of the social group. The authors 
developed the collective self-esteem scale (CSE) which attempts to assess individuals’ 
levels of social identity based on their membership in ascribed groups (i.e. religion, 
ethnicity, gender, socioeconomic class). The reasons for focusing on this type of 
membership and not in acquired groups (based on profession, hobbies, interests) is 
that the former are widely shared categories while the latter are much more 
idiosyncratic.
Depending on the research questions, the scale, which can be used to measure global 
collective self-esteem and/or levels of collective self-esteem deriving from 
membership to a particular social group, is comprised of four components: private 
(self-evaluation of one’s own public (refers to the perceived judgement of
the individuals of how ‘others’ evaluate their group), membership (self-evaluation to 
the extent that someone is a good member of this category) and importance 
(perceived importance of one’s membership to the overall self-concept).
This approach to the private and public aspects of CSE proposes that self-knowledge 
is not solely based on interpersonal processes, where one learns about oneself through 
interaction with others, as symbolic interactionists would suggest (‘looking-glass’ 
self), but also on intrapersonal processes. More specifically, the evaluation of the 
social group is based on the self-perceptions that individuals hold about their own 
memberships (private) and on their lay ‘theories’ on how others perceive them as 
members of these groups (public). The authors in their studies (1991) also examined 
the correlations between the CSE scale and the Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem
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measure (1965). The results indicated that the scales were only moderately 
correlated, and thus empirically distinct.
The distinction between personal and collective self-esteem presented above also 
proposes a fragmented nature of identity, (personal versus social identity), which as 
discussed in much more detail in Chapter 2, may not be a psychologically meaningful 
one as the two interact to grant each other meaning (Breakwell, 1986; Deaux, 1992; 
Reid and Deaux, 1996; Verkuyten, 2005). Undoubtedly, group identity processes are 
shaped partly by individual processes- motivations and vice versa. However, this 
does not necessarily mean that we can assume that the same sets of motivations would 
apply at both individual and group levels of identity. As it was discussed in the 
previous chapter, our view on identity is in agreement with Deaux’s (1992) approach 
that personal and social identities should not be treated as totally distinct or 
completely inseparable. As she suggests, an integrated model of identity is needed, 
similar to the one suggested by IPT (Breakwell, 1986), where the interconnectedness 
between these two aspects at the phenomenological level of identity is emphasized.
In her own words ‘there is a need for a more personalized view of identity and a more 
social view of the self (p. 29). This interplay between the two aspects of self 
(personal/social) may be also reflected in their motivational strategies. However, at 
the same time the measurement of personal and collective self-esteem as two distinct 
motivations would be helpful in advancing the theoretical questions relevant to the 
nature of their relationship and the conditions under which these two different types 
of esteem impact on social behaviour.
The use of domain or identity specific self-esteem measures is in our opinion an issue 
of a conceptual rather just of methodological nature (Rosenberg et al., 1995). The 
following discussion on the global versus specific debate refers not only to self­
esteem but to other identity motivational constructs. One of the main problems with 
using global esteem measures is that it does not acknowledge that different identities 
may satisfy the same needs to a different degree depending on their associated 
meanings and on the relevant context. (The assumption that all identities serve the 
same functions should be also contested but it is not addressed here as it is not 
relevant to the global/specific debate.)
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Imagine that your local team and your national team are playing the same day. Your 
local team has just lost the football game while your national team has won. It is 
expected then that your self-esteem (if it is an important motivation in guiding 
identification with both of your teams) in relation to your local team will be 
negatively affected while self-esteem levels based on being a fan of the national team 
will be boosted. If you completed a scale of global self-esteem at that time, the state 
of your self-esteem might have been classified as high, low, or average. It does not 
really matter. The important thing is that the researcher wouldn’t be in the position to 
know which identification of the two or to what extent simultaneous membership in 
other social groups have contributed for you to report this level of self-esteem. This is 
a highly simplified example of our point but it illustrates that an individual is a 
member of many social groups and that in a given context each membership may 
contribute to a different extent in satisfying, in this case, the need for self-esteem.
The assumption that every identity contributes equally towards an individual’s self- 
evaluations is also debatable as it is not yet clear to what extent people behave or act 
out their identities, as proponents of symbolic interactionism approach would suggest, 
only in terms of a single of identity or to a combinations of identities (Breakwell,
1986; Thoits, 1986, 1992, 2003; Trew and Benson, 1996; Stets and Burke, 2000). 
According to IPT (Breakwell, 1986), the theoretical framework used in the present 
thesis, the content dimension of identity is comprised of multiple elements, which 
may be loosely or tightly related. Each identity element has its own value (identity 
principles) which needs to be attained. However, Breakwell (1986) discussing the 
identity principles at the individual level, refers to a generalised sense of self-esteem, 
distinctiveness, continuity and efficacy. At this point the theory is not very clear as to 
whether global or specific motivations need to be used to measure the evaluative 
aspect of identification with these categories or identity elements under investigation. 
The studies conducted so far within this framework have used global measures of 
self-esteem, distinctiveness, continuity and efficacy (Vignoles et al., 2002;
Timotijevic and Breakwell, 2002; Vignoles et al., 2006).
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3.3 Measuring the structural representation of identities: Data driven vs. 
theory driven models of identity structure
This section briefly reviews some of the data driven and theory driven models and 
revisits the definitions and the empirical assessment of the two popular terms used for 
representing the organisation of multiple identities/elements within identity structure 
and of their interrelationships.
There are a number of different strategies employed for measuring multiple identities. 
One important feature that distinguishes the different models of multiple identities 
(personal and/or social) is the extent to which they rely on inductive methodologies or 
deductive methodologies in an attempt to elicit the structural organisation of 
identities. The methodologies used seem to differ based on the degree of participants’ 
involvement in this process. In other words, the agency of the former to choose the 
identity or identities that best describes them. Freeman (2003) also suggests that the 
difference between these models stems from “the degree of structure they introduce 
into assessments of the meaning of identities” (p. 62). Most of the models focus more 
on the hierarchical organisation of these identities and tend to neglect the study of 
meanings associated with them although their inclusion in the models would make the 
emerged structure much more interpretable. Multiple identities are compared and 
structured based on their relative salience, centrality or according to their perceived 
similarity.
The Twenty Statements Test (Kuhn and McPartland, 1954) was one of the first 
inductive methodologies used to empirically assess multiple identities. The 
respondents in this test are asked to respond to the broad question “Who I am” by 
listing spontaneously the most self-relevant identities. This method has been used 
mainly for assessing self-categorisation. However, some researchers like McGuire 
(1984) suggested that the order that identities are listed may reflect the way they are 
organised within identity structure. The validity of this methodological approach has 
not only been criticised in relation to how it addresses issues of identity but most 
importantly for its inefficiency to assess the meanings associated with identities 
(Deaux, 1992).
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So far, the most popular unstructured model of multiple identities and possibly the 
only to date that manages to elicit information on both the structure and meanings of 
identities, is the Hierarchical Classification approach (Rosenberg and Gara, 1985; 
DeBoeck and Rosenberg, 1988). The model uses a “bottom up” and a two-staged 
methodology for generating the necessary data to represent an individual’s identity 
structure. Firstly, participants are asked to indicate their most important self-relevant 
identities. In a second stage, they are asked to provide a list of traits, they consider 
typical of the identities they have enlisted. By the end of this process an “identity x 
traits” matrix is generated later used for studying the associations between attributes 
and identities and between identities which share the same traits. The hierarchical 
classification analysis yields a structure for each individual (idiographic approach), in 
which identities are organised based on their prominence. On the top of the hierarchy 
are all these identities (not single superordinate identity) associated with many traits. 
Subordinate to these, are the remaining identities that contain subsets of these traits 
(Freeman, 2003). As we discussed before, the present methodology has been 
extensively used by Deaux and her colleagues in testing the assertion about the 
dialectic relationship between personal and social identities. Despite the advantages 
of such inductive approaches, it was not considered appropriate to use them in the 
research presented in this thesis for the following two reasons. Firstly, its use requires 
the study of a number of social identities. Secondly, and most importantly, the 
relationships between these identities are understood only in relation to the relevant 
traits they may share. However, as mentioned previously two or more identities may 
be closely or distantly aligned within identity structure because they may satisfy the 
same motivational needs for the individual or the group under consideration.
On the other end of the continuum, there are models that driven by their theoretical 
expectations have used a more structured (“top down”) methodology for assessing the 
salience and/or psychological centrality of identities. These methodologies would be 
described in the following section.
Defining and measuring Salience and Centrality
It was only recently (Brown, 2000; van Rijswijk and Ellemers, 2002; Ashmore et al.,
2004) that the utility and the necessity of incorporating the theoretical and the
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methodological implications of the multifaceted nature of social identities in the study 
of identification processes were revisited. Ashmore et al. (2004) reviewed the various 
definitional and methodological approaches used by different theorists for measuring 
social identity based on the concepts of ‘psychological centrality’, ‘salience’ or 
‘importance’ (often these terms are used interchangeably in the literature) pointed out 
its problematic and controversial nature.
After a systematic evaluation of the similarities and differences among the different 
labels and methods endorsed so far by identity theorists to assess the levels of 
importance and hierarchical positioning of a group membership in an individual’s 
identity structure, Ashmore et al. (2004) proposed an integrated approach for studying 
the multidimensionality of social identities and hence the identification process where 
the different forms of importance can be incorporated and classified conceptually 
under two general but distinct categories: the ‘implicit’ and the ‘explicit’ (see also: 
Chatman, Malanchunk and Eccles, 2003). The main difference between these two 
types, reflected also in their relevant measures, lies on the level of awareness of how 
important a specific identity is in the individual’s overall identity structure.
Implicit importance commonly referred to by most theorists (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; 
Turner et al., 1987; Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Stryker and Serpe, 1982; Callero, 1985; 
Rosenberg and Gara, 1985) as ‘salience’, mirrors the position that a group 
membership/role occupies in the hierarchal organization of identities (structure) 
without necessarily implying that the individual is consciously aware of this 
hierarchy. Explicit importance subsumes the variety of labels theorists (Me Call and 
Simons, 1978; Luhtanen and Crocker, 1992; Stryker and Serpe, 1994) have used to 
define ‘centrality’ or importance of an identity and refers to the “conscious appraisal 
of the degree to which a collective identity is important to an individual’s overall self- 
concept” (Ashmore et al., 2004, p. 87). Out of these two concepts it seems that 
implicit importance or salience is the most problematic one.
The considerable variation in the definitional and empirical use of the term is a sign of 
disagreement that exists among the theorists relevant to the psychological processes
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involved in explaining when and why an identity or several identities become over and 
above more salient within identity structure. It is beyond the aim of this thesis to 
discuss in depth as to whether this evinced conceptual ambiguity around the term is 
valid or professed. However, we believe that reviewing briefly some theoretical 
tenets relevant to the concept of salience may be useful in understanding what 
methodologies, measures and/or related constructs have been employed by social 
researchers to assess and represent how identities are organised within identity 
structure.
SIT, SCT and comparative identity model, a theory grounded on the principles of the 
former, posit that when an identity is made salient due to a change in context, this will 
initiate changes in levels of identification. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the 
salience of an identity (using artificially constructed (minimal) group memberships 
either/or real affect-laden categories) and its relative position within identity structure 
has been assessed mainly based on the reported levels of strength of identification 
with the social identity under investigation (Rutland and Cinnirella, 2000; Ros, Huici 
and Gomez, 2000).
Strength is a term frequently used by researchers in these frameworks to deal with and 
to operationalise the multidimensionality of identification process. Therefore, it does 
not only measure the hierarchical position of that identity within identity structure 
based on its perceived importance-in explicit terms- but includes also measures of 
affective attachment (socio-emotional connotation of the identity) and goodness of fit 
(perceived similarity of the individual to the prototypical ingroup member and 
perceived interdependence of the individual to the fellow ingroupers). Cinnirella’s 
scale (1997), also used in the present thesis, is a representative example of a 
multidimensional measure.
The salience of an identity is context dependent and is determined by its perceived 
accessibility, according to permanent or situational demands, and its contextual fit: 
meaning the extent to which it accentuates intra-group similarities and inter-group 
differences in certain dimensions found in the environment (Oakes, Haslam and
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Turner, 1994). Turner and his colleagues (1987,1994) emphasized that self- 
categorisation process is not only based in the context but on past experience, chronic 
accessibility.
Researchers usually use data-driven methodologies to measure chronic accessibility, 
such as TST statements (Kuhn and Me Partland, 1954) based on which participants 
are free to indicate their identity preferences without being primed. This list of 
identities is later used to make predictions of the hierarchical order of identities based 
on the degree of identification in the given context.
What makes an identity more or less accessible? Although category accessibility has 
a key role in explaining which identities will be made salient after self-categorisation 
occurs at different levels of abstraction, the answer to that question has not received 
much empirical investigation. Oakes (1987) suggested that the levels of perceived 
importance or centrality of the social category and affective attachment to this 
category may determine the accessibility of an identity and consequently its salience. 
The fact that centrality levels can modify the perceptions of readiness in adopting a 
specific identity shows that the two concepts are conceptually related. However, the 
relationship between the two has not received empirical investigation within this 
framework for two reasons. Firstly, due to the fact that perceived 
importance/centrality is usually confounded in measures of strength of identification 
(single item measure of importance- Cinnirella, 1997) or although measured (Identity 
membership Subscale in Collective-Self Esteem Scale, Luhtanen and Crocker, 1992) 
they are either precluded from the analysis (computation of sum of scores) or they are 
used as scales measuring the degree of identification. Secondly, there are no 
theoretical expectations formulated for perceived importance and it usually appears in 
the discussion section as an explanatory variable for evinced variations in levels of 
identifications. To our knowledge the majority of studies who examine the 
relationship between the two and its outcomes are usually based on identity theory 
framework (Stryker and Serpe, 1994; Cassidy and Trew, 1998). There is only one 
study theoretically driven by IPT on which perceived centrality is treated as an
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outcome of identity processes with a set of motivational principles being the 
predictors of its levels (Vignoles, Chryssochoou and Breakwell, 2002).
Evidence from research conducted for exploring under which conditions the context 
effects on self-categorisation are more profound, indicated that factors such as chronic 
identification with the social category combined with the psychological functions 
served by this category and perceptions of category fragility need to also taken under 
consideration as determinants of category accessibility (Reicher and Hopkins, 1996; 
Herrera and Reicher, 1998; Rutland and Cinnirella, 2000). The last concept refers to 
a social category that its meanings are still under negotiation and contestation between 
those who identify with the category within and across any given social context. 
Rutland and Cinnirella (2000) who used this concept for testing context effects on 
Scottish national and European identification suggested that there was a high level of 
uncertainty and variation among participants regarding what it meant to be 
“European”. They used this perceived high level of category fragility to explain why 
inter-group comparisons when introduced (manipulation of the comparative context) 
affected only levels of identification with this category.
Despite the fact that salience and accessibility seem to be quite elusive in the sense 
that there is circularity in their definitions (identity is made salient when it is 
accessible, an identity is considered accessible if made salient) the theorists are 
reluctant to abolish one of the two terms. Under these circumstances it seems that the 
context has assumed the role of the main determinant of an identity’s saliency. As 
Sellers and his colleagues argue (1998), the interaction between the person x situation 
has become the unit of analysis with salience both being defined and measured based 
on the degree to which an individual identifies with a category (personal/social) at a 
particular moment in a given context. Consequently, research within the SCT 
framework has focused on exploring how the context may determine which 
categorization seems more appropriate to provide a meaningful organization of the 
social stimuli and therefore which aspects of an identity become more salient as to 
shape the perceptions and guide the behaviours of those who operate within that 
context.
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Proponents of symbolic interactionism and identity theory also adopt a contextualized 
approach on the study of identity in the sense that they recognize that the inner 
structure of the self (fragmented instead of undifferentiated), composed of multiple 
identities (role-based, group-based and personal), reflects the diverse and multiple 
character of the relevant societal context. However, the relationship between the 
society and the individual is reciprocal. It is not only society that imposes the position 
and roles adopted and enacted by the individual. As Burke (2003) argues “identities 
through the role-making process recreate the society in which the identities are 
embedded” (p. 3).
These multiple identities that individuals hold are also organised in a hierarchical 
manner based on their relative saliency. Although there was consensus among 
theorists (Rosenberg, 1979; Me Call and Simons, 1978; Stryker, 1980; Callero, 1985) 
relevant to the hierarchical organisation of identities, they seem to diverge in their 
theoretical predictions as to what determines the precedence of one identity over the 
others and to the empirical steps employed to answer this question. Reviewing the 
relevant models it was apparent that the same terms were used under different labels 
or some terms were used interchangeably which was even more confusing (hierarchy 
of salience and hierarchy of prominence). However, as discussed previously in 
Chapter 2 all identity theorists make a clear theoretical and empirical distinction 
between the concepts of salience and activation with the first term referring to the 
likelihood an identity to be activated and the second term to its actual activation.
Stryker (1987) defined salience behaviourally in the sense that those identities that are 
more likely to be activated would occupy a higher position in the structure and be 
perceived as more self-defining from the ones less often activated. Researchers in this 
field have used different steps for assessing the salience of the multiple identities 
studied. Stryker and Serpe (1994) proposed a method which has been used in a 
number of studies (e.g. Cassidy and Trew, 1998) based on which identities achieve 
their saliency after being valued against each other. In the first instance, the 
respondents are asked to imagine being in a situation where they need to introduce
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themselves to a complete stranger so this person really knows them. Afterwards, they 
are asked to choose one identity over the other, using all possible pairs.
Another way for eliciting information on how multiple identities are organised was 
described by Trew and Benson (1996). In this methodology participants are given a 
list of identities and they are asked to choose the best and the second best self­
description. Then, the relative salience of these identities is measured (Callero, 1985) 
along with the determinants of salience, meaning affective and interactional 
commitment to the particular identities under consideration.
In addition to salience, multiple identities are organised within identity structure based 
on their centrality. Psychological centrality refers to the subjective importance of an 
identity in an individual’s repertoire and in contrast to salience the individual is aware 
of this importance. The term is usually measured by absolute comparative 
judgements or with the use of simple judgements that rate the perceived importance of 
each identity/element separately using unipolar scales (Cassidy and Trew, 2001).
Despite their differences, what is common among all these methodologies is that they 
are deductive in the sense that the identities are already given to participants whereas 
the meaning of these multiple identities is not empirically assessed in their models.
Another methodological variation is that researchers study multiple identities and 
their processes at the individual or at the group level. According to Rousseau (1985), 
the level of theory should dictate the level at which a construct is conceptualised, 
measured and analysed.
Finally, we aim to finish our discussion with methodologies that do not structure 
multiple identities based on their salience or centrality dimension but based on 
perceived similarity. Two more methodologies need to be mentioned that group or set 
apart identities based on the similarity assumption: MDS plots and Cluster analytic 
techniques. Both have been used successfully by researchers (Deaux et al., 1995 ;
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Freeman, 2003) and have produced empirically based maps and dendograms 
providing useful information on the looseness or their tightness of multiple identities’ 
relationships within identity structure. Despite of the different structural contexts 
(United States and Sri Lanka respectively) according to the findings, nationality 
and/or ethnicity and religion were always clustered together, presented as closely 
aligned in an individual’s identity structure.
For the purposes of the present research a multi-methodological approach was 
employed (open-ended measures, interviews and scales) to study the relationship 
between the two identity elements (national and religious). This research strategy was 
designed to build a complementary and sequential process, and to use the findings of 
one methodology to inform and enhance the clarity of issues being addressed in the 
next stages of research. More specifically, the relationship between the two identity 
elements were initially assessed based on the correlations obtained between the two 
identity elements and their relative positioning within identity structure in terms of 
levels of strength of identification and perceived centrality. Secondly, turning our 
research focus from structure to content, open-ended questions and semi-structured 
interviews were used to study how participants construct their national identity. Our 
aim was to allow the relationship to emerge from participants’ responses without 
making it salient by asking them to rate the two identity elements on the basis of their 
similarity as suggested in the previous methodologies. This was designed to elicit 
information on: 1) whether participants interweave nationality and religion whilst 
constructing national identity and 2) how they justified their overlap. Moreover, 
information on the dimensions shared between these two target identity elements was 
expected to provide us with the relevant material to construct a scale that measures the 
strength of this relationship which will be used for further analysis. Thirdly, it was 
aimed at identifying if, and the extent to which, there was an overlap between the two 
identity elements regarding their respective motivational functions. To achieve this 
aim, based on the theoretical arguments presented in Chapter 2 and in Section 3.2 
above, identity motivations were operationalised as being ‘identity specific’ and were 
therefore measured in relation to national, religious and other target identities 
separately.
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3.4 Concluding remarks
This Chapter outlined some of the main methodological issues involved in the 
measurement of constructs relating to social identification, identity motivations and 
identity structure. It also discussed the reasons for choosing the research strategy 
employed for the purposes of the research presented in this thesis.
The literature discussed so far in Chapters 2 and 3 have pointed to the need to adopt a 
more complex and integrative approach to study multiple identity processes involved 
in self-definition and inter-group perceptions than has often been used to date. It is 
suggested that it was important to use a measure of social identification which 
captures its multi-dimensionality. Furthermore, it was thought necessary to treat the 
relative contribution of different identity motivations in predicting strength of 
identification as an empirical question rather than assume the primacy of the self­
esteem and/or distinctiveness motives. In addition, it was thought appropriate to 
measure the relationship between the target identities in terms of their structural 
relationships in the identity system, the meanings attached to these identity elements 
and the motivations they satisfied. In addition, all these constructs were measured in 
relation to each of the target identity elements in order to enable us to study how they 
changed either under conditions of threat or in relation to different comparative 
contexts. In this way it was expected to build a better understanding of the flexibility 
and responsiveness of individual identity systems.
Thus far. Chapters 2 and 3 covered issues concerned with how identities relate and the 
motivations they satisfy at the individual level. However, as mentioned in Chapter 2, 
these structural representations of the relationships of identity elements at the 
individual level are likely to be influenced by the societal representations of such 
relationships and furthermore such representations are likely to serve particular socio­
political functions for particular groups and societies. The following Chapter turns 
our attention to these issues.
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Chapter 4: Examining the Nationality-Religion Relationship and Its 
Functions
In the previous chapters we discussed how social psychological and sociological 
theories empirically and conceptually addressed the concept of multiple identities and 
the issue of their interrelationships, giving examples of how the relationship between 
the focal identities of this thesis, nationality and religion, could be conceptualised. 
This chapter argues that relationships between identities at the individual level often 
reflect existing relationships at the social representational, ideological and 
institutional level. In particular, it looks at the relationship between national and 
religious identities at both an ideological and an institutional level, and examines the 
functions it may serve for the state and the individual. It is argued that the 
relationship between the two identity elements in terms of structure and content 
evinced at the individual level is likely to be related to the historical role that religion 
has played in the past nationalistic movements. Moreover, in contemporary societies, 
religion may still play an important role in shaping social identities such as ethnic 
and/or national identity by maintaining the distinctiveness and continuity of both 
minority and majority groups living in multicultural settings.
4.1 Introduction
Of all the relationships between social identities, one of the longest lasting and 
perhaps the most intriguing for the future of multicultural societies is the one between 
nationality and religion. The strength of the interplay between the two is indicative of 
the type of nation-state that will emerge, and may have important repercussions on 
state policies implemented for those who share one or none of these two identities.
The construction of a shared identity representation, where a particular religious 
ideology is perceived to be an important aspect of nationality or ethnicity and its 
internalization, may be seen as having both positive and negative consequences. On 
the positive side, it may consolidate the ingroup boundaries. On the negative side, it 
may advocate the exclusionary character of this identity’s content construed in 
essentialist terms, consequently leading to violent outbreaks and discrimination 
towards the ‘Other’ i.e. ethnic and religious minorities living in a society. The
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maintenance of a strong relationship between national (and /or ethnic) and religions 
identities may be a reminder of the cultural differences between the groups in contact, 
of past inter-group conflicts and be perceived bilaterally (both from a majority and 
minority perspective) as a barrier to the successful adaptation of the group in the 
minority position. This may especially be the case in societies where a collective 
representation of a strong nationality-religion relationship circulates for a good few 
centuries and there are still constitutional provisions that declare and protect a close 
state-church relationship (Moscovici, 1988; Mavrogordatos, 2003; Roccas, 2005).
In an effort to understand why and when a religious dogma becomes a defining 
characteristic of national (and/or ethnic) identity this chapter will examine the 
different functions that religion has served in past and present times for the individual 
and the state justifying its central or peripheral position in relation to nationhood. 
More specifically, this chapter will first look at the involvement of religion in the 
nation building process (function 1) by examining a) the factors which foster the 
nationality-religion relationship; and b) the way theories of nationalism have 
incorporated religion in their premises. These issues are illustrated by giving some 
socio-historical examples. This examination is expected to lead to a better 
understanding of how religion and nationality (and/or ethnicity) are involved in 
coping with diversity in multicultural societies (function 2), approaching this function 
mainly from the perspective of the majority group.
4.2 The involvement of religion in the nation-building process (function 1)
The origins of the alliance between the two identity elements need to be traced back 
in time, focusing mainly on the role played by religion and its differential impact on 
nation-building and hence on national identity formation processes. At various points 
in history we have witnessed the constructive and obstructive influences of religion on 
nation-state formation process and its strong link with the nationalistic ideologies. In 
some instances, as in the case of the Jewish population, religion has set the basis for 
the emergence of a new nation-state. In other occasions, religious particularism, in 
conjunction with other factors (e.g. level of economic development, aspirations of 
political autonomy and linguistic uniformity) has contributed to the gradual 
weakening and disintegration of the multinational empires, states (e.g. Roman,
103
Ottoman, ex-Yugoslavia, ex- Soviet Union), or to the perpetuation of a religious 
conflict (e.g. Northern Ireland; Israel-Palestine Conflict) voicing different claims to 
nationhood. What these examples clearly demonstrate is that the role of religious 
dogmas (mainly of their institutions) was to foster or mask, to a greater or lesser 
extent, the nationalistic ideologies in times when the main aspiration was- and in 
some cases still remains- the creation of a sovereign state. However, it should be 
noted that the relationship between religion and nationalism is not consistently 
evidenced in all societies, and even when evinced its strength does vary from time to 
time.
The following section addresses two relevant questions: a) what are the common 
factors that make the two constructs comparable and related to each other? and b) 
what is it about religion that makes it either a good or a bad candidate to go side by 
side with the nationalistic movements?
4.2.1 Common factors supporting the nationality-religion relationship
For Smith (1991) and Phinney (1998), religion, language, customs and traditions are 
all parts of the cultural dimension of nationhood and ethnicity (referring to minority 
groups) informing their content. This conception of religion as a cultural aspect of 
nationality and ethnicity is a useful starting point in the identification of where these 
two may overlap. However, explaining the relationship solely on these grounds may 
downplay the uniqueness of religion as a social category and narrow our 
understanding of what makes possible the alliance between the two (nationality- 
religion) and the functions that this relationship may serve for the individual, the 
group and the state respectively.
One may suggest that compared to nationality and/or ethnicity, religion is a more 
inclusive social category, in the sense that the meaning of ‘we’ rises above ethnic, 
racial, national and cultural boundaries (an argument, which as discussed later, was 
extensively used by some theorists in order to downplay the influence of religion in 
theories of nationalism). Research on Islam provides some support for the 
universality of religion and for its ability to rise above the aforementioned 
identifications. More specifically, research on British Moslem activists’ constructions
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of community and identity demonstrates the primacy of identification with a super­
ordinate global community of Islam (Ummah), where identification with ethnicity and 
race are conceived as incompatible with the Muslim identity and with its transnational 
character (Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins, 2004). It is worth noting though that the 
findings fi*om this study indicated that the meanings associated with Moslem identity 
and the Islamic community (Ummah) were highly contested. They were construed 
either in strictly spiritual and cultural terms, or as fimdamentally political. The 
second hints at the malleable role that religion may take as an individual and 
collective meaning system (Silberman, 2005) and how it can be employed with ease 
to empower political projects.
The role of organised religion is not, and never was, strictly spiritual. It is also social. 
Societies in the past, especially in the Middle Ages, were much more organised 
around religion with religious laws enforcing social order to a great extent. Kelman 
and Hamilton (1989) see religion as an expression of social needs and ideologies of 
order. The social influence of religion is discussed in their work, with respect to its 
role to exercise power and to contribute to social control: “The Bible can be 
conceived as a book of norms: a historical window into the ‘ought’ and the ‘ought 
not’ of long ago cultures in what was then the crossroads of the world” (p. 58). 
Moreover, religious dogmas provide meaning to individuals’ lives and give answers 
to their existential queries (Pargament, Magyar-Russell and Murray-Swank, 2005). A 
growing body of research points to how religion can speak to the limits of human 
power and become a unique and effective way of coping better with adversities in 
health and social domains (Pargament, 1997; George, Ellison, and Larson, 2002).
In Durkheimian terms (1912/2001) religion is a “unified system of beliefs and 
practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden- beliefs 
and practices which unite into one moral community called Church (Mosque or 
Synagogue), all those who adhere to them” (p. 46). In the beginning of the present 
definition, religion’s role is identified with that of introducing structure in an 
individual’s every day life, providing a guide to the interpretation of reality, morality 
and a set of beliefs that need to be followed by the ingroup members (see also 
Silberman 2005 on religion as a meaning system). In a similar way, nationalistic 
ideologies also provide a dogmatic way of thinking about the national group, as Billig
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(1995) argues, a form of ideological consciousness. Although there is a long list of 
definitions on nationalism, the one proposed by Antony Smith (1991) is most 
applicable to this thesis, as it embodies both the task-oriented nature of this core 
doctrine and the important role that ethno-symbolism may play in defining the nation. 
According to this definition nationalism is “an ideological movement for attaining and 
maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some 
of its members to constitute an actual or a potential ‘nation’” (Smith, 1991, p. 73).
The nationalistic frameworks are also ideologies of order that define how individuals 
should relate to their national collectivity and to the social whole (Juergensmeyer, 
1995). They compose the “shared reality” of the group providing a template based on 
which individuals would imagine the lineage, endurance (imagined as a historical 
entity) and distinctiveness of their national/ethnic group, its historical relations to 
other groups, influencing that a group’s very essence in both dramatic and mundane 
ways, and on both national and international level (Kelman, 1997; Bar-Tal, 2000; 
Condor, 2003).
Following from the above, the last part of the sentence (“all those who adhere to 
them”) in Durkheim’s definition does not only refer to the social cohesiveness of the 
group as a moral community but also to its relative distinctiveness. As with all other 
social identities (e.g. national and ethnic), parallel to the homogenisation process that 
occurs within religious sects, there is a process of differentiation between them, most 
frequently affirmative, in light of their dogmas and religious rituals. Every religion 
proclaims the centrality, virtue and rightness of its dogma in providing answers about 
the meanings of life and death. Take for example the Christian Orthodox dogma.
The word “orthodox” itself derives from the Greek words ‘ortho’ (right, correct) and 
‘doxa’ (thought) and is used to refer to the correct observance of a religious doctrine 
(Oxford dictionary, 1998). In this sense, only those individuals who would follow the 
pathway of a particular dogma can discover the truth, making them morally superior 
over those who would choose other religious pathways in their lives. As Hunsberger 
and Jackson (2005) suggest, maintaining a religious belief that one’s dogma 
represents the absolute truth and that it is a unique and only guide to morality may 
enhance, as social identity theorists (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) would argue, a sense of 
positive esteem to the members of this collective. However, at the same time it can 
be used as a basis for expressing prejudicial beliefs towards other religious and
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nonreligious groups (Hunter, 1998, 2001). In addition, religious identification entails 
a notion of exclusivity in group belongingness. Similar to gender, the boundaries of 
religious category appear more impermeable and not at all hybrid. There are many 
individuals of mixed ethno-cultural backgrounds, multilingual, but never of mixed 
religions. .
In his famous work on national identity Anderson (1983) has pointed out the 
remarkable and unique power of the national group to be imagined as immortal by 
“transforming fatality into continuity and by linking the dead with the yet to be bom” 
(p. 18). By means of social commemorations of people and events important to the 
historical past of the national/ethnic group, a strong sense of continuity is assured 
with a community of a common ancestry where all its members are bounded by 
history and destiny. Through historical narratives the idealised past belongs and is 
claimed by all those who live in the present. It also becomes a powerful source of 
legitimacy of the aspiration of changing the future of the nation and the root of its 
history to favour nationalistic sentiments (see Reicher and Hopkins, 2001).
However, the position taken in this thesis is that this is not a unique property of 
nationality. Religion also provides individuals with a sense o f continuity. Through 
its rituals it ‘baptises’ a member into the religious group to become a part of a 
community which is unified, superior, primordial and sacred. Moreover, the religious 
narratives (religious texts) and symbols confer the story of the group, the strong 
familial ties among its members, alluded also in their common ancestry (e.g. related 
to Abraham or Prophet Mohamed) and their shared destiny. The national heroes in 
religious terms are the saints. These are mortal people who after following their 
dogma to its letter, fulfilling their moral obligations or after suffering because of their 
religious beliefs, have been spiritually liberated and sanctified. There are also many 
examples firom ancient to modem societies where common ethnic origins are 
explained on religious notes and national heroes are those of religious lore (Smith, 
1999).
Thus, both in the case of nation and religion, individuals belong to one great family, 
to “a community of propinquity” (Weber, 1967, cited in Reicher and Hopkins, 2001, 
p. 16), whose members can only be imagined in their totality (Anderson, 1983). Being 
a member of this family may evoke strong feelings o f loyalty, interdependence and
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emotional attachment. The primacy of the community over the individual is 
‘preached’ in their dogmas, and when threatened, individuals would take action to 
defend them on the expense of their ‘individuality’.
As McCrone (1998) rightly points out in the case of the nation “none of this is, of 
course, enough without a priesthood, religious or secular, which is able to read the 
appropriate runes and pronounce the uniqueness of the nation. The intelligentsia 
provide the successors to the ecclesiastical priesthood” (p. 53). Their role is to shape 
and affirm the nation’s character, to protect the nation’s history, territory, and finally 
to mobilise people when the nation is under threat. It is their views that shape the 
cultural core doctrine of nationalism. Their voices are echoed in the historical books 
also conveyed in the choice of national myths and symbols. According to Smith 
(1991, 1999) the old religious myths of ethnic election have preceded nationalistic 
ideologies. In his own words, “ nationalism is the secular modem equivalent of the 
pre-modem sacred myth of ethnic election (...) chosen peoples were formally selected 
by their deities; today they are chosen by an ideology that elevate the unique and the 
individual and transform them in a global reality” (1991, p. 84). One should not 
underestimate the influential role of the religious agents in shaping and affirming the 
religious character within societies. The ecclesiastical priesthood interpretation of 
dogma may immensely affect the believers’ attitudes, beliefs and behaviours. From 
moral arbiters the religious institutions have the power to authenticate a political 
rebellion including the right to kill in the name of nation or religion. As 
Jurergensmeyer (1995) suggests “when either nationalism or religion assumes this 
role by itself, it reduces the other to a peripheral social role” (p. 381).
The use of myths, symbols (e.g. cross, crescent, national and religious flags), 
language (e.g. political speech, religious text, historical books) and sanctification of 
places (e.g. church, mosque, synagogue, national frontiers, and tombs) is also 
common between religious dogmas and nationalistic ideologies. Pargament and 
Mahoney (2005) suggested that individuals are more likely to preserve and protect 
objects that are sanctified as they may be used as symbols of strength and support on 
a day-to-day basis. Since sacred objects are likely to be appraised, their loss, violation 
and disrespect may cause particularly potent reactions with an exceptionally powerful 
impact, such as war. In situations of ethnic conflict or civil war, religion is frequently
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used as a primary aetiology for dividing populations and even for justifying ethnic 
cleavages (Psalidas-Perlmutter, 2000). Gopin (2000) and Juergensmeyer (2000), who 
studied the reasons behind the continuation of conflict between Israelis and 
Palestinians, argue that for both parties the land and the sites are tied to religious 
myths of ethnic election. This notion of sacred land legitimises their right to retaliate. 
For example, in the case of Jewish populations religious nationalism, solidified on 
territorial claims for the ancestors’ ‘sacred’ land, has been an instrumental tool in the 
establishment of the nation-state. The religious myths of ethnic election, derived 
from the ancient covenant of God with Abraham and Moses written in the Old 
Testament sanctified and legitimised the community’s national mission and destiny, 
that of creating a sovereign-state (Smith, 1999).
Thus, the similarities between national and religious identities, on the basis of 
nationalistic and religious dogmas, also stem from the fact that both can provide 
guidelines to behaviour that can lead to conflict as they are both value-laden 
categories. Their belief systems can be reified (nationalistic ideologies, religious 
fundamentalism), and when combined they can sharpen the ingroup boundaries even 
more. A recent study using the Minorities at Risk Phase III data and questionnaire- 
based surveys aimed to examine whether nationalism or religion had a greater impact 
on ethnic conflict (Fox and Squires, 2001). The findings indicated that nationalism 
was most frequently mentioned as aetiology of conflict between groups when there 
were no religious denomination differences. However, in cases that religious 
differences were also present, or perceived as an important factor of demarcation, 
religion and nationalism were involved almost to the same extent in ethnic group 
conflict. Based on their findings the authors concluded that religion cannot be 
analysed as an isolated factor in inter-group conflicts. Instead, emphasis on religious 
differences (real or fabricated) can be an additional weapon for justifying political 
actions and human atrocities to achieve dominant power.
The socio-political context of Northern Ireland proffers a representative example of 
how religion, when combined with nationality can accentuate category-based 
prejudice and inter-group conflict. The overlap between religious and national 
identities has been inextricably linked with the perpetuation of an ethnic conflict 
derived from the divergence in religion and nationhood (religious nationalism).
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Certainly the ‘troubles’ in that context are not solely due to the existing differences on 
religious affiliations but they are also of a political, historical, cultural and economic 
nature (Rieffer, 2003). Much social psychological and sociological research has been 
devoted in the exploration of the strength of this relationship in that context and of the 
psychological importance that individuals from both religious communities attach to it 
(Cairns, 1982, Wadell and Cairns, 1986). Religion has been strongly connected with 
national awareness. Belonging to a certain religious group is still very much 
associated with believing and supporting one tale of the story (nationalistic ideology).
The complexity of inter-group relations in Northern Ireland has been tackled with the 
use of different theoretical approaches and empirical methods. Crisp, Hewstone and 
Cairns (2001) put emphasis on the multiple dimensions of Northern Irish identity, and 
emphasize the effectiveness of the crossed-categorisation paradigm in examining how 
multiple dimensions of social categorisaton may influence differently inter-group 
perceptions in real-life contexts. By using experimental scenarios (bogus newspaper 
stories) they revealed that the recalled information concerning the ingroup and 
outgroup is mainly determined by the interactive function between religious and 
gender identities, rather than ethnic. Other researchers have strictly followed the 
theoretical tenets of social identity. They have focused on the affective aspect of 
Northern Irish identity, exploring the relationship between the psychological 
processes involved in inter-group perception, meaning the relationship between self­
esteem motivation and inter-group discrimination (Hunter, Stinger and Coleman, 
1993). However, the authors suggest that the findings were quite inconclusive as both 
groups rated their identities negatively. Adopting the theoretical perspective of 
identity theory, research which examined the salience of religious and national 
identities of Northern Irish students revealed that when the environment was inclusive 
and non hostile, maintenance of religious and national identities was considered 
relatively less important compared to other identities, like family and student (Trew 
and Benson, 1996; Cassidy and Trew, 1998, 2004). In all these studies, national and 
religious identities did not hold a primary position in the individuals’ self definition 
and revealed to be moderately salient. However, most authors argue that there is still 
a strong sense of commitment (affective, interactional) with these identities that may 
move them to the psychological forefront, and influence participants’ inter-group 
perceptions and behaviour, in situations that would make these identities salient (e.g.
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inter-group conflict or transition to a religiously and ethnically diverse cultural 
environment).
In this section, this chapter has identified a number of common socio-psychological 
functions that identification with the national and religious social categories may 
serve for the individual and the group that would justify a joint consideration of their 
effects. Religion and nationality, as both individual (idiosyncratic) and collective 
meaning systems, contain a set of prescriptive norms (stereotypes) and beliefs that 
can be learned, developed, reified and changed (Billig, 1995; Gopin, 2000; Silberman,
2005) to serve the needs and aspirations of the individual, the group and the society. 
The way an individual or a group connects to these meaning systems, in a 
fundamentalist or in a quest orientation way, bluntly rejecting or accepting doubts and 
open questions about the rightness and truthfulness of their dogmas may influence to 
a great extent the quality of inter-group relations (see Section 4.3).
4.2.2 Inclusion and exclusion o f religion in theories o f nationalism
The influential role of religion in the rise of nationalism and in the formation of 
national identity has been seriously contested or even neglected by some scholars.
The majority of scholars agree that prior to the rise of nationalism, religion was the 
dominant doctrine of political and religious life (Kohn, 1945). However, they all 
refute its contribution in the rise of the nationalism era, and in the emergence of 
nation-states on the basis that religion(s) is by a universal definition “designed to 
fudge ethnic, linguistic, political and cultural differences” (Hobsbawm, 1992, pp. 67- 
68 cited in Merdjanova, 2000, p. 244). Therefore, by questioning the centrality given 
to the ethno-cultural basis of nationalism, they place more emphasis on how the ideals 
of Enlightenment, economic, technological factors resulting in the industrialisation of 
previously agrarian societies, and the emergence of a common language all contribute 
to the development of nationalism in some parts of Europe (Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 
1983; Hobsbawm, 1990; Kitromilides, 1990). Anderson (1983), in his writings 
acknowledged to some extent the existence of old ‘sacred imagined communities’, but 
claimed that the presumption that the ‘imagined’ national communities emerged from 
and succeeded the religious ones, as proposed by Hayes (1960), was far too simplistic. 
In his account of nationalism he proposed that vernacular print-capitalism was the
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major force shaping the nationalistic ideologies of the time ‘the convergence of 
capitalism and print technology on the fatal diversity of human language created the 
possibility of a new form of imagined community which in its basic morphology set 
the stage for the modem nation’ (1983, p. 49).
Other scholars criticised this modernist approach that explains the development of 
nationalism merely based on economic reasons (secular form of nationalism), 
suggesting that in different points in time and in some contexts (e.g. Ireland, Poland), 
nationalism was revealed to have both an economic and a religious character (Smith, 
1981, 1991; Rieffer, 2003). Despite religions’ claims to universality many examples 
where religious communities coincided with or developed into exclusive ethnic 
communities. If this argument is correct, then these cases should not be treated as the 
exception to the mle, but rather as templates for studying why there is a close affinity 
between religious and nationalist ideals.
Armstrong (1982), Smith (1981, 1988, 1991, and 1999) and Llobera (1994) argued 
that discussing nationalism as a by-product of modernity implies a sense of 
discontinuity between pre-modem and post-modern societies. Most importantly, this 
image of the modem nation as ex nihilo fails to locate the nation in a historical 
sequence, to acknowledge its consequential evolution from the ethno-cultural 
communities that predated it, and its cultural shaping by the pre-existing myths of 
common ancestry, destiny and traditions (McCrone, 1998). According to their views, 
the study of nationalism should not preclude the ethnic-origins of the population of 
interest, as well as the pervasive role of ethno-symbols in the construction and 
communication of the nationalistic ideologies to the people. Along with language, 
religion is also a traditional feature that has been introduced in different points in time 
by the intelligentsia and the authorities (historians, religious leaders or politicians) as 
paths to socialise individuals to the broader nationalistic movement.
In many ways, the debate about the peripheral or central role of religion in the nation­
state formation process and its interplay with nationalistic ideologies is embedded in a 
broader one about the origins and character of the “nation” itself. In essence, labelled 
as primordialist vs. modemist (or sometimes essentialist vs. instmmentalist), the 
dispute is about the origins of the national sentiment. This raises the following
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question: Is nation-ness a transcendent human need also evinced in the pre­
modem/traditional societies or a need invented only in post-modern societies to 
accommodate a political project, the making of the modem state? Two well-known 
quotations summarise this debate effectively. Smith (1988,1991) promotes a 
primordial image of nations and traces its roots in earlier civilisations arguing that 
“nations exist from time immemorial and that nationalists must reawaken them from a 
long slumber to take place in the world of nations” (p. 20). On the contrary, Gellner 
(1964) in his modemist approach does not acknowledge a long past in the nation and 
proposes that “nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness; it 
invents nations where they do not exist” (p. 169). The use of the same term “nation” 
is quite ambiguous in both these quotes. It seems that the authors refer to the nation 
and state interchangeably using the same term whilst explaining two inverted 
processes. The first quote by Smith seems to refer more to the national community, 
with nationalism being a political ideology with a cultural doctrine that does not 
necessarily aims at and/or results in the creation of a sovereign-state., Moreover, in 
cases where the aspiration of the group is the acquisition of a state, it is the inherent 
cultural element of nationalism along with other factors that would solidify the 
grounds for the emergence of this nation-state (from cultural to political). However, 
in the second quote this process is reversed from political (state) to cultural (nation). 
This counter view is very well captured in Zubaida’s (1989) answer that “common 
ethnicity” and solidarity are the cultural products of nationalism and of the ongoing 
political processes after the state formation, not their cause.
The aim of the present section is not to trace the various shades of this debate, 
something which was efficiently carried out by Billig (1995) in his book “ Banal 
nationalism” and by McCrone (1998) in “ The Sociology of Nationalism:
Tomorrow’s ancestors”. The position taken in this thesis is that whether the concept 
of the nation pre-existed {ethnie), and was awaked from its lethargy in a point in time 
that statehood was the next logical step after it has come into being, or if  it is a social 
and political artefact created to satisfy the needs of people in the modem era, is 
extraneous.
Rather than just trying to historically locate when a nation (and/or a nation-state) 
emerged one should study the nation as a process and as collective identification: a)
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that is placed and exists among the world of nations both defining and being defined 
with reference to ‘others’ (Robertson, 1992; Triandafyllidou, 1998); and b) whose 
survival requires its constant reaffirmation and sometimes redefinition of its character 
both in symbolic and material ways (Billig, 1995; Reicher and Hopkins, 2001; 
Triandafyllidou and Paraskevopoulou, 2002).
Theorists have agreed that the processes described above (cultural to political vs. 
political to cultural) would contribute to the emergence of two broad and rivalry 
models of nations and nationalisms (civic/territorial-ethnic/cultural) (see, for example, 
Gellner, 1964, and Smith, 1991). Proclaiming a set of different features, meaning the 
criteria that a collectivity should have to qualify as a nation, each of these two 
definitions of the nation would influence the process of national identity formation in 
a different way.
The first model, ethnogeneological, is firequently witnessed in Eastern, Central 
European and Asian countries and refers to the conception of the nation based on 
ethnicity element. The route to national membership depends on cultural uniformity. 
It is based on myths of a common descent, language, religion, traditions, historic 
memories, all enhancing a sense of temporal continuity and an emotional aspect of 
group belongingness. The second model is a more Westernised conception of 
national identity-the civic territorial-where the acquisition of citizenship presupposes 
legal equality serving as the basis for national definition. The main difference 
between the two is how they deal with cultural diversity. Nationality mainly defined 
on ethnicity dimensions promotes the idea of ethno-cultural homogenisation 
excluding those who lack these specific characteristics (meaning the ethno­
geneological lineage). On the contrary, nationality defined on the dimension of 
citizenship works as a basis for social integration of culturally diverse communities.
It aims to ensure their equal participation in the social system in spite of their distinct 
cultural markers. However, the two models should not be viewed as antithetical to 
each other (Roudometof, 1999). Within modem-hybrid states both models of 
nationality are still present, while their nature is relational influencing the type 
(content) of nationalistic ideologies, the citizenship laws and the state immigration 
policies. Interestingly, ethnic ideology is still present in all three working models of 
citizenship (ethnic, civic and multicultural) questioning the efficacy of nation-states to
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build a model free from premises of ethnic and cultural homogeneity (for a detailed 
discussion on citizenship see Isin and Wood, 1999). This may be explained based on 
the fact nationalistic ideologies continue to exist in explicit or banal terms long after 
the nations have gained their political autonomy and their identities are established in 
order to maintain the positive and distinct ontological status of the former. It is with 
the use of national symbols and ceremonies that the nationalistic sentiments resurface 
on a daily basis. Although perceived in a habitual way and usually taken for granted, 
national ceremonies, customs and symbols (e.g. flags, coinage, and popular heroes) 
are the most compelling and enduring aspects of nationalism (Smith, 1991; Billig, 
1995). Their main function is to act out as constant reminders of the common ideals 
of this historical community of culture across time. In this way, they manage to 
induce strong emotional reactions to all those who identify with the nation (in ethnic 
terms) and potentially marginalise those who have not yet become or they are not 
‘eligible’ to become fully-fledged members of the society (minority and immigrant 
groups).
Finally, it should be noted that nations in their political form (nation-states) and their 
identities are not monolithic. Depending on the needs of the society and following the 
international regulations and trends, they may evolve and change. A nation that may 
have followed the genealogical model in the past may need to be reformed along the 
civic-state lines. The reverse is also true. For example, in the case of Iran, after the 
Revolution (1979), the nation approached the ethnogeneological model more than it 
used to. The nationalistic movement was highly influenced by religion (Shii Islam). 
Orchestrated by clerics, it was organised around the doctrine that the Iranian people 
needed to defend themselves against the Westernised forms of imperialism. This 
resulted in the emergence of a rather anachronistic type of nationalism, religious 
nationalism, and in the amalgamation of national with religious identities. As Haggay 
(2000) argues, the politicisation of Islam did not aim to change the pre-existent 
national myths. Instead, Islam remains within the confines of Iranian nationalism 
adding to its meaning a strong religious character.
To summarise, the present section discussed the existing debate as to whether religion 
should be included or excluded from theories of nationalism. In the context of this 
thesis, all these generic approaches on the processes, the preconditions for the
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emergence of the nation-state, national identity, and the weak or strong relation of the 
former to religions dogmas need to be considered in relation to the aim, time and 
context (nationally and internationally) of the nationalistic movements. As 
Merdjanova (2000) argues, although nationalism and religion are usually 
conceptualized as two opposing ideals based on different, almost antithetical 
principles (i.e. universalism of religion vs. particularism of nationalism), in some 
social contexts they build up strong alliances. Rieffer (2003) recently developed a 
three-fold classification model that represents the strength of the relationship between 
religion and nationalism {religious nationalism, instrumental pious nationalism, 
secular nationalism) evidenced across different times and contexts. In the following 
section, some examples are provided of how (under what conditions), and to what 
extent religion has been a significant factor in some past and contemporary nationalist 
movements in Western and Eastern parts of Europe. In this analysis, Rieffer’s (2003) 
classification model will be used but it is also suggested that the influence of religion 
on the nation formation process varied at times fi*om being ideological to institutional 
and vice versa. The institutionalised type refers to the politicised role of religion 
through its institutions and to the close alliance of the latter with the state authorities.
4.2.3 Religion in the age o f nationalism in Europe: Examples from a socio-
historical perspective
The emergence of the Byzantine Empire after the decline of the multi-religious 
Roman Empire was based on the unifying power of a new religion: Christianity. 
During the Middle Ages the role of Christianity was also influential in the 
development of national identities in Europe as it contributed to “the evolving 
connection between political centre formation, ethnic community building and 
cultural-linguistic homogenization” (Spohn, 2003, p. 272). The translation of the 
Holy Bible in both Greek and Latin languages, along with the promotion of the idea 
of ‘the chosen people’ facilitated the use of a common religious language and set the 
basis for the emergence of a political community (Hastings, 1997). However, the era 
of nationalism launched with the social, economic and intellectual movement of the 
Enlightenment, during which the communication and diffusion of innovative ideas 
contributed to the emergence of a new form of political organisation, the nation-state.
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The rise of this socio-political organisation (nation-state) led to the gradual 
transformation in the ways people thought about themselves and their communities. 
As Giddens (1991) suggests, it brought forward a notional criterion of cultural 
homogeneity, political and territorial sovereignty. In what way and to what extent 
was religion part o f these nationalistic movements!
In Western Europe and more specifically in France, the avant-garde - intellectual 
movement of the Enlightenment and later on of the French Revolution (1789), 
degraded the institutional power of religion (mainly of the Catholic Church), putting 
forward a more civic model of the nation which was no longer based on the fault lines 
of religious particularism. The ideals and the principles of Enlightenment questioned 
the legitimacy of religious dogmas to explain the universe, and provided alternative 
ways of thinking using scientific paradigms. This gradual erosion of the prestige of 
religion and of its influence in the political realm, the growth of the civic-individual 
rights as means of revolting against the economic enfeeblement of the people set the 
basis for the emergence of a secular form o f nationalism (Riefer, 2003). Solidified 
mainly around the idea of a cultural homogeneity and linguistic uniformity, this form 
of nationalism arose in an effort to build a nation-state free from royal and religious 
despotisms (Keitner, 2000). The present model of secular nationalism and national 
identity institutionalized the separation between the church and state in 1902, 
encouraging the development of a religiously secular national culture where religion 
was considered a private issue and not a national affair. This belief was, and to some 
extent is still reflected on the place and secondary role of religious education in 
France. However, the “headscarf affair” in 1989 has been and still remains a great 
challenge questioning both the intention and effectiveness of the religious-free 
educational system to reconcile two main principles: that of individual freedom 
(laicity) and of religious secularism within classrooms (MacNeill, 2000).
In Southeastern Europe, more specifically in the Balkan peninsula (i.e. Greece, 
Bulgaria and Serbia), religion was called upon once again to challenge the integrity of 
another empire, the Ottoman one. By accentuating the similarities between Balkan 
countries based on a shared religious dogma, that of Christian Orthodoxy, religious 
institutions managed to convert and extend these religious ties into national ones 
(Roudometof, 1999). Loyal to the ecumenical ideals and traditions of Eastern
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Orthodoxy, with Greek being the lingua franca at the time, the Balkan societies 
headed by the Patriarch of Constantinople remained for a long time ideologically and 
psychologically unified against the ‘Moslem tyrant’. The fact that the Ottoman 
regime (millet-system) recognised the Patriarch not only as a religious leader but also 
as a legal authority, endowing him with judicial power, strengthened even more the 
political and institutional power of the Orthodox Church (Svoronos, 2004).
However, the new concepts of statehood and nationality conveyed in the ideals of 
Enlightenment and in Western nationalism proved to be detrimental, firstly for the 
Ottoman rule and later on for the unity of the Balkan Orthodox community 
(Kitromilides, 1990; Veremis, 1990; Roudometof, 1999). The vision of the Patriarch 
o f Constantinople to weld together the Balkan people of different ethnic backgrounds 
into a single but multi-cultural community under his ruling was disrupted. The 
emphasis placed upon linguistic diversity initiated a process of ethnic differentiation. 
The previously unified Balkan Orthodox society was eventually jeopardized as the 
‘new’ national identities were forged based on ethnolinguistic distinctiveness and on 
historical narratives reflecting the irredentist dreams of the intelligentsia of the time.
The advent of independent states in the Balkans was initially proclaimed and 
solidified through the independence of their churches from the Patriarchate of 
Constantinople. The latter openly condemned the emergence of nationalism in the 
Balkans and accused religious institutions of ‘racializing’ the Orthodox dogma 
(Veremis, 1990). This fusion of nationalism and religion that arose in the Balkan 
countries during their national liberation movements firom the Ottoman rule and from 
the hegemonic Orthodox Church of Constantinople (18* -19* centuries), is an 
example of religious nationalism described as “a community of religious people or 
the political movement of a group of people heavily influenced by religious beliefs 
who aspire to be politically self-determining” (Rieffer, 2003, p. 225). The 
nationalization of the church, the redeployment of religious symbolism into national 
and the use of national rhetoric in the education system all contributed to: 1) the 
socialization of the Balkan people into the process of nation-state formation and also 
2) to their political mobilization initially against a common target (the Ottoman 
empire) but later on also against each other (Roudometof, 1999).
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To recapitulate at this point, it can be suggested that in some societal contexts like 
France, the early rise of nationalities, nationalism and the nation-building processes 
were objectified through the opposition and weakening of religious dogmatism. 
Nationalistic ideology in France, in Kohn’s (1945) terms, followed a more rational 
path and it was mainly political and territorial in nature. The cultural nation coincided 
with the territorial boundaries of this polity governed by the state (see also Jenkins 
and Sofos (1996) for a detailed socio-political analysis on how France has come to be 
considered as the prototypical civic nation state^). In contrast, in Balkan societies the 
process of state formation happened in two stages. The nation had to be defined as a 
socio-cultural entity before it was identified as a political one. In other words, a sense 
of nationality had to be created before the nation-state formation. Nationalistic 
ideologies in those contexts arose in a more organic version (Kohn, 1945) and 
communities were more ethno-historically determined (ethnogeneological model).
The territorial nationalism and the ideas of an independent state with political power 
and well defined boundaries were all far more ‘tempting’ for the people living in 
dynastic states. Given that the Balkan people were living under the Ottoman regime, 
nationalist movements had a strong religious character and were initially liberation 
movements. In a second stage, the nationalisation of the churches played a significant 
role in the initial stages of nation-state formation as a symbol of national struggle.
This role of national churches as bearers and protectors of national ideals (from 
institutional to ideological) exerted a continuous influence on national cultures and on 
national identity formation with religious foundations being a constitutive component 
of national identities. This explains why nationality and religion are still intertwined 
in some contexts, like Greece, both in an institutional (state-church relationship) and 
in an ideological level.
4.3 Involvement of nationality-religion relationship in coping with diversity 
in multicultural societies (function 2)
Within culturally diverse contexts, a conception of a strong overlap between 
nationality/ethnicity and religion may be a strategic response employed by either 
majority or minority group members to maintain the historicity of their identities and
 ^ Smith (1991) argues that in the early 19*^  century nationalism in France had also an organic character 
based on the French language.
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to ensure that their group is and remains positively distinct from the other groups 
living in the society (Tajfel, 1978). For social researchers the study of this 
relationship can shed light in how the contending groups understand the essence of 
multiculturalism as an ideology and deal with its repercussions (Breugelmans and van 
de Vijver, 2004). More specifically, the levels of strength of this relationship between 
national/ethnic and religious identities may predict the extent to which a group would 
value intercultural contact, feel threatened by its ramifications, and of the level and 
type of acculturative strategies it would endorse to position itself and maintain its 
identity essence within a culturally diversified society. As this thesis focuses on the 
identity dynamics and inter-group perceptions of members of the host majority 
members, the following section discusses these issues only from the majority 
perspective.
The majority perspective
From the majority perspective, a systematic collective representation of nationhood, 
where a particular religious dogma and genealogical descend are both‘considered 
defining elements of its content, may be indicative of this group’s unwillingness to 
imagine and accept the cultural diversity, as an old or new, feature of the society 
(Freeman, 2003; Chryssochoou, 2004). It denotes a degree of resistance in changing 
the ‘traditional’ meanings attached to national identities in order to incorporate 
individuals of a different ethnic origin and/or of religious affiliation.
The actions and intentions of the immigrant and minority groups living in the society 
may be questioned by the majority and perceived as posing a threat to the group in 
both symbolic and material ways (Stephan and Stephan, 2000). Relevant research 
indicates that group perceived competition in non religious dimensions (jobs, 
housing) may accentuate discrimination towards minority groups based on religious 
beliefs and cultural practices (Esses, Jackson and Armstrong, 1998; Modood, 1998a, 
1998b, 2001; Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, Armstrong, 2001), especially, when these 
appear to be in direct opposition to the dominant way of life, to the group norms and 
practices of the host majority members. Therefore, as a means of coping with the 
experience of threat that people of different cultures may pose to the socioeconomic 
life, and to the dominant values and cultural belief systems (e.g. threat to group
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distinctiveness and/or continuity), majority members may define their ingroup using a 
set of descriptive and prescriptive criteria based on certain societal norms (Sherif and 
Sherif, 1953, 1964; Kahneman and Miller, 1986). All these justifications, advocated 
as normative features of the group and the society, may be a set of traditional beliefs, 
value systems that are defining nationhood along religious fault lines and/or myths of 
ethnic descent. Moreover, the representations of citizenship that host majority 
members hold for the different ethno-religious groups, and the legal framework 
provided by the state is also something that needs to be taken under consideration, as 
it may also reflect the coercion and exclusion that the majority culture may force in 
subtle or aversive ways to the minority groups (see Phalet and Swyngedouw, 2002).
It is therefore the preconditions, the subjective (public’s opinions) or legal (state 
immigration policies) criteria that would restrict or allow access into the ingroup (host 
majority). As Parekh (1998) argues, if  in a multicultural context the state is not 
culturally neutral, this may end up in the enforcement of a single culture as the 
prevailing one (majority culture) and in the exclusion of the other cultural belief 
systems. Language and religion of the majority population may be culturally 
patterned and hence implicated in the demand of the acculturation of the group in the 
minority position. The state and religious authorities using different media 
(education, mass media) can legitimize and strengthen the role of a particular 
religious dogma presenting it as an important cultural dimension of nationhood.
In that sense, both in an individual and collective level, the national ingroup may be 
constantly represented as a compound category formed by the combination of two 
category dimensions: national and religious (see Crisp, Hewstone and Cairns, 2001), 
especially when the presence of minority is perceived by majority members to be a 
potential threat to its cultural integrity or to its material existence. The findings from 
Roccas and Brewer’s (2002) study on students in Israel indicated that in the high 
threat condition (potential war situation with Iraq) participants perceived their group 
as having more clear ingroup boundaries both in national and religious terms. High 
perceptions of ingroup homogeneity were also positively related to less outgroup 
tolerance.
To conclude this section, in a society where the relationship between religion and 
nationhood has acquired a normative quality through socialisation processes (family
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environment, education, mass media) and the church-state relationship is cordial, the 
ingroup boundaries are less permissive for those differing in either/or both 
dimensions (Schwartz and Huismans, 1995; Roccas and Brewer, 2002; Roccas, 2005). 
This may lead to the moral and social exclusion of these groups (Opotow, 1995), and 
legitimise expressions of explicit or implicit forms of derogation against them based 
on cultural differences (Gaertner and Dovidio, 1986; Pettigrew and Meertens, 1995). 
This does not denote however that all host majority members would consider the 
relationship between nationality and religion to be psychologically important and 
influential in the way they perceive the immigrant and minority groups and the extent 
they value intercultural contact (Pettigrew, 1998). Yet, living in a context where a 
particular dogma is considered for historical and cultural reasons an integral part of 
national definition, negotiation and creation of alternative more secular constructions 
of nationhood is far from an easy task to achieve even for host majority group 
members (Bar Tal, 2000; Hopkins, Kahani-Hopkins and Reicher, 2006).
As discussed in Chapter 2, with few exceptions (Hewstone, Islam and Judd 1993; 
Cassidy and Trew, 1998; Crisp, Hewstone and Cairns, 2001; Roccas and Brewer, 
2002; Freeman, 2003) most extant research has explored majority perceptions and 
attitudes towards the minority groups based on one category dimension (national) or 
the other (religious). To the best of my knowledge, there is no study that examines 
the effect of the interrelationship between these two identities on the majority’s 
acculturation theories about the minority groups. In general, consideration of this 
relationship has been a minor strand in the research based on theories of inter-group 
relations (SIT, SCT). The majority of studies that have examined multiple social 
identities in interaction tend to focus more on the relationship between national and 
supra-national identifications (Cinnirella, 1997; Brown and Haeger, 1999). The 
relationship between nationality and religion has so far been examined in societies 
marked by an internal ethno-religious conflict (Cassidy and Trew, 1998; Reiman, 
2001; Fox, 2004), and to some extent in multicultural contexts, but mainly from the 
immigrant and minority perspective. However, even in studies examining the 
acculturation attitudes of these groups, religion seems to be a rather neglected domain 
(Phinney, 1998). It is usually employed at later stages for explaining the level of 
adaptation of these groups within the host society and the variations evinced in their 
levels of ethnic and national identifications (Hutnik, 1986; Berry, 1990, 1997;
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Phinney, Horenczyk, Liebkind and Vedder, 2001). Recently, there has been a lot 
more interest in examining the relationship between ethnicity and religion and how 
the latter may be used in political activists’ speeches or in lay peoples’ theories as a 
gauge of ethnicity (cultural and ethnic transcendence), and for shaping and setting the 
‘boundaries’ of minority’s group assimilation in the host society (Saeed, Blain and 
Forbes, 1999; Raj, 2000; Phalet and Swyngedouw, 2002; Hopkins and Kahani- 
Hopkins, 2004).
This thesis will address how the relationship between these two types of 
identifications, in a context that it is considered of particular historical, political and 
cultural importance (Greece), influences host majority acculturative attitudes towards 
groups that share one or none of these two group memberships (cross-categorisation 
paradigm). The relationship between them is expected to be mediated by perceptions 
of threat posed by the presence of these group on national identity and levels of 
prejudice expressed towards each of these groups.
4.4 Concluding remarks
Modem nations are frequently portrayed as progressive, industrialized and 
ideologically secular social structures that are guided by the process of globalization 
and the ideals of multiculturalism (Hutchinson, 2000). By adopting policies that 
embrace a cosmopolitan ideology, societies are expected to become tolerant to 
internal cultural diversity and able to accommodate the needs of their citizens. It is in 
those contexts that religion is or should he moved to the private sphere and its relation 
to nationhood may be only discussed in historical and cultural terms.
However as the 21^ century launched with interethnic wars, terrorism and the 
revivalism of nationalism and religious dogmatism, it conveyed a less optimistic 
message to the future of both multiculturalism and globalization, the latter 
exemplified by the establishment of supranational institutions (e.g. European Union). 
The rise of both religious fundamentalism and extreme right-wing political ideologies 
provide evidence that religious and national identities are still strongly intertwined in 
contemporary societies. The intention of the secularization thesis to relegate the 
strength of their relationship and to downplay the role of religious dogmas in the
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definitions of nationhood and state formation processes (nation building) evidently 
did not succeed^. Although the cultural meaning of religion seems to vary 
significantly across nations, there are many examples where religion still remains a 
defining part of nationhood and nationalistic ideologies (Hutchinson, 1996; 
Kârârianen, 1999; Agadjanian, 2001; Fox, 2004).
Most scholars, within the disciplines of sociology and political sciences tend to link 
this parallel revivalism of religion and nationalism with the socio-historical changes 
that pursued the fall of the communist regimes, and to explain its reoccurrence as a 
reactive manifestation against the globalization process and its proliferation of a 
universalising logic that of cultural homogenization (Beyer, 1994; Dorraj, 1999; Loch 
and Heitmeyer, 2001). As Dorraj (1999) proposes, “religious revivalism should not 
be viewed only as a reactive manifestation to the dislocation of modernity and 
fi-agmentation in the modem society but also as an attempt to restore a sense of 
community and cultural authenticity in a changing world” (p. 238). This statement 
captures the underlying psychological processes that may keep this relationship 
‘alive’ across time and in different contexts: the need of individuals and groups to 
maintain a distinct and historically continuous cultural character. It seems that both 
globalisation and multicultural ideologies have brought to the psychological 
foreground and successively legitimised as Soysal (2000) points out the ‘right to one’s 
own culture’.
This chapter has identified two key functions of religion in relation to national 
identity: its role in the nation building process, and its role in coping with cultural 
diversity. A critical issue for formulating an understanding of the parallel resurgence 
of nationalism and religion and of its diverse manifestations (religious 
fundamentalism, religious nationalism), is first of all to revisit the preconditions that 
contributed to the historical development of this relationship after examining the role 
and differential impact of religion on nationalist movements: such as the nation 
building and on the initial stages of national identity formation processes. Moreover,
 ^ Spohn (2003) in his analysis on how modernization theories relate to nationality and religion by 
focusing mainly on the non-European nation-states discusses in detail the sociohistorical circumstances 
responsible for the failure of the secularization process.
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to locate its presence and function in majority (state, and nationals) and minority 
ideologies and to investigate how it can be used by people, political activists, state and 
religious institutions for maintaining the vitality and distinctiveness of ethnic 
communities within culturally and politically diverse societies.
In the initial stages of this task we found ourselves ‘caught’ in the middle of a long 
lasting disagreement among scholars regarding the ancientness of the history of the 
nation. On the one end, there is a primordial image of the nation that traces its roots 
in the earlier civilizations (e.g. Ancient Greece) (Smith, 1991; Roudometof, 1999) 
emphasizing the role of a common culture and heritage in the nation formation 
process. Based on this approach the fact that national consciousness emerged well- 
before the current forms of nation appeared is an indication of the fact that nations are 
not products of the latest centuries. On the other end, there is a modernist approach 
that does not acknowledge a long past in the concept of nation but it suggests that it is 
a product of the current socioeconomic circumstances. According to this view, the 
origins of the nation should be associated with the ideals established during the period 
of Enlightenment and of French and Industrial Revolutions (Gelhier, 1964; Giddens, 
1991).
Irrespective though of whether nations are really ancient or not, what seems to be 
important es the role of historical continuity in empowering the nationalistic 
ideologies that bind us with these, in Anderson (1983) terms, ‘imagined communities’ 
(Kitching, 1985; Lowenthal, 1985). The use of myths, symbols and traditions 
(religious or not) fosters a sense of transcendence and eternity to the national group 
adding emotional value to the content of national identity (Salazar, 1998). In some 
cases, the historicity of the nation needs to be faked through the ‘invention of 
tradition’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983), or even by claiming another nation’s 
historical past (Triandafyllidou, 1998). What remains important for all those studying 
inter-group relations incorporating identity in their approaches is that the definition of 
each nation as a social and/or political organisation (nation-state) is based on a set of 
objective and subjective criteria emanating from the socio-historical context that have 
been originally generated and constantly (re)enacted.
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Our first task then is to identify how people make sense of their national identities and 
which criteria they use to form social categorizations (common fate, similarity), as 
well as the meanings they consider prevalent in defining this membership. Secondly, 
to examine the extent to which a particular dogma is part of their national/ethnic 
definition and the processes (common meanings, motivations) that may explain and 
potentially modify their intersection especially under contexts of threat. In this 
analysis, one should not underestimate the extent to which their lay theories about the 
nation and of its defining constituents may have been influenced by the political 
orators and the social institutions (religious and state) of their social environment 
(Moscovici, 1984, 1988; Reicher and Hopkins, 2001).
From the standpoint of the 2U  ^century, the resurgence or the maintenance of a strong 
relationship between nationality and religion may seem a backward state of affairs. 
However, the study of their interrelationship is still of paramount importance within 
multicultural contexts as it may facilitate a better understanding of the criteria that 
individuals bring into play to establish their ingroup-outgroup boundaries, the 
permeability of these memberships, and their content. Moreover, the existence of 
cross-categorizations based on real affect-laden memberships between members of 
the minority and the majority groups may explain the differential absorption of the 
former in the host society under investigation and the differential (positive or 
negative) inter-group treatment.
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Chapters: The Greek Context
5.1 Introduction
Anderson (1991) has claimed that “nationality or nation-ness as one might prefer to 
put it in view of that word’s multiple significations as well as nationalism, are cultural 
artefacts of a particular kind. To understand them properly we need to consider 
carefully how they have come into historical being, in what ways their meanings have 
changed over time, and why today they command such profound emotional 
legitimacy” (p. 4). Modem Greece should be considered as an Eastern European or a 
Balkan country, for geographical as well as historical and cultural reasons. A number 
of scholars have classified the Greek culture as a collectivistic one (Hofstede, 1980; 
Triandis and Vassiliou, 1972, as cited in Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Assai and 
Luca, 1988, p. 326; Pollis, 1992) and the nation-state under the ethnogenealogical 
model also incorporating at different points in time a territorial and a civic conception 
in relation to its significant ‘others’ (enemies and minority groups, EU) (Smith, 1991; 
Roudometof, 1999; Triandafyllidou, 1998; Triandafyllidou and Paraskevopoulou, 
2002; Triandafyllidou and Veikou, 2002).
The present chapter provides a brief overview of the historical and contemporary 
features of Greek national identity. It investigates the process of formation of the 
Greek nation and identity from the time of its national independence. Of cmcial 
importance for the current discussion on Greek national identity is its past and present 
relationship with the Christian Orthodox dogma. This chapter is therefore focuses on 
the role of religion for understanding the impact of immigration trends and 
membership of the European Union on the Greek national identity.
Historically, the ties between the two (nationality-religion) were legal, political 
(Church-State relations) but most importantly ideological in nature (i.e. merger of 
nationalistic ideologies with religion during the formative period of Greek 
nationalism). The constmction of Greek national identity was founded on notions of 
common ancestry, cultural traditions and religion. An important question that arises 
is the extent to which an ethno-cultural conception of the nation-state, also influenced
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by the past and heavily politicised role of the Orthodox Church, is still present in the 
Greek cultural context. If so, does it contribute in any way to the construction and 
sustenance of an exclusionary character of Greekness in relation to the minority and 
immigrant groups living in Greek society?
5.2 Greek national identity and its relation to the Christian Orthodox dogma
“On, ye sons o f Hellas! Free your native land, free your children, 
your wives, the fanes o f your fathers ’ gods and the tombs o f  your 
ancestors. Now you battle for you all”
(Aeschylus, The Persians, v.402-405)
In the case of Greek national identity, there was an early development of national 
consciousness evidenced in times of conflict (Persian Wars). Although in ancient 
Greek times there was no nation-state in the form that exists today [e.g. only city- 
states (Athens, Sparta) and kingdoms (Macedonian)], there was a sense of Hellenism^ 
that united Ancient Greeks against their perceived national enemy usually addressed 
as “barbarians”. According to both Smith (1991) and Svoronos (2004) at that time 
there was evidence of a Greek cultural and ethnic community but not of an Ancient 
Greek “nation”. In other words, there was no single-unified political community 
whose people could share common institutions and be bounded under a common set 
of political duties and rights as members of this community. This occurred only at the 
level of city-states (e.g. the Athenian city-state). Although religion in Ancient Greece 
was a common point of reference, it did not provide any sense of national solidarity 
among Ancient Greeks (i.e. Peloponnesian War).
It was not until the Byzantine Empire arose in the Eastern part of the Roman Empire 
that the relationship between religion (Eastern Orthodoxy) and nationhood 
(Greekness) started to emerge. Byzantium started as the Eastern part of the Roman 
Empire but gradually became politically and culturally an autonomous multi-ethnic 
nation with the modem meaning of the word. It had its own emperor, capital 
(Constantinople), laws, and army-military system. On a cultural level, the Byzantine 
civilisation was mainly an amalgamation of the Hellenic and Roman cultures with
 ^Hellenic identity is a much more appropriate term but the Latin version Greek has prevailed in the 
literature.
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Christianity. The Hellenic culture (language, literature) predominated through its 
existence to the extent that the Byzantine intellectuals considered themselves 
successors of the Ancient Greek spirit. However, their main point of departure from 
the Greco-Roman culture was the adoption of a new religion: Christianity.
During this time, Christianity and in particular Eastern Orthodoxy enjoyed for the first 
time the status of a ‘state religion’. It is interesting to discuss in much more detail 
how the ideological and institutionalised aspects of this relationship (Eastern 
Orthodox Church-State) that was initially established in the Byzantine times 
contributed later to the realisation of the Greek nation potential during the Ottoman 
conquest.
As already mentioned in Chapter 4, during the period of great political reformation in 
the West, Greece and other Balkan countries were still under the .millet-system of the 
Ottoman regime. Within this political organization the non-Moslem subjects were 
allowed to form their own communities, delegated with some power under their own 
ecclesiastical chiefs. However, the millets lacked territorial cohesion and their people 
citizenship rights (Svoronos, 1999). One had to simply convert to Islam to enjoy the 
rights, wealth and power of the majority at the time. For all those refusing to convert, 
such an action was perceived as an early manifestation of national resistance. 
According to Mavrogordatos (2003), religion usually becomes an essential core of 
national identity in contexts marked by a history of defence and of political 
deprivation.
The ideals of Enlightenment arrived later in the Greek context but in sharp contrast to 
the West they did not extrapolate the religious element. Instead, Eastern Orthodoxy 
was perceived by the Greek intelligentsia of the time as a good path for 
communicating nationalistic ideals and aspirations to people (Svoronos, 2004). In 
addition, the priests, who were also involved to some extent in the liberation 
movement, interpreted the ideals of Enlightenment through the lenses of the Christian 
Orthodox dogma. This provided the nationalistic doctrines of the time with a 
religious character.
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The nation formation movement happened during the process of liberation from the 
Ottoman regime. In 1821 the Greek nation declared its War of Independence which 
was won in 1829. As previously discussed, the Patriarchate was officially against the 
revolution (Veremis, 1990). However, the involvement of lower clergy into the 
revolution as well as the decapitation of Patriarch Gregory V legitimized in peoples’ 
minds the notion that the Church was supportive of their nationalistic movement. In 
1833, the Church of Greece was the first one in the Balkans to become autocephalous 
proclaiming independence from the Patriarch of Constantinople. The former was still 
a captive of the Ottoman Empire, an Ottoman official. On that basis, he was no 
longer considered eligible to represent the liberated Greek population. The Greek 
Church was nationalized and became a state church much later in 1850 when the 
Patriarch eventually accepted to let it go. The blending between Greek nationality 
with the Christian Orthodox religion is evident in the following extract from the first 
article of the first Greek Constitution in Epidaurus (1822) “all inhabitants who believe 
in Christ, were ipso facto Greeks” (cited in Crysoloras, 2004a). As it is discussed in 
much more detail in the following Section (5.2.1), since then the two are inseparable 
in the Greek context.
One could therefore argue that religion was one of the most dominant influences on 
the development of Greekness for the following reasons. Compared to the religious 
homogeneity which was established almost from the early years of Independence, the 
linguistic homogeneity (referring to the existence of various linguistic idioms) seemed 
a far more difficult and enduring task. Under these circumstances, as Mavrogordatos 
(2003) argues “despite the linguistic emphasis of early Greek nationalism, therefore. 
Orthodoxy and not language was bound to provide the ready-made initial core o f . 
Greek national identity” (p. 129). The Helleno-Christian ideals prevailed over all 
other forms of nationalism as the former: a) constructed rigid boundaries between the 
insiders (people of the nation) and ‘external others’ (Turks, other Balkan Orthodox 
people) intensifying their differentiation process based on ethnicity and/or religion; b) 
managed to transcend the class and the existing linguistic-idiomatic differences; c) 
were in agreement with familial and communal values of the society (Triandaffylidou, 
Calloni and Mikrakis, 1997; Chrysoloras, 2004c); and d) communicated the idea of 
cultural uniqueness and superiority with Greeks being the successors and thus the
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legitimate custodians of all great cultures (Ancient Greek classical past, Hellenistic 
and Byzantine Empire).
In Greece, as in the case with all nations, national history was and is still contingent 
upon political aims stressing an uninterrupted continuity between past and present 
times. It aimed to create a strong national rhetoric that would link the Ancient ethnic 
community with the people of the modem state. However, there is a paradox within 
the Greek culture in the sense that its ideological past is comprised of two opposing 
forces. On the one end, there is the Ancient Greek culture with its anthropocentric 
values and Pagan religion. On the other, it is the Byzantine culture with its Anatolian 
theocratic values, preached in the Christian Orthodox dogma. The success of the 
Greek intelligentsia of the time (19^  ^century) was that they managed to combine these 
different historical periods and present their ideological positions as successive and 
continuous. There is no doubt that in the years that the Byzantine Empire was at its 
peak, the Greeks held a politically (e.g. Byzantine Emperors and Patriarchs were of 
Greek origin) and culturally (e.g. use of the Archaic Greek language in religious 
liturgies and textbooks) privileged position compared to the other ethnic groups 
(Svoronos, 1999). The intelligentsia used later these historical facts to ‘hellenise’ the 
dogma and most importantly to present the Byzantine state as the precursor of the 
Modem Greek Orthodox state (Veremis, 1990).
This is well captured by Kitromilides, one of the leading political analysts of Greek 
national identity:
“The doctrine of national unity, which was to he elaborated throughout 
the rest of the nineteenth century, was articulated on three levels. On a 
social level it stressed the need for national unity within Greece, with 
uniformity and homogenization becoming prevalent norms of cultural 
discourse; on a geographical level it stressed the unity o f Hellenism, of 
the Greek nation as an integral whole bringing together its constituent 
parts within and outside the kingdom; and on a historical level it stressed 
the unity of the Greek nation along a temporal dimension, emphasizing
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its uninterrupted continuity throughout the centuries from Homeric 
through Byzantine to modern times ”
(Kitromilides, 1990, p. 41)
This emphasis on common ancestry, destiny and the glorification of history suggests 
that the Greek nation (nation-state) followed more what was defined by Kohn (1945) 
and Smith (1991) as an ethno-genealogical model stressing the organic unity of the 
culture and its relative uniqueness. Therefore, nationality was defined as the 
expression of genealogical descent and in direct reference to this ethnic community’s 
glorious past. The myths of a common ethnic heritage, language and religion still 
remain defining aspects of the Greek national identity. The strong integration 
between the past and present and the perceived ethnic homogeneity of the nation is 
also manifested in the Greek language. Etymologically, there is still only one word 
(“ethnos”) to describe the ethnic group and the nation and this refers to both the pre­
modem, ethnically homogeneous community and to the present nation as a political 
community (Karakasidou, 1993; Chryssochoou, 2004). Moreover, as Pollis (1992) 
puts it, such an organic conception of the society reflects its traditional, communal 
and collectivistic character. It makes the ‘personal’ a component of the ‘social’ 
calling for the individual’s subordination of rights and duties to the primary claims of 
the state. It is within these societies (the so-called ‘traditional’), where there is a 
comparative uniformity in belief and knowledge, that collective or hegemonic 
representations about religion and nationhood rooted in systems of power, remain 
potent (Moscovici, 1988).
5.2.1 The nationality-religion relationship in the modern Greek society
In the previous Section, the role played by religion in the initial stages of national 
identity constmction, and in the formation of the Greek-nation state was discussed. 
What remains to be seen is whether and why the overlap between nationality and 
religion is still a dominant feature of the society. Data from intemational monitors of 
religiosity have shown that Orthodoxy has still a primary role in the content definition 
of modem Greek national identity. According to the US Department of State 
Intemational Religious Freedom Reports on Greece (2002,2006), “approximately 
97% of the population identify themselves at least nominally with the Greek Orthodox
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faith”. In addition, according to the 2002 Eurobarometer survey Greek youth are the 
most religious in Europe after the Irish. The following sections aim to shed light in the 
ways in which the relationship between Greekness and Eastern Orthodoxy is 
(re)constructed and diffused in the Greek political and cultural context.
5.2.1.1 The politicised aspects o f the relationship: The Eastern Orthodox 
Church and the State
Due to its historical role, as the ‘midwife’ of Greek nationalism. Orthodoxy was 
awarded by the state a politically privileged position in the present society. These are 
some of the ways in which this relationship is manifested.
Firstly, the relationship between the political and religious elements of modem Greek 
society is reflected in the following extract from the current Greek constitution which 
proclaims that “the prevailing religion in Greece is the religion of the Eastem 
Orthodox Church of the Christ” (Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 3). The 
autocephalous Church of Greece remains a symbol of the belief that statehood 
requires a church of one’s own nation. Priests are considered civil servants and are 
paid officially by the state.
Secondly, the existence of the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs verifies 
even more the close state-church relations and the liable role of the former (state) to 
socialise young people into Greek Orthodoxy (Pollis, 1992). The constmction of a 
reified collective representation (knowledge system) where Orthodoxy is a key 
element of the Greek national identity is diffused in the Greek educational system (i.e. 
religious and history curriculum). More specifically, the part of the Greek 
constitution that refers to the educational system emphasises the important role given 
to the governmental institutions in reproducing the national and religious identities of 
Greek citizens:
“Education is a basic mission o f the state aiming...the
development o f the national and religious consciousness ”
(Greek Constitution, 1975, Article, 16.2)
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Taking into account that the same constitution declares a particular religious creed, 
Eastem Orthodoxy, as the prevailing one in the country, the extensive focus on the 
Christian Orthodox dogma in the school-religious textbooks, does not come as a 
surprise. It is also worth noting that religious education is mandatory in the public 
school system. According to the state law (issued in 1995, cited in Mavrogordatos 
2003), students have the right to be exempted from religious studies and activities of 
collective worship only if  they and their parents officially declare their belief in a 
different religious dogma. The problem with such a policy is that students of different 
faiths are not offered altemative religious education (Zambeta, 2000). Moreover, 
exemption from religious instmction may lead to isolation and discrimination of these 
students within the school environment. This is the main reason why students rarely 
exercise this right. The fact that the Greek educational system does not follow a 
secularist model has been a point of long lasting political debate between Greece and 
the rest of the EU union (see Section 5.6 below).
The affinity between Greekness and Eastem Orthodoxy and the pivotal role of the 
second in the nation-building process era and in the formation of Greek national 
identity is also diffused in the history textbooks. The prevailing discourse in history 
textbooks, which is heavily influenced by the views invented by the intelligensia of 
the 19^  ^century, is the following: the Greek nation was initially created in Ancient 
times and survived through centuries o f different political formations (Roman, 
Byzantine and Ottoman). As Avdela (2000) argues in the national narrative 
reproduced until the present day in school, the Greek nation is presented as “a natural, 
unified, etemal and unchanging entity, not a product of history” (p. 239). In one of 
the history books used in school, Byzantium, referred also as “The Greek Medieval 
Empire”, is considered an important historical transitional period for the Greek nation 
due to its cultural achievement to synthesise Hellenism with Christianity (Asemosytis 
et al., 1998 cited in Zambeta, 2000, p. 151). The Greek language and the Christian 
Orthodox dogma are presented as the two main factors helping the Greek community 
to maintain a sense of unity and cultural distinctiveness during these difficult 
transitional periods.
An example of how Greekness and Christian Orthodoxy are intermeshed in historical 
terms is that the day that Greeks announced their battle against the Ottoman
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Occupation (War of Independence) coincided with one of the most important 
religious festivities, the Annunciation of Blessed Virgin Mary (25* of March). The 
story has it that on March 25* in 1821 (the day of Virgin’s Mary Annunciation), the 
bishop Germanos of Patras together with Greek people shouted the motto of 
revolution “Freedom or Death” (the nine stripes in the Greek flag are said to represent 
the number of syllables in this Greek phrase) and raised the Greek flag at the 
Monastery of Aghia Lavra in Peloponnesus declaring officially the war of 
Independence against the Ottoman regime. Whether this is an invented cultural myth 
or a real historical event is irrelevant. One needs to examine the underlying messages 
that these durable and reconstructed shared historical memories (Lyons, 1996;
Reicher and Hopkins, 2001) confer on the role played by Orthodoxy and its 
priesthood as a social source of political cohesion, from the time they were created 
until now.
Firstly, one cannot fail to notice the symbolism in the historical timing chosen for this 
defining moment for the Greek nation and its identity (Smith, 1991). On the same day 
that in the Christian religious calendars Archangel Gabriel revealed to Virgin Mary 
that she would conceive and give birth to the son of God, the same day the ideal for 
political autonomy was conceived informing the Greek people that a war was starting 
for the creation or ‘birth’ of an independent Greek nation-state.
Secondly, the leading role of bishop Germanos (as a Christian warrior mobilising the 
enslaved Orthodox people against their Ottoman oppressors in the nation’s liberation 
movement) communicates the idea that religion was supportive in this war effort, 
justifying until now the identification of the nation with Orthodoxy and the historical 
legacy and rightfulness of the Orthodox Church to maintain its status as a national 
church.
Proselytism and blasphemy are considered criminal offences and the church has the 
legal right to condemn any individual or group who commits either of the two.
Except from Islam, Judaism and Catholicism, the Greek Church has officially 
condemned all other religious denominations as heretical (Anti-Heresy Campaign, 
1983) communicating to the public the idea that acceptance and legalisation of these
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religions renders possible a threat to the spiritual transcendence of the Greek nation 
and to the “purity” of its culture (Pollis, 1992).
In addition, the Greek Orthodox Church does not only have jurisdiction and control 
over its own religious establishment but it also exercises considerable influence over 
the practice of minority religions. The Orthodox bishop should give his permission 
for the construction of any religious buildings. In opposition, the Orthodox Church 
has the right to built churches and chapels without asking always the permission of 
civil authorities (Pollis, 1992; Mavrogordatos, 2003). At the moment there is a big 
debate about the construction of a Mosque in the area of Attica. No Mosque operates 
and no religious festivities can be performed or are considered valid outside the area 
of Thrace where the local Moslem minority lives (see Section 5.4). The rights of this 
minority are preserved and protected by the intemational Treaty of Lausanne (1923).
Finally, compared to other EU countries, civil marriage was later legalised in Greece 
(1982), but only as an altemative to the religious one. However, some clergy refuse 
burial rights to those who are not married in church (Mavrogordatos, 2003). 
Moreover, the percentages of both civil and religious intermarriages are very low. 
Based on a national statistical report published in 1989 from the area of Thessalonica 
(Northem Greece) only 146 civil marriages were performed in that year compared to 
1191 religious marriages. Moreover, the percentage of intermarriages between 
Christian Orthodox people with people of other religions (i.e. Islam, Jewish) and 
dogmas (Protestants, Catholics) are also very low. Although the report is old and it 
describes the situation in only one region in Greece, we believe it provides a good 
example of the Greek public’s resilience towards these two institutions.
Table 5.1: Percentages of civil and religious marriages in the area of
Thessalonica between members of different religious groups
Marriages between 
Christian Orthodox and... %
Other religion 3.42%
Other Christian dogma 10.95%
Christian Orthodox 83.56%
(Adapted from Statistical analysis o f civil marriages: years 1982 to 1989, Statistical Report 
produced by the District of Thessalonica)
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The identity politics exercised by the state establish the legal (e.g. constitution) and 
the ideological (e.g. educational system) framework for the preservation and 
reproduction of the affiliation between Greekness and Christian Orthodoxy. Even the 
few examples provided are enough to give an idea of the privileges granted to the 
Eastem Orthodox Church as the official state church. This becomes evident with 
regard to the educational policies and with the institutional framework that ‘allows’ 
the Church not only to be actively involved in all matters deemed religious but also on 
secular policies.
Therefore, in contrast to the majority of Westem democracies, the symbiotic 
relationship between the Church and the State has retained its legal status and power 
in the Greek context. According to Mavrogordatos (2003), one of the main reasons 
that this relationship continues to be part of the Greek political culture is that the 
Church has always been aligned to the state, giving its spiritual blessing to any 
political regime in power, even to the military one. The latter action has put under 
examination the state-church relationship especially after Greece has restored its 
democracy (1974). However, the past support and active participation of some clergy 
men (i.e. the former Archibishop of Athens Serapheim) in the Communist Control 
National Front (EAM) during the World War II and the failure to identify a primary 
involvement of the Church in the anti-democratic political movement (coup d’etat, 21 
of April 1967-1973) has saved the Church from a constitutional reformation of the 
state-church relationship (Mavrogordatos, 2003).
The reluctance of the state to separate from the Orthodox Church was demonstrated in 
1998 when an overwhelming majority of politicians voted against the revision of 
constitution regarding the state-church relationship. No revision of the constitution 
will take place until 2010. However, taking also under consideration the massive 
appeal that the Orthodox faith has in the Greek population, even for those who 
support the leftist ideologies, such a decision would have enormous political cost for 
any government in power.
However, the rise of the socialist government (PAS OK) in the early 1980’s marked 
the end of the harmonious relations between the state and the church. The political 
project of the socialist party at the time was to gradually modernise Greek society by
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turning religion to the private sphere and separating nationality from religion. This 
created tensions between the two. Any proposed changes (e.g. reduction in the hours 
of religious instruction in 1998) towards this direction were perceived by the 
Orthodox Church as a threat to its status, blasphemous and disrespectful to its past 
hegemonic role in shaping Greek consciousness. As a consequence, there were 
massive public reactions orchestrated by the ecclesiastical priesthood under the 
charismatic leadership of Archbishop Christodoulos. His enthronement in 1998 gave 
rise to the emergence of a new form of religious nationalism in the Greek context, the 
so-called ‘neo-Orthodox’ nationalism. With his advent the Orthodox Church has 
reclaimed its past role as guardian of national identity and tradition and increasingly 
demands active involvement in policy decisions (Alivazatos, 1999; for a detailed 
discussion on religious populism in Greece see Stavrakakis, 2004). The assumed role 
of the Church to protect national identity is evident in the following extract from the 
Archibishop’s speech to the Eurodeputies in 2006:
“The Church feels that it is the ark of the spirit of its people. The ark of 
tradition, and the value it embodies. For this reason, the Church will 
intervene to preserve the particular identity of its people naturally 
without obstructing creativity and renovation. This has nothing to do 
with nationalism. It has everything to do with the aforementionedfact 
that the Church is the ark of tradition and the values it embodies ”.
Moreover, in this politicised discourse of the Greek Church, modernisation has been 
identified as the antagonistic enemy of the Church and of the cultural identity of the 
Greek people. Even before his enthronement the Archbishop Christodoulos of Athens 
and All Greece expressed his strong opposition to the ideals of modernity and 
globalisation processes implemented in the EU policies. He proclaimed that the aim 
of the latter is to alienate Greece of its tradition and to undermine its cultural 
uniqueness.
“The problem is very old. Directly after our liberation from the Turkish 
yoke the governing political and intellectual order in Greece became 
trapped in the perception that Hellenism could survive if  it neglected its 
eastern mentality and if  Greeks were to walk uninhibited in their course 
towards the West...I do not want to say that the integration in the EU is
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wrong. But it is dangerous... Today Hellenism is in danger of being 
absorbed into the European crucible... The Church should not isolate the 
Greek from Europe, nor though should it surrender him from Europe ”
(Archibishop Christodoulos, 1997, A17 cited in Focas, 2000, p. 16)
There is no doubt that the church’s new activism and the primarily political role that it 
envisages for itself as a guardian of the Greek cultural tradition against the secular 
forces of modernisation, became apparent when the government decided to change 
Greek identity cards. The fierce debate between the state and the church that 
polarised Greek society at the time, started on May 2000 when the independent 
Authority for the Protection of Personal Data and the superior constitutional State 
Court outlawed the mention of religious affiliation on Greek citizens’ identity cards. 
The state immediately supported the decision and constitutionalised the abolishment 
of religion from identity cards. On the contrary, the church refused to accept it, asked 
for a referendum and organised massive rallies to show its disagreement. In this effort 
the Church found the support of the major opposition party at the time (New 
Democracy) and of other right-wing parties. Christodoulos openly expressed his 
political support towards these parties, hoping to bring the issue forward again and 
change the current law when they would come to power (Chrysoloras, 2004a).
The campaign of the Church led by the Archbishop Christodoulos had a strong 
political character. In an attempt to gain the public’s support, the Greek Church came 
up with conspiracy theories about the European Union’s intentions to gradually erode 
Greek national identity. The intentions of the socialist governments were also 
questioned and characterised as anti-patriotic and dangerous for the future of the 
Greek culture and the purity of its identity. In addition, in his demonstration speech 
in Athens, Archibishop Christodoulos waved the flag of the 1821 revolution. The 
waving of a flag that symbolised both the faith and the social cohesion of the group at 
an important historical time for the nation, aimed to mobilise Greek people to resist 
and to defend their dogma. It was an attempt to invoke strong emotional reactions, 
and remind Greeks, as Chrysoloras also points out (2004b), that whenever Orthodoxy 
is threatened nationality is threatened too. Thus, the politicised discourse of the 
Church used the concept of threat as its central issue. The identity card issue was 
situated within a discourse that represented religion as the guardian o f the cultural
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aspect of Greekness and a symbol of resistance to globalisation and Europeanisation. 
As it will be discussed in much more detail later (see Section 5.3), threat at the level 
of national identity is a strong emotive and mobilising force for Greek people who 
live in a context where notions of national insecurity are kept alive.
Finally, it should be noted that not only the Church but also the Greek politicians have 
repeatedly stressed the cultural importance of the nationality-religion relationship. In 
the own words of the former president Constantine Karamanlis in a speech he gave in 
1981 after Greece j oined the EU :
“The nation and Orthodoxy ...have become in the Greek conscience 
virtually synonymous concepts, which together constitute our Helleno- 
Christian civilisation. ”
(cited in Ware, 1983, p. 208)
5.2.1.2 Cultural aspect o f the relationship
On a cultural level, the aesthetics of the Christian Orthodoxy have penetrated the 
Greek culture both implicitly and explicitly. Religious customs and festivities like 
Easter are considered an intrinsic part of the Greek way of life. Moreover^ the 
Christian cross is part of the Greek flag. It rests in the upper left side of the flag 
demonstrating the devotion and respect Greek people have for the Christian Orthodox 
faith as well as the status of the Orthodox Church of Greece as a national church. It is 
also a reminder of the important role that Christianity played in the liberation 
movement. It should be noted here that there is also another flag with the two- 
headed eagles from the Byzantine times. Although this flag is widely recognisable 
and respected by Greek people, it is not extensively used as its use denotes and is 
associated with the glorious Byzantine Empire and the nationalistic aspirations of its 
resurrection. However, it is always waved outside religious places and it is also used 
in the Greek army. Finally, the Orthodox Church is always present in national 
celebrations which are often accompanied by religious ceremonies.
The standing of religious institution in a society may also have a strong impact on the 
cultural dimension of national identity defining its value systems. As Inglehart (2000)
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proposes, the dominant religion in each society is strongly related to the types of 
values prevalent in this society. The values and beliefs preached in the Orthodox 
dogma are perceived to be compatible with, and to a certain degree even defining, the 
Greek mentality (e.g. family values) and its traditionally and collectivistic oriented 
culture. In Eastem Orthodoxy’s theological doctrines and principles, both mysticism 
and spiritualism are central. Compared to the Westem forms of Christianity there is 
less quest for tmth, rationality and scope for individuality. Instead, there are stronger 
ingroup ties to a community of believers (Church-Ekklissia), to rituals and tradition 
(Zemov, 1961; see Pollis, 1993 for a detailed discussion on Eastem Orthodoxy).
A famous study conducted by Schwartz and Huisman (1995) tested the strength and 
direction of the relationship between religiosity levels in four different religious 
denominations (Judaism, Catholicism, Protestantism and Greek Orthodoxy) and the 
importance ascribed to the ten distinct motivational goals expressed as basic types of 
human values (hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, 
tradition, conformity, security, power and achievement). The results obtained for the 
Greek Orthodox group indicated high positive correlations between religiosity levels 
with needs for conformity, tradition and security. On the contrary, there were 
exceptionally low correlations with all the values that put the individual interest and 
philosophical quest for meaning beyond religious dogmas at the centre (i.e. hedonism, 
stimulation, self-direction and universalism). Taking under consideration the 
theological precepts of Eastem Orthodoxy, its intolerant position towards other 
religious dogmas, its assumed role as the guardian of Greek tradition, as well as the 
psychological importance ascribed by the Greek people to the upholding of historical 
and cultural legacies, these results are not surprising. As the authors also point out in 
the discussion of their results, the strength of the relationship between religiosity and 
specific human values are always moderated by the needs prevalent in the relevant 
socio-historical context (see also Hunsberger and Jackson, 2005).
In any case, one can safely suggest that a dominant state religion, especially when its 
dogma values traditionalism, collectivism and has been linked with myths of ethnic 
community survival and national destiny (see Smith, 1999) as it happens with the 
Greek Orthodoxy, always comes at the expense of religious freedom. As 
Mavrogordatos (2003) rightfully points out “ as long as an established church
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continues to be identified with an ‘endangered nation’, change in the direction of 
pluralism is even less probable than an outright separation between the church and the 
state” (p. 134). In the following Section this chapter will discuss how Greece came to 
view itself as an endangered nation, explain why fears of national insecurity are still 
widespread in Greek society, and how these notions may affect minority groups living 
in this context.
5.3 A nation living under real and perceived threat
In the course of history, Greek nationals’ sentiments have been frequently 
manipulated by the intelligentsia, politicians (Greek or foreign), and sometimes the 
Church, in order for the former to pursue their imperialistic aspirations and/or 
political agendas. For instance, after the Greek nation-state was established as a 
political unit and its territorial boundaries were secured, it assumed another mission: 
territorial expansion (territorial or irredentist nationalism). Greeks viewed the Greek- 
state and the territorial settlement of 1830 as a temporary arrangement and anticipated 
its gradual expansion and the resurrection of the Byzantine Empire (Megali Idea,
1920). The political project involved the expedition in Asia Minor and it was 
legitimized based upon the idealistic conception that all the areas that the Orthodox 
Greeks lived in had to be liberated and become part of the newly bom Greek nation­
state (Mavrogordatos, 1983). The mission was not accomplished, yet the Greek-state 
succeeded in territorially expanding during the Balkan wars and the First World War 
(Triandafyllidou, Calloni and Mikrakis, 1997). In this process of territorial expansion 
of its borders, the Greek nation-state found itself fighting not only against the 
Ottoman mlers but also against its neighbors- the Albanians, the Slavs and 
Bulgarians, against which the nation felt united before. Although in 1912 (First 
Balkan War) the Balkan powers of Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro were all 
united against the Ottoman Empire forcing the latter to retreat (Treaty of London, 
1913), the second Balkan war was between Greece and Serbia on the one side and 
Bulgaria on the other fighting over the annexation of the Macedonia region. With the 
exception of the Northem region of Epims which was given by the Great Powers to 
Albania, by the end of Balkan wars the Greek nation-state managed to reclaim most 
of its “lost land” and take an honorable place in the world of nation-states. Although 
a detailed account of historical events cannot fully be presented in this chapter, it is
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clear that the irredentist types of nationalistic aspirations that flourished in the Balkan 
region especially during the 19* and 20* century have set the grounds for the 
emergence of a strong national risk perception related to the prospect of a political 
conflict between Greece and its neighboring countries.
The constant struggles of the nation to defend and secure its political, territorial 
sovereignty and cultural heritage from its invaders or enemies, its Tost’ lands (i.e. the 
region of North Epirus and Istanbul) were a central theme in the representations of 
Greek history. This political discourse is still popular today, enhancing not only 
feelings of nostalgia, national pride and unity, but also a sense of chronic threat. 
Greek nationals feel that both on cultural and territorial grounds their nation runs the 
risk of being attacked by its neighbours. Take for example the so-called ‘Macedonia 
Question’. This issue re-emerged in the Greek state’s political agenda (in 1993), not 
long after the collapse of the former Yugoslavian Republic, with the creation of the 
FYROM state (Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia). The proclamation of 
this state that it would use Macedonia as its official name and the claims made by 
FYROM nationalists that their nation, with its Slavic and Albanian populations, 
should be considered as an inheritor of the Ancient Macedonian Kingdom, were 
extremely provocative for the Greek state and people. It was perceived as major 
historical fraud, deliberatively fabricated to mask political claims regarding the region 
of Macedonia. All these led to the emergence of new forms of Greek nationalism (i.e. 
regional nationalism) and nationalistic movements for defending the cultural 
ownership of both the name and symbols associated with the Hellenistic era and the 
historical figure of Alexander the Great. As Triandafyllidou, Calloni and Mikrakis 
(1997, % 4.1) aptly phrased it “the extreme sensibility of the Greek population with 
regard to the Macedonian question is related to the prominent role given to the past in 
the definition of Greek identity”. The History of Ancient Macedonia with its famous 
kings, Philip II and Alexander the Great, is considered one of the most historical 
periods of the Greek civilization. Thus, the cultural claims of FYROM were deemed 
threatening for the national distinctiveness and continuity of the Greek nation. 
Moreover, the geographical area of Ancient Macedonia in its greatest part is inhabited 
by the Greek population. Only a small part of the North-Western Ancient Macedonia 
is included in this new Republic. The Greek government propagated and mobilised 
Greeks in the mainland and abroad to refute strongly against the naming of the nation
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as Macedonia and the use of the star of Vergina (symbol of the Hellenistic Kingdom) 
in that nation-state’s flag. The issue was partly resolved in 1996 when FYROM 
agreed to remove the symbol from its flag. Greece has lifted the embargo but there 
are still intense negotiations between the two countries not only about the use of the 
name “Macedonia” but also about a small Slavophone minority living in the North- 
Western Greece. The new state proclaimed to take under its protection this minority, 
whose ethnic origins have been a long-lasting point of dispute between the two 
countries (Karakasidou, 2002).
The collapse of communism and the rise of new forces of nationalism in the Balkan 
region have put Greece in an obscure political place. Greece found itself in a 
defensive position and greatly involved in the problems of the Balkan minorities. 
Despite the Macedonia question, the resurgence of Albanian nationalism forced 
Greece to be involved in the protection of the Greek minority in the Southern region 
of Albania. There is a discrepancy with regard to the size of this minority. The 
census of Albania in 1989 numbers a population of 59,000 Albanian citizens of Greek 
origin. The ‘Greek nationalists’ oppose this given estimate and argue that the size of 
this minority group is around 300,000 people (Clogg, 2002). It is difficult to clearly 
describe the situation because of the existing nationalism in both sides and the 
problems of immigration (both temporal and permanent) of the Greek origin Albanian 
citizens from this region to Greece. However, it is important to note that in addition 
to the already complicated diplomatic relations with Turkey concerning the Cyprus 
issue and the Aegean, these ‘new’ problems have intensified the public’s feelings of 
national insecurity even more.
In particular, the ‘Macedonia’ situation revitalised Greek national identity putting 
emphasis on its ethno-cultural basis and invoking strong feelings of national threat 
and uncertainty about what the future holds for the Greek nation (Triandafyllidou, et 
al., 1997). The confrontation between Greece with some EU partners on the 
Macedonia issue and the fact that the majority of them use the name ‘Macedonia’ 
although they are barred from doing so based on Greece’s political veto, made Greek 
people at that time ambivalent and suspicious towards the EU integration 
(Kouveliotis, 2001; Triandafyllidou and Veikou, 2002). Those fears about European 
integration, as discussed in the previous Section, were resonated in the Church’s
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discourse on the identity cards campaign making them salient and encouraging their 
re-emergence. Furthermore, the Macedonian issue portrayed by political orators and 
the Greek media as a critical situation for Greek national identity, also influenced 
social perceptions about the minority groups living in Greece. It gave way to the 
emergence of conspiracy theories about hidden political agendas concerning other 
regions in Greece, especially those where the Moslem minority groups are settled (i.e. 
Eastem Macedonia and Westem Thrace). Any apprehension that a minority may 
claim and show a future interest in being united with another state is perceived by 
both the state and nationals as another kind of ‘Trojan Horse’ (Clogg, 2002, p. 15). In 
Greece the only officially recognised minority is the Moslem minority that lives 
mainly in the area of Westem Thrace (see the highlighted area in Figure 5.1). A more 
detailed discussion about this minority is presented in the following Section.
Figure 5.1 : Map of Greece
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In general, the area of Westem Thrace is mainly agricultural and a less economically 
developed area compared to the other regions of Greece. Greek politicians from all 
political parties and the Church have stressed from time to time that the migration of 
the Greek Orthodox population from this area and the increase of the minority 
populations, mainly of the Turkish origin, may produce a similar situation to that of 
Cypms (Policy Paper in 1990 cited in Meinardus, 2002). It is these kinds of political 
discourses as well as the past conflicting socio-historical relations with Turkey and 
Bulgaria that create and sustain these notions of potential threat to Greek national 
identity and the state. Although reports on Greece seem to suggest that the state has 
improved the living conditions of these minority groups and has managed to 
safeguard their rights more compared to the past, when perceptions of national 
insecurity are linked with the presence of certain minority groups in the country, this 
may result in more subtle ways of moral and social exclusion of the former and to less 
intercultural contact between the majority-minority populations.
5.4 The ‘old’ multicultural character of the Greek society: Minorities living 
in Greece
According to the census of 1951 the size of minority populations (religious and 
linguistic) in Greece was the following:
Religious groups: In a total population of 7,632,801, 7,472,559 citizens were 
Orthodox (97.9%); 112,665 Muslim (1.4%); 28,430 Catholic (0.4%); 12,677 
Protestant or Other Christian 6,325 (0.2%) and Jewish (0.1%). The broader category 
of ‘Orthodox Christians’ also includes the minority of Armenians, while the category 
entitled Other Christian includes religious groups such as the Old Calendarists, the 
Evangelicals and the Jehovah Witnesses.
Linguistic GroMps:_Greek mother tongue: 7,297,878 (95. 6%), Turkish: 179,895 
(2. 4%), Slavic: 41,017(0. 5%), Vlach: 39,855 (0, 5%), Albanian: 22,736, (0.3%). 
Given that this census took place 2 years after the end of the Greek civil war and the 
Slavophones of Macedonia were mostly in the ranks of the defeated Greek 
Communists the percentage of the Slavic speakers is considered to be estimated lower
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since “a strong incentive for Slavic speakers to play down their linguistic preference” 
was expected (Clogg, 2002, p. 11).
The next decennial censuses in Greece gave no new information about the size of the 
minority populations also failing to record mother tongue, religion and ethnic origin. 
As it can be observed from the estimations given above, the strongest in numbers and 
in ethnic and cultural differentiation minority in Greece, is the Muslim one. This 
minority is settled in Northern Greece, in the region of Western Thrace, and is divided 
into three groupings: 1) the Turkish origin population left back in Western Thrace and 
Rhodes according to the Lausanne Treaty (1923), 2) the Slavic speaking population of 
Pomaks and 3) the Muslim Rom (Meinardus, 2002). Different estimations are given 
for the size of this minority by different sources (i.e. Greek Ministry Rights Group, 
State Department’s Human Rights Reports) but for the purposes of this chapter the 
following approximations can be used to give us an idea of the composition of this 
minority group.
Moslems of Thrace are Greek citizens and can be divided according to their descent 
into three categories:
1. Muslims of Turkish origin (Tourkogeneis) 51,917 or accounting for the 
49.9 % of the minority settled mainly in the prefecture of Rodopi.
2. Pomaks: 34,878 or 33.55% of the total Moslem minority settled in the 
prefecture of Xanthi and also in the areas of Kehrou / Organi in the prefecture 
of Rodopi. A more recent estimate states that the minority of the Pomaks is 
gradually increasing so one in four members of the minority is a Pomak.
3. Gypsies (Roma): 17.06 % or 16.6% spread over all the three prefectures of 
Western Thrace. Of the whole population 241,418 of them are Christians
(Source: G. Kapsis Former Greek Minister, 1987, p. 298 cited in Meinardus, 2002)
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The Turkish origin population
In the period following the compulsory exchange of populations between Greece and 
Turkey (Lausanne Treaty, 1923), Greece was considered to be one of the most 
ethnically homogenous countries in Europe (Mavrogordatos 1983). It is important to 
note that religion was used from both sides (Greece and Turkey) as a defining element 
of ethnicity and as a decisive factor of who had the obligation and the right to move or 
remain in any of the two countries. According to the decrees of the treaty the Turkish 
nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion had to move back to Greece and the Greek 
nationals of the Moslem religion to Turkey. Three groups have been excluded from 
the compulsory exchange: The Muslims of Western Thrace, the Greeks of Istanbul 
and the Greek population of hnbros and Tenedos. However, the areas in which ethnic 
and political territories did not coincide later became areas of bilateral conflict. The 
Greek population of Istanbul, hnbros and Tenedos was later gradually expulsed. The 
Greek minority in Turkey once measured equal to the Muslim minority in Greece is 
now numbering no more than 2000 people. As stated by Meinardus (2002) “it is no 
exaggeration to speak of a systematic de-hyalinization of Istanbul and the islands of 
hnbros and Tenedos” (p. 86). On the other hand, as far as the size of the Muslim 
minority in Western Thrace is concerned, there has been also a slight decrease, but 
this is due to immigration to Turkey and Germany. The minorities of both sides have 
frequently been subjected to discrimination and policies of social exclusion. The 
principle of ‘reciprocity’ is applied to the minorities of the two countries, which stood 
more than once on the brink of war. The affected areas are mainly those of education 
and of religious freedom referring to the construction and operation of religious 
buildings (Pollis, 1993 see also Section 5.6). The recent orientation of the policy of 
Turkey to enter European Union, the support given to Turkey by Greece and the new 
perspectives for the solution of the Cyprian issue with the integration of the latter in 
the European Union have positively changed the whole political climate for the 
minorities in both countries. The “Helsinki Watch” encourages these efforts to solve 
the problems which insist to remain.
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The Pomaks
The Pomaks, as Meinardus (2002) argues have the status of a “minority within the 
Muslim minority” (p. 81) and live for centuries in an area (Rodope Mountains) that 
geographically divides Greece from Bulgaria. The income of the population is based 
on agriculture and farming. More recently, many of them, looking for permanent or 
temporary employment, leave their areas and move to urban centres mainly in 
Western Thrace.
The ethnic origin of this population is a subject of historical and political controversy 
among Greeks, Bulgarian and Turks (Karakasidou, 2002; Demetriou, 2004)
According to the Greek perspective, they are successors of the Ancient Thracians, 
who learned the Slavic language and converted to Islam in the Late Ottoman Period. 
(Ronneberg -Mergl 1980). The Bulgarian and the Turkish side also claim the ethnic 
origins of this population. There is no official statistical data about the exact number 
of the Greek Pomaks but according to some recent estimates the number does not 
exceed 30,000 people (Meinardus, 2002).
After the end of the Second World War and the Greek civil war, during the Cold War 
Greek nationalists related the Pomaks to the communist threat coming from the North 
-especially from Bulgaria- whose oppressive occupation of Eastern Macedonia and 
Western Thrace was still fresh in the memory of the Greek population. The Slay- 
speaking Pomaks living in the Bulgarian frontiers have been considered as potential 
allies with Sofia and Moscow. Thus, the Greek Government in order to ameliorate 
this threat did not react to the progressive ‘Turkification’ of Pomaks, which was 
supported massively by the Turkish Government (Demetriou, 2004). It was only in 
1950 with the escalation of the Cyprus issue, and after 1974 that the Greek state 
decided to change its policy and strengthen the Pomak identity. Until the present day 
there is an increasing political and socio-historical interest in Greece about this 
minority that lives relatively isolated on the mountains of the Greek Thrace.
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The Gypsies (Roma)
The Gypsies are also part of the wider Moslem minority settled mainly in the 
prefecture of Evros in the borders with Turkey. Although they are Moslems, and the 
majority of them speak Turkish as a second language, in an attempt to keep their own 
cultural and national identity, they do not mix as much with the Turks. Some of them 
prefer to be called Turk but the majority identify themselves either as Gypsies or 
Muslims (Triandafyllidou, 2002).
5.4.1 The current socio-political status o f  the minority
Regardless of the accuracy of the statistical numbers provided, the presence of those 
religious and linguistic minorities in Greece does not alter the public’s perception of a 
religiously and linguistically homogeneous nation-state. However, one can safely 
suggest that the relations between the Greek state, the public and the minorities are 
somewhat obscure and to some extent problematic. The Greek governmental policies 
towards these minorities groups were never consistent.
Firstly, the official status of the minority has changed over the years from religious to 
ethnic and back to religious, each time reflecting the existing political climate 
between Greece and its neighbouring countries (Turkey, Bulgaria). The Greek 
official rhetoric until the present day stresses mainly the religious character of the 
minority, acknowledging also a past-oriented ethnic identification which becomes 
only relevant in the internal definition of the ethno-cultural differences among the 
subgroups of this minority.
Secondly, on a civic level, Greek citizens of Moslem faith have and should enjoy, at 
least in theory, the same civic rights and obligations (e.g. voting, military service) as 
the Greek Orthodox citizens. However at the same time, the Greek state has devised 
policies to control the land ownership, the juridical as well as the political power of 
these minority groups. Members of the minority groups can participate in the national 
parties, if and when elected, but they do not have the right to form their own political 
party. On this latter point, Greece had to defend its case after a European report 
(ECRI, 2000a) was released suggesting that on a political level the Muslim minority
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in Thrace is underrepresented. The Greek government replied to the Commission the 
following “it is difficult for members of the minority to be elected perfects or 
perfectual councillors, but no place is found to report the fact that three members of 
the minority sit in the Parliament” (Reply to ECRI’s report on Greece, 2000b, p.26).
Thirdly, in the domain of education, students frorh the Moslem minority have the 
right to attend either Greek or the minority primary and secondary schools where the 
Turkish language and Islam are also taught. Although some of the curriculum is 
common for both Muslim and Christian students as Triandafyllidou and . 
Paraskevopoulou (2002) argue, the existence of a segregated educational system may 
satisfy on the one hand the decrees of the Lausanne Treaty (1923) but at the same it 
widens the gap between the Christian and Moslem populations living in Thrace (p.
87). According to the EUMC (EU Report of Monitoring Centre on Racism) report on 
Education (2004) in years 2001-2002, 233 primary minority schools operated with 
only 7,000 students. The dropout rates in both the primary and secondary schools 
(some of which are private) are very high and this is due to the low economic status of 
the minority. Moreover, the percentage of students from this minority in the Greek 
Universities is extremely low. According to the estimates provided in the EUMC 
report (2004) for the years 2002-2003, only 178 students from the minority would 
attend Greek university. The Greek government has recently developed some 
programs encouraging students from the minority to continue their education 
(‘positive discrimination system’, cited in Triandafyllidou and Paraskevopoulou,
2002, p. 87).
During the last decade of the 20* century there was an immigration boom in Greece 
which made the country the host of a large immigrant population. Citizens from 
countries of South-Eastern Europe fled to Greece mainly as economic immigrants. 
The structural changes induced in a society by migration movements require that both 
the state and citizens (nationals) devise theories of migration that would ease the 
process of learning to harmoniously live together with the newcomers. This raised 
interesting questions: Was Greece ready to deal and accept this new realm? What 
were the initial reactions to the transformation of the Greek society from 
homogeneous to multicultural?
151
5.5 From ethnic to civic? The immigration boom
The intensification of migration flows that preceded the fall of the communist regime 
(Fall of the Berlin War, 1989) in the Eastern and Central Europe and the abolition of 
economic and political borders after the emergence of European citizenship 
(Maastricht, 1992) enhanced the mobility of nation-states’ members across the 
European Union and led also to substantial changes in the ethnic and cultural 
composition of previously traditionally homogeneous societies, such as Greece. From 
being a traditional emigrant-pole country, only recently (in the 1990’s), along with 
other South-eastern European countries (Spain, Italy and Portugal), Greece joined the 
long list of immigrant-recipient countries.
Given its geographical position as the ‘bridge’ between West and East, its economic 
prosperity and political stability in the Balkan peninsula, it has been the point of 
arrival for immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees from countries of Eastern Europe 
(Balkan) and Asian countries. According to the census data of 2001, the number of 
immigrants settling in Greece has increased dramatically since 1991. The majority of 
these immigrants come from Albania, from countries of the former Soviet Union, 
Bulgaria and Romania. As indicated from the official national statistics, Albania and 
ex-Soviet Union countries are the main immigrant-sending countries for Greece.
Table 5.2: Foreign citizens in Greece
1991 2001
Citizenship N % N %
Albania 20,556 12.4 443,550 55.7
EX-Soviet Union 12,918 7.8 73,621 9.2
Bulgaria 2,413 , 1.5 37,230 4.7
Romania 1,923 1.2 23,066 2.9
(Adapted from National Statistics Service, Greek National Censuses of 1991 and 2001)
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Among the immigrant populations coming from these countries are also two groups of 
immigrants (Pontic Greeks and Greek Albanians) that claim a right to the Greek 
citizenship on the basis of their ethnic and cultural origins. It is beyond the scope of 
this chapter to discuss in detail the Greek citizenship laws and the immigration 
policies (see for a detailed discussion Tsitselikis, 2003). However, it needs to be 
mentioned that the immigration laws make a clear distinction between the so-called 
co-ethnics (repatriate Greeks) and other foreigners. Repatriate Greeks are provided 
with a relatively advantageous legal and social status due to their Greek ethnic origins 
and Christian Orthodox religious affiliations (Triandafyllidou and Veikou, 2002). 
Interestingly, this is the third time (Constitution of Epidaurus, Lausanne Treaty, 1923) 
in the history of Greek politics that religion interacts strongly with nationality and 
determines the civic conception of Greek national identity.
This sudden transition of Greece has found, especially in the early years, both its 
citizens and the public policy unprepared and unorganised. The Greek-state and the 
public were reluctant to accept that immigrants ‘are here to stay’, and that cultural 
diversity was becoming a long-term feature of the modem Greek society. The lack of 
cultural and ethnic homogeneity after the population movement resulted in cultural 
and religious tensions inside the Greek society (a large majority of Greek citizens are 
Christian Orthodox and consider themselves as culturally and ethnically Greek). The 
rise in crime and unemployment rates were associated with the arrival of the 
‘newcomers’ in the society, and were used as a justification for the expression of 
discriminatory attitudes and retaliatory policies against them (Hatziprokopiou, 2004). 
The mass media also played an influential role in shaping the public’s attitudes. They 
set the scene for scapegoating the ethnically and culturally different “others”, creating 
strong negative ethnic stereotypes and a climate of xenophobia, mainly towards the 
Albanian group. Such negative portrayal occurred in spite the fact that the Albanian 
groups, even undocumented, have become indispensable sources of labour for many 
unskilled jobs (for a detailed discussion see EUMC Report on Greek media analysis 
by Triandafyllidou, 2002). After the first explosion of nationalistic sentiments, and 
the expression of rather exclusionary attitudes, a period of reconciliation followed 
under the European perspective of the Balkan States, which may open a new horizon 
for a climate of tolerance and peaceful coexistence between the Greek majority and 
new minorities.
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However, data from the EU reports reveals a less optimistic message. In an EU social 
survey (2003) themed “Society-Politics-Values”, in the section measuring Greek 
nationals’ attitudes towards immigrants, the respondents indicated that the presence of 
foreigners undermined their culture, economy and quality of life. When asked 
whether it is better for a country if its citizens share the same customs and traditions, 
82.2% reported that they agreed that cultural homogeneity constitutes an important 
precondition of a harmonious society. With respect to religion, 60.2% reported that 
they disagree with the idea of religious pluralism. Compared to the other EU 
countries participating in the study (Holland, Spain, Portugal, England), Greek 
respondents strongly opposed the idea that the presence of immigrant groups would 
enrich their culture. Instead, the majority of them stated that the presence of these 
groups in the country would negatively affect both the culture and the quality of life 
(59% and 62% respectively).
To summarise, the immigrants coming to Greece from the former USSR and Albania, 
even the so-called ex-patriots, have shown different levels of adaptation in the Greek 
society and have received differential treatment from the host majority members 
(Chrysanthaki, 2000). One may assume that the representations that Greek people 
hold about the nation, the government and the inhabitants of the immigrant sending 
countries may differ based on economic and cultural status. Secondly, commonality 
in religion may be also used to explain these differences especially in a nation like 
Greece where religion and nationality seem to interact both at an ideological and an 
institutional level. Moreover, the quality of intergroup relations among the two 
countries can also play a role. Examining the historical representations of past 
enemies and friends to the nation is a useful tool for explaining intergroup relations 
and attitudes. All the above are assumptions at the moment, but as this thesis 
progresses it will address some of these points.
5.6 Greece in the EU
The strong relationship between nationality and religion and more specifically the 
close Church-State interdependence remains a distinguished but at the same time 
rather problematic characteristic of modem Greece, affecting the nation’s perceived 
European identity and by extension its place in the EU. The successor of Karamanlis,
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who was the president of the Hellenic Republic when Greece joined the EU (1981), 
Xristos Sargetakis stated that both in linguistic and religious terms the Greek nation 
stands on its own in relation to other EU members. The absence of a culturally and 
religiously similar comiXry {anadelfon kratos-sibling country) conveys on the one 
hand its cultural uniqueness but on the other its minority status. However, as Pollis 
(1993) suggests “assertions of distinctiveness and exclusivity cannot be upheld as 
sovereignty diminishes and a new European identity, composed of multiple 
ethnicities, gradually emerges” (p. 355). Relevant research indicates that the majority 
of Greeks view the European Union mainly in economic terms (Fokas, 2000; 
Chryssochoou, 2000b) and feel alienated from Europe in cultural terms 
(Triandafyllidou and Veikou, 2002).
However, the development of a European identity, even if  it is not strictly associated 
with a common culture, necessitates at least the acceptance of a commonly shared set 
of values and norms such as the establishment of a secular state to incorporate 
cultural diversity, privatisation of religion, emphasis on the individual and respect for 
one’s rights irrespective of ethnic background and/or religious denomination.
In the case of Greece, EU human rights monitors have repeatedly raised a variety of 
concerns about the ethnic/religious minorities and about their deprivation of religious 
education and freedom (see also EUMC Report on attitudes towards minorities, 
2001b). More specifically, the EUMC report on education (2004) also alarmed 
Greece that there are still no legal provisions in place that would ensure the promotion 
of cultural diversity in education. The history and language of the immigrant 
populations are treated as optional but at the moment they are not taught in any of the 
Greek public schools. As mentioned previously, it is only the schools for the Moslem 
minority that operate in Thrace and some private language schools where the mother- 
tongue language is taught. Moreover, in Greek schools there is not much support for 
those students whose mother-tongue is not Greek. The changes suggested by the EU 
organisation also refer to the teaching of religious education. The committee 
encourages Greece to adopt a more secularist approach in the religious curriculum.
In a society where individual rights are subordinated to communal (to the nation) and 
“unity is articulated as an organic entity for which Eastern Orthodoxy is central”
155
(Polis, 1992), the violation of religious freedom rights does not come as a surprise. 
The abolition of religion from identity cards in 2000-2001 was considered a good step 
towards this direction.
On a positive note, research in Greece (EUMC Report on Greece 2001a) did not 
reveal any anti-Islamic reactions towards Moslem immigrants, or the minority groups 
living in the region of Thrace as an aftermath of the attack. In general terms, it can be 
suggested that the events of September the 11* have placed the Moslem world and the 
religion of Islam in a very vulnerable position. The explanations enlisted in the report 
were: a) there has been long term sympathy with the Arab world declared by Greek 
politicians, mainly by Andreas Papandreou (former Minister of Greece and President 
of the Greek Socialist Party, PAS OK; b) terrorism has not been associated with 
national struggles (i.e. Palestine case); c) the government of the time has officially 
condemned terrorism and Islamic ftmdamentalism but made a careful distinction 
between Islam and terrorism; and finally d) anti-American sentiments prevail in 
Greece over the Anti-Moslem. According to the report, the reaction of politicians to 
reduce polarisation and negative attitudes were very effective. Moreover, the official 
position of the Moslem Community in Greece also condemned terrorism and 
dissociated the Islamic dogma from any extremist reactions. The heads of the 
Moslem Organisation in Greece emphasised the quality of intergroup relations 
suggesting that Christians and Moslems live in peace in the Greek context. The 
Archibishop of Greece Christodoulos also declared that Islam should be separated 
from terrorism, thus promoting a positive image of the former.
5.7 Concluding remarks
In conclusion, this chapter aimed to set the agenda for the context in which this thesis 
is set. What makes Greece a particularly interesting context to study is that its 
integration in the EU, the Moslem minority as well as its sudden transition to a 
recipient country of immigrant groups requires the redefinition of Greek national 
identity previously founded on notions of ethnic, religious and linguistic 
homogeneity, into a civic one. The host majority’s attitudes and the state policies’ 
reaction to the arrival of the immigrant populations are crucial factors in determining 
the latter’s incorporation in society.
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The strong relationship between nationality and religion and perceptions of chronic 
national threat are two factors that need to be considered when studying this context. 
The synthesis of historical events indicated that the contemporary Greek nation-state 
has been profoundly affected by the religious legacy of Christian Orthodoxy. 
Furthermore, the state and the Church still create the social and legal preconditions for 
the sustenance of a collective representation of nationhood where a particular religion 
remains one of its central elements (Moscovici, 1988).
On the basis of this review, a series of questions are raised which constitute the 
empirical foundations of this thesis. The first question that emerges is how Greek 
people define their national identity and to what extent they perceive that Orthodoxy 
is still one of its defining elements (Study 1 and Study 2). Secondly, the functions 
that this relationship (nationality and religion) may serve for the ingroup in a context 
that nationhood is under threat (Study 3). Finally, how the nationality-religion 
relationship may affect intergroup relations and in particular Greek majority’s 
perceptions about the way minority and immigrant groups should be absorbed in the 
society (Study 4).
More specifically, the impact of the nationality and religion relationship and 
perceptions of threat to Greek national identity on the attitudes of Greek people will 
be investigated in relation to the following immigrant and minority groups: Albanians, 
Russians and the Moslems of Thrace. The Muslim Minority, whose members are 
Greek citizens but ethnically and religiously different, the Albanian immigrants who 
are Muslims in their greatest part and the immigrants coming from the former Soviet 
Union countries and in particular from Russia, a fellow Christian Orthodox nation like 
Greece. Moreover, the acculturation theories of the Greek majority population will be 
examined in relation to their expectations from the Greek state and from the 
aforementioned groups contextualised in three domains: education, intermarriage, 
citizenship/political rights.
As discussed previously, the Greek state still needs to account to European and 
international committees for its policies in relation to some of these domains, and 
demonstrate that its current legislative framework protects the rights to expression of
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belief and religious manifestation of these old and new minority groups living in 
Greece.
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Chapter 6: An Exploration of the Relationship between National and 
Religious Elements in terms of Structure and Content: A 
Multi-methodological Approach
This chapter reports a multi-methodological study designed to explore the relationship 
between national and religious elements in terms of both structure and content. Using 
self-completed questionnaires with closed and open-ended questions, the first part of 
the study investigated the relative importance of national, religious and gender 
identity elements and the strength of their interrelationships, based on participants’ 
strength of identification and the levels of perceived centrality they attributed to each 
of these identity elements. Potential gender differences in structural representations 
of identity in terms of the three target identity elements were also examined. The use 
of open-ended questions aimed to explore qualitatively whether there was an overlap 
between the meanings participants attached to national and religious elements at the 
individual and social representational levels. This analysis of the content of Greek 
national identity went beyond describing the meanings participants attached to this 
identity, by also examining the affective and motivational aspects that reside in the 
process of national identification. The study also addressed the degree to which 
individuals invoked, customised and used a consensual set of beliefs in their own 
constructions of nationhood. The second part of the study comprised face-to face 
interviews and further explored the overlap between the meanings participants attach 
to the two target identities (national and religious). In addition, the findings were 
discussed in relation to the perceived psychological and/or instrumental functions that 
this relationship may serve for the individual and the society.
6.1 Introduction
So far, social identification has been used as the core medium for exploring ingroup 
and inter-group processes. However, as discussed earlier, there is no consensual way 
to study social identification processes mainly because of the multidimensionality of 
this concept. Thus, there are variations in the methodologies researchers have 
employed in exploring identity processes, structural representations, and the extent to 
which the meaning and content have been incorporated into their identity models.
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The context specificity of social identifications, referring to both their embeddedeness 
in the social context and situational-temporal refiexivity (salience), the typology of 
identities (ascribed versus, acquired) and their disparate functionality at an individual 
and a group level validate the richness of meanings (content) and the representations 
of identity structure evinced so far.
Moreover, an added difficulty in the study of identity structure is that social identities 
do not exist in isolation within individuals’ identity systems. Instead, they relate to 
each other to different degrees. The fact that individuals are assigned to a number of 
different social categories brings out the possibility of combinations and raises 
questions about how, to what extent and under which contexts these 
identities/elements of identity relate to each other. The answer to these questions 
pertains to the study of identity structure, focusing on salience and on related concepts 
such as centrality o f  and strength of identification with the identities/elements of 
identity under consideration. However, the relationship between them can be 
explored in other dimensions as well. It can be investigated on the basis of the 
common dimension of meaning, a rather under-explored issue in relation to the study 
of multiple social identities. Consistent with this view then, a calculated strong
I
relationship may be indicative of a potential overlap that may exist between two or 
more identities/elements of identity also in terms of content; that is, the meanings that 
individuals associate with and use when defining membership in these social 
categories.
With a focus upon the nationality identity element, the present study has two main 
objectives. Firstly, using two measures of relative importance (strength of 
identification measures and centrality), to explore firstly the strength (tightness or 
looseness) and direction (positive or negative) of its structural relationship with 
religious and gender identity elements. The aim of this analysis is to provide an 
understanding of the degree and the way these multiple ingroup memberships are 
incorporated and subjectively represented within participants’ identity structure. The 
second aim, also addressed in the follow-up interview study, is to investigate whether 
identity elements (mainly national and religious) share meanings. This study will 
elaborate further on the psychological and macro-contextual factors influencing the 
strength of their relationships.
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Prior to discussing the ways in which multiple identities and their interactions may be 
represented in an individual’s identity repertoire, it is imperative to revisit two issues 
frequently mentioned in the literature in relation to the study of both multiple and 
single social identities. The first issue refers to the organisation of a number of 
different social identifications within identity structure, based on the concepts of 
salience, strength of identification and centrality. The second issue refers to the lack 
of empirical consideration devoted to the content dimension of social identifications, 
and to the variation of meanings employed by individuals or groups within the same, 
and across different social contexts when defining group membership. Moreover, the 
position taken in this thesis is that studying the meanings that reside in them can also 
add valuable information about the level that these different identities may be 
perceived to interact within a given social context, and the degree to which 
individuals would perceive them in their own identity constructions as sharing (or not) 
similar profiles based on belief-systems, social stereotypes and as serving 
complementary motivational needs.
6.1.1 Strength o f identification, centrality and salience
One of the main problems frequently mentioned in the literature is the great variety of 
definitional terms (strength, salience, centrality, importance, and prominence) and 
methodological tools (open-ended measures, closed-ended questions, ranking order) 
adopted for measuring an individual’s level of identification with a social category 
and/or the relative importance referring to salience and centrality of this category in 
relation to the other categories within identity structure (cf. Ashmore et al., 2004). In 
spite of confusion about these concepts, their use is considered eminent in exploring 
how an individual’s multiple identities are organised within identity structure, and 
how they relate to each other.
Undoubtedly, as discussed in much more detail in the previous chapters, according to 
the theoretical viewpoint employed (SIT, SCT and IT) there are considerable 
variations in the definitions and determinants of salience as an unconscious process 
responsible for altering the hierarchical ordering of an individual’s identities. Recent 
literature supports the utility of taking a more integrative approach in understanding
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the factors that influence the likelihood that an identity will be activated after 
considering both the fit of identity to the situation, and the individual’s commitment 
to that identity (Oakes et ak, 1994; Stets and Burke, 2000).
Despite salience, elements comprising identity structure can be alternatively organised 
based on relative centrality and strength of identification. Degree of identification 
(strength) and psychological centrality are usually conceptually aligned with salience 
(defined psychologically or behaviourally), serving both predictive and explanatory 
functions of the process (Oakes, 1987; Ethier and Deaux, 1994). More specifically, 
they have been used by researchers both a priori to make predictions about which 
identity would gain priority over the others, and post hoc as an explanation of why 
this order is meaningful and what functions it may serve for the individual or the 
group under investigation.
In contrast to salience, which refers to the momentary activation of an identity and to 
its relatively antagonistic prominence within identity structure in which all identities 
reside, strength of identification and centrality (Rosenberg, 1979; Forehand, 
Desphandé and Reed II, 2002), both classified as explicit forms of importance 
(Ashmore et al., 2004), are enduring processes that reflect the awareness and agency 
of the individual to evaluate the extent an identity or a number of identities are 
important and central to his/her identity structure. Furthermore, it is important to note 
that self determination in relation to both levels of identification and perceived 
centrality would also be influenced by the type of identity under investigation 
(ascribed vs. acquired see Ethier and Deaux, 1994; Deaux, 2000a or voluntary vs. 
obligatory see Cassidy and Trew, 1998; Thoits, 2003).
There has been a lot of discussion as to whether the concepts of strength of 
identification and centrality can be used interchangeably, as in most part they seem to 
represent the same psychological process (Settles, 2004). The problem seems to 
originate from the fact that the operationalisation of strength as a multidimensional 
construct always includes measures of centrality or perceived importance of the given 
social category. However, strength of identification does not refer only to the 
perceived importance of categorising oneself as a member of a category, or the extent 
to which one may decide to rate it as a defining (or not) characteristic of his/her self-
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image (centrality). It also measures other concepts such as common fate and 
perceived prototypicality. This suggests that strength of social identification is a much 
more inclusive term that incorporates concepts such as qualitative/affective 
commitment to the social group. These are also considered and measured separately 
by proponents of identity theory as antecedents of salience, centrality and 
consequently main predictors of role identity enactment (Stryker, 1987; Stryker and 
Sepre, 1994; Stets and Burke, 2000).
The present study uses separate measures for strength of group identification and 
perceived centrality in order to explore any possible variations in the structural 
arrangement of thç identity elements of interest (national, religious and gender), and 
in the strength of their interrelationships. Moreover, with respect to the 
multidimensional nature of social identification process, as discussed also in the 
previous chapters, researchers have focused in some aspects more than others. In an 
attempt to deal with some of the criticisms of the scales, it was decided that a 
multidimensional scale should be used in the present study. Cinnirella’s (1997) scale 
of strength of identification was considered the most appropriate for use as it adopts a 
more integrative approach in the measurement of the concept. The present scale 
included one item measuring the perceived importance of a given social identity. This 
followed the assertion that psychological centrality should also be included as a 
hierarchical component of identity structure on the basis that it may affect individual’s 
behavioural choices in a different way (Stryker and Serpe, 1994). Separate fixed- 
response questions were therefore used, as well as comparative judgements to assess 
this concept. Similar to Cassidy and Trew (2001) respondents were asked to evaluate 
the psychological centrality and importance of each one of these identifications with 
respect to the overall self-definitions.
6.1.2 What about content?
An additional problem frequently mentioned in the literature is the minor status given 
to the study of the content and meaning of a social identity(ies). Measuring only the 
extent to which an individual identifies with one social category in a given context, 
the relative position of this identity in the hierarchical organization of identity 
structure and whether this identity element occupies a central or a peripheral role in
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his/her overall self-concept is not sufficient in addressing another important aspect in 
the study of identity and its processes. The meanings and the emotional significance 
individuals attach to these memberships are related to questions of self-knowledge 
and to some extent to motivational needs (Deaux, 1992; Deaux et al., 1999).
According to Reicher and Hopkins (2001) “little attention has been paid to the 
meanings associated with different category memberships and how these are quite 
central to the ways in which the social identity processes play themselves out” (p.34). 
This raises the following questions: What does it mean to be a member o f a specific 
group? To what extent and under what contexts we perceive that the meanings we use 
as ingroup members to define the relevant category (idiosyncratic meanings) are 
shared by others? I f  yes, can we talk about a symbolic or generic meaning o f an 
identity?
The first question refers to all the relevant information about the meanings associated 
with the content of an identity element. It goes beyond categorising the self as a 
member of a social category (cognitive basis of identification), and explores further 
the motivational and affective basis of identification process. It also refers to what 
Bar Tal (1990) defined as group beliefs, the “convictions that group members are 
aware that they share and consider as defining their ‘groupness’ ” (p. 36). This point 
is also relevant to the second and third questions. The utility of activating and 
internalising a stereotypical view to define our membership in a social group and the 
extent we believe that our beliefs are mainly consensual in nature.
As discussed in Chapter 3, a number of studies have examined the content of social 
identities by employing different methodologies such as hierarchical classification 
methods (De Boeck and Rosenberg, 1988) and open-ended measures or interviews. 
These research findings provide substantial evidence that there are variations in the 
individual definitions of social categories (Spence, 1984; Skevington and Baker,
1989; Ethier and Deaux, 1990,1994). This idiosyncratic approach on the content 
dimension of social identity does not suggest that there are no consensual and socially 
shared meanings of social categories (for a detail review on stereotypes see Hilton and 
von Hippel, 1996; Fiske, 1998). As proposed by Breakwell (1993), there is a great 
level of interplay between an individual’s personal construction of the meanings 
associated with a social category, and of those that are widely shared and
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communicated by the ingroup members (stereotypes, social representations). This 
point is also at the heart of social representation theory (Moscovici, 1972, 1988), a 
framework that greatly contributes to the study of identity content, and its relation to 
the social context. According to the theory, social categories defined based on a set of 
associated normative beliefs, stereotypes and behaviours should not be treated just as 
cognitive schemas with fixed and invariable content (this point was also discussed by 
Oakes, Haslam and Turner, 1994). Instead, they should be treated as socially 
constructed representations, responsive and flexible to the social world (context) they 
are trying to make sense of. The theory focuses on the processes involved in the 
genesis of these cultural representations and in the importation of meaning from 
widely shared cultural representations to the self (Moscovici, 1988; Duveen 2001).
Researchers who have studied the framework of social identity and self-categorisation 
theories have emphasised that a clear distinction should be made in the empirical 
assessment between individual and cultural stereotypes.
Cultural stereotypes refer to the consensual views about the group, whereas the type 
of stereotypes termed as individual goes beyond those views by providing information 
about personal beliefs and evaluations about one’s own group. Findings have shown 
that the two were strongly related (Esses, Haddock and Zana, 1993; Krueger, 1996; 
Verkuyten, Drabbles, Van den Niewenhuijzen, 1999). The fact that stereotypes 
appeared to be widely shared by members of social groups (mainly researched in 
relation to national stereotypes) led most theorists to treat them as rather consensual in 
nature examining the processes involved. Based on this notion theorists listed a set of 
different explanations for the strong relationship between cultural and individual 
stereotypes. Some emphasised that consensus arises from information-processing and 
social learning that group members are exposed to (Deutch and Gerard, 1955 cited in 
Haslam, et al., 1998; Park et al., 1991; Stangor and Lange, 1993). Others proposed 
that individuals comply and internalise the shared view of their social group out of 
fear of rejection and exclusion (Eysenck and Crown, 1948). Most theorising and 
empirical investigation on stereotype consensus and the social processes involved was 
made within the self-categorisation and social representation theoretical frameworks 
respectively (Turner et al., 1987; Moscovici and Doise, 1992; Haslam et al., 1998, 
Haslam, Rothschild and Ernst, 2002; Hopkins and Cable, 2001). Based on the SCT
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approach, stereotype consensus is enhanced in an inter-group context, when the 
ingroup members are compared to an outgroup on the basis of salient category and/or 
is an outcome of communication and mutual social influence process occurring via 
social interaction (i.e. group discussions) or other mediums (education, mass media). 
The implication of this process is that individuals would view themselves and their 
beliefs as relatively interchangeable with those held by the other ingroup members 
(depersonalisation process). This is expected to hinder ingroup variability and 
enhance perceptions of ingroup homogeneity (Haslam, Oakes, Turner and McGarty, 
1995).
Within the theoretical paradigm of Social Representation Theory (Moscovici, 1984, 
1988, 2001), conceptual and empirical distinctions are drawn between the 
idiosyncratic and the socially shared meanings of a social identity (individual and 
social representations). The latter is developed and reproduced within a social system 
and as Moscovici (2001) argues is relatively “stable, impersonal and holistic” (p. 26). 
On the contrary, individual representations are the variations from the culturally 
shared meanings that may be present in an individual’s consciousness. At any point 
these may be perceived and used as more ‘appropriate’ in the self-descriptions of a 
social category. Consensus in this sense can be defined as the extent to which an 
individual’s meaning of social identity reflects shared cultural representations (Deaux,
2001). Therefore, this framework suggests that social representations are socially 
constructed, shared belief systems of meaning that can be both unconditionally 
accepted, and internalised in individual’s accounts of the social categories, or 
contested and customised each time reflecting the psychological needs of their 
beholders (Breakwell, 2001; Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins, 2004; Hopkins, Kahani- 
Hopkins and Reicher, 2006).
In the first part of the present study, the content of Greek national identity is explored 
not only based on participants’ subjective definitions of what it means to be members 
of the national category, but also based on their accounts of what meanings the 
category carries for the majority of the ingroup members. This measurement of the 
consensual meanings facilitates the researcher to study an individual’s positioning in 
relation to the ‘prototypical member’ of the group. As postulated by Deaux (2000a), 
this ‘rescues social identity from a purely individual focus and set of experiences to
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one that is inherently linked to the social group and to collective constructed 
representations’(p. 9).
6.1.3 From single to multiple social identities: Studying the nature o f  the
relationships between multiple identity elements in terms o f structure and 
content
With respect to how multiple identities are structured within identity structure and 
how they can influence behaviour, most theorists would agree on the assumption that 
identities/elements of identity are hierarchically arranged based on their relative 
salience and/or centrality (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Breakwell, 1986; Turner, et ah, 
1987; Oakes, 1987; Stryker, 1987). In a sense, one could argue that their hierarchical 
organisation has developed from a theoretical expectation to an interdisciplinary 
axiom. This is not to suggest that theorists did not discuss alternative forms of 
structures that multiple identities are organised (cf. Roccas and Brewer, 2002). In 
situations, or contexts that two or more categorisations are of equal psychological 
relevance for social identity and simultaneously salient, an individual may represent 
the relationships among his/her multiple ingroups as: 1) unrelated; 2) cross-cutting, 
resulting in the construction of a more inclusive category (cf. Brown and Turner, 
1979; Hewstone, Islam and Judd, 1993; Urban and Miller, 1998) and 3) nested, 
allowing for their simultaneous existence at different levels of abstraction (Brewer, 
1999a; Rutland and Cinnirella, 2000).
The interactions between different identity constituents also invite a study of the 
direction and strength of their relationships within identity structure (Hoelter, 1985; 
Breakwell, 1986; Cinnirella, 1996). A strong and positive relationship between them 
based on measures of identification and/or centrality suggests their neat and 
harmonious coexistence (perceived compatibility) within identity structure. On the 
contrary, a negative interrelationship suggests tension and conflict on the basis of 
multiple identity structure (Hofrnan, 1988).
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When two or more identities/elements are strongly and positively related, does this 
mean that they can also overlap in terms o f meaning?
Understanding what makes two or more identities relatively compatible to each other 
and what a strong or weak correlation between them two or more identities stands for, 
requires the study of identity content looking at the perceived similarities among them 
on the basis also of their associative meanings (traits). Most extant literature (Kelly, 
1955; Rosenberg and Gara, 1985; Breakwell, 1986; Hoelter, 1985; Deaux 1993; 
Deaux et al., 1995; Stets, 1995; Burke, 2003) that has tested the idea of relating 
identities by the degree to which they share similar profiles, has demonstrated 
considerable variation among individuals and cultures in the level of connectedness 
between components of their self-description and definition. However, shared among 
all these researchers is the idea that identities that share many common meanings 
would be closely aligned in an individual’s identity structure, and are likely to be 
activated together in a situation that these meanings are relevant and present- most 
possibly affecting in a joint manner individual’s perceptions and attitudes towards 
ingroup and outgroup members.
In their model of social identity complexity measuring interrelationships between 
memberships based on “members in common” (perceived overlap) and “shared 
values, norms and attributes” (perceived similarity), Roccas and Brewer (2002) argue 
that the degree of overlap between these identities could be informative of the 
complexity evinced within an individual’s identity structure influencing also inter­
group behaviour. More specifically, a strong perceived overlap between identities 
implies a rather simplified identity structure where identities are perceived as highly 
compatible, allowed to be combined and conceived in a single but rather exclusive 
social identity. On the contrary, low perceived overlap is an indication of a complex 
identity structure. In the second instance, the individual may need to negotiate the 
meanings and the values attached to these memberships and construct a more 
inclusive identity incorporating all those who do not share all other identities.
Finally, identities do not exist in a social and a cultural vacuum. Whether there would 
be any intersections and the strength of the relationships between them is also 
expected to be influenced and reflect the complexity of the socio-historical and/or
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ideological context in which they operate. Despite the effect of the immediate context 
(salience of identities), individuals live and act in a socially structured system which 
provides an ever-present environment of social behaviour and a source of content for 
social categories (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Moscovici, 1988). This is crucial for 
explaining the levels of psychological attachment that individuals place on them, their 
activation (jointed or not), and the variations evinced in the strength between their 
relationships within and across cultures. According to Stryker and Serpe (1982), 
contexts “that overlap structurally will call up more than one identity, and then the 
relative salience of those called up becomes a potential predictor of behaviour” (p.
24). However, not all social categories are embedded to the same extent in the 
structure and culture of the society. Identities such as gender, race and class, referred 
to by Stryker (1980) as ‘master statuses’ due to their influential role in the 
development of identity, may predominate in all situations informing to a large extent 
an individual’s thoughts, feelings and behavior (Erikson, 1968, Breakwell, 1986). 
Similarly, nationality, ethnicity and religion may also reside in the societal context, 
carrying some historical and psychological significance for the collective and the 
idiosyncratic search for meaning. This highlights once more the importance of 
typologies of identities (Brown, 2000; Deaux, 2000a), and the study of the social 
conditions that make these identities and their intersections chronically accessible and 
psychologically relevant and important to the individuals living in these contexts.
Therefore, identity elements should not be viewed only as context-specific 
constructions (or ideological positionings following a discursive approach) whose 
meanings and interrelationships change variously across situations. Such an approach 
would ignore the dynamic role that cultural myths and wider representations in 
society play in generating and reproducing an identity’s content (Chryssochoou, 
2000a). As Verkyuten rightly points out (2005):
“the flexible processes of categorization and boundary drawing for defining an 
identity are not more important than the contents of that identity. Social identities 
should not be treated as phenomena without a history and without defining 
characteristics. The crucial emphasis on situation and change should not lead to 
ignoring continuity and stability” (p. 54).
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Verkyuten’s remark about the content vs. processes debate in relation to the study of 
social identities, a viewpoint shared by many social psychologists (Billig, 1995; 
Deaux, 2000a; Reicher and Hopkins 2001; Jost and Kruglanski, 2002), is particularly 
relevant to the social category of interest, nationality. Any study on national 
identification should not strictly focus on its cognitive and motivational processes. 
Instead, it needs to explore its content dimension as well. Using such an integrative 
approach, and by acknowledging the historicity of national identities and their close 
relationship to the relevant cultural context would allow an exploration of the 
emotional significance it has for those who identify with it and their reactions to any 
type of change, threatening or not and proposed or imposed, to its value and content.
So, what should one expect to find when asking participants to define the meanings 
attached to their national membership? One would possibly come up first with a long 
list of national stereotypes that would include all the psychological attributes, beliefs 
and behaviours considered typical of the national group under investigation. Of these 
categories, one of the most popular ones is the one that tends to naturalise national 
identity the most: the notion of national character. The idea that people of a specific 
nation have, or rather should appear to have common culturally defined attributes that 
are unique to their group, is an established and essential part of the process of national 
identity construction. In Rousseau’s (1915) words, during the nation building 
process, “the first rule which we have to follow is that of national character: every 
people has, or must have, a character; if it lacks one, we must start by endowing it 
with one” (cited in Smith, 1991, p. 75).
Instead of understanding how and why these attributes have taken the role of being 
descriptive, and to some extent prescriptive for members of a national group, most 
researchers proposed an extensive list of positive and negative traits (Katz and Braly, 
1933), asking participants to rate their national group in absolute terms (Condor,
1996, 2003), or against a specified outgroup, testing the positive-asymmetry 
hypothesis linked to ingroup favouritism and discrimination (see Mummendey and 
Otten, 1998). Many researchers do not focus solely upon the frequency of appearance 
and the evaluative orientations of these traits. Instead, they study the perceptions of 
ingroup -  outgroup perceived variability (stereotype consensus), and their antecedent 
processes (Peabody, 1985; Haslam, et al., 1998; Moscovici, 1988; Haslam, et al..
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2002). Even studies that employ a more discursive approach on the meanings 
associated with national identity indicate that individuals evoke descriptions of the 
national character and reconstruct the psychological profile of the prototypical 
member (Condor, 1996, 2003; Hopkins-Kahani and Hopkins, 2004). As long as 
researchers take into account that people of a nation may change their behavioural 
patterns dramatically and quite rapidly, the study of the national character is a good 
starting point for exploring how individuals construct their national identity.
Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 5, the content and value of national identity are 
always relational (Triandafyllidou, 1998), and are heavily influenced by the 
nationalistic rhetoric reproduced and diffused in the respective social and political 
systems (e.g. education-historical textbooks) that usually place it within a time 
continuum and in most of the times within a specified national territory (Smith, 1991; 
Billig, 1995; Reicher and Hopkins, 2001). Research on discursive constructions of 
national category demonstrates that members of a national collectivity tend to invoke 
representations of history (historical events, periods) as a means of positioning the 
identity of their group in relation to other nationalities describing it as a culturally 
valued and enduring historical entity (Condor, 1996, 2003; Liu and Hilton, 2005).
In addition, research exploring the meanings attached to national identity has focused 
on its intersection with identity elements such as gender, race, ethnicity, religion and 
European, by examining how individuals in an attitudinal (strength of identification, 
levels of commitment, perceived centrality) and/or in a more discursive way may 
resist, dispute or accept the compatibility and strength of these intersections in their 
own identity constructions (Cinnirella, 1997; Cassidy and Trew, 1998, 2004; 
Hopkins-Kahani-Hopkins, 2004; Stapleton and Wilson, 2004; Verkuyten, 2005). The 
level of interplay between nationality and other identities (e.g. ethnicity, religion, 
supra-national categories) is also part of the identity politics exercised by the state 
(e.g. education) and other social agents (e.g. Church, intelligentsia, media), which 
speaking from different ideological positions and having differential power status, 
code the social reality and reify the knowledge-systems of the individuals living in 
these contexts (Moscovici, 1988). This point is particularly relevant to the study of 
national identity content and its level of interplay with religion in the social context of 
interest (Greece). As discussed in the previous chapter, using different mediums, both
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the Greek state and the Orthodox Church diffuse the ideological notion that Greekness 
and Orthodoxy are and to some extent should remain intertwined.
As Moscovici (1988) would argue in his theory of social representations, all these 
issues contribute to the formation of common-sense knowledge, in our case a wide 
perception that there is strong, functionally important overlap between national 
(Greek) and religious (Christian Orthodox) identity elements, that individuals would 
draw upon to make sense of their social world. Drawing an analogy between his 
findings from the study examining how the Catholic church and Marxists using 
propaganda, reacted to the emergence of psychoanalysis in France in the late 1950’s 
(Moscovici, 1976), and on the ways this relationship between Greekness and 
Orthodoxy has been and is still propagated in the Greek context, it can be suggested 
that across time and contexts, the ideological managers (e.g. politicians, 
intelligentsia, clergy, journalists) and institutions (e.g. Church, schools) have used 
implicit or explicit forms of propaganda to transform an ideology into culture and to 
build it into common sense. As Wagner and his colleagues argued “living in a 
particular social, cultural and political system, people unreflectively adopt ideas and 
ways of thinking implicitly imposed upon them by that system. Even if they disagree 
and oppose that system at a conscious level, the system creates and defines their 
social reality and pervades daily language” (Wagner, Duveen, Farr, Jovchelovitch, 
Lorenzi-Cioldi, Markova and Rose, 1999, p . 116).
Although there is little doubt that the social, cultural and political aspects of the 
system all have a primary role in the creation and establishment of a cultural shared 
social representation, an analysis that does not acknowledge human agency and 
autonomy in this process runs the risk of being highly deterministic (Thompson,
1984). In agreement with all those theorists for whom the dialectical relationship 
between the individual and the society is a core principle in their frameworks 
(Stryker, 1987; Breakwell, 1986,1993), and with those who argued against the 
ideological domination approach and the treatment of social representations as 
primarily hegemonic in nature (Billig, 1995; Augustinos, 1998), the position taken in 
this thesis is that such an approach fails to incorporate the constructionist and 
reflexive capacities of the individual living in these social systems. Following from 
this point, in the present two studies this thesis will investigate how Greek nationals
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make sense of this phenomenon. Do they perceive that there is an overlap between 
their national and religious categories? What is the importance o f this relationship 
fo r them? Has this relationship changed in any way?
To summarise, using multiple methods (fixed response measures and open-ended 
measures), the first part of the study sought to capture different aspects (strength of 
identification, perceived centrality and content) of the structural relationships that 
exist between nationality with religious and gender identity elements in Greek 
participants’ identity systems. Using semi-structured interviews and asking 
participants to talk about their nationhood, the aim of the second part of the study was 
to further explore the dimensions of overlap between nationality and religion (if any), 
and to examine how individuals position themselves in relation to the strong 
ideological and institutionalised collective representation of Helleno-Christianism, 
and the functions that this relationship may serve for the individual and the Greek 
society. The different meanings that different identities may serve for those who 
claim it (Spence, 1984; Deaux, 2000a; Brown, 2000) and their potential overlap in the 
social context they are embedded in, were considered issues of interest in the present 
study.
6.1.4 Aims and research questions (Study 1-Part 1)
The present study was designed to examine:
1. The relative strength of identification with each of the three identity elements 
(national, religious, gender) within a sample of Greek adults.
2. The relative centrality of each of the three identity elements (national, 
religious and gender) within Greek adults.
3. Gender differences in the levels of strength of identification and in the 
perceived centrality of each of the three target identity elements.
4. The strength of the relationship between levels of identification and centrality 
with their respective national, religious and gender groups.
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5. The meanings attached to national identity, focusing on whether there is an 
overlap between national and religious identity elements as discussed by 
Greek adults.
The set of research questions pertaining to the exploration of the content dimension of 
the Greek national identification aimed to elicit information on how this particular 
social category is defined (as an individual and social representation), evaluated and 
the extent there is a relationship-overlap between the national and religious identity 
elements under investigation. More specifically:
• What meanings do Greek adults attach to their respective national identities?
• Is there an overlap in terms of content between their national and religious 
identity elements?
6.2 Method
6.2.1 Participants
A convenience sample of 100 Greek adults (49 males and 51 females) was recruited 
firom the general public living in three different Greek cities (Athens, Thessalonica 
and Kavala). Respondents’ age ranged from 18 to 70 years old, with a mean age of 
30.42 years.
6.2.2 Measures
The collection of data was carried out through the use of self-completed 
questionnaires, divided in four sections (Appendix I). In the first part of the 
questionnaire participants were asked to rate the levels of identification with the 
respective national, religious and gender identity elements. The three social 
identifications were measured based on a 7-point Likert scale (l=not all and 7= 
extremely) developed by Cinnirella (1997, also see Rutland and Cinnirella, 2000).
The scale was originally designed to address the strength of national and European
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identification measuring the following components of social identity: perceived 
importance/value (Item 5: How important to you is being (group membership)?), 
socio emotional connotation (Item 3: To what extent do you feel pleased to be (group 
membership)? similarity between self-group (Item 4: How similar do you think you 
are to the average (group membership)person?) and interdependence between self 
and group (Item 7: When you hear someone who is not (group membership) criticise 
the (group membership) people, to what extent do you feel personally criticized?). 
Cinnirella’s scale (7 items) was preferred over single-item strength of identification 
measures because it addresses the multidimensionality of social identities. The first 
item of the scale measuring the extent to which an individual identifies with the 
gender identity (Item 1 : To what extent do you feel man/woman) was excluded since 
it was deemed to have little relevance for measuring the relevant identity. The same 
fixed-response scales were used to measure all three identity elements and they were 
translated and back-translated in order to be administered in the Greek sample.
Furthermore, two items were constructed in order to measure levels of psychological 
centrality (Item 1: Is being (group membership) a central characteristic o f  y  our self? 
and Item 2: Is your (group membership) an important part o f your self?) of each of 
the three identity elements (nationality, gender, religion) scored on a 7-point Likert 
scale (l=not important at all and 7=extremely important, 1= not central at all and 
7=extremely central). It should be noted that levels of religious identification and the 
perceived centrality of religious element were measured only in relation to Christian 
Orthodoxy. As discussed previously, Christian Orthodoxy is the state religion and the 
majority of Greek people according to the estimates identify with the Christian 
Orthodox dogma. The presentation of the administered scales was altered based on 
the type of identification (nationality was first, then second and finally third) for 
controlling any order effects on participants’ responses. All the items were translated 
and back-translated in order to be suitably administered to a non-English speaking 
sample.
The second section of the administered questionnaire comprised of three open-ended 
questions that aimed to explore the content of Greek national identity, investigating 
which categories were the most prominent in participants’ responses in defining 
Greekness. More specifically, questions A and B were expected to elicit information
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on how individuals define and discuss the meanings they themselves attached to the 
content of their nationality. However, in question C participants were asked to 
indicate their personal accounts of the cultural stereotypes associated with their 
national category as shared by the majority of the ingroup members.
The open-ended questions used are presented below:
□ Question A: What does being Greek mean to you?
□ Question B: If somebody would ask you to describe Greekness how 
would you describe it?
□ Question C: If you were asking this question to the majority of people of 
your country which do you think would be the most fi*equent response?
In the third section of the questionnaire, an alternative measure of psychological 
centrality was used, requiring participants to place the three examined identities 
(national, religious and gender) in a hierarchical order according to their worth as self­
defining in relation to the overall self-concept. In the last section of the questionnaire, 
demographic data relating to participants’ nationality, age, gender and religion were 
collected.
6.2.3 Design
The present study used a mixed-factorial design. The within subject factors were: 
strength of national, religious and gender identifications, psychological centrality of 
national, religious and gender identity elements. Participants’ gender was the 
between subject factor.
6.2.4 Procedure
Participants were administered an information sheet which included information 
about the purpose of the present study, an email-address for any questions and 
comments about the study. Participants were also informed about issues of 
confidentiality and anonymity. They were provided with stamped envelopes in case
/
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they needed more time to consider their responses and needed to send them back by 
post.
6.2.5 Descriptive Analysis
Before running the statistical analysis, the distributions of scores on the administered 
scales were inspected using frequencies and histograms with normality curves 
superimposed. Only two scales measuring strength of identification 
(skewness: -1.42, kurtosis: 2.87) and levels of perceived centrality (skewness: -1.39, 
kurtosis: 2.18) with national identity element violated the normality assumption with 
scores being negatively skewed and positively kurtotic (peaky). This was an 
indication that the majority of participants scored relatively high on these 
nieasurements. However, since the reported values of skeweness and kurtosis suggest 
that the two scales did not substantially depart from normality (-/+!), the researcher 
decided to avoid making transformations that would make difficult the interpretation 
of the findings (see also West, Finch and Curran (1995) who introduced a set of 
different criteria for detecting whether data are normally distributed with skeweness <  
-/+7 and Kurtosis ^ /+2).
6.2.6 Factor analysis on strength o f identification scales
Although the scale used is a well-validated scale in Britain (Cinnirella, 1997; Rutland 
and Cinnirella, 2000), the researcher decided to subject all twenty items measuring 
strength of national, religious and gender identification for the Greek sample to 
principal component analysis (oblique rotation) to explore their conceptual structure 
in this population. The choice of oblique rotation (Direct Oblimin) lies on the 
theoretical assumption that all identity components are allowed to correlate with each 
other within each identity. Factor extraction was guided by a combination of 
techniques including Kaiser’s criterion, scree plots and factor interpretability (Hair, 
Anderson, Tatham, and Black, 1998).
First, all seven items measuring strength of national identification were subjected to 
PCA analysis with oblique rotation. An inspection of Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin 
measurement for sampling adequacy followed with KMO= .84. The pattern matrix
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revealed two factors accounting for 70.45% of the total variance with the first factor 
accounting for 54.26% (eigen value: 3.80) and the second factor for 16.19% (eigen 
value: 1.13). The fact that there was a two-factor solution might be explained based 
on the fact that the three items (4, 6, 7 see Table 6.1) which loaded in the second 
factor, measure perceived similarity and interdependence between the self and the 
group. However, both the scree-plot (see Figure 6.1) and the size of correlation 
between the two factors (i= 0.43), suggest that we are able to accept a single-factor 
solution, in accordance with the factor solution produced for the English-speaking 
sample (Cinnirella, 1997), as the two factors seem to measure partially the same 
concept (strength of national identification). The reliability analysis performed on the 
single-factor solution further indicated that the scale used for measuring national 
identification was internally consistent with Cronbach’s alpha=0.85.
Factor analysis on the items measuring strength of religious identification produced a 
single factor solution accounting for 74.33% (eigen value: 5.20) of the total variance. 
All the items loaded highly under the same factor with the lowest being .80 and the 
highest .92. The scale was reliable and internally consistent with Cronbach’s 
alpha=0.94.
Finally, factor analysis on the scale measuring the strength of gender identification 
produced also a single- factor solution that accounted for 49.56% (eigen value: 2.97) 
of the total variance. The loadings ranged from the lowest being .50 to the highest 
being .79. The scale had an overall Cronbach’s alpha =.77.
The fact that rules of internal reliability (i.e. Cronbach’s alpha>.70) were met for all 
scales used in the present study allowed the researcher to proceed with the calculation 
of composite scores for the three variables. The simple summation method (E of 
items/N of items) was used to create scale scores as all items loaded well on their 
respective factors.
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T a b le  6.1: P attern  m atrix: In itia l tw o  factor-so lu tion  fo r  stren gth  o f  n a tio n a l
id en tifica tion
National Identification 
Items Factor I Factor II
Item 1 : Ta what extent do 
you feel Greek? .98
Item 2: To what extent do 
you feel strong ties with 
other Greek people?
. 8 6 '
Item 3; To what extent do 
you feel pleased to be 
Greek?
.76
Item 4: How similar do 
you think you are to the 
average Greek person?
.89
Item 5: How important to 
you is being Greek? .78
Item 6: How much are 
your views about Greece 
shared by other Greek 
people?
.81
Item 7: When you hear 
someone who is not Greek 
criticize the Greek people 
to what extent do you feel 
personally criticized?
.48
Note: Rotation converged in 5 iterations
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F igu re 6.1: S cree-p lo ts for  n a tio n a l, re lig ion s and  g en d er id en tifica tio n s
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In order to check the internal consistency of the scales measuring levels of 
psychological centrality of the three identity elements under investigation, inter-item 
correlations were performed. Correlations were quite high and significant. Therefore, 
the three measures of national, religious and gender centrality were constructed hy 
adding up each pair of relevant items.
Table 6.2: Inter-item correlations- Levels of centrality for the 3 target
identity elements
VARIABLES NO OF ITEMS PEARSON’S R
N=100
Centrality of National Identity 2 .84**
Centrality of Religious Identity 2 .84**
Centrality of Gender Identity 2 .61**
Note: **p<.07 
6.3 Results
6.3.1 Examining the structural relationship between identity elements
6.3.1.1 Testing for différences between the relative strength o f the three 
identifications within the Greek sample and between men and women
Initially, the differences between the relative strength of identifications were 
examined within the Greek sample (DVs). The mean scores revealed that participants 
irrespective of their gender reported different levels of identifications based on the 
type of identity under investigation. The Mauchley test indicated that there were 
sphericity violations, meaning that the variances of the differences between the 
measurements of the three types of identifications were significantly different (p<.01). 
To deal with this issue multivariate tests were used instead as these tests do not 
depend upon this assumption (Field, 2000). The within-subjects main effect of type 
of identifications on participants’ responses was significant with F  (2, 86) = 18.09, 
p<.01; Wilk’s Lambda: .70 with a large effect 7j^=30 suggesting that participants, 
irrespective of their gender, rated the three types of identification differently (see
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Table 6.3 for means and standard deviations). There were significant differences 
between national, gender and religious identifications with national and gender 
showing the highest means and religious the lowest (national=gender> religious).
Table 6.3: Relative strength of identifications: Means and standard
deviations (Z/stw/se n=89,4/^=88)
Types of Identification Mean SD t p-value
National Identification ^ 5.25 1.00 2 0 3 W .045 (ns)
Religious Identification*’ 4.58 1.48 5 .000
Gender Identification‘s 5.04 .96 - 3.12 .002
Note: Bonferroni tests (p<.02) indicated that the difference between levels of national and gender 
identifications was no longer significant.
In the second stage, the effect of gender (IV) on participants’ responses on the three 
identification scales was examined. Although the main effect of gender revealed not 
to be significant {F (1, 87) = 2.90, ns), there was a significant two-way interaction 
between the type of identification and participants’ gender with F  (2, 86) = 8.59, 
p<.00i and a large size effect The obtained mean scores revealed that Greek
men and women differed significantly on their levels of religious identification with 
the latter gender group identifying significantly higher with the religious category.
We considered that it would be also interesting to investigate how identity elements 
are organised based on their relative identification within each gender group 
separately. As it can be also observed from Figure 6.2, men identified at the same 
level with their national and gender groups and least with their religious 
(national=gender>religious). Interestingly, women identified to the same degree with 
all three identity elements (national=gender=religious).
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Table 6.4: Strength of identifications: Means and standard deviations- per
gender {Listwise n=88, df=^l)
Types of Identification Gender Mean SD t Significance
Level
P<
National Identification Male: 5.21 .97 -.41 ns
Female: 5.29 1.03
Religions Identification Male: 4.08 1.63 -3.31** .001
Female: 5.06 1.13
Gender Identification Male: 5.07 .94 .30 ns
Female: 5.01 .98
Note: **p<.01
Figure 6.2: Levels of identification associated with each identity element
amongst the two genders
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6.3.1.2 Testing for differences between the relative centrality o f the three identity 
elements within the Greek sample and between men and women
In order to investigate which identity elements are more central for the Greek 
respondents and whether gender has an effect on the relative centrality of these 
identity elements within identity structure, a mixed repeated measures MANOVA was 
also performed. The within-subject effect tests indicated that the type of identity 
centrality had a main effect on participants’ scores with F  (2, 95) =17.18; Wilks’ 
Lambda: 3.18 and a large effect r}^=27. Further statistical analysis suggested that 
similar to the results obtained for relative identification, both national and gender
183
identity elements were perceived to be of an equal importance in the individuals’ 
representation of identity structure but significantly more important compared to the 
religious identity element which was accorded less psychological centrality 
(nationality=gender> religion) (see Table 6.5 for means and standard deviations).
Table 6.5: Relative centrality of the 3 identity elements: Means and
standard deviations {Listwise n=98, d f =97)
Identity Elements Mean SD t Significance
Level
p<
National ^ 5.54 2.51 -1 3llacj ns
Religious ^ 4.76 3.49 4_94(ab)Hî* .000
Gender ® 5.72 1.98 _5i6 (bcr .000
Note: **p<.01
Once more, the main effect of gender was not significant (F (1, 96) = 2.73, ns). 
However, there was a two-way significant interaction between gender and the three 
types of centrality with F  (2, 95) = 7.86, p<.01; Wilks’ Lambda: .86 and a medium 
size effect with =.14. As in the case of the three identity elements examined 
earlier, post-hoc analysis revealed that both men and women accorded the same level 
of centrality to the role of national and gender categories within their identity 
structure while they differed significantly on their levels of perceived centrality 
relevant to the role of religion. More specifically, women perceived religion to be a 
more central element in their identity structure compared to men with Mwomen= 10.63, 
Mmen=8.41and t (96) =-3.31, p<.01 (see Figure 6.3 below). The same follow up 
analysis was conducted as before to explore how the identity elements are 
hierarchically arranged based on levels of perceived centrality within each gender 
group. The results indicated the same pattern as before. Men perceived their 
nationality and gender to be of an equal importance in their self-definitions while 
religion was considered relatively less important. Women, on the other hand, seem to 
believe that all three identity elements are equally important in their self-definitions 
(national=gender=religious).
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Figure 6.3: Levels of centrality associated with each identity element by
gender
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6.3.1.3 Exploring the relationship among the three identity elements in terms o f  
strength and centrality
In order to examine the strength of the bivariate relationships between the three 
identifications in the Greek socio-historical context, a series of Pearson’s correlation 
analyses were performed. Our main interest was to explore the strength and the 
nature of the relationship between national and religious identifications. Overall, the 
findings indicated that all three identifications were perceived to be positively and 
strongly correlated in the Greek context. National identification was significantly and 
positively correlated with both religious (r= .62, p<.01) and gender (r=.52, p<.01) 
identifications while the correlation between religious and gender identifications was 
also positive and significant (r=.39, p<.01).
To investigate whether the strength of the relationship between national and religious 
identifications was significantly stronger than the relationship between gender- 
national, Williams’ formula (cited in Steiger, 1980) was used as the present test 
calculates the statistical difference between two dependent correlation coefficients 
(when correlations share the same variable) obtained in the same sample. The results 
revealed that there was no statistical difference between the two correlation 
coefficients [t (86) = 1.12, ns] meaning that based on levels of identification religious
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and gender identity elements were related to the same extent to nationality identity 
element within identity structure. The same analysis was conducted for testing 
whether there is a significant difference in the strength of the relationship between 
religious-national and religious-gender identifications. The findings suggested that 
the two correlation coefficients differed significantly with t (86) = 2.76, p<.01 and 
that the relationship between national and religious identifications was relatively 
stronger.
For testing whether the strength of interrelationships differed significantly based on 
participants’ gender the correlation coefficients were transformed into z scores and 
Fisher’s formula was used to estimate the differences (see Table 6.6). The results 
indicated that the strength of the relationships obtained between the respective 
identity elements (e.g. national-religious and gender-national) does not vary due to 
participants’ gender. Moreover, further analysis was conducted for testing whether 
there are significant differences on the strength of nationality-religion relationship 
between different age groups (N2o-4o= 44, r=.53, p~0 and N4i-70= 37, r=.61, p~0) 
respectively). The analysis indicated that the bivariate correlations did not differ 
significantly based on age with z=-.51.
Table 6.6: Pearson’s correlations among variables measuring the strength of
the relationship between the three types of identification for men 
{Listwise n = 44) and women (Listwise «= 45)
Correlation 
Coefficients and z 
scores
National-Religious
Identifications
National-Gender
Identifications
Gender-Religious
Identifications
Men: Men: Men:
.65 .44 .44
p~0 p<.003 p<.002
Women: Women: Women:
.67 .59 .42
p~0 p~0 p<.004
z= -0.16, ns z=-0.93, ns z=0.11,n s
Finally, the correlations among the three identity elements based on centrality levels 
were examined. The results indicated that levels of centrality with nationality were 
positively and significantly correlated with both levels of religious and gender
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centrality while there was no significant relationship based on the reported levels of 
perceived centrality between religions and gender identity elements. Furthermore, the 
analysis performed for examining whether the relationship between nationality and 
religion based on perceived centrality (r =.49, p~0) measures is significantly stronger . 
than the relationship between nationality and gender (r=.29, p<.003) revealed to be 
once again non significant with t (96) = 1.76, ns. However, the relationship between 
nationality and religious identity elements was stronger firom the one obtained 
between religion and gender with t (95) = 2.78, p<.01.
6.3.1.4 Ranking the comparative importance/centrality o f the three identity elements
In the last section of the questionnaire study, Greek participants were asked to rate the 
three identity elements against each other using a hierarchical rank ordering task. The 
aim of the present measurement was to explore in an alternative way the relative 
centrality of the three examined identity elements within identity structure according 
to the levels of perceived importance that individuals attribute to these memberships. 
The three identity elements were presented in the following order: 1) Greek national 
2) Christian Orthodox and 3) Man/Woman.
Overall the results showed that there was a great variation in the hierarchical ordering 
of the three identity elements based on their relative centrality. In order to examine if  
there were statistically significant differences in the rank order of these three identity 
elements according to their perceived centrality, a Friedman’s test was performed.
This non-parametric test, which is equivalent to ANOVA for normally distributed 
samples, can be used to compare the distributions of the two or more ordinal 
dependent variables measured by the same sample usually at the same time.
Friedman’s chi-square revealed to have a value of 12.34 and to be significant with 
p<.002. Hence, there is evidence that the distributions that the three identity elements 
were ranked by the participants according to their perceived importance (centrality) 
differed significantly. As seen in Table 6.7 religious identity element was consistently 
ranked at a lower order (last) compared to both nationality and gender identity 
elements. Moreover, fi*om the calculated mean ranks it can be suggested that there 
was no significant difference between the rank order of nationality and gender identity
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elements. These results are in accordance with findings reported earlier where religion 
was assigned the lowest levels of centrality.
Table 6.7: Friedman’s test on hierarchical ordering of the 3 identity elements
Centrality N Mean SD Mean
Rank
Friedman’s
Chi-square
Significance
Level
P<
Gender 90 1.67 .82 1.86
Nationality 90 1.65 .74 1.87 12.34 .002
Religion 90 2.07 .82 2.28
Furthermore, in order to examine if  there were statistically significant differences in 
the rank order of these three identity elements when compared against each other in 
pairs according to their perceived centrality, a Wilcoxon signed -rank test was 
performed. As seen in Table 6.8 significant differences were found only for the 
ranked comparisons of religion-gender [z= -3.02, p<.002] and religion-national 
identity pairs [z= -3.19, p<.001]. In both cases the positive ranks were more than the 
negative suggesting that religious identity element was ranked at a lower order (i.e. 
second or third) compared to gender or national identity. These results also suggest 
that religion was perceived as being the least central identity element.
Furthermore, there were also tied ranks between different pairs of identity elements 
suggesting that participants evaluated these identity elements (paired differently each 
time) as being equally important in their self-definition.
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Table 6.8: Wilcoxon signed-rank test on hierarchical ordering of the 3
identity-combinations
N Mean
Rank
Sum of 
Ranks
Z score Significance
Level
P<
NATIONAL- Negative Ranks 35(a) 42.07 1472.50
GENDER -.26 ns
Positive Ranks 40(b) 34.44 1377.50
Ties 15(c)
Total 90
RELIGION- Negative Ranks 27(d) 32.44 876.00
GENDER -3.02 .002
Positive Ranks 48(e) 41.13 1974.00
Ties 15(f)
Total 90
RELIGION- Negative Ranks 23(g) 37.15 854.50
NATIONAL -3.19 .001Positive Ranks 52(h) 38.38 1995.50
Ties 15(i)
Total 90
a NATIONAL < GENDER 
b NATIONAL > GENDER 
c NATIONAL = GENDER 
d RELIGION < GENDER 
e RELIGION > GENDER 
f  RELIGION = GENDER 
g  RELIGION < NATIONAL 
h RELIGION > NATIONAL 
i RELIGION = NATIONAL
6.3.1.5 Summary offinding o f quantitative data analyses
The findings fi*om the quantitative part of the study revealed so far that:
>  With respect to how identity elements are organised within identity structure 
based on their relative strength of identification, participants identified to the 
same extent with their national and gender identity elements and least with the 
religious. Moreover, the comparison between the two gender groups on levels of 
identifications with the three examined identity elements revealed that women 
identified more than men with the relevant religious group (Christian Orthodox)
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> The same pattern of results was found for the relative centrality of the three 
examined identity elements. Participants reported that their nationality and gender 
were equally important whereas religion was perceived as relatively less important 
(central). The analysis performed for testing any variations in the relative 
centrality of these examined identity elements based on gender, revealed that 
women placed more importance in their religious identity element than men.
>  A follow-up analysis was performed to identify whether the form of identity 
structure obtained for the whole sample representing the organisation of these 
three identity elements (national=gender>centrality), would be replicated in the 
two gender groups. The within-gender group analysis testing this assumption both 
in terms of relative strength of identification and centrality indicated the same 
pattern for men but a different one for women. More specifically, for the former 
(men) there was no significant difference between nationality and gender identity 
elements in terms of relative identification and perceived centrality. Being 
Christian Orthodox was the least central identity element and with level of 
religious identification being significantly lower compared to the levels reported 
for the other two group identifications (national and gender). On the contrary, for 
the female participants, it seems that none of the identity elements has taken 
precedence over all others, as there were no significant differences among them 
based on the relative strength of identification and centrality measures.
>  Overall, it can be suggested that national, religious and gender identity 
elements are related within identity structure. The relative strength of these 
relationships was initially examined using the identification measures indicating 
that: nationality identity element relates to the same extent to religions and 
gender while religions relates more with national than gender identity element. 
The same pattern of results was revealed for the relationships between identity 
elements based on perceived centrality levels.
>  Finally, the ranking order measurement indicated that the majority of 
participants rated religion as being the least important of all three while there was 
no significant difference in the hierarchical positions of nationality and gender. 
There were also some tie ranks in the data suggesting that some participants
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ascribed the same levels of importance to pairs of identity elements or to all of 
them.
6.3.2 Content Analysis o f  Open-ended Questions
The open-ended questions included in the questionnaires were analysed using content 
analysis, a semi quantitative method which involves a replicable, systematic sorting of 
the data (words, phrases) into progressively broader categories according to their 
commonalities followed by counting their attributes in the data (Knipperdorf, 1980; 
Weber, 1990). One of the key dilemmas that any analyst faces after deciding to 
conduct content analysis is whether to adopt a deductive (testing the premises of a 
theory) or a data driven approach (exploration of new links in the data without a 
priori theoretical preconceptions) in relation to the coding of the collected data. The 
‘theory driven’ typology of content analysis may help the researcher to organise better 
the data as the codes emerge according to the theoretical arguments and the relevant 
research questions (Bauer, 2000). However, at the same time the extensive focus on 
theory and on confirming a set of predetermined hypotheses may narrow the 
analytical perspective and the ability of the researcher to identify key themes in the 
present data useful for challenging or even extending any theoretical claims (Joffe and 
Yardley, 2004). Since the aim of the present study was to explore the meanings that 
Greek respondents attach to their national group focusing on whether and to what 
extent Greek respondents would mention religion as a defining aspect of Greekness, 
emergent coding based on which categories are established after some preliminary 
examination of the data was preferred over the a priori coding. The analytic process 
employed here is described below.
The raw data (open-ended measures) were given to another Greek speaking colleague 
who independently from the researcher also built up and developed a preliminary set 
of categories after a systematic inspection of the data. Initially, many categories were 
generated based on selected words and phrases from the qualitative section (open- 
ended measures) of the administered questionnaire. The procedure of coding and re- 
categorizing continued and new labelling resulted into less specific categories than 
before. Due to the fact that both questions A {What does it mean to you being 
Greek?) and B {If somebody would ask you to describe Greekness how would you
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describe it?) were exploring the individual understanding of Greekness, and based on 
the fact that common categories were emerging, the researcher decided to collapse the 
data elicited from these two questions. Moreover, since the material was rich in 
adjectives and phrases, it was agreed by both researchers that the emergence of few 
general categories would not be representative of the data, as some of the less 
frequently mentioned categories could not fit under these broader categories. 
Disagreements between the categories were discussed extensively between the coders 
since researchers needed to develop a consolidated list to independently apply coding. 
The categories generated were mutually exclusive (no unit would fall between two 
categories) and exhaustive (when the category represents all recording units without 
exception). Categories mentioned by only one coder were excluded from the final 
table.
Reliability was ensured after the two coders agreed on all broader and sub-categories. 
According to Weber (1990) “to make valid references from the text, it is important 
that the classification procedure to be reliable in the sense of being consistent. 
Different people should code the same text in the same way” (p. 12). An inter-rater 
reliability rate of Cohen’s K =0.75 was obtained that according to Cohen (1960) is 
substantial.
Eleven general categories emerged for defining the content of Greek national identity. 
Both the frequency of the times mentioned and the number of participants mentioning 
these general and the sub-categories was reported and calculated allowing the 
researcher to keep a record of the most popular and the less common categories in the 
data. The general categories and sub-categories are described in Table 6.9.
6.3.2.1 Findings relating to individual perceptions o f  Greekness
Definitions of the emerged general categories and the sub categories will be discussed 
in the present Section. A number of verbatim quotes are also reported to illustrate the 
kind of statements that underpinned the identification of these categories, as the 
majority of participants used mainly words to describe the meanings they associate 
with their national group. In the extracts (...) indicates that material has been omitted.
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The analysis based on the data collected from the first two questions revealed that the 
most prominent general categories (Number of participants mentioning the category 
more than 40) in defining the content of Greek nationhood were: 1) image of the 
national character, 2) flagging the ancientness of the nation and 3) commitment to the 
nation. The nationality-religion relationship category was not one of the most 
prominent categories, however its emergence provides preliminary evidence that 
religion is perceived as a constitutive part of the Greek national identity.
Table 6.9: Exploring the content of Greek national identity-Content Analysis
(Questions A & B)
General Categories Sub-Categories Times 
mentioned 
Total N=354
Number of 
Participants 
Total N=311
Zorbas the Greek: Image 84 70
o f the national character
(positive and negative Filotimos (sense of dignity) 11 9
qualities)
Hospitable 12 11
Intelligent 11 9
Open-hearted 7 5
Sensitive 6 6
Enthusiastic 5 3
Authentic 4 3
Brave/Heroic 4 3
Energetic 3 2
Impulsive 4 3
Fun-loving 4 4
Disrespectful to laws 6 6
Nagging 3 2
Lazy 2 2
Egocentric 2 2
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T a b le  6.9 continued
General Categories Sub-Categories Times 
mentioned 
Total N=354
Number of 
Participants 
Total N=311
Qualities associated with the 
Greek-state Fighting Spirit (e.g.
23 23
metaphors used as Lion, 
Eagle)
10 10
Favouritism 4 4
Unorganised 4 4
Corruption 3 3
Slyness 2 2
Flagging the ancientness and the 59 49
cultural prosperity o f the nation:
The importance o f cultural heritage Common Ancestry 5 4
from past to present times
Civilization 13 11
Historical Past 
(e.g. historical eras and 
figures)
18 15
Tradition (Music, 
Customs)
17 13
Ancient Origins of 
Language
6 6
Nationally Distinct but better? 15 15
Comparing Greece to other nations
Superiority in terms of 
culture
10 10
Similar to other nations 
(e.g. European Identity)
5 5
Sources o f National Pride: 36 36
Richness of History 15 15
Intellectual contribution 
to humanity
12 12
Origins (ancestors) 
Uniqueness of language
7 7
as a source of pride 2 2
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T ab le  6.9 continued
General Categories Sub-Categories Times 
mentioned 
Total N=354
Number of 
Participants 
Total N=311
Pride for the past and worry for the 11 10
future
Commitment to the nation
Sacrifice & loyalty to the
47 43
nation and its ideals 
Struggle for a better
18 15
Greece 
Cultural obligations
10 9
(Need for historical 
continuity)
14 14
Patriotism: Homeland, 
Motherland
5 5
Ideals & Values defined by 32 25
nationality
Democracy 13 10
Family 8 8
Freedom 6 4
Justice 5 3
Religion -Nationality Relationship 21 19
Being Greek means being 
Christian Orthodox
10 9
Religious festivals (i.e. 
Greek Easter)
7 6
Greek -Christian 
Orthodox ideals and 
values 
(e.g.. ecumenicity of 
Orthodoxy, family values 
as portrayed in the 
religious dogma)
4 4
Gender-Nationality Relationship
Gender roles in the Greek 
context 
(Motherhood, Housewife)
10 10
Greek landscape 16 11
Geographical
Morphology
8 6
Ancient Monuments 8 5
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Zorbas the Greek: Image o f the National Character
Social psychological analysis on national stereotypes has demonstrated that when 
asked about defining national categories, respondents usually tend to reconstruct the 
image of the national character, referring to long list of traits, attitudes and behaviours 
associated with a ‘prototypical’ category member (Condor, 1996; Van Knippenberg 
and Dijksterhuis, 2000). Respondents in this study (70 out of 100) also defined the 
content of their national category using autostereotypes they perceived as “typical” of 
their group and culture. It is worth noticing that it was rare for a participant to refer to 
a single trait or lifestyle in his/her description of the national Greek character. On the 
contrary, their descriptions combined a variety of traits, societal attitudes and beliefs 
about life. There was also an evaluative orientation in the list of the adjectives 
provided with the majority of them being positive rather than negative in tone. 
Moreover, similar to Condor’s findings (1996) about the “Janus-faced”- the 
heterogeneous image of English national character, Greek respondents also 
constructed a two-sided image of their national identity. “Zorbas” was appraised for 
possessing a number of positive qualities (e.g. being conscientious-7?/c»rimo5, 
hospitable), but at the same time some participants admitted that this image also had 
negative stereotypical traits.
Female, 55: “As Greeks we are filotimoi (conscientious), hospitable and open-hearted 
but quite egocentric as well”.
Male, 26:“I would describe Greek people as being really intelligent and fun lovers! 
We know how to enjoy life”.
Female, 25: “A group of people who are caught in their past, nag a lot and do not 
obey any laws. However, they are also intelligent and open-hearted”.
Qualities associated with the Greek State
In a similar vein that Greek nationals reconstruct the image of their national character, 
in the present category they invoke the image of their state based on both positive and 
negative qualities. On one hand, the heroic “nature” of the state and its determination 
and ability to survive harsh times are discussed. In their answers participants 
employed a range of metaphors such as the eagle, the leonine to convey this image of
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a powerful and strong nation (for a detailed discussion on the functions of figurative 
language see Reicher and Hopkins, 2001). Conversely, a negative image of the state 
was also portrayed in their answers. Participants profoundly criticized the state- 
owned organizations (public sector) and politicians for being corrupt, disorganized 
and consequently untrustworthy. These findings are in accordance with research 
concerning representations of democracy in “traditionally” democratic and post 
communist states, which indicated that ordinary people, irrespective of the system 
they lived in, discussed the opaque nature of their social systems displaying a great 
deal of suspicion regarding the motives of those in power and their competence to 
govern the state (Markova, Moodie and Plichtova, 1998).
Male, 42: “When I think of Greece, I think of a state that has undergone so many 
difficulties (international and civil wars) but managed to survive.
Female, 35: “In Greece, if  you don’t have connections you are nobody!”
Male, 38: “(...) the Greek social system cannot be trusted as the people who are part 
of it do not have the best intentions at heart”.
Flagging the ancientness and the cultural prosperity o f the nation: The importance o f  
cultural heritage from past to present times
Fifty nine participants mentioned this category and discussed the influence of cultural 
heritage such as history, civilization, tradition, ancient origins etc. while defining the 
content of their national identity. In traditional societies, like Greece, historical and 
cultural past entails a fundamental basis of the content and value of nationhood. The 
definition of national identity based on historical narratives and tradition marks its 
continuity across time and its power to maintain and integrate these elements in the 
present content of their identity. Therefore, for Greek participants “the sureness of ‘I 
was’ is a necessary component of the sureness of T am’ (Lowenthal, 1985, p. 41).
This emphasis on the glorious past may be also due to perceived threats emanating 
from the present state of national identity and may be a source for enhancing national 
self-esteem, especially when the present is not seen as something to be proud of.
Greek Female, 21: “Greekness means rich history, tradition and civilization”
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Greek Male, 68: “Greekness means to me the basis of a long-lasting tradition that 
starts from the ancient times and continues until the Byzantine era and the Ottoman 
Empire”.
Nationally distinct but better? Comparing Greece to other nations
In the present category participants adopted a relational method of ingroup evaluation 
based on comparisons with a group usually manifested in their perceptions as 
economically superior to them, the Europeans (Chryssochoou, 1996; 2000h). In the 
present findings, comparisons were made based on cultural dimensions, which 
comprise an important element of Greek national identity, where participants feel 
superior to their comparators. It should be noted that in some cases Greek 
respondents were comparing their national group against a more abstract category 
‘people of other nations’, rather than solely Europeans. Overall, these findings 
support SIT and SCT claims that groups seek ingroup-outgroup comparisons to 
favour their ingroup based on dimensions that they value and would enhance their 
positive distinctiveness (Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Brewer, 1999h).
Male, 44: “Europe of all nations”.
Male, 50: “It means I am a carrier of a cultural tradition that makes me different and 
better from other Europeans!”
Female, 21: “It’s my nationality that differentiates me in a positive light from other 
nations”.
Male, 38: “It is important because I feel superior compared to other nations because
■ <
of our historical past as a nation which dates hack to the ancient times”.
Female, 23: “We are different and better! When the Europeans were eating human 
flesh and lived in caves we were building Parthenon(s)!”
Finally, for five participants in the sample, national membership was not perceived as 
a source of national distinctiveness, either because they described themselves as both 
Greeks and Europeans (dual identification), or because they transcended the national 
boundaries identifying in a higher level of abstraction, that of being a human or a 
citizen of the world.
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Male, 45: “I am not just Greek. I am also a European which means free migration, 
citizen of a welfare state and carrier of a language and a tradition that happened to 
emerge in Greece.”
Male, 31: “My nationality is not important to me. We are all the same. We are all 
humans.”
Male, 25: “Nothing special. I would feel the same if I was a German. I am a citizen of 
the world.”
Sources o f national pride
Many participants (N=36) expressed strong emotional sentiments for belonging to the 
Greek nation and justified this pride discussing the richness of national history, the 
intellectual contribution of the Greek civilization to humanity, their ancestral origins 
and the uniqueness of their language. It seems that Greek participants derive a lot of 
pride from their historical past whereas, as discussed in the following category, their 
present is mainly perceived as a source of distress and worry.
Male, 58: “I am proud because I was horn in a country with rich history that has 
enlightened the whole of humanity”.
Female, 24: “As Greeks we are proud of our ancestors (Ancient Greeks). Possibly a 
little for our history but mostly for what we have accomplished so far”.
Female, 26: “I feel extremely proud about Greece. Greece is like “Prometheus” that 
provided the humanity with the element of fire empowering humans in relation to 
Gods. I believe that Greece has provided the whole of humanity with this “intellectual 
frame”.
Male, 64: “I feel proud to belong to a category of people that despite their weaknesses 
they possess a number of good qualities you rarely find in people of other nations.”
Pride for the past, worry for the future
In the present theme Greek respondents conveyed not only feelings of pride regarding 
the glorious past but also voiced feelings of uncertainty and distress concerning the 
current state and the future of their nation. It is evident in this category that
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participants adopted temporal comparisons between past and present times as a 
method of ingroup identity evaluation, which resulted not only in the idealization of 
their past hut also in the dismissal of their present.
Female, 55: “Pride for your ancestors and sorrow for the successors”.
Female, 35: “The fact that I am Greek makes me proud because my ancestral roots 
date back to the Ancient Greeks. However, the fact that I live in a country that does 
not resemble at all the Ancient Greek era, worries me a lot”.
Female, 47: “It means that I am proud but worried for the future of this country”. 
Male, 55: “(.. .) Greece was strong during the ancient years; it is weak at the present 
time due to the invasion of our land and governance by incapable politicians”.
Commitment to the nation
Participants also referred to their commitment and patriotic attitudes towards their 
nation. According to their answers there seemed to be a sense of a shared, collective 
responsibility and willingness to sacrifice and to fight possible future contingencies in 
order to ensure a better future for their nation (potential identity). Additionally, 
participants emphasized the need and obligation to maintain their historical, linguistic 
and traditional continuity and to potentially update these “old” constructs in order to 
fit in the ‘current’ reality of their national identity. History, tradition and language 
were not only perceived as past dimensions of national identity. On the contrary, they 
were presented as important elements that continue and should continue to exist for 
maintaining the present status and content of national identity.
Male, 43: “Struggle and effort to acquire the position we should have as Greeks.” 
Female, 44: “(...) a continuous struggle to maintain the status of Greekness”
Male, 33: “Feel Greek, Greek consciousness and willingness to participate in the 
nation due to its valuable historical past”
Male, 54: “It means that I possess a strong heritage that I need to maintain but at the 
same time I have to adopt it to the modem beliefs and life standards”.
Male, 33: “It means I have an obligation to maintain history, language, the culture and 
the societal values and protect our great history, tradition and heritage. However, as 
Greeks we need to combine the past with the modem character of the nation”.
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Male, 27: “The fact that Greece has encountered so many dangers in the past makes 
me feel that I need to DEFEND it and pay my RESPECT to those who sacrificed their 
life for this country!”
Female, 43: “Devotion-self sacrifice to the nation and its ideals, freedom and 
democracy. Love for the fellow-man, honour to our ancestors and obligation for a 
better Greece.”
Female, 29: “We need to improve the status of Greek national identity not just by 
appraising our valuable cultural past. The modem Greek national identity is also 
important. We need to combine the two to show to others that our culture is still worth 
of respect and admiration!”
Moreover, participants used the terms “homeland” and “motherland” to describe the 
place they are bom, live and work. Although the word “homeland” might seem quite 
general and descriptive, it conveys a sense of belongingness of the individual to the 
broader category of the nation and his/her emotional and instmmental attachment to a 
bounded territory occupied by people who share common social memories and 
political rights. As Smith (1991) argued, “the homeland becomes a repository of 
historic memories and associations, the place where ‘our’ sages, saints and heroes 
lived, worked prayed and fought” (p.9). Additionally, patriotism is also conveyed 
when participants use gendered metaphors to refer to their nation such as 
“ motherland”. A conception of the nation as “family” also entails meanings such as 
common ingroup fate (Deaux, 1996; Brewer and Silver, 2000), sacrifice and 
obligation to defend it under threat (Johnson, 1987; Billig, 1995). Gendered and 
familial personifications of the nation are core themes in nationalistic doctrines 
(Smith, 1991; McWilliams, 1991, cited in Stapleton and Wilson, 2004, p. 61) and they 
are often used in political projects due to their effectiveness: a) to unite people living 
inside and outside of the nation’s territory in one big brotherhood; b) to sanctify the 
land of the nation; and c) to fuel any long-lasting aspirations about a “lost” or 
unredeemed land.
Male, 35: “It is my homeland, I live, work here and I love it...”
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Ideals and values defined by nationality
Participants referred to values such as freedom, democracy and justice as being 
defining characteristics of their nationality. For Greek participants democracy was 
the most frequently mentioned ideal of all, with emphasis placed on its origins in the 
Ancient Greek civilisation. Moreover, participants discussed the importance of 
families as being a unique value defined by nationality. In the map of cultures, the 
Greek culture has been classified in the past as being a more collectivistic one 
(Hofstede, 1980; Triandis et al., 1988). Although the Greek society has undergone 
individuation the family values remain a strong element of the culture and of its 
identity (Georgas, 1989, Georgas et ah, 1997; Verkyuten and Pouliasi, 2006). 
Moreover, the Greek data from the European Social Survey (2003) revealed that 
85.1% considers family values as extremely important in life.
Female, 45: “An ideal and a philosophy based on democracy developed by Ancient 
Greeks and that its meaning has changed and turned into a symbol of an authoritative 
oligarchy”.
Male, 39: “Greeks are like night gales when you imprison them, they die”.
Female, 26: “(...) family is important in Greece. There are always a part of your 
life.”
Male, 45: “(...) maintenance of tradition, language, had quality of life, strong family 
bonds and values.”
Religion & Nationality relationship
Nineteen participants in total mentioned Orthodoxy, Christian morals, ideals and 
festivities as heing defining characteristics of Greek national identity. The emergence 
of this category is in line with the statistical findings, and indicates that this 
interaction between religious and national identifications is also reflected in the 
content dimension of the latter. Based on participants’ answers there are different 
ways that the relationship between the two is manifested. Some of them suggested 
that the two grant each other meaning to the extent that they may be conceived as 
almost ‘indistinguishable’ from to each other. Eleven participants mentioned that 
religion relates strongly to Greekness through the religious festivals (i.e. Greek
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Easter) and the familial values preached in the Christian Orthodox dogma. The latter 
have been endorsed and adopted in the Greek way of life to the extent that they have 
been ethicised and perceived as intrinsic characteristics of Greekness (Pollis, 1993).
Male, 41: “Ideals such as democracy, freedom, Christian Orthodoxy and its 
ecumenicity”.
Female, 58: “(...) tradition, Greek Easter and a mixture of emotions”
Female, 26: “(.. .)strong family values as portrayed in the Christian Orthodox 
dogma established as a Greek element during the Byzantine era.”
Male, 48: “(.. .) Being Greek means that you are a Christian Orthodox! Christian 
Orthodoxy and Greekness are almost impossible to tell apart.”
Gender-Nationality Relationship
This category was mentioned only by 10% of female participants who discussed the 
gender roles (woman, motherhood, and housewife) that are specific to being Greek. 
These female participants seem to acknowledge that there are normative assumptions 
about women in their national community and a set of expectations regarding their 
professional status and their roles as mothers and housewives. However, it is not clear 
from their answers whether they perceive this purported image of gender roles as a 
cultural constraint. The results explain further how these national and gender identity 
elements are related within identity structure, not only based on their relative strength 
of identification and centrality but also in terms of content.
Female, 29: “To live in this country, to work and think as a Greek woman”.
Female, 50: “living in Greece it means that I need to be a good mother, housewife and 
economically independent at the same time”.
Female, 36: “(...) good mother and housewife”.
Greek landscape
In this category participants discussed the role of the physical environment in the 
construction of their national identity. Six participants referred to the geographical
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morphology of their country as defining aspects of Greekness, focusing on the beauty 
and uniqueness of the Greek landscape. Moreover, five participants mentioned the 
existence of historical places and ancient monuments and explained how the symbolic 
meanings attached to them plays an important role in the development of their 
national identity.
Male, 20: “(...) it is a nice country in terms of landscape. There are mountains, rivers, 
the Greek islands. Can we ask for more?”
Female, 28: “I was bom in one of the most beautiful countries in the world.. .When I 
walk around and I see all these Ancient monuments, the Parthenon and the Acropolis. 
For me this is Greece!”
Female, 32: “Greekness means (...), light, sunny beaches...”
Male: 54: “The ancient mins are a constant reminder of Greek civilisation’s grandiose 
and a strong link with our historical past”.
The emergence of the present category is in agreement with research that suggests 
that the physical environment and geography are important elements of national 
identities (Chase, 1996, Condor, 1996). As Penrose (1993) argues, most individuals 
find it hard to think of a nation without a specific territory. The territorial aspect of 
national identity is represented by the possession of a ‘historic land’ which is linked 
with strong social memories. The natural scenery of a national territory adds to the 
nation’s Character and is considered sacred. It needs to be worshipped and defended 
under all circumstances. Thus, whereas cultural elements such as tradition, religion, 
symbols and language draw the boundaries between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ in a 
symbolic manner, the geographical territory of the nation marks the boundaries in a 
physical way.
Relevant research on the role played by ancient monuments in the constmction of 
national identities indicates that the reification of these places into symbolic cultural 
markers provides a sense of a positively distinct and continuous national identity 
(Jacobi and Stokols, 1983; Devine-Wright and Lyons, 1997). Harvey (2003) argues 
that the meanings associated with ancient monuments are open to contestation and
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that they are constantly used in myths associated with the nation-building process, 
playing a significant role in national identity affirmation and political mobilisation.
6.3.2.2 Exploring the degree o f consensus between an individuaVs own definitions o f  
Greekness and his/her perceptions o f the widely shared definitions
Question C in the administered questionnaire explored participants’ perceptions of 
popular (prototypical) definitions of Greekness. Many participants did not answer this 
question. The resulting content analysis revealed the same categories as the previous 
analyses. More specifically, 58% participants referred mainly to the image of the 
national character, listing traits and behaviours representative in defining Greek 
people and their mentality. A closer inspection of the descriptions revealed that in 
their opinion, the majority of their ingroup members would define Greek people in a 
positive light (4 out of 6) with adjectives such as filotimos, hospitable and fun-loving 
being the most popular traits. Most importantly, the second strongest emerging 
category was the overlap between Greek national identity and Christian Orthodoxy. 
The fact that participants appraised that religion would be also included in the 
majority’s definitions of Greekness, is an indication that the relationship between the 
two identity elements is perceived as a shared and culturally defined social 
representation (N=20, mentioned 20 times).
Female, 36: “They would define Greekness based on culture and the Christian 
Orthodox ideals”.
Male, 22: “I believe that most people of my country would perceive the concept of 
Greekness to be identical to that of Orthodoxy and Greek civilisation”.
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Table 6.10: Emerged Categories from responses to Question C ( I f  you were
asking this question to the majority ofpeople o f  your country which would be the 
most frequent response?)
General Categories Sub-Categories Times
mentioned
N=138
Number of 
Participants 
N=135
Zorbas the Greek: Image of 58 58
the national character Filotimos (sense of 14 14
(positive and negative qualities) dignity/conscientious) 
Hospitable 10 10
Intelligent 9 9
Fun-loving 11 11
Lazy 6 6
Disrespectful to laws 8 8
Qualities of the Greek state 11 11
Fighting Spirit 6 6
Favouritism 5 5
Sources of National Pride 14 14
Richness of History- 8 8
Uniqueness of Culture 
Ancient Origins 6 6
Ideals defined by nationality 15 15
Democracy 10 10
Freedom 5 5
Commitment to the nation 17 17
Struggle for a better Greece 9 9
Love for the country: 
Patriotism, Homeland 8 8
Religion-nationality 23 20
relationship Greece of Orthodox Greeks 12 12
Byzantine 
influence/Orthodox ideals 7 7
Greek Easter 4 4
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6.3.3 Summary offindings o f content analysis
Overall, the content analysis of the open-ended measures exploring the content of 
Greekness revealed eleven general categories. The most prominent categories 
(number of participants/times mentioned) defining nationhood were: 1) image of the 
national character; 2) flagging the ancientness of the nation; and 3) commitment to the 
nation. Importantly, the emergence of the nationality-religion relationship category in 
the data, although mentioned 21 times by only 19 participants, suggests that there are 
foregrounded issues of an overlap between the two identity elements, with Christian 
Orthodoxy perceived as a constitutive part of the Greek national identity content.
This finding was further explored in the qualitative study where participants were 
given the opportunity to elaborate more on their views on the strength and the 
importance of this relationship. Finally, the data also revealed an overlap between 
national and gender identity elements. However, this was not a strong category in the 
data, as it was mentioned only by few female participants (N=10).
Finally, the material elicited from the third question, requiring participants to provide 
information on their perceptions about the prototypical definition of Greekness, 
although poor in content, indicated that participants believed that their personal 
beliefs about the meanings associated with Greekness were shared to a great extent by 
the other ingroup members. The data revealed that the group’s distinctive qualities 
(national characteristics) and the Christian Orthodox religion were also perceived as 
core elements in the normative definitions of Greekness.
6.4 General discussion (Study 1- Part 1)
A number of different conceptual questions were posed at the onset of this research 
regarding the study of multiple identities/identity elements with respect to their 
organisation within identity structure, the strength and direction of their relationships 
based on strength of identification, centrality measures, and their content. To this 
end, a more integrative methodological approach was employed. Focusing on 
nationality identity element, the quantitative part of the study explored its relative 
position and strength of relationship with both religious and gender identity elements 
within participants’ subjective representations of identity structure.
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The structural relationships between the target identity elements were explored based 
on 1) the relative strength and centrality of each element; and 2) the tightness and 
looseness of the relationships between them (Breakwell, 1986; Hofinan, 1988; 
Cinnirella, 1997). Most of the theoretical perspectives emphasise the situational 
determinants of salience (usually experimentally induced), and the responsiveness of 
identity structure in the changes occurring in the immediate context. In the present 
study the relative position that the three elements of interest (national, gender and 
religious) held within participants’ identity structure, as well as the type and strength 
of the relationships existing among them were explored based on stable determinants: 
levels of perceived centrality and strength of identification (measures of explicit 
importance, cf. Ashmore et al., 2004).
The qualitative component of the study assessed participants’ constructions of 
Greekness, and aimed to further clarify the relationships evinced based on the two 
measures of explicit importance, and to elicit important information on the way and 
the extent to which the three identity elements relate in terms of content. It is worth 
reiterating at this point that the central aim of the present study was to explore the 
degree to which national and religious identity elements relate in Greek nationals’ 
representations of structure, and the dimensions of meaning these may share at an 
individual and a collective level in their definitions of nationhood.
Prior to the discussion of findings it is important to note a couple of issues in relation 
to the methods employed, and the measures used in the present study. Firstly, 
participants were not given the option to enlist a number of identity elements that they 
perceived as being important in their self-definition. Instead, guided by the 
hypotheses upon which this research is based, participants were asked to rate the level 
of importance ascribed to the three identity elements of interest (nationality, religion 
and gender). This may have affected their responses making these identity elements 
salient. However, the salience of identity elements is a confounding variable in any 
research design that examines strength of identification and its relevant content 
(Rutland and Cinnirella, 2000).
Secondly, as stated in the introduction of this chapter, after acknowledging the 
multidimensionality of social identification process in the present study, a scale
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(Cinnirella, 1997) was employed that measures and differentiates between the 
different dimensions of identification (Ellemers et ah, 1999; Jackson and Smith, 1999; 
Jackson, 2002; Ashmore et ah, 2004; Cameron, 2004; Obst and White, 2005). Similar 
to the results obtained by researchers who have used similar multidimensional scales 
in their studies (Brown, Condor, Mathews, Wade and Williams, 1986; Cinnirella, 
1997; Rutland and Cinnirella, 2000), the factor analysis yielded unidimensional 
solutions for both religious and gender identifications. However, the factor analysis 
performed on strength of national identification revealed a two factor-solution with 3 
out of 7 items loading on the second factor. These items measure an individual’s 
levels of perceived prototypicality to the ingroup, behavioural and ideological intra­
group similarity and feelings of interdependence (perceived strength of ingroup ties). 
For reasons of comparability with the other two social identification scales, national 
identification was also treated as a unidimensional scale. The correlation obtained 
was strong enough to allow the combination of the two factors, further supported by 
the high internal reliability of the scale.
Hierarchical vs. alternative forms o f identity structure
So far, researchers studying the structure of multiple identities (or elements of 
identity) have proposed that they may he hierarchically arranged based on their 
relative salience and centrality (Breakwell, 1986; Stryker, 1987; Deaux, 1993; Oakes, 
et al., 1994). Yet the findings from the present study showed that the structural 
relationships between the examined identity elements can take other forms despite 
being relatively antagonistic to each other. To start with, the analysis performed on 
the total sample exploring the degree and the way in which the three identity elements 
are assimilated and represented within identity structure showed that participants 
consistently identified to the same extent and ascribed the same rate of importance 
(perceived centrality) to their national and gender identity elements. Being Christian 
Orthodox was rated less important in the overall self-definition with participants also 
reporting relatively lower levels of religious identification (N=G>R).
One cannot also fail to notice that strength of identification and centrality measures 
produced the same results. Two alternative explanations may be offered in relation to 
the present finding. Firstly, it may be suggested that in contexts that participants are
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aware of the salience of their identity elements, centrality and strength of 
identification would operate in the same way (Stryker and Serpe, 1994). Secondly, 
the two concepts may not necessarily represent two distinct psychological processes. 
One may suggest that the extent to which someone identifies with an identity may 
depend on the levels of perceived centrality that this identity element has in his/her 
overall self-definition. However, the type of identities under consideration may also 
play a role in setting apart these two processes. For example, large social categories 
like nationality, gender and religion are more influential in the development of an 
individual’s identity. Individuals are socialised in these categories from an early age, 
learning a set of normative beliefs and prescriptive behaviours (Erikson, 1968; 
Breakwell, 1986; Verkuyten, 2005). On the contrary, one may identify high and 
temporarily with a fictitious category (Tajfel and Turner, 1986), or with a role identity 
that wouldn’t he classified as psychologically important (Stets and Burke, 2000). In 
this case, one would expect identity to appear in different positions in an individual’s 
identity structure based on levels of identification and centrality respectively.
The hierarchical ranking order measurement of centrality revealed relatively similar 
findings to the scale measure of the concept, showing the utility of using both 
methodologies (fixed response measures and hierarchical ordering). More 
specifically, it also showed that there were tied ranks between the identity elements, 
meaning that participants allocated the same level of importance in them making 
different identity combinations each time. This finding highlights the importance of 
including measures that capture identity combinations when data is collected on 
identities. Past research indicated that identity combinations are a key variable for 
explaining psychological outcomes as distress (Thoits, 1986, 1992; Settles, 2004) and 
for studying inter-group attitudes in multicultural contexts, especially in those where 
there is strong political dichotomisation (Trew and Benson, 1996; Diez, 1999; Crisp, 
Hewstone and Cairns, 2001).
Thus far, the findings are in line with previous literature (Brewer, 1999a; Cinnirella, 
1997; Freeman, 2003), suggesting that it is not always plausible for multiple identities 
to be always organised in a hierarchical way as most theorists would argue. Two or 
more identities may be relevant and accessible at the same time in a given context, 
creating a form of dual identification. Individuals may place the same levels of
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psychological importance and treat them as chronically accessible categories (Stryker, 
1987; Deaux, 1993, 2000a). The present analysis indicated that gender and 
nationality identity elements, hoth in terms of centrality and strength of identification 
carried systematically equal psychological significance (strength of identification and 
centrality) within individuals’ identity structure. According to Brewer (1999a) 
depending on the type of identifications under investigation and their purported ability 
to serve complementary needs for their beholders (inclusion vs. exclusion), they may 
be represented either os, nested or as an intersecting-additive (Brown and Turner,
1979; Turner et al., 1987; Hewstone, Islam and Judd, 1993; Urban and Miller, 1998), 
influencing in a joint manner an individual’s attitudes and intragroup/inter-group 
perceptions. Nesting as a principle of organizing an individual’s numerous identities 
allows their hierarchical arrangement in which one or more identities are subsumed 
under more inclusive ones. In the present case, strictly based on the identity typology 
argument it may be assumed that gender identities may take on the role of the 
superordinate category, whereas identification with the national collective may 
represent the subgroup identity that satisfies the need of the individual to belong in a 
less inclusive social group. However, as there is little information available to test the 
motivational assumption suggested by Brewer (1993, 1999a), and most importantly 
based on the fact that participants identified to the same degree with their national and 
gender identity elements, classifying them as equal important for defining the self- 
concept (Greek=Man/Woman), it may he suggested that Greek participants defined 
their primary social identity in terms of the compound combination of both nationality 
and gender (cf. Roccas and Brewer, 2002).
It was also anticipated that there might he differences between the two gender groups 
in the way the three identity elements are organised within their identity systems. For 
men, nationality and gender carried equal psychological weight, whereas their degree 
of identification with the religious category and its perceived centrality was relatively 
lower. On the contrary, for women none of the identity elements seemed to dominate 
the others in their subjective representations of identity structures. They were all 
equally psychologically important, showing that for women both in terms of relative 
identification and centrality, the three identity elements may compose a single and 
uniquely shared social identity (intersection type of identity structure representation). 
Based on the social identity complexity model (Roccas and Brewer, 2002), the
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evidence from the data suggests that compared to male participants, the female 
participants have a relatively simpler representation of their multiple ingroup 
identities. In a context that all these identities may be salient women may use this 
construction of a compound and rather exclusive social identity. Only individuals 
who are members of all these groups would he classified as ingroup members. This 
may render possible negative inter-group treatment and less tolerance, especially 
under contexts of threat, towards all those who may be perceived as triple-outgroup 
members (Vanbeselaere, 1987a, 1991).
Moreover, the results indicated that Greek women tend to identify more than Greek 
men with the religious membership, and perceive it as more central in their self­
descriptions. This finding is in line with research on gender religiosity that shows that 
being religious is a stronger part of the stereotypical feminine sex role (Batson, 
Schoenrade and Ventis, 1993; Francis and Wilcox, 1998; Miller and Stark, 2002). 
Despite early socialisation processes and gender orientations advanced so far within 
the literature accounting for gender differences in religiosity (see for a review,
Francis, 1997), one should not preclude the power that religious dogmas have in 
shaping sex-role belief systems and influencing gender relations to explain the 
differences (Shanks, 1967). Pollis (1993), focusing on the religious precepts, 
textbooks and rituals of the Christian Orthodoxy, provides some examples and 
discusses how religions influence sex belief systems and how representations of 
inequality between the two sexes are reproduced in the dogma. For example, women 
are considered morally superior because of the original sin of Eve (only Virgin Mary 
is pure), and ‘unclean’ because of their sexuality (menstruation). Their involvement 
in the religious category is defined based on their gender identity and they are not 
allowed to be actively involved in the liturgy. In this sense, women rights and duties 
as members of this religious category are defined, dictated and to some extent 
restrained by their sexuality.
In addition, a range of studies also examined how constructions of nationhood can be 
‘engendered’, reflecting both men’s and women’s stereotypical social roles within the 
national context (Liebkind, 1996; Duveen, 2001; Verkyuten, 2005). Using a 
discursive approach, Stapleton and Wilson (2004) analysed how Irish female 
participants position themselves within their respective national contexts and how
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they construct their national identities by invoking gender stereotypes. The authors 
explain that the strong overlapping evinced between the two categories is based on the 
notion that nationality is shaped by gendered location within the national context, 
whereas the content of gender identity, at least to some extent, is influenced by 
national, religious and normative cultural perceptions of masculinity and femininity 
prominent in the social contexts.
In summary, the present findings suggest that it might not always be possible for an 
individual to prioritize his/her identities under contexts that two or more identities 
may be salient and central to an individual’s self-concept, either because they may he 
chronically accessible due to their typology (e.g. nationality, gender), to culturally 
defined gender representations, and/or because they may overlap in terms of content. 
The latter point was further explored with the use of the content analysis on the open- 
ended measures exploring the content of Greek national identity.
Exploring the compatibility between identity elements based on their relationships
The positive valence of the correlation coefficients obtained among all three social 
identifications (national, gender, religious) suggests their harmonious interconnection 
within Greek participants’ repertoire of identities, what Hofinan (1988) would have 
called consonant. Furthermore, the study of the strength of the relationship 
between them also provided useful information about their tightness and looseness 
within identity structure (Breakwell, 1986). National identification was strongly and 
equally related to both gender and religious identifications. On the contrary, the 
relationship between gender and religious identification was relatively weaker, 
whereas in the case of the perceived centrality measures, the two identity elements 
were totally unrelated. The results from this part of the study suggest that nationality 
occupies a relatively central position in Greek participants’ representations of identity 
structure, defining and being defined by the other two social categories (gender and 
religion). The open-ended measures section of the administered questionnaire yielded 
a wide range of meanings associated with Greek national identity, its stereotypic 
content, the psychological functions it may serve for its beholders, and most
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importantly helped to clarify the ways in which nationality intersects with religion and 
gender in participants’ identity constructions.
Getting to know the Greek people: The character o f the Greek people and state
As stated in the introduction of this chapter, within social psychology there is an 
enormous appeal in the notion that individuals perceive cultures as having distinct 
personalities (Reicher and Hopkins, 2001). The image is of a group of people that 
shares a set of common traits defined and determined hy nationality or ethnicity. This 
has heen commonly termed in the literature as the image of national character, and 
aims to summarise all those traits, attitudes and beliefs perceived by individuals as 
prototypical when defining members of the ingroup or a psychologically relevant 
outgroup (Bar Tal, 1997). In the present study, analysis of the open-ended measures 
indicated that Greek respondents imagined their national identity as a group of 
individuals sharing a list of common traits. The present discussion focuses primarily 
upon the content-valence and the purported functions that invocation of this 
stereotypical knowledge may serve for individuals as members of a national group. 
Moreover, it was not clear from participant’s answers whether an ingroup/outgroup 
distinction was operative during the self-stereotyping process, or when asked to 
provide an account of the cultural view as shared hy the majority of ingroup members.
One critical difference between the present research and most previous work on 
national stereotypes (e.g. Jonas and Hewstone, 1986; Haslam et al., 1998; Verkuyten, 
Drabbles, Van den Niewenhuijzen, 1999; Rutland and Cinnirella, 2000;
Chrysoochoou, 2000b) is that respondents were neither asked to provide, nor there 
were already provided with a list of adjectives described as “typical” of their ingroup 
(Katz and Braly, 1933), neither were asked to rate their ingroup against a relevant 
outgroup on the basis of these attributes. Instead, the information concerning 
stereotypes of the Greek people was elicited in a less constraining context (adjective 
lists), as the questions used did not directly invite the description of the national 
character. Therefore, this category emerged as part of participants attempt to define 
their nationality. However, its emergence as the strongest category in the data came 
as no surprise. There is a large amount of experimental and questionnaire-based 
studies showing that the activation of a social category enhances the cognitive
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accessibility of those traits that are seen as more typical or stereotypical in defining 
the properties of the group (Macrae, Stangor and Milne, 1994; Dijksterhuis and Van 
Knippenberg, 1996; Spears, Oakes, Ellemers and Haslam, 1997; Haslam, Oakes, 
Reynolds and Turner, 1999; Van Knippenberg and Dijksterhuis, 2000; Krueger, 
Hasman, Acevedo and Villano, 2003).
Stereotype Content
In order to gain more insight into the nature of stereotypes, one needs to analyse their 
fimction a little more closely. Tajfel (1981) was the first to emphasise the social role 
of stereotypes and integrate the social cognition literature with the group based 
motivations (for a detailed discussion see Brown, 2000). Later, proponents of SCT 
(Oakes, Haslam and Turner, 1994; Spears, 2002) proposed that stereotyping as an 
outcome of a dynamic and variable categorisation process provides a common 
perspective on reality that may regulate both the perception and evaluation when a 
social identity is made salient. The evaluation of the group may appear rather 
ambivalent and involve not only positive attributes but negative ones (for detailed 
discussions on evaluative connotation of the stereotypic contents see Fiske, Xu, 
Cuddy and Click, 1999, and Fiske, Cuddy, Click, and Xu, 2002). As Hogg and 
Abrams (1988) argue, self-stereotyping is presumed to occur “on all and any 
dimensions which are believed to be correlated with the salient categorisation” (p. 
74).
The rich variety of traits allocated to members of the Greek national collective can be 
organized along the following dimensions: warmth (filotimos, hospitable, open- 
hearted, and sensitive); competence (intelligent, lazy); instrumentality (brave-heroic, 
energetic); psychological functioning (impulsive, nagging, egocentric); and life-style 
(disrespectful to laws, fun-loving). It should be noted that the majority of these 
attributes are common with those described by Chryssochoou (2000b and 2000c) in 
her studies of the national and European stereotypes of Greek participants. Moreover, 
the representations of the Greek national category appeared to include an ambivalent 
or an evaluative mixed stereotypic content. The labels used to characterise the Greek 
national group connote positive and negative evaluations of the ingroup (for a 
discussion on positive and negative self-stereotyping process and coping strategies.
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see Breakwell, 1986; Crocker and Major, 1989; Mlicki and Ellemers, 1996; Biemat, 
Vescio and Green, 1996).
It would be interesting to examine whether participants would appear less self-critical 
towards their ingroup when an evaluative inter-group differentiation context would be 
made salient. Gilbert, Gielser and Morris (1995) suggest that many comparisons are 
made automatically and that self-stereotyping is always relational. Moreover, two of 
the most frequently discussed principles guiding the formation of stereotypes are that 
they create and sustain positively valued differences between social groups (Tajfel, 
1981; Spears, Oakes, Ellemers and Haslam, 1997; Spears, 2002). Nonetheless, in the 
absence of an outgroup referent in relation to the content and valence of these traits 
we can assume that participants focused mainly on the characteristics of the ingroup 
when defining the national character. This is not to say that Greek respondents did 
not show a propensity to social comparisons. As discussed in much more detail later, 
some participants engaged in inter-group comparisons in order to affirm their national 
identity.
Similar to the category of ‘national character’, individuals also constructed the image 
of their state using symbolisms and traitlike characteristics to describe the ethos of the 
state, institutions and people (politicians). The image of the Greek-state was once 
again Janus-faced. On the positive side, the state was appraised for its past strength 
and ability to cope efficiently with the threats posed to its political existence 
(warfare). On the negative side, respondents expressed their dissatisfaction and 
distrust towards the Greek- state when they were referring to the “character” of the 
state-own institutions and of the Greek politicians. For them, the administrative 
insufficiency and weakness of their social system reflects hoth the lack of 
organisation at the operational level and the corrupted intentions of the governmental- 
political authorities. The Greek public’s lack of trust in authorities is also 
demonstrated in the European Social Survey (2003) report. In a scale from 0 (no trust 
at all) to 10 (absolute trust), Greeks amongst other Europeans expressed low levels of 
trust in their politicians (mean score: 3.4) while the Greek governing bodies were 
considered less trustworthy and efficient (mean score: 4.8) compared to other 
European ones (mean score: 5.7).
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Taken as a whole, the present findings, the large-scale opinion polls (e.g. European 
Social Survey, 2003), and research on representations of democracy and political trust 
in “traditionally” democratic and post-communistic states (Markova, Moodie and 
Plichtova, 1998) seem to suggest that people tend to show low levels of confidence, 
respect and trust in authority and state-governed institutions. In his discussion about 
the socio-political factors influencing the rise of public’s distrust in the American 
politics, Nye (1997) argues that although a degree of scepticism is not only an 
important but a requisite element of democracy, high levels of distrust may be a cause 
of concern for the future strength of democratic institutions. If people believe that 
their government is incompetent and that politicians cannot be trusted, they are less 
likely to comply with laws and will be less motivated to strive for a better society 
(political passivity). Taking this argument one step further it may be suggested then 
that the invocation of a stereotype that describes Greek inhabitants’ attitudes as 
disrespectful towards their state and laws is closely related to the ideological 
representations and judgements held by those who live in the national context about 
the performance and competence of their socio-political systems (see also Staerklé, 
Clémence and Doise, 1998). In other words, being disrespectful to laws may be 
associated with a shared representation that the political and social institutions are 
ineffective and corrupt.
Stereotype consensus
In line with several researchers (Devine, 1989; Esses, Haddock and Zanna, 1993; 
Krueger, 1996; Verkuyten et al., 1999), the distinction between the individual and 
cultural ingroup stereotypes was also at the heart of the research design employed in 
the present research. In this research the aim was to explore whether there were 
variations in the content of national stereotypes when participants provided 
information about the characteristics of the group, hased upon their own personal 
judgments or the beliefs they held about the predominant cultural views of the group.
As already mentioned, the stereotyped perceptions of the Greek national character 
were one of the most frequently mentioned categories comprised of both positive and 
negative components, with the former heing markedly more than the second.
Initially, the content and evaluative orientations of the idiosyncratic and psychological
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attributes were compared, elicited by the methodologically induced distinction 
between individual and cultural ingroup stereotypes. The data showed no great 
variations, thus providing more support for the consensual nature of stereotypes 
(Haslam et al., 1998,1999; Hopkins and Cable, 2001). Overall, participants enlisted 
the same traits irrespective of whether they were asked to define their national group 
based on their personal beliefs or the prototypical view. It should be noted that the 
same pattern of results was evinced for other emerged categories (e.g. qualities of the 
state, ideals and beliefs defined by nationality); thus, the following discussion does 
not solely refer to the stereotypes invoked for defining the image of the national 
character.
Prior to providing possible explanations of this phenomenon, a possible limitation in 
the present research should be acknowledged. Compared to the first two questions, 
the question measuring respondents’ perceptions of the predominant definition of 
Greekness was much poorer in content since the response rate was relatively lower. 
However, this does not necessarily confine our ability to draw some conclusions. 
Looking in more depth participants’ answers in these questions, the consensus 
between the two types of stereotypes was demonstrated by the fact that respondents 
provided the same list of traits, values, beliefs and opinions concerning their 
nationality and their country. Moreover, the emergence of sentences in the third 
question such as, “They would say the same things, as I did”, or “They would agree 
with what I have already mentioned”, denoted the normative aspect of the provided 
definitions, and respondents’ expectation that a high degree of agreement exists or 
should exist among the ingroup members when defining Greek national identity. 
Krueger’s (1996) explanation for the emergence of a strong overlap in the content 
between these two types of stereotypes (individual and cultural) in his study was that 
participants overestimated the degree that their personal views were shared by the 
other ingroup members. Even if there is an element of ‘false perception effect’ 
(Alicke and Largo, 1995) present in respondents’ answers pertaining to the extent 
their personal group-definitions are widely shared, two questions still seem relevant. 
What are the underpinning processes that lead to consensualisation? What motivates 
individuals to perceive their ingroup stereotypes as highly consensual?
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With respect to the first question, the antecedent processes of consensus formation 
and the contextual variation in ingroup’s perceived stereotypicality were not 
empirically addressed in this study. Stereotype consensus occurred in an intra-group 
context without reference to any specific outgroups and was measured in a different 
way. It emerged after comparing the commonalities in content between Greek 
respondents’ personal definitions about the national stereotype of the ingroup 
(individual stereotype), with the definitions they provided as being widely shared 
among the majority of the Greek people (cultural stereotype). However, it should be 
noted that the way consensus is defined in research has important consequences for 
the interpretation of the data. More specifically, if  one moves away from the 
comparison between individual and cultural stereotypes and takes the percentages of 
specific traits, beliefs and opinions as measures of variability (stereotypicality 
measure) in defining the concept of Greekness, then claims of ingroup homogeneity 
may no longer be tenable. Some traits such as filotimos or intelligent were perceived 
as more stereotypical group-attrihutes than others since a greater percentage of 
participants felt that they were more appropriate in advancing the definition of the 
national collective. In addition, the fact that some categories such as “ideals defined 
by nationality” or “qualities of the state” were mentioned only hy some rather than 
others is a reminder that the construction and definition of the content of a social 
category is subject to contestation (Hopkins and Reicher, 1996), and that individual 
variations are always present within a group’s ‘shared’ perspective (Augoustinos, 
2001).
Addressing the second question on what motivates individuals to perceive their 
ingroup stereotypes as highly consensual, it can be suggested that there is a strategic 
element in presenting one’s own definitions of the national group and those held by 
the majority of ingroup as somewhat consensual. First of all, it projects the image of 
a cohesive/unified group, a psychologically important motive when it comes to large 
scale social categories such as nationality (Lyons, 1996). In addition, an extensive 
overlap between individual and cultural stereotypes does not only suggest that the 
individual complies with, and has internalised to a great extent the shared group 
representations. It also represents this individual’s high levels of perceived 
prototypicality (individual as the spokesperson of the group), and intra-group
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similarity with the other ingroup members (Turner, et. al, 1987; Verkuyten and 
Nekuee, 1999).
Despite the group-defined attributes, the content of Greek national identity was 
defined in other ways. It was also defined based on common ancestry, culture 
(history, civilisation, tradition) and language, all alluding to its past orientation. 
Reference to the past dimension of national identity may seem as serving two main 
functions: informing its content; and shaping its value. To begin with, incorporating 
a temporal perspective in the national narrative (Kelman, 2001) is often motivated by 
the desire to present the group as coherent and continuous over time (Goffman, 1976; 
Breakwell, 1986). The story of a nation is usually based on notions of historical and 
cultural legacy (Reicher and Hopkins, 2001), and on the conviction that its people are 
ethnically related (Condor, 1983, cited in Triandafyllidou, 1998, p. 597). The data 
elicited in the present study revealed that Greek respondents conceived themselves in 
ethnic terms as members of a historically valued and distinct community of culture 
that travels in time: anchored in its past, positioned in the present, and imagined in the 
future. Likewise, a reference to one’s own ethno-cultural origins serves an important 
function in relation to the other groups. It provides a clear self-evident distinction 
between the ingroup and those who in civic terms belong to the same polity 
(minority), or to a different political unit (other national/ethnic groups). In this sense, 
emphasis placed on origin and cultural lineage stresses the unique, tangible and 
irreplaceable nature of the ethnic group, frequently used hy group members to police 
the ingroup boundaries and to differentiate in a positive way from their ‘significant’ 
others (Triandafyllidou, 1998; Horowitz, 2000). Therefore, so far it can be suggested 
that Greek national identification provides its members with a strong sense of 
continuity across time and a sense of distinctiveness, ensuring a unique place for the 
nation and for its people among other cultural systems within and outside the Greek 
social context.
The value dimension of the Greek national identity element was established after 
participants engaged in hoth intra-group (temporal) and inter-group comparisons. 
Brown and Haeger (1999) conducted a survey in which they assessed the prevalence 
of spontaneous social comparisons (temporal intra-group comparisons, inter-group 
comparisons) in ingroup descriptions and the factors influencing these choices. Their
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findings revealed that perceived threat on national identity affected these comparison 
choices differently. With respect to the first type (temporal comparisons), the present 
findings initially demonstrated that Greek nationals tend to compare and contrast their 
present with their past national identity. To date research on the antecedents and 
consequences of temporal comparisons is rather limited as participants are not 
frequently given this option in the research designs (Brown, 2000). In their recent 
study investigating comparison choices among ethnic minorities and majorities, 
Zagefka and Brown (2005) observed that, overall participants preferred engaging in 
intrapersonal-temporal rather than to cross-group comparisons (see also Brown and 
Haeger, 1999; Condor, 2006). Breakwell (1986) also refers to temporal comparisons 
as a coping mechanism that individuals would adopt to appraise their identity when 
threat demands a change in the existing identity structure. The choice of comparison 
then (past with present and/or present with future) would depend on the positive 
outcomes and on its potency to eradicate any negative effects it may have upon self­
esteem and efficacy levels (value dimension of the identity). For example, when the 
present identity is better than the past, or when the present identity needs to be 
modified.
In relation to its past, modem Greek identity carried a negative value. It was deemed 
culturally valueless compared to its predecessor, characterised mainly as a source of 
threat and worry rather than pride. On the contrary, the past identity entailed by the 
Ancient Greek civilisation, its ideals and unique cultural elements (e.g. language) has 
become an object of worship and it was vastly idealised. The outcome of this 
temporal comparison raises the following question: why do individuals, as group 
members o f the national collective, instead o f affirming their identity at all times, 
purposively abrogate the importance o f its current value and content? In order to 
understand the functional importance of such a negatively oriented comparison, and 
the underlying motives guiding this process, one needs also to consider how Greek 
participants envisaged their national identity at some future point. Although the 
potential (future) identity is not yet in existence, it is a desirable end state for identity 
that sets clear tasks to the individual or the group of what needs to be done for getting 
closer to the idealised past and/or for improving the current identity in the foreseeable 
future. Markus and Nurius (1986), in their theory of possible selves suggested that 
past oriented thinking can affect the future possible selves if  the individual perceives a
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possibility of their re-emergence in the future. In a similar way, Cinnirella (1998), 
discussing the same idea in relation to possible social identities, proposed that the 
conceptions we hold as ingroup members of what our group used to be in the past, or 
what it could have been may impact on how we construct social identity in the present 
and future. In the category labelled as “commitment to the nation”, respect to the 
ingroup’s past and to its potential to act as a guide to any future aspiration it may hold, 
or should hold for improving the status of Greek national identity was further 
discussed. It was expressed by some participants as willingness and felt obligation as 
bearers of the Ancient Greek civilisation to maintain continuity and improve the 
current and future status of national identity. Few participants acknowledged that too 
much emphasis on the past may result in the development of an outdated identity. 
According to their views, the reconstruction of the past should take place in such a 
way that would not only enhance historical continuity, but incorporate features that 
reflect the change and serve the needs of the modem Greek society. At this point, it is 
also important to note that this identity improvement project does not only show some 
potential to individual and collective action, and perceptions of common fate 
(Campbell, 1958), but also a collective belief in the group’s potency to execute this 
task (Guzzo, Yost, Campbell, Shea, 1993; Pmssia and Kinicki, 1996). Individuals 
high in national efficacy would engage in more proactive behaviours identifying more 
with the national group and with its current and future goals (Bandura, 1997, 2000). 
There is no doubt that believing in the power of the group to achieve and improve its 
position in the future is a great source of well-being.
With respect to ‘inter-group comparisons’, although it was not mentioned hy a large 
number of participants, some chose this relational strategy to value and affirm their 
national identity. Culture was chosen as the dimension of comparison and in most 
times the Europeans, perceived as a homogeneous entity, was the target comparator. 
The process of differentiation does not conflate with discrimination (Reicher and 
Hopkins, 2001). However, in their attempt to positively differentiate themselves, 
some participants rated their culture as ‘ostensibly superior’ to that of the other 
Europeans expressing strong ingroup favouritism and in some cases even outgroup 
derogation (Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Gagnon and Bourhis, 1996; Guimond, and 
Dambrum, 2002). The choice of outgroup is particularly interesting if one considers 
that according to the EU polls the majority of Greek nationals are supportive of the
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EU integration (Eurobarometer, 1992, 2006). Why do Greeks then choose this 
particular group and their ancient civilisation as a dimension of comparison? The 
findings from previous studies on constructions of Greekness in relation to the EU 
identity (Chryssochoou, 1996, 2000b) and data from the last Eurobarometer poll 
(2006) leads to the understanding that Greeks perceive that their economic standing 
position is relatively lower compared to other European members. To avoid, then, a 
low-status group threat which may result in depressed national self-esteem, they 
introduce a comparison dimension that it is a major source of pride and international 
admiration, their cultural heritage (see Chryssochoou, 1996 and Luhtanen and 
Crocker, 1991 for a discussion on inter-group comparisons and collective self­
esteem).
The Greek nation and its identity was not only located in time but also in place. Greek 
participants defined their national category in relation to the geographical place and 
ancient monuments. In their accounts, the Greek landscapes were the hallmark of 
national beauty and the ancient monuments were symbolic of the nation’s glorious 
past. As already mentioned in the results section of this category, the present finding 
is in line with research emphasising the importance of studying the spatial or place 
orientated dimensions of national identity and of their indispensable quality to 
embody and reaffirm the history of the nation and its unique character (Penrose, 1993; 
Billig, 1995; Devine-Wright and Lyons, 1997; Wallwork and Dixon, 2004).
To conclude, the majority of the emerging themes in the present study were also 
mentioned by Condor (2003) in her analysis of how English students define their 
nation and identity. Similar to the present findings. Condor (2003) reports that the 
nation was defined in territorial terms (description of physical locations), as a group 
of people sharing trait-like characteristics (national character), as a political- 
administrative institution (state) and as an historical entity that continues to exist in 
the world of nations. The commonalities between the present findings and Condor’s 
corroborate both Smith’s (1991) and Billig’s (1995) argument about the universality 
of nationalistic dogmas and of the ideological parameters employed during the 
processes of nation formation that banally reproduced would positively reaffirm 
national identity. Individuals may reproduce these accounts in their own 
constructions of national identity. The position taken in this thesis is that it is
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important to examine the psychological functions served by the acceptance or 
rejection and contestation of these hegemonic collective representations. The present 
findings suggest what IPT (Breakwell, 2001) postulates, that the use of social 
comparisons (temporal/inter-group), and the degree of individual’s acceptance of a 
particular social representation (e.g. traits, belief-systems, nation as a historical entity) 
depend on its potential impact on the identity processes (motivations) shaping and 
maintaining the content (distinctiveness, continuity) and value (collective self-esteem 
and efficacy) dimensions of national identity.
However, the present results add one more dimension that needs to be included in the 
study of national identity; its intersections with the other identities. According to 
Chryssochoou (2000a) the salience of identification is not just pertinent to the given 
context. On the contrary, it might be “influenced by the relative position of the 
identity within the identity structure as well as its association with other 
identifications” (p. 349). In terms of structure, the intersection between identity 
elements was investigated in their type of structural relationships and also with the 
strong and positive interrelationships existing between nationality with gender and 
religious identity elements. Starting with the interrelationship between nationality 
and gender, although it is revealed to be strong on the basis of strength of 
identification and centrality measures, there was no extensive overlap in terms of 
content. It appeared only in ten females’ personal accounts of nationhood. 
Unfortunately, based on their answers there is little indication as to whether the 
gendered cultural traditions, the processes and practices that may naturalise the role of 
women in the Greek society were experienced by them as highly oppressive.
With regard to the relationship between Greekness and Orthodoxy the findings from 
the content analysis showed that there is a rather strong overlap between the two, 
appearing as an individual and a collective representation. The majority of 
participants mentioned that nationality and Orthodoxy are intertwined in Greece, 
providing, in some instances, a more detailed description of the relevant dimensions 
that these two share meanings. According to their answers there is a temporal 
dimension in this relationship that makes it an integral part of the Greek nation’s past 
and of national identity. Using the historical knowledge diffused in schools, 
participants referred to the historical legacy of this relationship and to a specific point
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in time that this relationship was established and flourished (Byzantine Empire).
They also mentioned that religion has become a cultural dimension of national 
identity, and that it is symbolically (re)produced in religious festivities and traditions 
(e.g. Easter time). Participants also acknowledged one more function in Christian 
Orthodoxy: its role in shaping the Greek family values (see Pollis, 1993; Georgas et 
al., 1997).
An additional finding concerning the relationship between nationality and religion is 
worthy of further discussion. The nationalistic motto “Greece of the Orthodox 
Greeks” was used by some participants to present the prototypical view of the ingroup 
about the important role that Orthodoxy has in defining Greek national identity. The 
use of this phrase shows that in their opinion, the majority of Greeks seem to believe 
that there is an overlap in terms of group membership and that there is still a strong 
notion of religious homogeneity within the Greek society (i.e. the majority of Greeks 
are supposedly Christian Orthodox as well). However, some could view the use of 
this phrase as conveying another message. It may mean that all Greeks should be 
Christian Orthodox and/or only those citizens who are Christian Orthodox have the 
right to be called Greeks. This shows how nationality can be essentialised along 
religious faultlines and can take on an exclusionary character towards the ethno­
religious minorities living in that context. In addition, the fact that this subtheme was 
mentioned by participants as the prototypical view raises questions as to whether 
these individuals also shared this idea, and did not refer to it in their own self­
definitions due to social desirability issues. On the other hand, the fact that it 
occurred only as part of the collectively shared definition of national category may 
reflect participants’ rejection or questioning of the validity of this view.
All in all, it may he suggested that the emergence of a category describing nationality 
intertwined with a particular religious dogma, although it was not as strong as other 
categories in the data, still shows to some extent that nationality is not only 
‘engendered’, but is religiously ‘particularised’ in the Greek context; an ideological 
notion mainly (re)produced through wider social processes and practices under the 
control of religious and political institutions and echoed, albeit in different degrees, in 
participants’ answers. Despite all the rhetoric of essentialism that may reify the 
content of Greekness and present its relationship with Orthodoxy as two identities
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impossible to set apart, the findings show that group identifications and their 
intersections with other identities are not fixed. They are also issues of contestation 
reflecting an individual’s positioning in relation to the prototypical views of his/her 
national membership (Hopkins, Kahani-Hopkins and Reicher, 2006). A more in 
depth review of the current findings was considered in the interview study, where 
participants had an opportunity to elaborate more on meanings attached to Greekness 
and on the functions that the nationality-religion relationship is perceived to serve on 
an individual and a collective level.
6.5 Greek nationals’ lay theories of the nationality-religion relationship 
(Study 1-Part 2)
6.5.1 Aims of the study
The aim of the present small-scale qualitative study was to complement the findings 
firom the content analysis on the emerged “nationality-religion relationship” category, 
and to provide an in-depth analysis of this particular theme. The previous analysis 
indicated that on both the cultural and individual level, Christian Orthodoxy was 
perceived as a defining element of Greekness. Participants mainly referred to the 
historical and cultural precedence of the relationship in the Greek context.
The main aim of the current study was to investigate participants’ narratives 
pertaining to: 1) the ways that nationality and religious identity elements are 
conceived to be related in their identity structure; 2) the degree of this perceived 
overlap (if any); 3) the importance they ascribe to this relationship with reference to 
the specific functions it may serve for the individual and the society (psychological 
and/or societal); and finally 4) their perceptions about the present state of the 
relationship and the underlying factors causing variations (if any) in its strength. As 
will become more evident in the method section (interview schedule), to avoid 
priming respondents’ answers on the relationship between nationality and religion, the 
interviews were introduced to the participants as part of a study exploring the 
meanings associated with Greekness. Respondents were encouraged to lead the 
discussion in response to general prompts whereas the interviewer shaped the
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conversation by picking up on topics relating to the role of religion and to its 
relationship with nationhood as they arose in the course of the discussion.
Focusing on ordinary social actors’ discursive accounts of the importance and 
strength of the Greekness-Orthodoxy relationship was expected to contribute in a 
better understanding of how Greek nationals position themselves in relation to the 
normative ideological representation of Helleno-Christianity and to the perceived 
strategic functions the latter may serve for the members of this national collectivity. 
More specifically, it would help us clarify the extent to which Greek respondents have 
internalised the nationality-religion relationship collective representation in their own 
accounts of nationhood and how it has been grounded in the forms of their everyday 
lives.
6.5.2 Method
6.5.2.1 Participants
Due to the fact that the analytic method used (Interpretative Phenomenological 
Analysis) requires a homogeneous sample, all participants belonged to the same age 
group. The data for this study were collected from seven semi-structured interviews 
with four women and three men aged 50-66 years old. Participants were Greek 
nationals, residents of Thessalonica, a city located in the Northern region of Greece. 
Participants had varying levels of education. The demographic characteristics of the 
sample are presented in the Table below.
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Table 6.11: Demographic characteristics of the sample (Sudy 1 -  Part 2)
Sex Age Occupation
Female 50 Pensioner (previously a Teacher)
Female 50 Merchant /shopkeeper?
Female 57 Merchant
Female 59 Midwife
Male 50 Economist
Male 66 Decorator-Fumisher
Male 66 Pensioner (previously a Policeman)
Although it was acknowledged that this sampling strategy could potentially result in a 
limited range of views, it was thought that this age group could talk about this issue 
in-depth. Furthermore, the previous study demonstrated that there was no difference 
in the strength of the relationship between national and religious identifications for the 
younger and older groups.
6.S.2.2 Interview Schedule
The interview schedule was not intended to be prescriptive but to act as a guide 
without dictating its exact course. During the interview, questions were adapted to 
the specific context, and interesting issues which arose were prohed. The aim was to 
facilitate participant discussion of their own views on the overlap between their 
national and religious identity elements, and to evaluate the current role and strengtÿ^ 
of this relationship as experienced through life in the Greek context.
The interview started by asking participants to define Greekness and to elaborate on 
what membership of this national category signified for them. If religion was 
mentioned as a defining aspect of Greekness, participants were asked to elaborate 
more on the role of religion and on the importance of this relationship. Participants 
were also asked to discuss the customs and morals they considered as being 
representative of Greekness. The findings from the content analysis indicated that 
religion (Christian Orthodoxy) was associated with Greekness through religious
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festivities and familial values. Therefore, the researcher decided to include this 
question (if not already mentioned by the participants) in order to elicit more 
information on the religion-nationality relationship. This question was also used as a 
probe for participants who did not mention religion in their accounts of Greekness. 
Finally, the last question of the interview aimed to explore how Greek nationals 
perceived the present state of the relationship between these two identity elements in 
the Greek context, more specifically, whether they believed that this relationship has 
changed in the last few years and what factors are at play in influencing its strength 
and bringing about any form of change. The question about change was considered 
important not only for studying participants’ perceptions about the stability of this 
relationship but also for examining whether the gradual transition of Greek society to 
a multicultural one and the presence of these groups would be held responsible for the 
change.
6.5.2 3 Procedure
The interviews were conducted in participants’ workplaces or homes. Since the aim 
of the study was to further explore the existence and type of the relationship between 
nationality and religion, participants were not informed about the exact purpose of the 
study. Instead they were told that the study aimed to elicit information on meanings 
associated with Greekness. With permission obtained, the conversation was tape- 
recorded and subsequently transcribed verbatim. The researcher assured participants 
that their participation in the study would be kept anonymous and confidential. Each 
interview lasted about an hour.
6.5.2.4 Analytic strategy
Data from the semi-structured interviews were analysed following the principles of 
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) (Smith, Osborn and Jarman, 1999). 
The aim of IP A is to explore in detail the participant’s view of the topic under 
investigation. IPA “is concerned with an individual’s personal perception or account 
of an object or event as opposed to an attempt to produce an objective statement of the 
object or event itself’ (Smith et al., 1999, p. 218). What differentiates IPA from other 
phenomenological approaches is that it also aims to capture “in detail the content and
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structure of the subject’s consciousness, to grasp the qualitative diversity of their 
experiences and to explicate their essential meanings” (Kvale, 1996, p. 53). IPA also 
acknowledges the inability of researchers to gain direct access to a participant’s 
world, as their own conceptions are also involved to make sense of the data through a 
process of interpretative activity. Therefore, the phenomenological analysis is a 
product of the researcher’s interpretations and participant’s personal accounts of the 
phenomenon under investigation. In relation to epistemological strands, IPA can be 
classified as adopting a contextual constructionist viewpoint allowing diversified 
insights and instantiations of the examined phenomenon based on the premise that 
“knowledge is necessarily contextual and stand-point dependent” (Willig, 2002, p. 
145). The role of language is also accepted as a powerful tool in understanding 
participants’ ways of thinking, beliefs and actions without disregarding at the same 
time the existence of underlying cognitive and emotional structures and processes 
behind the language (Smith, 1996). In this sense, IPA is conceptually aligned with 
social representation theory and can be employed with ease to study individuals’ 
understandings of socially shared phenomena as “representations are expressed 
through language and at the same time language is itself an object of social 
representation” (Wagner et al., 1999, p. 116).
IPA provides a systematic and clear presentation of the analytic stages that need to be 
followed by the researchers. This analytic process was adopted hy the researcher and 
it is presented below.
Interview transcripts were read many times which helped the researcher to gain a 
general sense of the important issues mentioned by participants. At this stage some 
notes on potential themes were written down. The researcher reread each transcript 
and new themes emerged which were coded using a word or a phrase that captured 
the meaning of these emerging themes. An attempt to group the sub-themes of each 
transcript in higher order themes followed. At this stage, as a check on the analysis, 
an independent researcher was asked to read three out of seven transcripts and to 
examine whether the analysis presented so far was supported by the data. The two 
researchers discussed their readings and agreed on these themes prior to the 
identification of shared themes across the interviews.
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The next stage in the analysis involved the detection of general categories that could 
conceptually subsume the common and disparate themes within and across the 
interviews. For this purpose, the researcher engaged in a form of relational analytic 
thinking that required a close inspection of patterns, connections and tensions among 
these recurrent themes. Finally, groups of related recurrent themes were organised 
under master themes, which along with their sub-themes summarised participants’ 
ascribed meanings and accounts of the topic under discussion (nationality-religion 
relationship) and they were demonstrably grounded in the data (extracts).
6.6 Reflections of the researcher on the interviewing process: Representing 
the “Other”
There are a number of issues that a researcher should address before engaging in the 
interpretation of the collected data. First of all, this pertains to the issues of bias and 
subjectivity so frequently addressed by those who are reluctant to accept the 
contribution of qualitative research in the study of social phenomena. As discussed 
earlier, IPA takes on board the fact that the researcher’s prior knowledge on the topic 
and personal experiences may have an impact on the interpretation of results. In this 
case, since the researcher is a member of the national collective herself, and living in 
the same societal context where this relationship between Greekness and Orthodoxy 
flourishes or at least is presented as doing so, there was a positive influence on the 
interviewing process. Therefore, the researcher had a better understanding and 
prerequisite knowledge of the different accounts of the relationship. In addition, 
participants tend to disclose more information to an interviewer they think is similar 
to them (Breakwell, 1995). However, being from the same culture may bring to light 
the reality of diverse meanings about the origins and the functional importance of the 
relationship between the two identity elements (nationality-religion) endorsed by the 
interviewees and the researcher. This is a reminder of the danger of assuming 
homogeneity of the people on the basis of all being members of the same national 
group.
The interview process itself is a form of interaction performed on an unequal basis as 
the interviewer is not ‘allowed’ to disclose his or her beliefs on the discussed topic. 
Some participants were quite inexperienced with this form of research, and expressed
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their discomfort in the early stages of research. In later stages of the interview, they 
mentioned that it was a good experience and less intimidating than they had originally 
assumed.
Taking all the above mentioned issues into consideration, the analysis that follows 
reflects the researcher’s efforts to represent and interpret people’s accounts of the 
nationality-religion relationship so it resembles their own experiences of and beliefs 
about its functions and importance. However, as with any other interactive, 
interpretative process, giving voice to the “other” cannot escape from being also a 
rather subjective account.
6.7 Results
Participants’ answers on definitions of Greekness elicited many themes (master and 
sub-themes). However, the present chapter is concerned with only one part of the 
analysis. It is mainly based on the answers given in the areas described previously 
examining participants’ accounts of the perceived overlap between nationality and 
religion. Three master themes emerged: 1) Accounting for the inter-relationship of 
nationality and religion: divergent patterns; 2) Functions served by religion in relation 
to the individual and the society: the role of religion as a private affair and as a social 
value; and 3) A changing relationship? Factors influencing the strength of the 
relationship between the two.
Within each master theme recurrent sub-themes were identified which will be 
discussed in detail below. It should be noted that although the master themes are 
presented as disparate themes, they were interrelated. Extracts (translated into 
English) are also provided to support the discussed themes. Participants’ names in 
these extracts have been changed to preserve their anonymity and to guarantee 
confidentiality. The (...) indicates that material has been omitted.
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T a b le  6.12: E m erg ed  m a ster  an d  su b -th em es
Master Themes Sub-Themes
Accounting for the inter-relationship between 
nationality and religion: Divergent patterns
1. Convergent
2. Weak relationship? When time 
and behavioural patterns matter
Functions served by religion in relation to the 
individual and the society The role of religion 
as a private affair and as a social value
1. We become better people: Religion as 
a basis of morality and social values
2. A cultural aspect o f Greekness
3. Safeguarding the nation and its 
identity: Religion as a source of 
national continuity
4. Different and better: Religion as a 
source o f national distinctiveness
5. Religious differences as a barrier to 
minority’s assimilation
A changing relationship: Factors influencing 
the strength of the relationship between the 
two
1. Corruption in religious circles & Loss 
of Contact
2. Philosophising life: No place for 
religion
3. Hectic Lifestyle
4. Religious Pluralism and Fragmentation 
asathreat
6.7.1 Accounting fo r  the inter-relationship between nationality-religion: 
Divergent patterns o f  the relationship
This hroad theme addressed participants’ subjective representations of how Greekness 
and Orthodoxy are interrelated within their identity structure. The majority of 
participants referred to religion as a defining aspect of Greekness, however not all of 
them perceived this relationship to be strong since they provided different 
explanations about how or when it emerged.
Convergent
For some participants the two identity elements are “interwoven” and converge to 
create a consolidated ingroup, that of the Greek-Christian Orthodox. This is
233
particularly evident in the first two extracts where the national group is defined in 
highly exclusive terms (i.e. being Greek means being Christian Orthodox) with the 
Christian Orthodox dogma internalised to such an extent that it ends up being a 
unique element of Greek national identity.
For Chris, Greekness and Christian Orthodoxy are embedded in each other and both 
are of equal importance. He ascribes the same emotional value to religious 
membership as to national, and describes this affective experience as something 
unique in the Greek community - probably only shared by nationalities that practise 
the same religion.
Chris, 66 years old: Greekness is equal to religion. For me Christianity is o f the same 
standing as Greekness! To be Greek is to be a Christian Orthodox. These two 
concepts are intertwined! Maybe also in... in Russia and the Russian Christians 
with... with... with... could be the same with Russia but I  can’t feel that, I  feel our 
own...
In a similar vein, Helen provides a definition of Greekness based on the Greek- 
Orthodox ideals encapsulated in the homeland, religion and the Greek family. Her 
definition also implies a wide overlap between nationality and religion justified in the 
notion that Greeks are the heirs of the Christian Orthodox dogma.
Helen, 57 years old: Homeland, religion, family... I  believe in religion^, I  believe! I  
believe that religion... the Greeks introduced religion, that's what I  think... yes! To be 
Greek is equal to religion! Religion is equal to a Greek! That’s how I  feel it is!
What is particularly interesting in the ahove extracts is that both participants 
“equated” Greekness with Christian Orthodoxy. As Roccas and Brewer (2002) 
suggest, sometimes the semantics make it difficult to understand whether participants 
have used this word to refer to the intersection between the two ingroups forming a 
new identity element (Greek-Orthodox element of identity), or if the two
 ^Bold font denotes that the participants have put emphasis on these words or phrases whilst talking.
memberships and their associated meanings overlap to such an extent that they can be 
used interchangeably. Clearly the boundaries of Greekness and Orthodoxy are quite 
blurry in their answers but it can be asserted that participants have used this 
mathematical expression to emphasise the extensive overlap between the two identity 
elements in terms of group membership and their close alignment in their individual 
self-structures based on their relative affective importance.
Similar to Helen, the meaning of Greekness is also defined along the lines of 
Orthodoxy and Greek family in Olga’s definition.
Olga, 59 years old: What does it mean to be a Greek... the most beautiful thing in the 
world! I  wouldn ’t change Greece for anything, Orthodoxyy family, the Greekfamily.
Mary defines Greekness on the basis of religion and civilisation. The fact that she 
refers to Christian Orthodoxy as “our religion” suggests that she also perceives that 
the Christian Orthodox dogma is inextricably and uniquely linked to the content of 
Greek national identity. She believes that Greek people are ‘privileged’ by being 
Christian Orthodox. At the same time, she acknowledges the importance of all 
religions to bind people together in the conviction that they share a common fate and 
a common cause of good. In her answer, she offers an explanation for her beliefs and 
suggests that it is her upbringing that has influenced her way of thinking.
Mary, 50 years old: It is our culture, it is our religion... I  believe we have been 
fortunate! Because it could have been the case that we were not Christians but rather 
something else! Not that I  don’t believe that every religion has its positive aspects, I  
do believe that, that every religion, whatever each person believes in is fo r  good, not 
fo r evil... I  do believe that but... er... I  believe that quite strongly even that a foreign 
person who believes in something else, I  appreciate what he believes in. Because I  
believe that surely good is inside him! There is no religion that would preach evil! 
However er... there is something in me... I  don’t know, that’s how I ’ve been raised... 
that I  believe that our religion [Christian Orthodoxy] has many good things and I  
think i t ’s intertwined with Greekness!
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Weak relationship? When time and religious involvement matters
For Kate, religion (Christian Orthodoxy) and Greekness are two different meanings as 
the former has not always been a salient element of Greek national identity and 
civilisation. After introducing a temporal dimension in her account of the relationship 
between nationality and religion, she refers to the cultural affinity with Ancient Greek 
civilisation and to its strong influence on the early foundations of the content of 
Greekness, when Christianity was not yet considered its constituent element.
Kate, 50 years old: [...] Religion and Greekness are two different things. A Greek 
comes from Greece, a Greek... that is, from this region where certain people lived 
great lives, gave us their ideas, gave us their philosophy and... in the old days 
Greekness wasn ’t, these two were not connected... it wasn ’t linked with Christianity. 
Before Christ there was no religion, isn’t that right?
Interestingly, when asked about the role of Orthodoxy in the Greek context at present 
times, drawing on parallelisms with other nationalities where religion (Catholicism) 
and nationality (Italian, Spanish) are also perceived as overlapping, she emphasises 
that for Greek people this relationship is also very important.
[...] Very important! For a Greek, what Catholicism is fo r  the Italians.,, and fo r  the 
Spanish.
Nick takes on a different ideological position regarding the strength of the relationship 
between religion and nationality. His use of “they” (possibly referring to Greeks in 
general or to political elites and clergy) instead of “us” denotes his distancing from 
the ingroup and a certain level of awareness that his idiosyncratic approach to the 
strength of the relationship deviates fi*om the one endorsed by the majority of Greek 
nationals. He disagrees with the popular ideology that portrays Greekness and 
Orthodoxy as two faces of the same coin. For him, this overlap is more of a popular 
discourse than a real overlap, clearly manifested in patterns of religious behaviour. 
More specifically, he argues that strictly based on religiosity levels (church 
attendance) and religious commitment, Greek nationals are not religious people. Their
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low level of religious participation throughout the year denotes a moderately weak 
affective commitment to the religious category. In his opinion, religion has been 
incorporated in the Greek social life in such a way that it has become an integral part 
of tradition, a cultural habit and a unique opportunity to socialise, all explaining this 
common perception of a strong overlap between the national and religious identity 
elements.
Nick, 50 years old: These [people] claim that Greek and... Orthodoxy are the same 
thing! Yes... alright this is something that we do say, I  don’t think this is as... strong a 
view with most people... the... the majority o f the Greek people, I  don’t think that 
Greeks feel that much that they can 7 live without the Church. At Easter the streets 
will be fu ll ofpeople all around. But those who go to church the rest o f the days are a 
very small minority. It is a very small proportion... o f this society. I  reckon this 
doesn’t trouble anyone, that at Easter fo r  example wherever you go to there is no 
room for you. At Christmas i t ’s cold and we don’t go out to go [to church]... most o f  
us. But when the weather is good and we do go out (chuckle) and we go to see our 
friend and also join the procession o f the epitaphios... More like it’s customary... 
w e’ve got used to it. I  don’t think there is any emotional link, you see what I  mean? 
Because i f  there was one, we ’d have 10 times as many people, i f  not more, with the 
number o f churches that we have. The Greeks don’t go to church and whoever says 
they do, I  think they ’re lying! I t ’s enough to go there on Good Friday in the evening, 
the Easter Vigil [on Holy Saturday] and let’s see where all these people are, there 
isn’t enough room in the churches, whatever church we went to, the people are too 
many, not just inside the churchyard, even outside, they ’re too many! All the streets 
are full...
6.7.2 Functions served by religion fo r  the individual and the society (The role o f  
religion as a private affair and as a social value)
The present master theme is conceptually linked to the previous one as participants 
elaborate more on how Christian Orthodoxy has become a constitutive part of their 
national identity and how it affects different aspects of their every day life. More 
specifically, this theme encompassed the different functions that participants argued 
religion serves or has served in the past for the individual, the national group and for
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Greek society. In general, participants referred to religion: 1) as a source of moral 
and social values; 2) as a means of distinctiveness from other nationalities; 3) as a 
cultural aspect of Greekness and 4) as a guardian of the nation and its identity.
Finally, existing religious differences between the Greek majority and the minority 
populations were discussed as a barrier to the successful assimilation of the ethno­
religious groups living in the Greek society.
We become better people: Religion as a basis o f morality and social values
In the following extracts participants discussed the role of religious dogmas as 
providers of moral codes influencing an individual’s intrapersonal relationships (i.e. 
family, friends), as well as the relationship of the individual to the broader structure of 
society. In general, participants seem to believe that by following the moral 
principles set forth in the Bihle or in other religious books, one may become a better 
parent, partner, friend and lawful citizen. In their opinion, the morals and values 
preached in religious dogmas may not only improve an individual’s intimate 
relationships but they may also impact on societal well-being.
Whilst reading the following three extracts, it was obvious that participants’ speaking 
positions varied in the course of discussion. The function of religion and its impact 
on the individual and/or the society was discussed at different levels of abstraction, 
with the link between Orthodoxy and Greekness not being always an integral part of 
their answers. More specifically, the first participant initially discusses the role of 
religion as a provider of a moral framework in general terms without linking it to any 
particular nationality or dogma. However, later on, she makes an explicit reference to 
how Christian Orthodoxy influences the mentality of Greek people. The second 
participant recognised this pivotal role of religion only in the Christian Orthodox 
dogma and discussed how it influences the way a Greek national may think and 
behave. The third participant referred to this role of religion in relation to Christianity 
and to the competence of the moral set of rules dictated by that dogma to guide an 
individual in his or her course of life. However, there was no explicit reference in her 
answer to how this dogma affects the mentality of Greek people and society.
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Kate refers to the universal need of human beings to believe and rely on a 
supernatural power. This ability of religion to address the quest for meaning, to 
influence the value-systems and to morally frame societal behaviours is a precept of 
all religions. In her own words, the need for moral guidance cannot be fulfilled only 
by Christianity, and is not uniquely experienced by Greek people. Therefore, her 
speaking position at this point is not that of a Greek national, or a Christian but of a 
human being.
Kate, 50 years old: Every human needs the... support o f a religion, whatever that 
may be. Not just the Christian one! Humans want something to believe in and 
something to use for... support! It affects the way we express ourselves, it affects... 
our behaviour. It affects... our ethics. Not as a Greek... As a human, le t’s say towards 
your family, your children, your husband, your friends... the society you live in. A 
behaviour, that is what is fundamental about religion... The behaviour o f  a human 
being so that he can lead... a good life in this society.
The link between Greekness and Christian Orthodox dogma is built on the basis that 
the latter provides the lens through which reality is perceived and interpreted by the 
Greek people (religion as meaning and value-systems).
In Greek society ...As Orthodox Greeks... that is on the basis o f the Orthodox values, 
that’s how we behave and give meaning to our lives.
Helen also asserts the unique influence of the Christian Orthodox dogma in morally 
fi*aming the Greek mentality and provides an explanation of how religiosity may 
restrain antisocial behaviour. It is this fear of being judged by God that makes 
religion (‘our’ unquestionably refers to Christian Orthodoxy), in her view, act 
successfully as a moral barrier.
Helen, 57 years old: Because... when... you believe in our religion, you ’re afraid you 
might do something... unlawful, you’re afraid you might harm someone else, er.... In 
general you think o f God and you say to yourself: ‘‘Ah, God will not think this is 
good!” and for that reason... Greeks and Orthodoxy go together hand in hand.
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The first thing we may note in the following extract is the use of a disclaimer that 
denotes the speaker’s attempt to distance herself from all those who are too religious 
and probably more conservative and less open-minded whilst discussing issues of 
religion’s influence in peoples’ lives. Mary explains that religion became an intrinsic 
part of her life in school via religious education, when the teacher asked from students 
to write the ‘Ten Commandments’ as a way of punishment. It is obvious from her 
answer though that this ‘punishment’ was a valuable lesson for her. Focusing 
exclusively on Christianity, she also suggests that adherence to the values preached in 
that dogma can prevent someone from taking the wrong path in life.
Mary, 50 years old: We have to be close to our religion... because it is our 
foundation! Fm not too religious, mind you... These Ten Commandments... When I  
was in primary school our teacher, we had the same teacher in the 5^  ^and 
grade, he would make us, when we were punished for some reason in class, when we 
were chatting... he would do this on purpose, I  think... he’d say we should write down 
the Ten Commandments as a punishment! And so we knew them by heart! I  believe 
that when a person follows this Decalogue, which is the principle o f Christianity... it 
is the basis o f Christianity these Ten Commandments, I  believe that i f  we remember 
this in the course o f our lives, our daily er... we become better people. We ... not that 
we become better people but we avoid doing some improper deeds that we can do.
Religion as a cultural aspect o f Greekness
The present theme emerged after participants were asked to indicate the customs and 
traditions they considered being representative of Greekness. Participants mentioned 
a list of different customs and traditions (e.g. traditional dances, music) with the 
majority of them being religious festivals. The emergence of religious cultural 
activities as part of Greekness demonstrates how the aesthetics of religion have 
penetrated the Greek way of life, and how they become in Greek peoples’ minds a 
unique cultural aspect of their national identity.
Chris, 66 years old: There are so many customs and traditions that we have, and 
Easter and Christmas and... in weddings and everywhere that you can’t possibly list
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them in few  words. Easter is celebrated elsewhere too, but here in Greece we also 
have various local customs... not taken from foreigners.
Mary, 50 years old; Our greatest festivals, Christianity. Christmas, Easter... our 
weddings, where some people follow tradition [and] they use the traditional ways!
Kate, 50 years old: Er... The customs o f Easter, Christmas, the Carnival ofApokries, 
weddings, births, baptisms, death... all these are.customs that we have. Most o f them 
relating to the church, yes... most o f them yes!
Thomas, 66 years old; These religious customs are our festivals, the weddings that 
take place and you celebrate and you dance... the kalamatianos, er... the 
macedonian, the zeybek... all these dances.
Safeguarding Greekness (Religion as a source o f national continuity)
In this extract the role of religion in safeguarding nationality in times when the latter 
needed compensation is discussed. Thomas refers to the strong relationship between 
Greekness and Orthodoxy and provides examples of how the latter contributed in both 
blatant and symbolic ways to maintaining the Greek national identity during the 
Ottoman Empire. His answer echoes the popular belief diffused in Greek society via 
unfounded traditions, the educational system (historical books) and the Church 
institutions in the past role of Orthodoxy as a call for unity and as a guardian of Greek 
national culture (i.e. involvement of religious priests in the nationalist movement, 
preservation of ancient Greek literature in monasteries and use of the Archaic 
language in the liturgies). He also invites his fellow nationals to agree that this past 
role of religion is an important part of the nation’s history, that is should be 
collectively remembered and re-appraised.
Thomas, 66 years old: Orthodoxy is what kept Greece together at... in 1821! Plain 
and simple... take the “Secret School”^  ( “Kryfo Scholeio”), take Thourios by Rigas
 ^Secret School is an unfounded tradition but is one of the most enduring myths of Greek national 
imagination. It concerns the alleged suppression or in some cases the total prohibition of education, by 
the Ottoman ‘oppressors’. According to the Secret School narrative, Greeks had secretly organized
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[Ferreos], take Paleon Patron Germanos. Take then... later... the rest o f them, the 
holy fathers o f the Church, at Mount Athos, where else? Orthodoxy has contributed a 
very great deal! Maybe it didn 7 take up arms... but it fought in spirit! With its soul 
and faith! We should never forget this as Greeks!
Different and better: Religion as a source o f  national distinctiveness
In the present extract, membership of the Christian Orthodox group is used for 
formulating positive ingroup judgements in the context of intergroup comparisons. By 
way of example let us consider how Helen uses religious identification to positively 
affirm the national character of the Greek people in relation to the non-Greeks. In 
contrast to Nick who argues that the level of religious involvement is relatively low in 
Greek society, she believes that Greeks are religious people with the implication also 
being that people of a different nationality and/or religion are morally inferior to 
them. It is obvious in her answer that differentiation on the basis of religious category 
entails a negative and discriminatory attitude towards ‘others’ who lack this culturally 
framed moral advantage.
Helen, 57 years old: ‘T believe that Greeks more... we have better feelings... like that, 
in relation to religion. I  believe that the Greeks are more god-fearing and we 
believe... and they ’re more honest and virtuous ”.
Chris also considers religion (Christian Orthodoxy) a valued dimension of comparison 
that can evoke feelings of national group distinctiveness. In his opinion, being 
Christian Orthodox differentiates Greeks from people of other national and religious 
affiliations. At the same time, commonality on the basis of religion seems to generate 
a sense of solidarity and notions of cultural similarity with other Christian Orthodox 
nations like Russia.
small, underground schools for the education of their children. These schools were said to have 
convened in churches or monasteries, usually at night and were usually run by the ecclesiastical 
priesthood (Danos, 2002).
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Chris, 50 years old: It makes us different from the rest. In our behaviour as humans.
In relation to the Germans, the English, the Russians, not the Russians we are more 
similar to them, the... the Northern people, with the other peoples o f  Earth...
Religious differences as a barrier to minority’s assimilation
In the present extract, Mary uses religious differences to justify the lack of 
assimilation of the Moslem minority into Greek society. She attributes the current 
low socio-economic status of the minority members to the adherence of cultural 
values and religious beliefs that are perceived bilaterally not only different but 
incompatible to that of the host majority culture. The lack of religious congruence in 
her opinion hinders the development of those conditions that would lead to a positive 
inter-group contact with the host majority members. In her view, inter-group relations 
between these two groups are still highly competitive, hostile and merely antagonistic 
in nature. To further support her argument on how religion may influence the 
successful adaptation of immigrant and minority groups living in the Greek context, 
she refers to the Russian immigrants. In her opinion, this group of immigrants is 
relatively better assimilated and probably more accepted in the Greek society 
compared to the Moslem minority group, due to the fact that they share the same 
religion with the host majority members.
Mary, 50 years old: About what we ’re saying now... the minority there [the Muslim 
minority in Thrace] has hot developed as much as it should have, because themselves 
probably didn’t want this because they had their own culture, because they believed 
in something different from what we believe in, they considered, they consider us to 
be completely different. I f  we had the same religion, we would definitely not have 
what we have there today!.,. I  don’t know i f  that’s the reason, but I  believe that 
religion strongly influences what is now happening in Thrace. I f  these people were 
Christians, they’d have a different view o f us! They see us as people o f  a different 
religion, they see us... they don 7 have a very favourable view o f us! Er... this might 
be happening on our side as well. I ’m not saying that they ’re at fault and we aren’t. 
However, the fact that they’re still underdeveloped, this has a lot to do with that! That 
their religion is different! Take for example, the Russian immigrants ...they are better
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assimilated in Greek society and I  believe that is because they share the same religion 
with the Greeks.
6.7.3 A changing relationship: Factors influencing the strength o f  the 
relationship between the two
In this master theme the state of the relationship between religion and nationality and 
the factors attenuating its strength are discussed. Participants enlisted different 
reasons as to why the social importance of Christian Orthodoxy has already lost, or 
runs the risk of jeopardising its central position in Greek society. Some referred to 
religious institutions as being corrupted and of losing their prestige across time.
Others held responsible for the weakening of the relationship between Orthodoxy and 
Greekness, the lifestyle of Greek people, their secular existential queries, and the 
relatively ‘new’ social phenomenon of religious pluralism evinced in the modem 
Greek society.
Corruption in religious circles & Loss o f contact
For Mary and Nick, the relationship between the two seems to have lost its strength 
and prestige in Greek society due to cormption in religious circles. Both participants 
seem to suggest that compared to the past, Greek people have less tmst in the 
religious priesthood and Church institutions since their motives appear to them to he 
more materialistic and cosmopolitan than spiritual in nature.
Mary, 50 years old: [...] It has changed in recent y  ears... and i t ’s largely due to those 
who are occupied with our religion, those who... er... initiate us to it... I  believe these 
things have always been there, but lately some... evil messages have come across in 
connection to religion... Those who serve [our] religion, things have been said in 
some places, this bothers me! Very much! I ’d like those people who serve religion to 
be more righteous, more pure... You could say that such people are everywhere er... 
these evil people and that sometimes evil comes out instead o f good... Er... but I ’d 
like... while religion says that when you ’re doing a good deed, your right hand should 
not know what your left hand is doing, I  believe that the work o f the Church should be 
more visible because some people don’t know it...
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Nick, 50 years old: It [the Church] is the one that distanced itself from the people, i t ’s 
not the people that have left. So, i f  I  had a priest that I  could respect, as I  respected 
father Nicholas at my village, my relationship with the Church would be different. I  
don’t know how often I ’d go... I  think the Church has distanced itself, it has lost touch 
with the people and their respect as well.
Philosophising life: No place for religion
Helen argues that the threat to the nationality-religion relationship emanates from all 
those (non-believers) who aim to downplay, modernise and question the importance 
of religion in peoples’ lives. It is obvious from her answer that she holds a rather 
conservative view on religious value domains, an approach that clearly leaves no 
room for challenging these sacred meaning systems or for creating alternative ones.
Helen, 57 years old: It changed because the factors... the... I  don’t know, various 
people don’t believe and they ’re trying in their own way to show that there is no 
religion, some people might even believe them. I  don’t know what the reasons are but 
that’s how they... show the people that... there is no religion, there is no Christ and I  
don’t know what else... and some people even believe them, that that’s the way it is... 
This relationship has been shaken... The Greeks have become arty-farty, I  don’t 
know...? arty-farty
Hectic lifestyle
From the extract it is evident that the participant believes that the teaching of religious 
values and the socialisation of young children into religion is mainly a parental 
responsibility. The hectic modem lifestyle of parents and mainly of Greek mothers 
explains in her view the present low religious involvement of the Greek youth.
Mary, 50 years old: Parents don’t do much with their children as far as religion is 
concerned. They have so many things to do... they prefer taking their children to the 
playground to... because they don ’t see their children very much and they want to 
take them somewhere to relax, to have fun, to be a bit closer to them. Very rarely you 
will see a mother take her child to church, because she says the child gets up early all
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week and she gets up early because she works. It shouldn 7 wake up early and me 
dragging it around to church. She prefers taking the child to a playground in the 
afternoon, to one place, to another... to another house so that the child will have a 
good time... and so family has moved away from that concept, that o f religion! I  
believe that we should be going to church... we should feel like going and we should 
be going, not just go like that... but we have been forced by our jobs, we have moved 
away from religion.
Religious pluralism and fragmentation as a threat
The present sub-theme denotes how perceived changes in the cultural composition of 
Greek society relating to religious diversity were not viewed by some participants as a 
positive step that may lead to the modernisation of the former but instead as negative 
and potentially threatening for the Greek culture and people. For Chris legitimisation 
of religious pluralism, and more specifically religious tolerance and lack of control 
over the rise of various religious denominational groups in the Greek context, have all 
put at stake the status of Christian Orthodoxy and the strength of its relationship with 
Greekness.
Chris, 66 years old: Ever since they allowed in... religion Jehovah’s Witnesses and so 
many othesr that have come in and they do whatever they want uncontrolled, I  believe 
there has been some negative change! Mostly in religion... We have become very
In a similar vein, Thomas also attributes the newsworthy weakening of the 
nationality-religion relationship evinced in Greek peoples’ belief systems to the 
arrival of foreigners and mainly to the presence of “heretic” religious denominations 
and dogmas. Firstly, the classification of these religions as “heretic” conveys the 
internalisation and agreement with the official stance of the Greek Orthodox Church 
which officially expresses a rather derogatory attitude towards the spiritual and moral 
precepts of these faith groups (Anti-Heresy Campaign, 1983). Secondly, according to 
Thomas, these faith groups exert relatively more influence on younger age groups. 
References to moral lapse as a function of age are articulated on the basis that young 
people tend to question more the traditional beliefs, ideas and values. Therefore, he
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believes that they may be more inclined to alter their religious beliefs and espouse 
these ‘unorthodox’ dogmas. Finally, his opinion about how Greek young people are 
proselytised and eventually “trapped” in these faith groups is relayed through a strong 
metaphor (“//Are a spider and her web in which her victim entangles him self’).
Thomas, 66 years old: Maybe... because o f foreigners too. Maybe because o f  
heresies...all these unorthodox dogmas. I  see on television, there is such-and-such a 
sect... at Dafni, there is such-and-such a sect out... at Nea Makri, all this contributes, 
some people will be attracted... and that is definitely an influence. A young man 
would say “Oh well. I ’ll go have a lookout o f curiosity, see what’s happening... ” and 
he commits himself, just like a spider and her web in which her victim entangles 
himself, just like that, maybe out o f ignorance, maybe out o f curiosity, he finds himself 
in a mess and that’s it... there was a sect by those... by those people from Tibet, some 
monks had come over... their spiritual leader, i f  I ’m not mistaken, used to be Dalai 
Lama in the older days... those with the yellow robes, well, these people have had a 
lot o f influence on the youth in Greece, and I  do follow these issues because they 
interest me very much...
6.8 Discussion
The results from the present study provided a rich account of the strength of the 
relationship between Greek national identity and Christian Orthodoxy and on the 
processes involved in perceiving the latter as an integral part of Greek national 
identity’s content. The analytical process employed (IPA) allowed for the exploration 
of participants ’ idiosyncratic approaches, giving them the opportunity to voice their 
opinions on the factors that bring together or set apart nationality from religion, and 
the examination of the extent to which a collective representation that presents the 
two as culturally inseparable has been internalised in their answers.
As a general rule, it was clear that Christian Orthodoxy constituted a central axis 
around which respondents would discuss their definitions of “Greekness”. The fact 
that the questions used did not directly invite the description of nationality in relation 
to Christian Orthodoxy, and that the overlap between the two was established as a 
response to a general question about the meanings attached to nationhood, further
247
substantiates the central role that this religious grouping still has in defining the 
content of Greekness. Either implicitly or explicitly stated, the findings signalled that 
the majority of participants represented their ingroup as a convergent representation, 
that of the Greek-Christian (i.e. Being Greek means being Christian Orthodox). This 
is not to say that the importance and strength of this relationship was not contested by 
some participants. However, compared to research studying the ways images of 
nationhood are constructed fi*om the perspective of social agents and lay social actors 
in other national groups, (e.g. Hopkins and Reicher, 1996; Condor, 1996, 2003, 2006), 
it can be suggested that in this small group of Greek nationals, the meanings 
associated with Greekness in relation to the Christian Orthodox dogma appeared more 
consensual in nature rather than contentious. Most of the participants seem to have 
internalised in their own constructions of nationhood, to varying degrees, the 
propagated social representation that presents the relationship between the two in the 
Greek context as morally desirable, historically contingent and culturally unique. A 
closer inspection of Greek nationals’ answers pertaining to the perceived importance 
and fimctions of this relationship provided meaningful insights into the psychological 
processes involved and into the reasons often brought to the fore by participants to 
justify the high perceived overlap evinced between these two group memberships 
(nationality and religion) in the Greek context.
The functional importance of this relationship was initially discussed with respect to 
the utility of one religion, that of Christian Orthodoxy, to provide Greek nationals and 
society with a sense of social belonging, a moral framework and social order.
Christian Orthodoxy was perceived as both an idiosyncratic and a collectively shared 
meaning system that provides a guide to morality influencing participants’ 
intrapersonal relations and social behaviour in the given social context. In their 
opinion, religion, and in particular the Christian Orthodox dogma with its dogmatic 
commands is capable of exerting its influence from private to public life domains. 
Thus, it can evolve from a private affair into a guide of morally sanctioned social 
behaviours that would ensure a safe and harmonious society (Kelman and Hamilton, 
1989; Silberman, 2005).
Moreover, in line with the findings from the previous set of analyses that used the 
content analytic method to examine how respondents alluded to questions about
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nationhood, the present analysis also demonstrated that religion (Christian Orthodoxy) 
resonates cultural definitions of Greekness. For most participants, traditional 
customs, group norms, familial and social values are in line or even informed by the 
Christian-Orthodox dogma (Pollis, 1992; Chryssochoou, 1996; Mavrogordatos, 2003; 
Chryssoloras, 2004a).
Religion also seems to have both an historical and a contemporary affirmative role in 
relation to Greek national identity. Participants referred to how the religious dogma 
and institutions forged the unity of the nation in the past (temporal ingroup continuity) 
and how in the present it is still considered a valued dimension for positive 
differentiation in inter-group comparison contexts (positive ingroup distinctiveness). 
Reference to the past role of religion was used as a justification for why Orthodoxy 
has or deserves to have a central role in the current definitions of nationhood and 
national memories. More specifically, participants seem to believe that the 
contribution of religion in maintaining the cultural character of the group under the 
context of national threat (Ottoman Empire) should be constantly re-appraised and 
collectively remembered (for a detailed discussion on social memory and identity 
processes, see Lyons, 1996). The emergence of this sub-theme may act as a reminder 
of how it is almost impossible to study lay social actors’ accounts of nationhood 
without taking into consideration the power of the social agents in setting the basis for 
the development of national identities’ content (Moscovici, 1972, 1988; Billig, 1995; 
Cinnirella, 1996; Liu and Hilton, 2005). As discussed in the introduction of this 
chapter and in much more detail in Chapter 5, considering the extent to which both 
the Greek Orthodox Church and the state (teaching of history) propagate this past role 
of religion, the fact that participants invoke this representation in their discursive 
accounts of national category as well as the emphasis they place on keeping this 
memory alive, does not come as a surprise.
Nevertheless, it is mainly the second function of religion in relation to nationhood 
(religion as a source of positive national differentiation) that may influence the most 
and also create problems in the context of inter-group relations. When nationality is 
reified along religious faultlines and the second is perceived to positively affirm the 
former, then increased differentiation and even discrimination towards the culturally
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dissimilar outgroups is more likely to occur (Jetten, Spears and Manstead, 1996; Sani 
and Reicher, 1998; Roccas and Brewer, 2002; Roccas, 2005; Cairns et al., 2006).
The present findings showed that differences in religion and values were not only 
strategically used by participants as the basis for ingroup definition and differentiation 
but, in some instances, also for expression of strong ingroup favouritism and outgroup 
derogation (Hunter, 1998). Delegitimising beliefs with clearly defined affective and 
behavioural implications not only ascertains the superiority of the ingroup but also 
sustains the image of a cohesive group that shares a common set of culturally defined 
beliefs and values (Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Bar Tal, 2000). On the contrary, 
perceptions of between group-similarity on the basis of religion seemed promising in 
creating the basis for a cross-categorisation context to occur, according to which 
partial outgroups (like Russians) are usually perceived less negatively than double 
outgroups (see Byrne, 1971; Hewstone et al., 1993; Crisp et al., 2001). Greek 
participants reported that they felt relatively more similar to Russians when the salient 
dimension of comparison was religion. Moreover, this compatibility of religious 
values and beliefs is in the participants’ view what helps Russian immigrants to adjust 
better in the society and be relatively more accepted by the host majority members. 
However, cultural expression of one’s ethnicity and religious differences were also 
strategically used by participants for legitimising the existing inequalities and the 
majority’s lack of contact with the ethno-religious minorities living in Greece 
(Pettigrew, 1998). Similar to what Verkyuten (2001) argues, majority members often 
expect the minority groups (ethnic and/or religious) to conform after presenting their 
cultural profile to be in opposition or even posing a threat to the host culture. Overall, 
the findings suggest how perceiving the ingroup identity as a combination of national 
and religious categories is linked to differential treatment of the minority and 
immigrant groups living in the society.
Finally, participants’ perceptions about factors that have changed or render possible 
the attenuation of the strength of nationality-religion relationship were discussed. 
Taking a more critical stand towards their ‘own’ people, public and religious agents, 
some participants explained this phenomenon by also expressing their concern about 
the current decline in Greek nationals’ religious participation and respect for the 
ecclesiastical priesthood. Along these lines, they emphasised then that there is a need 
for both Greek nationals to re-evaluate the important role that religion may have in
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their lives and for the religious institutions to change their current profile so as to 
regain the Greek public’s respect and trust.
However, for participants for whom Orthodoxy was perceived as having an 
affirmative role in culturally defining nationality, questioning the legitimacy of 
religion to explain existential queries and religious diversity were the two main 
reasons brought forward to justify this phenomenon. The potential changes that the 
former may bring to the long established social representation of the two (Greekness 
and Orthodoxy) as mutually reinforcing and overlapping notions were perceived as a 
threat. As relevant research has demonstrated, people who hold conservative beliefs 
and value tradition are less open to change and tend to associate its outcomes with 
notions of ‘cultural contamination’ and threat to the ingroup’s identity (Schwartz and 
Huismans, 1995; Roccas, 2005).
If one were to take the results of this study at face value, they may suggest that in a 
world where, as Gellner (1983, p.6) argues, there is no “man without a nation”, for 
Greek participants the following statement seems to also hold true: there is “no nation 
without a religion”. Although in the intra-group context the overlap (or not) between 
religion and nationhood as an integral part of cultural heritage may help the group to 
sustain its continuous and distinctive character, in an inter-group context it poses 
substantial questions about the amount and the quality of contact between the Greek 
majority and religious minority groups living in the society (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 
1998). When it comes to the majority and minority relations a strong overlap between 
the two may act as a barrier to the successful assimilation of the former and may be an 
indication that the host majority is not yet ready to accept the changing character of its 
societal context.
6.9 Concluding remarks
By employing a more integrative methodological approach, both studies empirically 
established that in the Greek context there is a strong relationship between national 
and religious identity elements not only based on relative strength of identification 
and perceived centrality but also in terms of meaning. Overall, the analyses 
conducted on the meanings associated with the content of Greekness suggested that
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religion (Christian Orthodoxy) remains a constituent part of modem Greek national 
identity, embedded in everyday life through its cultural festivities, codes of morality 
and due to its perceived compatibility with the familial values. Moreover, for Greek 
participants the historicity of their national identity was asserted based on the notion 
of an unintermpted historical past, with the Byzantine Empire, a period historically 
linked with the emergence of the Christian Orthodox dogma, also being internalised 
to represent the culturally distinct and continuous past of the national group. Opening 
a parenthesis here, it needs to be mentioned that the way the image of Greekness was 
formulated in participants’ accounts promoted a positive valued image of a culturally 
distinct, homogeneous and temporarily continuous national group (national 
distinctiveness and continuity). Identification with the religious category also 
supported or even strengthened to some extent those feelings of national 
distinctiveness and continuity (respective motivations perceived as mutually 
reinforcing). This has set the basis for further exploration of this relationship within 
identity stmcture on another level, that of the motivational processes. Based on the 
strong relationship between national and religious identifications, the overlap in terms 
of content but mainly on the preliminary data obtained in the interview study, we 
assumed that there may be also an overlap between the respective motivational 
processes predicting levels of identification with each of these two target identity 
elements (nationality and religion).
However, the challenge remains to explore how and whether the strength of the 
relationship between nationality and religion is affected or would affect intra-group 
and inter-group attitudes under conditions that may pose threat to national identity. 
How would individuals respond when they felt that their simultaneous membership in 
a superordinate category is in conflict with their need to feel nationally distinct and 
continuous? What is the role of religious identification and of its respective 
motivational processes in ameliorating this threat experienced in an intra-group level?
Moreover, findings from the interview study provided evidence that the relationship 
between nationality and religion may influence to some extent the lay theories that 
host majority members hold in relation to the immigrant and the minority groups 
living in the society. Would Greek nationals use the nationality-religion relationship 
as a justification for preferring acculturation orientations that favour less biculturalism
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and individualism? Which factors might influence the relationship between 
perceptions of nationality-religion overlap and cultural attitudes towards the 
immigrant and minority groups? All the questions raised above are addressed in the 
next two studies of the present thesis.
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Chapter 7: The Impact of Threat to National Identity on the Relative 
Salience, Motivational Principles of National, Religious and 
Student Identities and their Interrelationships
7.1 Introduction
The findings from the previous two studies provided evidence that, within the Greek 
context, national and religious identity elements are strongly related. This is not only 
based on their relative strength of identification and centrality, but also in terms of 
content. Religion (Christian Orthodoxy) through its festivals, symbols and due to its 
historical role during the nation-formation process is revealed to be a defining 
characteristic of the Greek national identity.
This chapter reports an experimental study which draws on Identity Process Theory (IPT) 
(Breakwell, 1986; 1993), and other relevant literature (Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Oakes, 
Haslam and Turner, 1994; Deaux, 2000; Ellemers, Spears and Doosje, 2002; Crisp et al., 
2001; and Cassidy and Trew, 2004), using the social identification processes approach to 
study the impact of threat on identity structure. The study aimed to explore further the 
ways that national and religious identity elements are related and how the way they relate 
to changes in the context of threat to national identity.
Firstly, the study aimed to re-examine the extent to which national and religious 
identifications are related. Secondly, it set out to examine the relationship between the 
extent to which national identity contributes to the individual’s distinctiveness, 
continuity, self-esteem and efficacy and the degree to which religious identity contributes 
to the satisfaction of each of these principles. Thirdly, it explored an additional way that 
the two identity elements may relate; the extent to which each identity element satisfies 
the principles of identity related to levels of identification with the other identity element. 
That is, the study was designed to address the question of whether the degree to which 
one’s religious (or national) identity contributes to their distinctiveness, continuity, self­
esteem and efficacy is related to their level of identification with the national (or
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religious) identity. Fourthly, it investigated the impact of threat to national identity on 
different aspects of the relationship between national and religious identities. Threat to 
national identity was induced by giving participants a scenario pertaining to the potential 
development of a European identity which questioned the importance of maintaining 
cultural diversification and historicity of national identities, thus disrupting the principles 
of national distinctiveness and continuity. The interest here lay in exploring how 
different types, rather than levels, of threat may influence identity structure, and more 
specifically their impact on the relative salience of the target social identifications and 
motivational processes both in an ipsative and relative manner.
As was discussed in Chapter 2, in order to explain (rather than just describe) the relative 
strength of the relationship between any two or more elements of identity, it is also useful 
to examine the motivational basis of the target identities. There has been a considerable 
amount of criticism leveled against identity theories which support the supremacy of self­
esteem and distinctiveness motivations in guiding social identification processes 
(Breakwell, 1986; Brewer, 1991, 1993; Deaux, 1993, 2000; Cinnirella, 1996; Rubin and 
Hewstone, 1998; Brown, 2000; Hogg, 2000; Vignoles, Chryssochoou and Breakwell, 
2000, 2002; Vignoles et al., 2006). The present study is conceptualized within IPT 
(Breakwell, 1986, 1992), which claims that other principles (i.e. distinctiveness, 
continuity and efficacy), and not only self-esteem, need to be taken into consideration in 
the study of identity processes. However, so far the majority of studies using this 
framework, testing the contribution of multiple motives to explain identity construction 
and levels of social identification, have used global measures of self-esteem, 
distinctiveness, continuity and efficacy (Vignoles, Breakwell and Chryssochoou, 2000; 
Timotijevic and Breakwell, 2000). In agreement with all those who suggest that it would 
be more useful to employ identity specific measures of motivations for exploring the 
different functions that different social identities may serve (Deaux, 2000), and for 
explaining how individuals would respond to situations that may challenge their value 
and content (Abrams and Hogg, 1990; van Knippenberg and Ellemers, 1993; Long and 
Spears, 1997), in this study the four motivational principles postulated by IPT are 
conceptualised and measured in relation to the target group memberships (Lyons, 1996).
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The results from the qualitative part of the first study also offered preliminary support for 
the contention that identification with large social scale-categories like nationality 
satisfies a number of different needs, not only at the individual level, but at the group 
level as well. For instance, it was shown that Greek national identity seems to provide 
individuals with a strong sense of temporal continuity and distinctiveness (national 
continuity and distinctiveness). At the same time emphasis placed on the historicity and 
the unique cultural character of Greek national identity also endows members of this 
collectivity the notion that their group is a valued group (national private-esteem) and 
deserves the respect of others (national public-esteem). Furthermore, participants in 
Study 1 (Part 1) thought that the national group should strive for, and make sacrifices, in 
order to improve the current status of the nation. In contrast to perceptions that national 
group belonging enhances an individual’s self-esteem, distinctiveness and continuity, 
Greek people seemed to report a rather low collective efficacy.
Although the focus of the study reported here was firstly on exploring further the 
relationship between national and religious identities and secondly on the impact of threat 
to national identity on related identities, a third identity, being a student, was also 
included for comparative reasons. This third identity was chosen as it was also expected 
to be important and relevant to the sample studied (university students), but unrelated (or 
weakly related) to the national and religious identities prior to exposure to threat to 
national identity. Hence, the motivations guiding the process of identification with the 
studentship identity element and the strength of its relationship with the other two 
elements (national, religious) are assessed in both time conditions to explore whether 
threat experienced on national identity may affect in any way: 1) the processes of the 
student identity element; and 2) the strength of its relatively weak relationship 
(compared to the nationality-religion relationship) with the nationality identity element.
7.2 Research hypotheses
Thus, the study was designed to test the following hypotheses:
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Prior to threat
HI Different identity elements would relate to each other to varying degrees.
(a) Levels of national and religious identifications were expected to be strongly 
and positively related.
(b) Student identification was expected to be unrelated, or weakly related, to 
national and religious identifications.
H2 Overall, we expected that for identity elements that were weakly, or not related at
all within identity structure (student identity element), identification processes 
would be predicted only by their corresponding identity principles (i.e. student 
principles). However, a different outcome was expected for identities that were 
strongly related and that there was also evidence of a strong overlap between 
them in terms of content (i.e. national and religious). More specifically, we 
assumed that the motivational principles of a related identity element may 
contribute to predicting strength of identification with the respective identity 
elements (national, religious) in the pre-threat condition.
H3 In addition to collective self-esteem and distinctiveness, continuity and self-
efficacy were expected to guide the examined identification processes.
H4 Identification with the different categories (national, religious and student) may
be associated with different levels of continuity, distinctiveness, self-esteem and 
self-efficacy.
Post threat
H5 It was expected that the threat induced on national motivations would affect the
strength of the correlation between levels of national and religious identifications 
in the post threat condition. More specifically, we expected that the relationship 
between the two would be stronger after the administration of the scenarios.
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H6 There would be changes in the relative contribution of identity principles in 
relation to the type of threat induced (e.g. when national distinctiveness is 
threatened (Scenario I) national continuity may become a better predictor of the 
strength of post national identification and vice versa). The relative contribution 
of the identity principles of the related identity element (i.e. religious) was also 
expected to change in relation to the type of threats.
H7 Moreover, it is expected that under the context of threat (Time 2) principles of a
related identity element (religious) may contribute as well in predicting post threat 
national identification (H7).
H8 There are significant differences expected to the strength of identification of both
national and religious identity elements between the pre- and the post-threat 
conditions. More specifically, it was expected that the strength of both national 
and religious identifications would increase from Time 1 to Time 2.
H9 In Condition I (Scenario Threatening National Distinctiveness) national
distinctiveness was expected to decrease as a result of threat, whilst religious 
distinctiveness was expected to increase. Similarly, in Condition II (Scenario 
Threatening National Continuity) national continuity was expected to decrease 
but religious continuity was expected to increase after threat.
HIO In addition, there were changes expected in the levels of the other two national
and religious motivations between Time 1 and Time 2. Levels of self-esteem and 
efficacy deriving from national and religious categories were expected to increase 
in both the experimental conditions, to ameliorate the threat induced to the 
content dimension of national identity.
HI 1 No specific predictions were made with respect to changes in the levels of student
identification and the relative contribution of student identity principles over time.
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7.3 Pilot study 1
7.3.1 Aims
As Study 2 was to be conducted in Greece, and some of the measures needed to test the
relevant hypotheses were constructed and used in Western European countries and the
US, the psychometric properties of these scales were examined in a pilot study.
This pilot study was therefore designed to
1. generate valid and reliable measures for testing the hypotheses stated above,
2. identify any misconceptions about the instructions for the completion of the 
questionnaire,
3. ascertain the time needed for the completion of the administered questionnaire, and to
4. explore the relative strength of the relationship between student and national 
identification.
To achieve the first aim above, this study:
1. examined the metric structure and reliability of measures of strength of identification 
with nationality, religion and studentship
2. generated items to measure the extent to which each of the target identity elements 
(nationality, religion, and studentship) satisfied the motivational principles of 
distinctiveness and continuity
3. examined the metric structure and reliability of these measures as well as that of 
collective self-esteem (Luhtanen and Crocker, 1992) and collective self-efficacy 
(adapted from Schwarzer and Jerusalem, 1995)
259
7.3.2 Sample
The sample of the pilot study consisted of 200 (male: 90, female: 110) Greek students 
who attended the Aristotle University and the Technological Institute of Education both 
located in the city of Thessalonica in the northern region of Greece. The mean age was 
22.37 yrs old.
7.3.3 Measures: The Pilot Questionnaire
The pilot-questionnaire measured 18 dependent variables and was divided in three 
sections (see Appendix II: Section a).
Section 1 included measures of identification with each of the three target identity 
elements. The same scales as in the previous study were used for measuring strength of 
identification with the three identity elements (Cinnirella, 1997).
Section 2 included 15 scales, measuring the motivational principles of distinctiveness, 
continuity, private self-esteem, public self-esteem and self-efficacy relating to each 
identity element separately.
Measurements of distinctiveness and continuity motivational principles for each of the 
three identity elements (national, religious and student) were not available so they were 
developed by the researcher. The scales measuring the distinctiveness motivational 
principle were designed to ascertain the sense of differentiation that participants felt from 
‘others’, based on their membership on the specific national, religious and student 
categories. Each scale (pertaining to a target identity element) consisted of 4 items 
scored on a 7-point Likert scale (1 =strongly disagree to 7= strongly agree). Examples of 
some of the items used are presented below:
“Being Greek makes me feel unique.” (National distinctiveness)
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“Being a Christian Orthodox distinguishes me from people o f other religions.” (Religious 
distinctiveness)
The items measuring the continuity principle assessed the extent to which membership in 
each of the three examined identity elements was perceived by the participants as a 
means of maintaining a sense of a temporal continuum, connecting their past, present and 
future identity. This scale also consisted of 4 items and participants were also asked to 
indicate their level of agreement using a 7-point scale (1 =strongly disagree to 7= 
strongly agree). For example:
“Being Greek makes me understand how I  came to be the person I  am today.” (National 
continuity)
“Being a student helps me make sense o f who I  am today and how I  would like to be in 
(Student continuity)
In the present study we define self-esteem in collective terms referring to the evaluation 
of one’s membership in social groups. National, religious and student collective self­
esteem (or CSE) were measured based on the scale developed by Luhtanen and Crocker 
(1992). The scale consists of 16 items, representing four subscales. For the purpose of 
this study only two out of the four subscales assessing collective-esteem were used: 
private esteem (4 items) which measures one’s personal evaluation of a group 
membership, and public esteem (4 items) that measures one’s own perceptions of how 
outgroup members evaluate this group membership (see examples below).
“I  often regret that I  belong to this national group. ” (National Private-Esteem)
“Overall, my religious group is considered good by others. ” (Religious Public-Esteem)
Out of the four subscales it is the private-aspect of collective self-esteem that has been 
thought by many (Crocker and Luhtanen, 1990; Branscombe and Wann, 1994; Ethier and 
Deaux, 1994; Rubin and Hewstone, 1998; Verkuyten and Hagendoom, 2002) to be more 
consistent with the theoretical assumptions of Social Identity Theory (SIT), (individuals
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as group members maintain or enhance their self-esteem levels by evaluating their social 
groups positively) and hence, a more appropriate measure for testing and revising the link 
between self-esteem and the display of ingroup favoritism or even outgroup derogation.
In other words, the private-esteem scale has been used mainly by researchers so far to test 
and refine the set of inconsistent findings relevant to both corollaries of self-esteem (see 
for a review Hogg and Abrams, 1988).
Some proponents of SIT, when focusing their research more on the content and context 
of threat to identity (De Cremer, 2001; Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje, 2002; Hunter et al., 
2005), suggested that, on a conceptual level. Corollary 2 (according to which self-esteem 
is considered a cause of inter-group differentiation) needs to be examined using the 
public rather than the private self-esteem measure (see also Chapter 2). Long, Spears and 
Manstead (1994) in their study revealed that private-esteem was associated more with 
interpersonal differentiation, whereas a low level of public-esteem was a better predictor 
of ingroup favoritism. Moreover, Long and Spears (1997, 1998) proposed that in inter­
group contexts, when threat to an important social identity comes from outside the 
ingroup, it is more likely that the public aspect of self-esteem (ingroup members’ 
perceptions on how outgroups evaluate their ingroup) will be affected, motivating 
individuals’ to prove the positivity and superiority of their group over the others. The 
recent emphasis on the utility of the public self-esteem scale, in studies focusing on the 
impact of threat on identity stmcture and on the responses of individuals’ as group 
members in these contexts, provides further support for the use of both measures of 
collective self-esteem scale (CSE).
In the main study, threat was directed to a group identity (national) originating from the 
simultaneous membership of Greek nationals in a super-ordinate category, that of the 
European. The way the content of European identity would be constmed in the 
administered experimental scenarios would be directed towards the content dimension of 
national identity, encouraging the cultural assimilation after undermining the importance 
of retaining the historicity (continuity) and the distinctiveness of Greek national identity. 
However, threat experienced on these two motivations may also impact on the associated
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level of affect/value attached to national identity influencing both the private and public 
aspects of CSE derived from this category. We treat these variables as continuous 
instead of categorical, since testing the version of self-esteem hypothesis, assuming that 
low CSE will lead to competitive inter-group discrimination, was not an aim of the 
present investigation. Instead, we are interested in intra-group attitudes focusing on how 
threat experienced on national continuity and distinctiveness principles, may affect the 
levels and the contribution of all national motivations and of the related identity 
motivations in predicting the strength of identification with the examined identity 
elements in the post-experimental conditions.
The other two subscales of collective self-esteem, importance to identity (the extent to 
which membership in these social groups is perceived to be important to one’s self 
concept) and membership esteem (evaluation of oneself as a good member of the social 
group that one belongs to) were not used in the present research. This was due to the fact 
that the strength of identification scales (Cinnirella, 1997) included items measuring:
1. the perceived importance of the examined identity elements (national, religious, 
student), and
2. the individual’s personal evaluations of himself /herself as an ingroup member with 
respect to the extent he/she matches the descriptive and prescriptive norms of the 
group (ingroup prototype).
The degree of agreement with the items measuring the private and the public aspects of 
collective self-esteem, deriving from the relevant group memberships (national, religion, 
student), were assessed on a 1 to 7 scale, with higher numbers indicating positive 
collective self-esteem (with 1 representing “strongly disagree” dxAl “strongly agree”).
For measuring participants’ perceived self-efficacy in relation to their national, religious 
and student identity elements, a modified version of the General Perceived Self-Efficacy 
scale (Schwarzer and Jerusalem, 1995) was used. The scale consists of 10 items with a 4- 
point response format, 1 representing 'not at all true” and 4 “exactly true”.
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For the purpose of this research, the items were slightly modified to refer to the levels of 
competence and control experienced by participants as members of these groups (ie . “AS 
a Greek”, “AS a Christian Orthodox”, “AS a student”). Examples are:
“AS a Christian Orthodox when lam  confronted with a problem, I  can usually find  
several solutions. ” (Religious Efficacy)
“Thanks to my resourcefulness as a student, I  know how to handle unforeseen 
situations. ” (Student Efficacy)
There has been a lot of research interest in the study and measurement of efficacy as a 
shared, collective-level construct. For example, Schwarzer and Schmitz (1999) 
developed the Teacher Collective Self-Efficacy scale in their study in order to measure 
school teachers’ beliefs in the competence of the faculty to deal with prospective 
adversities that may challenge the group as a whole. The obtained alphas in the two 
samples (each about N = 300) of German teachers participating in the nationwide 
innovative school project Self-Efficacious Schools, were substantial with .91, and .92 
respectively. Similarly, research in organizational settings has focused on the role of 
collective efficacy (team efficacy) and group potency as determinants of performance and 
team effectiveness. Team efficacy has been defined and measured at both individual and 
collective levels referring to the shared perceptions in a team’ s capability of performing a 
specific task (Prussia and Kinicki, 1996; Bandura, 2000). In addition, the measures of 
group potency, a related but a distinct term firom team efficacy according to the levels of 
sharedness and the task specificity (Shea and Guzzo, 1987; Guzzo, Yost, Campbell and 
Shea, 1993), aim to assess the generalised shared beliefs about the capability of the 
collective (group or team) to perform well, irrespective of the context and the task set (for 
a detail discussion on team efficacy and generalized potency constructs see Gully, 
Incalcaterra, Joshi and Beaubien, 2002).
264
Different versions of the questionnaire were designed, each version presenting the scales 
included in Section 1 and 2 in a different order so that possible order effects could be 
tested.
Section 3 included questions designed to elicit the demographic information about the 
pilot sample, including age, gender, nationality and occupation.
7.3.4 Procedure
The researcher visited the University libraries and cafeterias to distribute the pilot study 
questionnaire. Participants were asked to read the information sheet attached to the 
administered questionnaire that included information about the purpose of the study and 
the contact details of the researcher. The study was introduced to the participants as a 
survey investigating the public’s opinion on social issues. Two-hundred students 
successfully completed the questionnaire.
7.3.5 Initial analyses
The scales measuring the three types of identification and their respective motivational 
principles were initially screened for normality and outliers with normality curves 
superimposed. All variables met the normality criteria of skeweness and kurtosis with 
values lower than +1-1. The order of the presentation of the scales was counterbalanced 
revealing no significant effects F  (8, 388) = 1.71, ns.
7.3.6 Examining the metric structure o f the identification measures
The sample of the pilot study (N=200) was considered fair for performing PC A analysis 
(Comrey and Lee, 1992) and the data were initially screened for missing values, 
normality, outliers, multi-colinearity issues and factorability of the correlation matrices. 
Sampling adequacy was checked in each analysis using Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin criterion 
(KMO).
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Unifactorial solutions were found for the scales measuring strength of identification with 
the three identity elements. More specifically, the single factor solution on items 
measuring the strength of national identification explained 61.40% (eigen value: 4.30) of 
the total variance with loadings ranging from .63 to .87. Principal component analysis 
performed on religious identification items showed that a single component accounted for 
69.27% of the total variance (eigen value: 4.85) with the lowest loading being .74 and the 
highest .88.
Regarding the student identification scale, the initial factor analysis revealed a two-factor 
solution with the first factor accounting for 48.58% (eigen value: 3.40) of the variance 
and the second explaining 15.18% (eigen value: 1.06). However, further inspection of 
the component correlation matrix indicated that the two constmcts correlated by .48, 
suggesting that the scale was a uni-dimensional one since each factor was not sufficiently 
distinct to be considered separate.
7.3.7 Examining the metric structure o f  identity motivational principles
In order to explore the conceptual structure of the underlying processes responsible for 
guiding national, religious and student identifications, the measurements of all four 
motivational principles (distinctiveness, continuity, self-esteem, and self-efficacy) of the 
three examined identity elements (nationality, religion and studentship) were submitted to 
a series of principal component analyses (PCA) with oblique rotation.
The choice of non-orthogonal oblique rotation lies on the theoretical assumption that all 
four motivational principles (components) are allowed to correlate with each other, since 
they are expected to guide the identification process not in isolation of each other, but in 
an interactive manner (Breakwell, 1986; Vignoles, Chryssochoou and Breakwell, 2000, 
2002). The strength of these relationships between identity motivations is always 
moderated by the cultural context where they develop and function (Breakwell, 1986).
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At this point it needs to be mentioned that a five factor solution was expected instead of a 
four factor one for each of the three examined identity elements. This expectation was in 
line with previous findings where the two subscales measuring the private and public 
aspects of collective self-esteem loaded on two different factors (see Luhtanen and 
Crocker, 1992). Despite the fact that collective self-esteem (Luhtanen and Crocker,
1992) and general self-efficacy (Schwarzer and Jerusalem, 1995) are well-validated 
measures, they were still subjected to principal component analysis due to the fact that: 1) 
they were slightly modified to refer specifically to the national, religious and student 
identity elements, and 2) their items were used in a non-English sample.
7.3.8 Examining the metric structure o f motivational principles relating to each 
target identity element
PCA on National Motivational Principles
Principal component with oblique rotation on the twenty-six items measuring the 
motivational principles responsible for guiding national identification processes revealed 
five components. This was also confirmed by the component correlation matrix, where 
correlations between the five factors are extremely low, allowing for combination of 
strongly related factors (inter-correlations between factors ranging from .085 to .44). The 
sample revealed to be adequate with KMO=.89.
The eigenvalues for the five factors were: 10.07 (Factor 1-National Self-Efficacy) 
accounting for 38.74% of the variance, 3.12 (Factor 2-National Continuity) accounting 
for 12 % of the total variance, 2.28 (Factor 3- National Private Self-Esteem) accounting 
for 8.79% of the variance, 1.59 (Factor 4-Public Self-Esteem) accounting for 6.11% of 
the variance and finally 1.07 (factor 5-National Distinctiveness) accounting for 4.10% of 
the variance. The five factor solution accounted for 69.73% of the total variance.
All the items measuring National Self-Efficacy loaded under the first factor with the 
lowest being .70 and the highest .88. The items measuring National Continuity loaded 
under the second factor with loadings ranging from -.58 to -.78. The pattern matrix 
clearly illustrated that there was one item measuring national-public aspect of self-esteem
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(Item 1 : “Overall my national group is considered good by others”) which loaded on two 
factors similarly (factors 2 and 4), although slightly higher under the second factor (see 
Table 7.1 below). This item did not conceptually fit with the items measuring national 
continuity. Moreover, for reasons of comparability with the scales measuring public self­
esteem for the other two identity elements (religion and studentship), the researcher 
decided not to exclude this item at this stage of the analysis. The third factor included all 
four items measuring National Private-Esteem with loadings ranging from .68 to .84, 
while the fourth factor included the three items measuring National Public-self esteem. 
Finally, the last factor consisted of the four items measuring National Distinctiveness 
with loadings ranging from -.58 to -.91.
Table 7.1: Pattern matrix of structural coefficieuts-five factor solution for
COM PONEl\ T
1 2 3 4 5
Being Greek makes me feel unique, (ndisl) -.582
Being Greek distinguishes me from people of other nationalities. 
(ndis2)
-.891
Being Greek makes me stand out from others. (ndis3) -.910
Being Greek makes me different from others. (ndis4) -.311 -.688
Being Greek makes me understand where my values derive from, 
(nconl)
-.663
Being Greek makes me understand how I came to be the person I 
am today, (nconl)
-.776
Being Greek helps me make sense of who I am today and how I 
would like to be in the future. (nconS)
-.577 -.319
Being Greek provides a link between me in the past and me in the 
present. (ncon4)
-.726
I often regret that I belong to this national group, (nprivestl) .685
In general, I'm glad to be a member of this national group I 
belong to. (nprivestl)
-.755
Overall, I often feel that my national group of which I am a 
member is not worthwhile. (nprivestS)
.838
I feel good about the national group I belong to. (nprivest4) . -.804
Overall, my national group is considered good by others, 
(npubestl)
-.558 -.436
Most people consider my national group, on the average to be 
more ineffective than other national groups.(npubestl)
.725
In general, others respect the national group I am a member 
of.(npubest3)
-.649
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Table 7.1 Continued
1 2 3 4 5
In general, others think that the national group I am member of is 
unworthy.(npubest4)
.734
AS a Greek I can always manage to solve difficult problems if I 
try hard enough.(neffl)
.699
AS a Greek If someone opposes me, I can find the means and 
ways to get what I want.(neff2)
.817
AS a Greek It is easy for me to stick to my aims and accomplish 
my goals.(neff3)
.813
AS a Greek I am confident that I could deal efficiently with 
unexpected events.(neff4)
.857
Thanks to my resourcefulness as a Greek, I know how to handle 
unforeseen situations.(neff5)
.837
AS a Greek I can solve most problems if I invest the necessary 
effort.(neff6)
.884
AS a Greek I can remain calm when facing difficulties because I 
can rely on my coping abilities.(neff7)
.855
AS a Greek when I am confronted with a problem, I can usually 
find several solutions.(neff8)
.817
AS a Greek If I am in trouble, I can usually think of a 
solution.(neff9)
.794
AS a Greek I can usually handle whatever comes my 
way.(nefflO)
.798
Note: Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization, 
suppressed. Rotation converged in 10 iterations.
Absolute values less than 0.3 were
PCA on Religious Motivational Principles
The second PCA was performed on the item scales measuring the four religious 
motivational principles (KM0=.91). All twenty-six items were submitted to principal 
component analysis with oblique rotation. Using the Kaiser (1960) factor extraction 
criterion based on which only eigenvalues greater than 1 can be retained, the analysis 
produced a four-factor solution. The eigenvalues for the four factors were 12.98 (factor 
1-Religious Efficacy) explaining 49.91% of the variance, 2.84 (factor 2-Religious 
Distinctiveness) accounting for 10.93% of the variance, 2.15 (factor 3-Religious Public 
Self-Esteem) accounting for 8.26% of the variance and finally, 1.34 (factor 4- Religious 
Continuity & Religious Private-Self Esteem) accounting for 5.15% of the total variance. 
The four-factor solution accounted for 74.25% of the total variance. As can be observed
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from the pattern matrix (see Table 7.2), all four items measuring the Religious Private- 
Esteem also loaded under the fourth factor consisting the Religious Continuity items 
(factor 4). However, an important aspect of deciding on the factor extraction method is 
also the extent to which a solution is interpretable (Cattell, 1966, 1982; Field, 2000). 
After examining the item content of these two scales, it was evident that the four-item 
scale testing Religious Private-Esteem did not fit conceptually with the Religious 
Continuity items, thus the researcher decided to ask for a five factor solution. The 
eigenvalue of the fifth factor was .82 which according to Jollife’s criterion (1972 cited in 
Field, 2000, p. 437) is acceptable since factors with eigenvalues greater than 0.7 can be 
retained. This factor accounted for 3.17 % of the total variance while the five-factor 
solution explained 77.43% of the total variance.
The present pattern matrix revealed a more interpretable solution. More specifically, all 
ten items measuring religious self-efficacy loaded under the first factor, with high 
loadings ranging from .84 to .99. The second factor included the Religious Continuity 
items with loadings ranging from -.54 to -.62. Meanwhile only three items of the 
Religious Public Esteem scale loaded under the third factor with loadings ranging from 
.59 to -.75. One item (Item 3: “In general, others respect the religious group I  am a 
member o f”) from that scale loaded under the fifth factor (-.52) which consisted of all the 
items measuring the private aspect of religious collective self-esteem (lowest loading 
from -.44 to .90). Finally, the fourth factor included the Religious Distinctiveness items, 
with the lowest loading being .60 and the highest .91 (see Tables 7.2 and 7.3 for the 
correlations between the factors).
As can be observed from the correlation matrix obtained for the five-factor solution, the 
items measuring religious continuity and private-esteem loaded under two separate 
factors which were weakly related (Factor 2-Factor 5: r=.20) (see Table 7.3).
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Table 7.2: Pattern matrix of structural coefficieuts-five factor solution for
religious motivational principles (Pilot study 1)
COMPONENT
1 2 3 4 5
Being Christian Orthodox makes me feel 
unique, (rdisl)
.599
Being Christian Orthodox distinguishes 
me from people of other religions, (rdisl)
.824
Being Christian Orthodox makes me stand 
out from others. (rdis3)
.910
Being Christian Orthodox makes me 
different from others. (rdis4)
.802
Being Christian Orthodox makes me 
understand where my values derive from, 
(rconl)
-.586
Being Christian Orthodox makes me 
understand how I came to be the person I 
am today, (rconl)
-.623
Being Christian Orthodox helps me make 
sense of who I am today and how I would 
like to be in the future. (rcon3)
-.545
Being Christian Orthodox provides a link 
between me in the past and me in the 
present. (rcon4)
-.551
I often regret that I belong to this religious 
group, (rprivestl)
.610
In general, I'm glad to be a member of this 
religious group I belong to. (rprivestl)
-.436
Overall, I often feel that my religious 
group of which I am a member is not 
worthwhile, (rprivestl)
.899
I feel good about the religious group I 
belong to. (rprivest4)
-.795
Overall, my religious group is considered 
good by others, (rpubestl)
-.750
Most people, consider my religious group, 
on the average to be more ineffective than 
other religious groups.(rpubestl)
.593
In general, others respect the religious 
group I am a member of.(rpubest3)
-.516
In general, others think that the religious 
group I am member of is 
unworthy.(rpubest4)
.744
AS a Christian Orthodox I can always 
manage to solve difficult problems if  I try 
hard enough.(reffl)
.854
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T able 7.2 Continued
1 2 3 4 5
AS a Christian Orthodox if someone 
opposes me, I can find the means and ways 
to get what I want. (reff2)
.871
AS a Christian Orthodox it is easy for me 
to stick to my aims and accomplish my 
goals. (reffB)
.917
AS a Christian Orthodox I am confident 
that I could deal efficiently with 
unexpected events.(reff4)
.845
Thanks to my resourcefulness as a 
Christian Orthodox, I know how to handle 
unforeseen situations.(reff5)
.905
AS a Christian Orthodox I can solve most 
problems if I invest the necessary 
effort.(reff6)
.941
AS a Christian Orthodox I can remain 
calm when facing difficulties because I 
can rely on my coping abilities.(reff7)
.944
AS a Christian Orthodox when I am 
confronted with a problem, I can usually 
find several solutions.(reff8)
.910
AS a Christian Orthodox If I am in trouble, 
I can usually think of a solution.(reff9)
.988
AS a Christian Orthodox I can usually 
handle whatever comes my way.(refflO)
.917
Note: Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. Absolute values less than 0.3 were 
suppressed. Rotation converged in 29 iterations.
Table 7.3: Component correlation matrix
Component 1 2 3 4 5
1. Religious 
Efficacy
1.000
2. Religious 
Continuity
-.321 1.000
3. Religious 
Public-Esteem
-.288 .085 1.000
4. Religious 
Distinctiveness
.441 -.295 -.249 1.000
5. Religious 
Private-Esteem
-.417 .204 .421 -.301 1.000
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PCA on Student Motivational Principles
Finally, the third PCA performed on student motivational principles (distinctiveness, 
continuity, private-public collective self-esteem and self-efficacy) produced a five-factor 
solution (KMO=.82). The eigenvalues of the five factors were: 7.33 accounting for 
28.21% of the total variance (factor 1), 3.58 with 13.78% of variance explained (factor 
2), 2.85 explaining 10.97% of the variance (factor 3), 1.72 accounting for 6.60% of the 
total variance and finally 1.13 which accounted for 4.36% of the total variance explained. 
The five factor solution accounted for 63.91% of the total variance.
As can be observed from the pattern matrix (see Table 7.4), the first factor included all 
the items measuring Student Self-Efficacy with the lowest loading being .61 and the 
highest .85. The second factor included all four student continuity items with loadings 
ranging from .64 to .72. However, regarding the two four-item subscales measuring the 
private and the public facets of collective self-esteem the results of the factor analysis 
appeared problematic. More specifically, with the exception of two items (Student 
Private-Esteem Item 1:1 often regret that I  belong to this student group and Student 
Public-Esteem Item 1 : Overall my student group is considered good by others) that 
loaded under the fifth factor (loadings .66 and -.77 respectively), all other items loaded 
under the same factor (factor 3). This solution did not support the distinctiveness of these 
two sub-scales which suggests that there may be a general sense of collective self-esteem 
associated with student membership category. Nonetheless, for reasons of comparability 
and given that the two sub-scales, private and public had acceptable alphas (.76 and .73 
respectively, see Table 7.5) it was decided to leave the scales unchanged and re-examine 
them after the main data collection. Finally, the items assessing Student Distinctiveness 
are all loaded within the fourth factor, with the highest factor loading being -.80 and the 
lowest -.67.
273
Table 7.4: P attern  m atrix  o f  structural coefficieu ts-five factor so lution  for
student m otivational princip les (P ilot study 1)
COMPONENT
1 2 3 4 5
Being student makes me feel 
unique.(stdisl)
-.727
Being student distinguishes me from 
people of other sectors .(stdis2)
-.675
Being student makes me stand out 
from others.(stdis3)
-.802
Being student makes me different 
from others.(stdis4)
-.716
Being student makes me understand 
where my values derive from.(stconl)
.722
Being student makes me understand 
how I came to be the person I am 
today.(stcon2)
.644
Being student helps me make sense of 
who I am today and how I would like 
to be in the future.(stcon3)
.674
Being student provides a link between 
me in the past and me in the 
present.(stcon4)
.642
I often regret that I belong to this • 
student group.(stprivestl)
-.327 .662
In general, I'm glad to be a member of 
this student group I belong 
to.(stprivest2)
-.705
Overall, I often feel that my student 
group of which I am a member is not 
worthwhile.(stprivest3)
.817
I feel good about the student group I 
belong to.(stprivest4)
-.823
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T able 7.4 Continued
1 2 3 4 5
Overall, my student group is 
considered good by 
others.(stpubestl)
-.767
Most people, consider my student 
group, on the average to be more 
ineffective than other student 
groups.(stpubest2)
.546
In general, others respect the 
student group I am a member 
of.(stpubest3)
-.695
In general, others think that the 
student group I am a member of is 
unworthy.(stpubest4)
.339 .547 .304
AS a student I can always manage 
to solve difficult problems if I try 
hard enough.(steffl)
.764
AS a student If someone opposes 
me, I can find the means and ways 
to get what I want.(steffZ)
.787
AS a student It is easy for me to 
stick to my aims and accomplish 
my goals.(steffB)
.606 -.363
AS a student I am confident that I 
could deal efficiently with 
unexpected events. (steff4)
.793
Thanks to my resourcefulness as a 
student, I know how to handle 
unforeseen situations.(steffS)
.835
AS a student I can solve most 
problems if I invest the necessary 
effort.(steff6)
.846
AS a student I can remain calm 
when facing difficulties because I 
can rely on my coping 
abilities.(steff7)
.835
AS a student when I am 
confronted with a problem, I can 
usually find several 
solutions.(steff8)
.822 !
AS a student If I am in trouble, I 
can usually think of a 
solution.(steff9) ,
.825
AS a student I can usually handle 
whatever comes my way.(stefflO)
.831
Note: Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. Absolute values less than 0.3 were 
suppressed. Rotation converged in 13 iterations.
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7.3.9 Reliability analysis on national, religious, student motivational principles and
identification scales
It can be ,inferred from the factor solutions produced on the motivational principles that 
private and public self-esteem scales appeared to be problematic for some identity 
elements more than others. Nonetheless, the obtained alphas for the scales (after items 1 
and 3 for private and 2 and 4 for public were recoded) indicated a good reliability with 
the exception, yet again, of the national public esteem scale. This scale had an acceptable 
alpha of .65 which did not improve after item deletion. According to Klein et al. (1993), 
findings based on scales with obtained alphas less than .70 should be interpreted with 
some caution.
Table 7.5: Reliability analysis on national, religious and student motivations
Variables
(Number of Items: 4)
N Mean SD Cronbach’s
alpha
Religious Distinctiveness 200 3.66 6.Ô0 .88
Student Distinctiveness 200 3.71 4.79 .78
National Distinctiveness 198 4.29 6.02 .86
Religious Continuity 200 4.14 6.23 .92
Student Continuity 200 4.28 4.51 .77
National Continuity 200 4.64 5.49 .87
Religious Priv. Esteem 200 5.27 5.65 .87
Student Priv. Esteem 200 4.99 5.38 .76
National Priv. Esteem 200 5.37 5.34 .82
Religious Pub. Esteem 200 4.92 4.29 .72
Student Pub. Esteem 200 4.90 4.59 .73
National Pub. Esteem 200 4.21 4.28 .65
Religious Efficacy (10 Items) 197 2.53 8.78 .98
Student Efficacy (10 Items) 199 2.71 7.26 .94
National Efficacy (10 Items) 200 2.40 9.44 .95
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Reliability analysis was also performed on each identification scale (7 items). The 
substantial alphas revealed that the scales were internally consistent and reliable in 
measuring strength of identification with the three identity elements (National 
identification: N=200, a= .89, Mean= 4.97, SD= 7.84; Religious Identification: N=200, 
a=.92, Mean= 4.17, SD= 10.13; Student Identification: N=200, a=.82, Mean= 4.61, 
SD=6.40). Therefore, the researcher decided to leave the questionnaire unchanged for the 
main study.
Finally, as discussed earlier, another aim of the current study was to pretest the strength 
of the relationship between the three examined identity elements based on participants’ 
reported levels of identification. It was expected that student identification would not be 
strongly related to national, whereas the relationship between these two would be 
relatively less significant compared to the strong and positive relationship expected 
between national and religious identifications. The correlations obtained fi-om the pilot 
data were in the expected size and direction. There was a strong and a positive 
correlation between national and religious identifications (r=.63, p~0, N=200). Student 
identification was not as strongly related to national (r=.30, p~0, N=200) and religious 
identifications (r=.15, p<.05, N=200) respectively. In order to test the null hypothesis 
that two correlations (national-religious vs. national-student) are equal when they share 
one variable in common (national), Williams’ Formula (T2) was employed (see Steiger, 
1980):
T2 = (r,3 -  r,2)* SQRT [ {(N - 1)(1 + r23)}/{2 * {(N - 1)/(N - 3)} * |R| +
{ l/2*(r,3+  r ,2 )} '* (l- r2 3 f} ]
Where |R| = (1 -  r,2^  -  -  r23^ ) + (2* ri2*ri3*r23)
The calculated t value estimating the difference between these two correlation 
coefficients, with national identification as their common variable, indicated that the 
relationship between national and religious was significantly stronger than that between 
student and national identifications with t (197)= 4.49, p~0. The finding from this
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analysis supports the idea that, in the present sample, national and student identifications 
are related to some extent; albeit this relationship is relatively weaker fi-om the 
association between national and religious identifications. Therefore, this makes it 
possible to test the prediction related to the differentiated effect of threat on the structure 
and processes of strongly related vs. weakly identity elements.
7.4 Pilot Study 2: Exploring the perceived threat emanating from the 
experimental manipulations (Pilot study 2)
7.4.1 Aims
The success of the main study clearly relied on the participants’ response to the 
experimental manipulations. Therefore, the second pilot study aimed to:
1. examine whether the scenarios designed to threaten national distinctiveness 
(Scenario I) and continuity (Scenario II) were perceived as factual and threatening as 
expected.
2. investigate the extent to which these two texts managed to threaten differentially each 
of the four national motivational principles both within and across the three 
conditions.
The vignette used in the control condition had also been piloted to ensure that it did not 
contain information that may induce any type of threat.
7.4.2 Sample
The sample of the second pilot study consisted of 60 students in total (20 allocated in 
each condition), who were recruited from the Technological Institute of Education in 
Thessalonica. Thirty five of them were male and twenty five female, with a mean age 
21.63 ranging from 19 to 27 years old. Assignment to each condition was random.
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7.4.3 Procedure
Having received permission from the Technological Institute of Education lecturers, the 
researcher attended one lecture to recruit the required sample for piloting the 
experimental scenarios. In order to ensure that participants were randomly allocated in 
the three experimental conditions, the researcher assigned numbers from 1 to 3 to each 
administered questionnaire and asked from the participants to choose one of these 
numbers. Participants were asked to read the attached information sheet and to follow 
the instructions provided for the completion of the administered questionnaire. After 
completing the first section, participants were asked to turn the page and read the 
attached text. Participants allocated in the first experimental group were administered 
Scenario /  which posed a threat on national distinctiveness. The second experimental 
group was administered Scenario II, threatening participants’ national continuity while 
participants allocated in the control group of the pilot study read an article totally 
irrelevant to all the identity elements and motivations studied (information about sea 
equipment). On completion of the study all the respondents received an oral debriefing 
with information about the two experimental scenarios. More specifically, the researcher 
emphasized that the two scenarios were fictional and explained thoroughly the purpose of 
their construction and the aims of the second pilot study. Participants were also asked to 
discuss their views on the content of the scenarios. The majority of them reported that 
the documents appeared authentic. They also raised their concerns about the current 
position of Greece within the EU arguing that these sets of imaginary decrees may 
become soon part of a reality that they, as Greeks, would have to deal with.
7.4.4 The Questionnaire: Measures
The pilot questionnaire was divided in three sections (see Appendix II Section b) and 
included:
• Measurements of National Distinctiveness and Continuity (Section 1)
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• Experimental Scenario (Scenario I, II or Control)
• Manipulation Check items
• Perceived Veracity of text item .
• Demographic Data (age, gender)
Before reading and evaluating the vignette, participants completed two scales measuring 
national distinctiveness and continuity. These scales were included prior to the 
administration of the experimental vignettes in order to exclude the possibility that the 
variations observed in the levels of perceived threat across the three experimental 
conditions were a function of prior variations in levels of distinctiveness and continuity.
The manipulation check consisted of items asking participants to indicate on a 7-point 
scale (7 =not at all, 7=a great deal) the extent to which they felt that the administered 
texts (2 experimental scenarios and the text used for the control condition) were 
threatening each of their four national identity motivational principles (national 
distinctiveness, national continuity, national self-esteem and national self-efficacy). 
Despite the fact that levels of national self-esteem and efficacy were not expected to 
remain completely unaffected after threat was induced, the success of the scenarios relied 
on threatening differentially (relatively more) national distinctiveness and continuity 
from the other two nationality principles.
Additionally, the researcher asked participants to indicate, using a 7-point scale (7 = not 
factual at all to 7= extremely factual), the extent to which they believed that the 
administered texts were real or fictional.
7.4.5 Constructing the vignettes: Using language & history as threats to national 
motivational principles
The findings from the content analysis of the previous study provided us with useful 
insights for the construction of the experimental scenarios aimed at threatening the 
content dimension of national identity (distinctiveness, continuity). The data illustrated 
that Greek participants derived a lot of pride from their civilisation comprising of
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elements such as language and history (see also Chryssochoou, 1996). The Greek 
language was portrayed as a highly valued dimension of their national identity both based 
on its uniqueness  ^and antiquity. Similarly, national history played an important role in 
participants’ construction of their national identity, not only in forging the ancient-ncss 
(ancient lineage) of the nation, but also in bolstering and sustaining the cohesiveness of 
the group across time. In the following sections the role of national/ethnic language and 
history in forging and affirming national and/or ethnic identity are briefly discussed.
Language, History and Identity
“Language is frequently a highly salient feature of cultural differences and can become 
the most potent symbol of ethnic identity” (Hogg and Abrams, 1988, p. 196). Moreover, 
it can play a vital role in inter-group relations by highlighting cultural diversities between 
groups, and building on similarities and solidarity among others. Relevant research on 
the role of language usage and identity has revealed that the two are reciprocally related 
as the former contributes to identity formation while group identity affects the attitudes 
towards language and the extent of its usage (Giles and Coupland, 1991; Sachdev and 
Bourhis, 1990, 1993; Barrett, 2001, 2007; Sachdev and Hanlon, 2000/2001; Reizabal, 
Valencia and Barrett, 2004). Following SIT’s premises Gilles and Coupland (1991) 
proposed the theory of ‘Ethnolinguistic Identity’ which proposes that when identity is 
salient and language is perceived to be an important dimension of social comparisons for 
affirming the positive value of this identity, individuals are likely to adopt different 
strategies of psycholinguistic distinctiveness (e.g. switch to their language of ethnic 
origin). In multicultural contexts, this link between identity maintenance and language 
(ethnic and/or national), is even more important as it encompasses both political and 
cultural dimensions. The strength and direction of the association between the two is a 
function of the socio-political factors (instigation of linguistic policies) and the 
psychological processes (motivations) at work resulting in the maintenance or loss of 
minority languages. It also reflects the relationships of power and the status differentials
 ^Greek language is not a Latin-based language but it has a unique alphabet, syntax and grammar rooted in 
Ancient Greek.
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in minority-majority inter-group relations. As Chomsky argues “questions of language 
are basically questions of power” (1979, p. 191). There has been a lot of research interest 
in minority language rights and in the pivotal role that the nation-state posits in advancing 
the prospect of more representational (culturally diverse) multinational states (Kymlicka, 
1995; Hamel, 1997; May, 2000; Parekh, 2000).
On the other hand, national history also plays an important role in the development of the 
content of national identity providing material for the creation of collective narratives 
about events relevant to the making of the ingroup. The contribution of history to 
nationhood, and the use of historical themes, does not differ between nations. As Reicher 
and Hopkins (2001) argue, whether a nation is ancient or not does not really matter since 
all of them consider themselves ancient. In their own words, “the significance of these 
formulations is that they formulate historical continuity... If the nation has always existed 
then it becomes something eternal and necessary rather than temporal and contingent” (p. 
19). It is this sense of temporal continuity conveyed by national myths, traditions and 
historical narratives that creates a strong thread between a group’s past and future. It 
gives its members the opportunity to turn the former (past) into something less remote by 
not only making them aware of it but also by being able to reconstruct it to the extent it 
becomes a constituent part of their present national identity. Therefore, history informs 
the content of national identity and, along with social rituals, commemorations and other 
cultural festivities, serves to communicate it to national group members across time. In 
that sense, individuals develop a sense of belongingness and they identify with a nation 
where they understand and acknowledge their past and portray their future as a result of 
these deep-rooted processes.
Moreover, historical narratives may evoke social memories which may not only impact 
on perceptions of the ingroup, but also of other groups (Lyons, 1996). The present status 
of interethnic and inter-group relations may be strongly affected by whom the national 
history has identified as being “enemies” or “friends” in the nation’s past. Therefore, 
history is not only a romanticised narrative about the making of an ingroup. Every so 
often, it may become the most effective medium in the construction and communication
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of polemical representations about other national groups (Liu and Hilton, 2005). In that 
sense, history provides an ideological context that justifies and/or contests the social 
position of a national group across time and its relative power and status in the current 
socio-political context.
The study of these functions of national language and history, to inform the content of 
national identity as relatively distinct and continuous across time, are even more pertinent 
when one turns to the extent to which they are compliant with the processes guiding the 
development of a super-ordinate identity in complex systems such as the EU. Relevant 
research has indicated that EU identity has been a far from easy identity to incorporate in 
an individual’s identity structure. Individuals vary in their perceptions of what being a 
European means and on its perceived compatibility with their national cultural identities 
(Breakwell, 1996; Cinnirella, 1996, 1997).
Cultural threat coming from Europe
Apart from identifying the type of threat (distinctiveness, continuity) to national identity 
and the means for inducing it, the previous findings helped us identify the source of threat 
to be used later in the experimental scenarios: that of a European identity. More 
specifically, both the first study (part a) and previous studies (Chryssochoou, 1996, 
2000b) indicated that Greek participants usually tend to compare themselves against 
other Europeans, with national culture being the preferred dimension of these inter-group 
comparisons. The perceived superiority of their cultural heritage allows them to affirm 
positively their national identity against their ‘competitors’ (see results section. Study 1- 
Part 1) and to justify their place in the European Union. However, being simultaneously 
members of the EU may imply different ingroup loyalties which may not always be 
compliant with the national ones.
On the one hand, the construction of a European identity that is highly inclusive after 
reducing the social meaning of category boundaries may be a prescription for minimising 
the existing cultural variation. On the other hand, this culturally homogenised
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representation of EU identity may be resisted by individuals on the basis that it poses a 
threat to the national groups’ claims to distinctiveness. Particularly, in the case of Greek 
national identity, that as the previous studies clearly demonstrated culture is a constitutive 
part of its content and its uniqueness is functionally important.
Moreover, in an attempt to promote positive inter-group relations and to generate a 
stronger sense of belongingness with the larger collective (the EU), history and its role in 
creating, sustaining and moderating levels of identification both at the national and at the 
supranational level may need to be revisited. It has been suggested that there are 
conflicting representations of history within the EU which need to be negotiated (Hilton, 
Erb, Dermot and Molian, 1996; Liu and Hilton, 2005). These negotiation processes may 
require the re-evaluation of the social identity functions (e.g. bolstering self-esteem, 
enhancing continuity) served by subgroup-based histories (national) and of their use so 
far by politicians, media and lay people as “causal theories” (Moscovici, 1984) for 
justifying inter-group attitudes and legitimising political actions. On this basis, the 
content of national histories may need to change leaving out narratives that ‘nourish’ 
hostility among the member-states after being replaced by those which put emphasis and 
discuss their economic and cultural interdependence.
Similar to national identity, the content of EU identity also needs to have a valued 
historical dimension to provide its members with a sense of temporal continuity for 
encouraging them to imagine their past not only at the national, but most importantly at 
the supra-national level. Therefore, despite changing the content of representations of 
histories at a national level, reconciliation may also be achieved by the construction of a 
shared social representation of an EU history: a narrative about the evolution of the 
supra-national group across time and contexts. After acknowledging the long history of 
conflict and the cultural diversity within Europe, European history needs to present and 
communicate an image of a non-culturally oriented and politically unified community, 
where none of the member-states appears to have an economic, political or cultural 
advantage.
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On the one hand, these issues of redefinition and change in national histories combined 
with the emergence of a consensual representation of European history may smooth inter­
group relations and strengthen identification with the EU, as individuals would feel 
members of a unified-temporal entity. On the other hand, they may also threaten the 
historicity of traditional national identities and the primacy of their role in establishing 
and sustaining national continuity. Changes in the content of national history render 
possible the disruption in the cognitive consistency of how a national group views itself 
across time and how it relates historically to the other national groups. Relevant to the 
second point, for most national communities there is a long list of ‘significant others’- 
groups which have posed a threat to the existence of the nation during its formation 
process (Triandafyllidou, 1998) - with whom the nation contested (or still does) over 
territorial and/or cultural claims of heritage (LeVine and Campbell, 1972). Thus, any 
attempt to downgrade the importance of these historical periods in reconstructing the 
struggle of a national group to define and to consolidate its national identity in territorial 
and cultural terms, may be experienced as highly threatening and meet great resistance. 
This is particularly evinced in nations like Greece where histories are marked by long 
lasting inter-group conflicts with neighbouring countries (current and future members of 
the EU) and the sense of national belongingness is reinforced every so often by the notion 
of real or perceived conflicts with these threatening ‘others’ (Triandafyllidou et.al, 1997; 
Mavrogordatos, 2003). The sense that national identities would disappear gradually and 
be replaced by a single European identity that lacks the historicity of the former may 
generate tensions between these two forms of identification. The construction of the 
experimental vignettes was grounded in this idea.
The importance of acknowledging the EU as a cultural integratioii rather than just as an 
economic one was emphasised in the present experimental scenarios. However, it is all 
the cultural possibilities previously discussed in the context of European integration, and 
their potential implementation, that may be perceived to elicit fimdamental changes in the 
meaning and value of national identities. In the present study, participants were led to 
believe that under the prospect of creating a culturally unified and continuous European
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community, the status of national language and history and over and above their 
respective functions would not stay immune to the processes of cultural assimilation.
Two experimental scenarios were constructed by the experimenter in order to threaten 
differentially the two motivational principles of Greek national identity (national 
continuity and distinctiveness) in each experimental condition. With the view to make 
the vignettes appear more authentic, the format used was one of an official document 
written and signed by an imaginary European Cultural Committee.
The first experimental scenario was a document written and signed by a fictional 
European Cultural Committee discussing the present difficulties and problems occurring 
within the EU due to its linguistic diversity. Based on the article, the linguistic 
distinctiveness that exists among European member states was presented as the greatest 
obstacle standing in the way of the emergence of a common European political identity.
A set of EU decrees was presented relevant to assimilation techniques that need to be 
employed for reducing this linguistic diversity. The article focused mainly on the case of 
Greek language and on its minority status in the multilingual EU with respect to the 
number of people speaking the language and its lack of lineage with the Latin alphabet 
and syntax. The necessity and the usefulness for assimilating gradually any form of 
national characteristic, starting with the creation of a common language, were 
emphasised. The new language EUROPA (rooted in Latin languages) and its prospect of 
becoming the official spoken language in the EU was expected to be perceived as being 
particularly threatening to the role of Greek language as a main source of national 
distinctiveness.
In a similar way, the devaluation of the role of Greek history in the second scenario 
aimed to induce threat to national continuity principle. Participants in the present 
condition were given a document, signed by the same European Cultural Committee, 
which debated the importance attributed to the role of national history in the educational 
system of all European member-states. The Greek national educational system was 
singled out and it was heavily criticised for enhancing prejudiced and imperialistic
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attitudes towards other nations. Consequently, the article discussed a number of changes 
that the committee decided to implement as a means of reducing national continuity and 
of establishing a stronger thread with the European vision (e.g. abolishment of 
commemorative days and of adjectives that declare victory over a fellow member state or 
evoke hostility).
7.4.6 Initial analysis
Skewness and kurtosis were calculated in order to determine whether the two scales 
measuring levels of national distinctiveness and continuity were normally distributed in 
each of the three groups (2 experimental, 1 control). The reported values suggested that 
only the national distinctiveness scales revealed to be slightly negatively skewed in the 
first experimental and control conditions (skewness /std. error of skewness= -2.16 and - 
2.57 respectively). However, as the values of skeweness do not deviate substantially 
from the absolute value of 2 (see West, Finch and Curran, 1995), no transformations were 
considered necessary and all variables were used in parametric statistical tests.
7.4.7 Results
In order to investigate whether the three groups differed on their levels of national 
distinctiveness and continuity prior to the administration of the experimental vignettes, 
one-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) were performed. The results indicated no 
significant differences based on the levels of national distinctiveness and continuity 
amongst the three groups with F  (2, 57) =.37, ns and F  (2, 57) = 1.27, ns respectively 
(National Distinctiveness: M Scenario Threatening National Distinctiveness = 5.23, M Scenario 
Threatening National Continuity=A.^2, M Control =5.07; National Continuity: M Scenario 
Threatening National Distinctiveness = 5.4, M Scenario Threatening National Continuity = 4.74, M 
C ontrol=5.0\). Furthermore, the series of paired-t tests, performed to identify whether the 
levels of national distinctiveness and continuity differed within each group, revealed no 
significant differences {Scenario Threatening National Distinctiveness', t (19) =-.64, ns; Scenario 
Threatening National Continuity', t (19) =.43, ns; Control', t (19) =.29, ns).
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7.4.7.1 Manipulation Check
A  repeated measures mixed within-between subjects MANOVA was performed to 
explore the impact of the experimental scenarios (between-subjects factors) used for 
threatening national distinctiveness and continuity on the levels of perceived threat of the 
four national motivational principles (within-subjects). Initially, by checking the 
multivariate tests, it was revealed that there was a significant main effect of the type of 
perceived threat with F  (3, 55) = 13.09, p<.001 and rj^-41.7% (Wilks’ Lambda= .58) 
which suggested that, irrespective of the conditions that participants were allocated in, 
they all scored significantly different on the items measuring perceived threat posed on 
the four national motivations. The effectiveness of the experimental scenarios was 
confirmed by the two-way interaction between the type of perceived threat x condition 
with F (6, 110)= 11.51, p<.01 and rj^  =38.6% (Wilks’ Lambda=.38). This finding 
suggests that participants’ scores on perceived threat posed on the four national 
motivational principles varied across the three experimental conditions (see Figure 7.1 
below).
Figure 7.1: Type of threafCondition
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The post-hoc mean comparisons (Bonferroni tests) on perceptions of threat posed to the 
national continuity variable indicated that participants who read the second experimental 
scenario (history) perceived higher levels of threat to their national continuity than 
participants in the first experimental scenario \M  Scenario Threatening National Continuity =  
6.30; Scenario Threatening National Distinctiveness = 4.20 with p<.001] and the control
group [M Control =1.00 p<.001].
The results testing the differences across the three groups on perceptions of threat on the 
national distinctiveness variable revealed that participants who read the scenario 
challenging the importance of maintaining ethnolinguistic distinctiveness, differed on 
their levels of perceived threat to national distinctiveness from the control group of the 
pilot study [M Scenario Threatening National Distinctiveness = 6.25, M Control =1.15 t (38) = 
20.17, p~.000]. Although there was a significant difference between the two 
experimental groups based on their scores on perceptions of threat on national 
distinctiveness, the p value exceeded the Bonferroni criterion applied (.01) \M  Scenario 
Threatening National Distinctiveness = 6.25 2iT[â.yi Scenario Threatening National Continuity =5.25 
p<.04].
Furthermore, a series of paired-t tests analyses were performed to examine the extent to 
which the two national motivations used in the experimental manipulations were 
differentially threatened within each of the two experimental conditions. The results 
revealed that in the first experimental condition (language scenario) national 
distinctiveness was significantly more threatened than national continuity with M Perceived 
Threat on ND = 6.25 and M Perceived Threat on NC = 4.20, t (19) =-6.57, p~0). On the contrary, 
participants in the second experimental condition (history scenario) perceived the 
scenario to be more threatening for their national continuity than for their national 
distinctiveness with M Perceived Threat on ND = 5.25 and M Perceived Threat on NC = 6.30, t(19) 
=-6.57, p<.02.
The calculated mean scores on perceived threat to national self-esteem and national 
efficacy revealed that there were significant differences between the two experimental
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groups and the control group of the study [Threat on National Esteem: M Scenario 
Threatening National Distinctiveness = 4.05 and M Control = 1.15, t(38)= 4.82, p~0, M Scenario 
Threatening National Continuity = 3.50 and ^ C o n tro l  = 1.15, t(38)= 4.95, p~0, Threat on 
National Efficacy: M Scenario Threatening National Distinctiveness = 4.35 and M Control= 1.00, 
t(38)= 7.56, P'^ 'O, ^ S cen ario  Threatening National Continuity = 4.45 and M C ontrol= 1.00, t(38)= 
12.50, p~0]. No significant differences were revealed between the two experimental 
conditions on the levels of perceived threat to these two motivations. As can be observed 
by the mean scores, participants in these two groups experienced the same levels of threat 
to national esteem and efficacy [Threat on National Esteem: M Scenario Threatening National 
Distinctiveness = 4.05 diXtà-lsA Scenario Threatening National Continuity = 3.50, t (38) = .73, ns; 
Threat on National Efficacy: M Scenario Threatening National Distinctiveness = 4.35 and M 
Scenario Threatening National Continuity = A AS, t (38) = -.19, ns]. However, as expected, in 
comparison with the control group these motivations were also affected.
One final analysis seemed appropriate for testing the effectiveness of the experimental 
manipulations. The pilot study needed to show that in each of the two experimental 
conditions both national esteem and efficacy were less threatened compared to the other 
two national motivational principles. The findings supported our expectations, as 
national distinctiveness, in the condition where the former was challenged (language 
scenario), was significantly more threatened than national esteem and efficacy 
respectively [M Perceived Threat on ND = 6.25 - M Perceived Threat on NEsteem = 4.05 t (19) =4.59, 
p~.000 and M Perceived Threat on NEfficacy= 4.35 t (19) =4.25, p~0]. Likewise, participants in 
the second condition (history scenario) reported that their levels of national continuity 
were significantly more threatened compared to their levels of national esteem and 
efficacy after reading the administered scenario [M Perceived Threat on NC = 6.30 -M Perceived 
Threat on NEsteem = 3.50, t (19) =6.47, p~0 and M Perceived Threat on NEfficacy= 4.45 t (19)
=6.75, p~0].
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How convincing were the scenarios after all?
In the last part of the questionnaire, participants were asked to indicate the extent to 
which they believed that the given texts were real or fictional. The mean scores revealed 
that participants who read the vignettes agreed that the texts were real (M Threatening 
National Distinctiveness — 5.05; M Threatening National Continuity =5.15). Participants who 
read the article in the control group which was the only authentic text also reported that 
the text was real with M Control = 5.65.
Overall, both the manipulation check and the reality text item indicated that the 
experimental scenarios and the text used for the control condition worked quite well.
Even though national distinctiveness and continuity were differentially threatened within 
each experimental condition, the fact that national distinctiveness was equally threatened 
between these two groups suggested that more changes needed to be made in the second 
scenario before it was used in the main study. Words and phrases that signified the two 
nationality principles and the changes that they would undergo after the implementation 
of the EU policies (distinctiveness, continuity) were highlighted.
7.5 Method of the main study
7.5.1 Sample
A  total of 258 University students-Greek nationals (98 males and 160 females; mean 
age=22 years and age range from 18 to 40) were recruited from the Aristotle University 
and the Technological Institute of Thessalonica, located in the Northern part of Greece, to 
participate in the study. Participants were from different schools and they were randomly 
allocated across the three experimental groups. Each experimental group consisted of the 
same proportion of males and females (Experimental Group 1: males: 33, females: 53; 
Experimental Group 2: males: 32, females: 53; Control: males: 33, females: 53). The 
majority of students were residents of Thessalonica (N=223, 85.7%) while the rest 
(N=35, 14.3%) reported that they were from different cities in Greece.
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7.5.2 Design
The main study comprised of an experiment which adopted a mixed factorial design 
(2x3). The within-subject factors were pre-post measures (repeated-measures) of 18 
dependent variables (national, religious, student identifications and their corresponding 
motivational principles: distinctiveness, continuity, private and public self-esteem, and 
self-efficacy). The between-subject factor was the type of threat and had three levels: 1) 
Threat to National Distinctiveness; 2) Threat to National Continuity ', and 3) Control 
Group.
7.5.3 Measures: Main Study Questionnaire
The self-completed questionnaire used in both phases of this study (pre-post the 
administration completion of the experimental vignettes) comprised three sections and 
measured 18 dependent variables.
Distinctiveness and continuity motivational principles for each of the three elements 
(national, religious, and student) were assessed separately based on eight items which 
were developed by the researcher. Preliminary analysis based on data collected in the 
first pilot study revealed that the constructed items were consistent and reliable in 
measuring distinctiveness and continuity principles.
The second section of the questionnaire also consisted of items measuring the strength of 
identification (Cinnirella, 1997), collective self-esteem (Luhtanen and Crocker, 1992) and 
general self-efficacy variables (Schwarzer and Jerusalem, 1995).
Finally, the last section of the second questionnaire included the demographic 
characteristics of the sample (age, gender, nationality and place of residence) and four 
items measuring levels of perceived threat posed to all four national motivational 
principles (manipulation check) with responses rated on a 7-point Likert scale.
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7.5.3.1 Experimental vignettes
Scenario I-Threatening National Distinctiveness (Language)
EUROPEAN CULTURAL COMMISSION
BRUSSELS 10-3-2002
SUBJECT; “Europe, a single cultural entity”
The coexistence of various national cultures within the European Union is leading to the gradual 
development of a multicultural society at a political, economic and social level. This sets the 
requirements that will lead to the creation of a single Euro-State in the future, where individual 
nation-states, regardless of size, will join together into a Federal European Republic.
However, in this creative process of a single European political entity, there still remains a 
significant obstacle: the linguistic differentiation between nation-states of Europe.
In his article entitled “How do we define European identity”, Karson (1999) highlights the issue 
of democracy that is posed by the linguistic differentiation of European citizens in case more than 
one language is established as official European language. If, for example, English and French 
become established as official languages of the European Union, political debates will be 
segregated among English- and French-speaking groups, and groups of citizens who don’t speak 
English and French will be essentially excluded.
On the other hand, the issue of translation is a huge one. More than 40% of the European Union’s 
budget is currently dedicated to the provision of language services.
As a European identity should not be differentiating between national groups, but rather be 
embracing them by putting potential differences aside, the European Commission, at an 
extraordinary session that was convened on the 15* February 2002 in Brussels regarding the 
abolishment of cultural differences among member-states, decided the following:
1. In the next five years, a single European language will be created, called Europa, which 
will incorporate elements from all Latin-based European languages.
2. At the level of nation-states, the European Union will provide strong financial incentives 
to services and organisations in the public and private sector in favour of using Europa 
in the press and on-line news agencies, in the media and in publications, while special 
awards for the establishment of Europa will be sponsored in literature and the music 
industry.
3. Non Latin-based languages will be excluded from the new European language, with the 
exception of some Greek words, mainly scientific terms which are already in use in the 
national languages of European countries.
4. Non Latin-based languages with an alphabet other than the Latin one (e.g. Greek) are 
required to replace their national alphabet with the Latin one within the next two years.
5. In accordance with the recommendation of the Chairman of the European Cultural 
Commission, the main objective is the abolishment of national languages, such as Greek, 
which have a different alphabet, grammar and syntax.
6. For Greek in particular, there will be no financial support from the EU, neither in the 
field of teaching nor in that of publishing. Greek children, like their counterparts in other 
European countries, will have to learn Europa as a compulsory first language and Greek 
as a secondary option.
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The establishment of a single European language will help the people of all European countries 
realise that as citizens of the European Union they belong to the same political and cultural entity 
with a common linguistic medium of communication and that any kind of differentiation 
stemming from nationality will have to be gradually abolished.
Scenario II- Threatening National Continuity (History)
EUROPEAN CULTURAL COMMISSION
BRUSSELS 10-5-2002
SUBJECT: “Europe and civilisation”
The history of a nation is a key factor in shaping the national consciousness of its citizens and in 
preserving, maintaining and disseminating its culture.
The role of history as a connecting link between the past and the future of a nation-state and 
its position in the educational system of the European Union member-states was an issue of 
particular debate and consideration at a recent meeting of the European Cultural Commission. 
During this meeting, which was held in Brussels on 5-5-2002, among other things, the negative 
role of the national history of Greece in the process of creating a European cultural identity was 
highlighted.
The Cultural Commission decided by majority voting to intervene in the delivery of teaching 
history in the educational systems of national member-states of the European Union.
Special mention was made for the Greek educational system which, on the basis of teaching 
history in particular, was described by some members of the Commission as highly nationalistic. 
Extreme cases of nationalistic prejudice were pointed out in the teaching of history in Greek 
schools, and it was decided that these cases need to be abolished.
In order to reinforce the development of a European national consciousness, the Commission 
decided that there need to be radical changes in the authoring of history textbooks, with particular 
emphasis in the history of Europe. These books will be compulsory reading with the beginning of 
the following academic year in all member-states, with increased teaching hours (double), and 
they will replace history textbooks that have been in use for teaching in schools so far.
With regard to the content of this history textbook, the following guidelines have been issued;
1. Epithets, for example those used for historical figures, such as Bulgar-Slayer or Turk- 
Eater, are deemed unacceptable. Additionally, the term used to describe the 400-year of 
Turkish occupation, Tourkokratia, will be renamed to “era of the Ottoman Empire”.
2. The common European cultural tradition was created in Central Europe and the 
beginnings of European Union history date to the early 9* cent. AD with the 
establishment of the Holy Roman Empire by Charles the Great (Charlemagne), an 
historical fact on which particular emphasis must be placed.
3. Roman history, which forms an illustrious past for the majority of western European 
countries, features in the textbook as the Protohistory of Europe and it therefore needs to 
be the introductory chapter of every school history textbook in all European states.
4. The Commission also recommends the abolishment of the epithet ‘Great’ for historical 
figures that have been linked with imperialist policies, such as Alexander the Great or
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Napoleon the Great. It also recommends the abolishment of national public holidays that 
commemorate military conflicts among European peoples (e.g. France -  liberation of 
Paris, Greece -  28* October).
Finally, Greece, as an example, is asked to make appropriate changes in textbooks of 
national history in order to demote its national tradition which links to its distant 
historical past and to emphasize its links with Europe by supporting the European ideal, 
which is not based on the past but rather invests in the future.
Control (sea equipment)
Mask
There are many types of scuba masks: one-window, two-window and panoramic masks, masks 
made of silicone and natural rubber, and masks of low, medium or h i^  volume. When choosing 
the mask you want, you mainly need to check the following:
a) air tightness
b) good fit of the nose pocket in order to allow for a proper equalisation of pressure
c) broad field of vision
d) easy-to-adjust strap.
Silicon masks, be it transparent or black, have a better fit than those made of natural rubber, as 
rubber is a harder material than silicone.
The average cost for buying a good diving mask is around 30-40 euros. On basic 
maintenance (washing and avoiding exposure to sunlight and oils), a mask can have a useful life 
of about 6-7 years. There dozens of masks available in the market, for all kinds of facial shapes, 
including the rarest ones. The cost only becomes higher if you need a mask with prescription 
lenses, in which case the cost could be almost triple of what was mentioned earlier.
Fins
There are fins of small, medium and large size, with adjustable heel straps or full-fbot, with or 
without vents, and blades of variable size and flexibility.
Whether fins have vents or not is not really important. The ideal fins for free diving are 
the adjustable ones, as they don’t slip off the foot when you drop into the water and you can slip 
them on quite easily when it’s the last thing you need to put on and you’re carrying the weight of 
the rest of your equipment. These fins need to be worn in combination with (hard-sole) diving 
boots to avoid injury. Choose the correct size for your fins but also their flexibility, depending on 
how fit you are. Again the cost varies. For a good pair of proper fins the cost would be around 45- 
60 euros, and 70 euros for a pair of higher quality. However, they can be useful in a number of 
different situations and they last for long. For a pair of diving boots you should expect to need 
around 30 euros.
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7.5.4 Procedure
The experiment was conducted in May, after Easter time, when none of the two examined 
identity elements, national and religious, was likely to be salient. Groups of students 
from different fields of study were approached during their lectures and were asked to 
participate in the experiment. For this purpose, the experimenter attended different 
modules in order to recruit students. Having obtained permission from the University 
lecturers, the experimenter entered the lecture theaters, stayed through to the end of the 
lectures and informed the students about the nature of the study. Subjects were not 
informed about the exact purpose to avoid salience of the identity elements measured. As 
with the pilot studies, the study was introduced as a survey that investigated the public’s 
opinion on social issues. The repeated-measures experiment included two stages and was 
based on a self-completed questionnaire which was twice given to the participants, before 
and after a distraction task and the introduction of experimental vignettes.
In the first experimental stage, participants were asked to complete the questionnaire 
measuring the level of identification with national, religious and student social categories 
as well as the motivational principles relating to each target identity element. The order 
in which the scales were presented was always the same in both phases, since the pilot 
study conducted before the experiment revealed no order effects.
There was a 20-minute time break between the two experimental phases with the purpose 
of reducing any carry-over effects influencing participants’ responses in the second part 
of the study. In particular participants were allocated to two groups and were asked to 
write down odd or even numbers up to 100 depending on the group they were allocated 
in.
In the second experimental stage, participants were already randomly allocated in three 
equally numbered groups. Experimental group I was administered Scenario I which 
referred to the role of Greek language and aimed to threaten participants’ national 
distinctiveness. Experimental group 2 was administered Scenario II, a text threatening
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national continuity^. The control group of this study read an article totally irrelevant to 
any of the identity elements or motivational principles studied. The text-scenarios were 
attached to the second questionnaire, which was identical to the one administered in the 
first stage of the study but also had the manipulation check and the demographic ' 
questions. The procedure lasted for about 35-50 minutes in total.
After completing the second questionnaire, participants received oral debriefing 
information concerning the two experimental scenarios, the purpose and the hypotheses 
of the specific experiment. Moreover, it was emphasized by the researcher that the list of 
decrees threatening the role of Greek language and history and the European committee 
mentioned in the experimental vignettes were fictional and the purpose of their 
construction was explained thoroughly. Participants also had the opportunity to discuss 
their own views and to comment on the nature of the study.
7.6 Initial data analysis
Preliminary analysis revealed a normally-distributed spread of data and a series of 
reliability analyses were performed on the measures of all 18 dependent variables of this 
study (see Table below). The obtained alpha coefficients for the scales measuring public 
aspect of self-esteem for all three identity elements were revealed to be relatively low 
(alphas ranging from .65 to .68). The reliability indices were not improved after item 
deletion so the researcher decided to use them in the analysis, keeping in mind this 
limitation. It should also be noted that previous studies using the same public collective 
self-esteem measures relating to social identities like ethnic or national indicated similar 
alpha coefficients (Korf and Malan, 2002; Houston and Andreopoulou, 2003). 
Furthermore, even the authors (Luhtanen and Crocker, 1992) themselves reported that the 
test-retest reliabilities after a six week period revealed much lower alphas than before for 
both the private and public scales (.58 and .68 respectively).
For more details see: Section 7.5.3.1 Experimental Vignettes
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T able 7.6: R eliab ility  analysis o f  the stu d y m easures
Variables N Mean SD Cronbach’s alpha
Religious Distinctiveness 256 3.27 5.88 .83
Student Distinctiveness 258 3.83 4.75 .77
National Distinctiveness 258 4.54 5.90 .84
Religious Continuity 256 3.94 5.89 .88
Student Continuity 258 4.16 4.92 .79
National Continuity 258 4.78 5.14 .83
Religious Priv. Esteem 254 5.22 6.10 .88
Student Priv. Esteem 258 5.17 4.80 .75
National Priv. Esteem 258 5.38 5.70 .87
Religious Pub. Esteem 256 4.76 4.07 .65
Student Pub. Esteem 258 4.74 4.16 .68
National Pub. Esteem 257 4.27 4.26 .67
Religious Efficacy 249 2.22 8.35 .95
Student Efficacy 254 2.54 7.47 .95
National Efficacy 252 2.32 8.87 .97
National Identification 257 4.99 7.12 .86
Religious Identification 257 4.14 8.69 .91
Student Identification 256 4.70 6.21 .78
7.6.1 Manipulation check
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was performed to test the effect of the 
experimental vignettes on levels of perceived threat posed on the four national 
motivational principles. Initially, by observing the Levene’s test it was indicated that the 
assumption of equality for all four dependent variables was violated (p<.01). According 
to Tabachnick and Fidell (1996) in this occasion a more conservative alpha level for 
determining significance (p<.01 for severe violation) must be employed in the univariate 
F- tests. The results showed that there was a statistically significant difference across the 
three conditions on perceptions of threat as a combined variable with F  (8, 500) = 77.77, 
p~.0; Wilk’s Lambda= .20 and a large effect with y]^ = .55.
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After obtaining a significant result on the multivariate test, the researcher investigated 
further the differences across the three conditions on all four dependent variables 
separately. The results suggested that there were significant differences across the 
conditions regarding the levels of perceived threat experienced on all four motivations 
(see Table 7.7 below).
Further post-hoc analysis was conducted in order to identify where these significant 
differences lay^. The calculated mean scores indicated that there were no significant 
differences between the two experimental groups on levels of perceived threat posed on 
national continuity with t (159) = 1.20; ns, on levels of perceived threat posed to national 
esteem with t (166) = 1.12, ns and finally regarding the levels of perceived threat posed to 
national efficacy t (167) = .94, ns. However, there was a significant difference between 
the two experimental groups on levels of perceived threat to national distinctiveness with 
t (168) = 3.73, p~.0 with the first experimental group (national distinctiveness threat 
condition) reporting higher levels of perceived threat. The two experimental groups 
differed significantly from the control group in all four motivational principles, with the 
participants in the control group reporting that the relevant text did not induce any threat 
to their four national motivational principles.
The fact that both of the experimental scenarios were perceived equally threatening for 
national continuity was an indication that the first manipulation (language scenario) was 
slightly problematic. In addition, further analysis indicated that the vignette did not 
manage to differentially threaten the two motivational principles in the first experimental 
group with M Perceived Threat on ND = 6.04, M Perceived Threat on NC =5.85 and t (84) =-1.50, 
ns. This finding needs to be taken into consideration when explaining the results in the 
later stages of analysis. On the contrary, the second manipulation did work in the sense 
that national continuity was more threatened than national distinctiveness with t (84) = 
2.62, p<.01 (see Table 7.8).
Bonferroni critical value of significance p<.02
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T able 7.7: M eans and  standard  deviations in  m anipu lation  ch eck  m easurem ents
Mean Df F p-value
Perceived Threat on National Continuity (2,253) 406.58 .000 76.3%
Experimental Group 1 (National 
Distinctiveness Threat: Language) 5.85
Experimental Group 2 (National 
Continuity Threat: History) 5.59
Control
1.13
Perceived Threat on National 
Distinctiveness
(2,253) 364.13 .000 74.2%
Experimental Group 1 (National 
Distinctiveness Threat: Language)
6.04
Experimental Group 2 (National 
Continuity Threat: History)
5.19
Control 1.13
Perceived Threat on National Esteem (2,253) 63.51 .000 33.4.%
Experimental Group 1 (National 
Distinctiveness Threat: Language) 4.09
Experimental Group 2 (National 
Continuity Threat: History) 3.69
Control
Perceived Threat on National Efficacy 
Experimental Group 1 (National 
Distinctiveness Threat: Language)
1.07
4.29
(2,253) 107.51 .000 46%
Experimental Group 2 (National 
Continuity Threat: History)
4.01
Control 1.05
Note: Tests ofBetween-Subjects Effects with Bonferroni adjustement
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Finally, as it can be observed from the calculated mean scores that the experimental 
vignettes had successfully posed relatively less threat to the other two national identity 
principles: national esteem and efficacy. The latter were equally threatened in the two 
experimental conditions. Moreover, as expected these two principles (national esteem 
and efficacy) did not remain completely unaffected by the vignettes, as they were 
relatively more threatened than in the control (see Table 7.8).
Table 7.8: Means and standard deviations on perceptions of threat (within)
Mean SD t p-value
Experimental Group 1 {Threatening
National Distinctiveness- Scenario I)
Threat on ND-Threat on NC ND: 6.04 1.31 -1.50 ns
Threat on ND -Threat on NEST NC:5.85 1.23 6.32 .00
Threat on ND-Threat on NEFF NEST: 4.09 2.47 6.74 .00
Threat on NC-Threat on NEST NEFF; 4.29 2.04 7.24 .00
Threat on NC-Threat on NEFF 7.84 .00
Threat on NEST-Threat on NEFF -.92 ns
Experimental Group 2 {Threatening
National Continuity- Scenario II)
Threat on ND-Threat on NC ND: 5.19 1.57 2.62 .01
Threat on ND -Threat on NEST NC: 5.59 1.63 7.35 .00
Threat on ND-Threat on NEFF NEST: 3.69 2.19 7.73 .00
Threat on NC-Threat on NEST NEFF: 4.01 1.89 6.38 .00
Threat on NC-Threat on NEFF 5.42 .00
Threat on NEST-Threat on NEFF -1.49 ns
Control
Threat on ND-Threat on NC ND: 1.13 .70 .00 ns
Threat on ND -Threat on NEST NC: 1.13 .70 .82 ns
Threat on ND-Threat on NEFF NEST: 1.07 .26 1.19 ns
Threat on NC-Threat on NEST NEFF: 1.05 .21 .80 ns
Threat on NC-Threat on NEFF 1.15 ns
Threat on NEST-Threat on NEFF 1.00 ns
Note: NC: national continuity, ND: national distinctiveness, NEST: national esteem, NEFF: 
national efficacy
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7.6.2 Screening for differences across the three groups on the dependent variables
in the pre-threat condition
A  multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted initially on the pre-threat 
identification measures for testing if the levels of strength with national, religious and 
student identifications differed significantly across groups in Time 1 (pre-threat 
condition). This analysis aimed to demonstrate that the groups were comparable and that 
any changes obtained in the salience of identification measures in the post-threat 
condition can be attributed to the type of threat induced and not to prior variations. The 
results indicated that the effect of condition on the combined variable was not significant 
[F (6, 496) = 1.63, ns; Wilks’Lambda; .96] which suggests that the groups did not differ 
in any of these variables (identifications).
The same analysis was repeated for the identity principles as it was important to inspect 
any variations across groups relevant to the state of distinctiveness, continuity, esteem 
(private and public) and efficacy reported for each type of identification (national, 
religious and student) prior to the administration of the experimental vignettes. A series 
of multivariate tests (MANOVAs) were performed with the identity principles of all three 
examined identity elements as the dependent variables and with the condition (scenario) 
as the independent (see Table 7.9). Because there are multiple ANOVAs, a Bonferroni 
type adjustment needs to be employed for inflated Type I error.
Another reason for using Bonferroni was that by observing the Levene’s tests it was 
indicated that the assumption of equality of variances was violated for the variables 
measuring national distinctiveness (p<.03), national continuity (p~.05) and religious 
efficacy (p<.01). This means that in the univariate F-tests a more conservative alpha 
level (Bonferroni type adjustment: for moderate violation p<.02 and for severe violation 
p<.01 respectively) needs to be applied for determining significance (see Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 1996, p. 80).
The effect of condition on the combined distinctiveness variable was not significant with 
F  (6, 500) =1.02, ns and Wilks’ Lambda: .98. With respect to continuity principle, the
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condition did not have any significant effect on the combined variable {F (6, 500) = 1.38, 
ns; Wilks’ Lambda: .97). By observing the univariate F-test it seemed that condition had 
a marginally significant effect on the levels of national continuity. However, the effect of 
condition was no longer significant after the Bonferroni adjustment was made (p<.01). 
The results so far suggested that the groups started at the same baseline as they did not 
differ based on their levels of distinctiveness and continuity principles in any of the 
examined identity elements.
The multivariate tests carried out for testing the differences across the three groups in 
relation to the their pre-threat levels of private-esteem (national, religious and student) 
showed that there was a statistically significant effect of condition on the combined 
dependent variables with F  (6, 488) = 2.16, p<.05; Wilks’ Lambda= .95 and if^2.6Vo. 
When the dependent variables were considered separately, the results showed that there 
were some variations between the groups relevant to their levels of pre national private- 
esteem. More specifically, the post-hoc tests revealed that participants allocated in the 
first experimental condition (reading the scenario threatening national distinctiveness) 
reported higher levels of pre-threat national private-esteem than participants in the second 
experimental condition (reading the scenario threatening national continuity). On the 
contrary, no significant differences were revealed among the groups based on their levels 
of national, religious and student public-esteem with F  (6, 498)= .26 and Wilks’ Lambda: 
.99. Finally, relevant to the effect of condition on the combined efficacy variables the F 
value revealed no significant effect with F  (6,476) = 1.64, ns; Wilks’ Lambda: .96. 
However, when the dependent variables were examined separately it was apparent that 
the condition had a significant effect on prior levels of student efficacy variable. The 
post hoc-tests (Bonferroni) revealed that the second group scored lower on levels of 
student efficacy compared to the other two groups. The present set of analyses suggested 
that some groups differed on their prior levels of national private esteem and student 
efficacy. These findings need to be accounted for, especially when comparisons are made 
between the groups on these variables before and after the experimental manipulation.
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Table 7.9: Testing the effect of conditions on the identity principles measures of
the three identity elements (Univariate F-tests) at the pre-threat stage
Mean D f F p-value
PRE National Distinctiveness (2,252) 2.11 ns 1.6%
Experimental Group 1 (Threatening 
ND Condition)
4.70
Experimental Group 2 (Threatening 
NC Condition)
4.28
Control 4.65
PRE Religions Distinctiveness (2,252) 1.44 ns 1.1%
Experimental Group 1 (Threatening 
ND Condition)
3.36
Experimental Group 2 (Threatening 
NC Condition)
Control
3.06
3.42
PRE Student Distinctiveness (2,252) 1.86 ns 1.5%
Experimental Group 1 (Threatening 
ND Condition)
3.99
Experimental Group 2 (Threatening 
NC Condition)
3.64
Control
3.85
PRE National Continuity
Experimental Group 1 (Threatening 
ND Condition)
4.84
(2,252) 2.95 .05
(p>.01)
2.3%
Experimental Group 2 (Threatening 
NC Condition)
4.50
Control 4.96
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T able 7.9 Continued
Mean Df F p-value V"
PRE Religious Continuity (2,252) 1.39 ns 1.1%
Experimental Group 1 (Threatening 
ND Condition)
3.88
Experimental Group 2 (Threatening 
NC Condition)
3.77
Control 4.14
PRE Student Continuity (2,252) 1.56 ns 1.2%
Experimental Group 1 (Threatening 
ND Condition)
4.26
Experimental Group 2 (Threatening 
NC Condition)
3.95
Control 4.22
PRE National Private-Esteem (2,250) 4.41 .01 3.4%
Experimental Group 1 (Threatening 
ND Condition)
, 5.67a
Experimental Group 2 (Threatening 
NC Condition)
5.04
Control 5.46
PRE Religious Private-Esteem (2,250) 2.48 ns (.09) 1.9%
Experimental Group 1 (Threatening 
ND Condition)
5.39
Experimental Group 2 (Threatening 
NC Condition)
4.92
Control 5.46
PRE Student Private-Esteem (2,250) 1.19 ns 0.9%
Experimental Group 1 (Threatening 
ND Condition)
5.32
Experimental Group 2 (Threatening 
NC Condition)
5.14
Control 5.04
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T able 7.9 Continued
Mean Df F p-value
PRE National Public-Esteem (2,251) .27 ns 0.2%
Experimental Group 1 (Threatening 
ND Condition)
4.34
Experimental Group 2 (Threatening 
NC Condition)
4.22
Control 4.28
PRE Religions Public-Esteem (2,251) .50 ns 0.4%
Experimental Group 1 (Threatening 
ND Condition)
4.85
Experimental Group 2 (Threatening 
NC Condition)
4.72
Control 4.71
PRE Student Public-Esteem (2,251) .46 ns 0.4%
Experimental Group 1 (Threatening 
ND Condition)
4.83
Experimental Group 2 (Threatening 
NC Condition)
4.70
Control 4.70
PRE National Efficacy (2,240) 2.27 ns 1.9%
Experimental Group 1 (Threatening 
ND Condition)
2.36
Experimental Group 2 (Threatening 
NC Condition)
2.15
Control 2.43
PRE Religions Efficacy (2,240) 2.00 ns 1.6%
Experimental Group 1 (Threatening 
ND Condition)
2.28
Experimental Group 2 (Threatening 
NC Condition)
2.05 "
Control 2.26
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T able 7.9 Continued
Mean D f F p-value Î/2
PRE Student Efficacy (2,240) 4.17 .02 3.4%
Experimental Group 1 (Threatening 
ND Condition)
2.65
Experimental Group 2 (Threatening 
NC Condition)
2.35b
Control 2.64
Note: The subscripts used portray the different comparisons:
a stands for the significant difference between the two experimental groups with p~.01 
b stands for the significant differences between the second experimental with the other two groups 
with p<.05
7.7 Results (Pre-threat phase)
7.7.1 Exploring the relationships between identity elements in the pre threat stage
In line with our prediction (HI), the bivariate correlations indicated that national and 
religious identifications were significantly and positively correlated at Time 1 (Pre-Threat 
stage) in all three experimental conditions. Moreover, in order to trace any significant 
differences in the correlation coefficients representing the strength of the relationship 
between national and religious identifications across these groups in the pre-threat 
condition, the raw correlations were transformed into Fisher’s z scores. The results 
revealed that for participants allocated to the second experimental group the relationship 
between pre-threat national and religious identification was significantly stronger 
(r=.69**, n= 83) than for those in the first experimental group (r=.42**, n=82 with z=- 
2.52 p<.01) and the control group of the study (r=.44**, n=84 z=-2.38 significant at 
p<.05). This finding has implications for the interpretation of the data on the relationship 
between identity elements and the changes occurring as it shows that the second 
experimental group started at a higher baseline than the other two groups in terms of the 
strength of the relationship between national and religious identity elements.
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Furthermore, although identity elements do not exist in isolation within identity structure, 
based on the findings from the first pilot study there was no reason to expect a strong 
association between national and student identifications. The correlation matrix indicated 
that at the pre-threat stage national identification was strongly and positively related to 
student identification in all three groups (Threatening ND condition: r=.58, N=82; 
Threatening NC condition: r= .42, N=83; Control: r=.58, N=84).
In order to test the second part of the present hypothesis which assumed that the 
relationship between these two elements based on levels of identification would be 
relatively weaker compared to the one reported between nationality and religion, 
Williams’ formula (see section 6.3.9) was used within each sample. This formula 
calculates the t-values to identify whether there is a difference between dependent 
correlations from the same sample. In our case, the shared common variable is pre­
national identification.
The analysis yielded a significant difference between these two correlation coefficients 
(national-religious vs. national-student) in the second experimental condition [t (80) = 
2.98, p<.05] with the relationship between national and religious being relatively 
stronger. Conversely, for participants allocated in the other two conditions there was no 
difference in the relative strength of these relationships (Threatening ND condition: t (79) 
=-1.48, ns and Control: t (81) = -1.24, ns respectively).
Finally, student and religious identifications were significantly and positively related in 
the two experimental groups (Threatening ND condition: r=.28 and Threatening NC 
condition: r=.39 respectively). No significant relationship between these two types of 
identification was revealed for the control group of this study.
With respect to the strength of the relationships amongst all three identity elements at the 
pre-threat stage, the present findings so far indicated that nationality is strongly and 
positively related to both religious and student identity elements in all three groups. There 
were some variations in the strength of its relationship with these two identity elements in
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the second experimental condition (reading the scenario threatening national continuity)
with nationality correlating more with religious than student identity elements.
Table 7.10: Summary of findings
Pre-Correlations Group 
(Listwise n)
Pearson’s r Z score 
(between)
t-value
(within)
National-Religious
Identifications
ThreateningND:82
ThreateningNC:83
Control:84
.42**
.69**
.44**
-2.52a
-2.38b
National-Student
Identifications
ThreateningND:82
ThreateningNC:82
Control:84
.58**
.42**
.58**
2.98c
Student-Religious
Identifications
ThreateningND:82 
ThreateningNC:83 
Control: 84
.28**
.39**
.16 (ns)
Note: The subscripts used portray the different comparisons:
a stands for the significant difference on the strength of national-religious relationship between the two 
experimental groups, with p<.05
b  stands for the significant difference on the strength of national-religious relationship between the second 
experimental with the control, with p<.05
c stands for the significant difference between national-religious and national- student correlation 
coefficients for the second experimental group, with p<.01
Moreover, the strength of the relationship between nationality and religion was revealed 
to be relatively stronger in this group than in the other two groups of the study (first 
experimental condition and control). Given the fact that participants of this group 
perceived a higher overlap between these two group memberships, one may speculate 
that religious motivations would be more associated with the national identification 
variable and may contribute more in its prediction in the present condition rather than in 
the other two groups.
309
Finally, the strong and positive relationships between levels of national and student 
identifications suggested that our intention to explore whether, and how threat to national 
identity has a differential impact on the identity processes of a priori strongly related 
versus a weakly related identity element, is either no longer possible or else it may be 
tested only in the second experimental condition where nationality was differentially 
related to religious and student identity elements.
7.7.2 Examining levels of identification by levels o f motivational principles
This part of the analysis aimed to address these questions: Which principles contribute to 
identification with each identity element in the pre-threat condition? Are there any 
variations in the contribution o f each o f the four identity principles depending on the type 
o f identification studied? Is there an overlap attributed to the strong a priori relationships 
between them?
In order to test all these assumptions, hierarchical regressions analyses were considered 
appropriate for use. To be more specific, the hierarchical ordering of the variables was 
used only for exploring whether the motivational principles of a related identity (IVs) 
also contributed in predicting the strength of identification process (DVs) after 
controlling for the variance explained by the known and expected predictors, meaning the 
identity element’s own motivational principles (H2). For example, in predicting strength 
of national identification process (at both the pre-threat and post-threat stages), the 
variables measuring the national motivational principles were entered in the first block 
followed by religious (second block) and then by student (third block).
The motivational principles of each identity element were all entered in the same block 
and no order was employed. The reason for including the identity principles for each 
element into the same model without making an a priori decision about the order in 
which they would be entered was based on the fact that, according to IPT (Breakwell, 
1986), the order of motivation is context specific and therefore no general order may be
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presupposed. Even though our previous studies provided some support for the 
importance of distinctiveness and continuity principles in relation to national and 
religious identity elements in the Greek context, we decided to let the analysis (forced 
entry) indicate which were the best predictors of the identification processes.
7.7.2.1 Correlations between identity principles and identifications (pre-threat stage)
Prior to conducting the series of hierarchical regressions, it was necessary to examine not 
only the strength of the relationships between all three types of identifications with their 
corresponding identity principles, but also with the principles of a related identity 
element. Pearson’s correlations were performed to examine the relationships between the 
variables of interest. The analysis was repeated for each group of the study (see Tables 
7.11,7.12, 7.13).
National Identification and its correlates
Firstly, the correlation coefficients revealed that national identification was positively 
related to national distinctiveness, continuity, private-esteem and efficacy in all three 
groups. However, there were some variations regarding the relationship between the 
national public-esteem and national identification. The two revealed to be weakly related 
in the first experimental group (r=.29, p<.05, N=79) while no relationship was 
established between these two variables in the second and the third (control) groups. 
Moreover, national distinctiveness and continuity were strongly correlated in all three 
groups with coefficients ranging from .64 to .71.
Regarding the correlations between national identification and religious identity 
principles, the correlation matrices also indicated some variations across groups. In the 
first group (Threatening ND) national identification was significantly related only to the 
two aspects of religious-esteem, private and public. On the contrary, in the second group 
(Threatening NC) all four religious motivations were strongly and positively related to
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national motivations. This finding was somewhat expected as the previous analysis 
indicated that the relationship between these two identities was relatively stronger in this 
group (r=.69, p~0). Similarly, in the third group all religious identity principles, with the 
exception of religious private-esteem, were significantly related to national identification 
variable. However, the strength of these relationships varied. More specifically, with the 
exception of religious public-esteem (r=.35, p<.01) and religious continuity (r=.38, 
p<.01) the other two principles (religious distinctiveness and efficacy) were weakly 
related to national identification.
The relationships between national identification and student identity principles were also 
examined as the findings from the previously conducted correlation analysis testing the 
strength and direction of the relationships between identity elements indicated that 
student and national identity elements were also positively and strongly related. There 
was no consistent pattern of results across the three groups relevant to the obtained 
correlations. National identification was related only to student private esteem and 
efficacy principles in the first experimental group and to student private and public- 
esteem in the second. However, in the third group (control) national identification was 
correlated with more student identity principles (distinctiveness, continuity, public- 
esteem and efficacy) with coefficients ranging from .30 to .48.
Religious identification and its correlates
The Pearson’s correlation coefficients between religious identification and its identity 
principles, as obtained in all three groups, indicated that the former was strongly 
associated with religious distinctiveness, continuity, private-esteem and efficacy. With 
respect to its association with religious public-esteem, the two variables were related on 
the same level (r=.32 and r=.33, p<.01 respectively) in the first and second groups but not 
related at all in the third group. Similar to the national motivational principles, the 
association between distinctiveness and continuity principles was also very strong 
(p<.001) in all three groups with coefficients .60 (Group 1), .70 (Group 2) and .69 (Group 
3) respectively.
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Religious identification was related to levels of national distinctiveness, continuity and 
efficacy in all three groups. National private esteem was significantly related to strength 
of religious identifications only in Groups 1 and 2 whereas the public aspect of national 
esteem appeared to be weakly related to religious identification (r=.25, p<.05) only in 
Group 1. With respect to the relationships between pre-threat religious identification and 
the student motivational principles, the results indicated that in Group 1 the former 
related to student continuity and efficacy, in Group 2 only to the student public, and in 
Group 3 only to student distinctiveness.
Student identification and its correlates
The correlation matrices obtained for testing the relationships between strength of student 
identification measure and the corresponding identity principles, suggested that only 
student efficacy appeared to be consistently correlated with student identification across 
all three groups. Student distinctiveness and public esteem correlated with student 
identification in Groups 2 and 3, private-esteem in Groups 1 and 2, and student continuity 
in Groups 1 and 3. The correlations between student distinctiveness and continuity were 
moderate and significant in the second group (.54) and third group (.46), whereas the two 
principles were not correlated in the first experimental group.
Finally, student identification was revealed to be strongly related to almost all nationality 
motivational principle in Group 1 (with the exception of its relationship with national 
public r=.26, p<.05) and to national continuity, private-esteem and efficacy in Group 2. 
For participants in Group 3, only national distinctiveness was found to be weakly related 
to the student identification variable.
The correlational analysis at this stage indicated that there were variations across the 
groups at the pre-threat stage. There was no reason to expect this extent of variability as 
the groups were divided randomly into three equal size groups, did not differ in terms of 
age and were consisted of the same numbers of males and females. However, these
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variations do not affect our results since, as it has also been stated in the relevant research 
hypotheses, we were not interested mainly in looking at between group comparisons. 
Rather, the study intended to observe the change in the contribution of the motivational 
principles over time within each group separately. Moreover, there was a strong 
correlation between the two principles guiding the content dimension of national and 
religious identity elements, i.e. distinctiveness and continuity. It is unsound to assume 
that the principles (not only distinctiveness and continuity) affect the identity processes 
independently of each other. Therefore, a certain degree of correlation should be expected 
between them. However, when the inter-correlations are as strong, they need to be taken 
into account when interpreting the results from the regression analyses.
7.7.3 Hierarchical regression analyses
Explaining the Strength o f National Identification at the Pre-Threat Stage
The first set of analyses regressed strength of national identification for each group 
separately before the two types of threat to national identity were induced. In the first 
model strength of national identification was predicted only by national motivational 
principles, while the second and third models allowed also the influence of religious and 
student identity principles to be assessed. Analysis indicated that for both the first 
experimental and the control groups of the present study, the first model which included 
only the four national motivational principles seemed to explain more variance with 
Adj.R^= .47 and .39 respectively (see Tables 7.14, 7.16). National private-esteem and 
national continuity were revealed to be the best predictors of the dependent variable.
The results obtained for the second experimental group indicated that the second model 
that also included the religious identity principles was still significant with F  change (5, 72) 
= 3.08 p<.05. However, the closer inspection of the two models suggested that none of 
the religious identity principles contributed in the second stage of analysis and that there 
was no dramatic increase in the amount of variance explained [Model 1: Adj.R^= .62 to 
Model 2: Adj.R^= .66]. Moreover, although in the first model national continuity and
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private-esteem were also the best predictors of national identification, after religions 
identity principles were introduced only national continuity remained a strong predictor. 
Although the change in R indicated that this model was significant none of the religious 
identity principles contributed significantly in predicting the dependent variable. Due to 
this fact, the researcher decided to keep the first model for the second experimental 
group.
Table 7.14: Hierarchical multiple regressions: Predicting strength of national
identification (Threatening ND condition) at the pre-threat stage
Variables
Entered
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
jg
National .13 .12 .10
Distinctiveness
National 28** .26* .28*
Continuity
National .43** .38** .40**
Private-Esteem
National Public- .09 .05 .04Esteem
National- .05 .05 -.07
Efficacy
Religious
Private-Esteem
.08 .07
Religious
Public-Esteem
.09 .09
Student Private- .003
Esteem
Student Efficacy .17
R? .51 .52 .53
R? Change .01 .01
A dfff .47 .47 .47
F change 15.34** 1.12 .97
Df (5,75) (2, 73) (2,71)
Note: **p<.01,
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T able 7.15: H ierarch ical m ultip le regressions: P red icting  strength  o f  national
identification  (T hreaten ing N C  condition) at the p re-th reat stage
Variables
Entered
Step 1 
/S
Step 2 Step 3
National .19 -.004 -.012
Distinctiveness
National .38** .41* .42
Continuity
National .31** .16 .17
Private-Esteem
National- .12 .11 .10
Efficacy
Religious
Distinctiveness
.18 .19
Religious .03 .013
continuity
Religious
Private-Esteem
.16 .16
Religious
Public-Esteem
.09 .10
Religious
Efficacy
.03 .042
Student Private-
Esteem -.001
Student Public- -.069
Esteem
.64 .70 .71
Change .06 .004
Adj.Rf .62 .66 .66
Adj.R? Change .04 .04
F change 34.05** 3.08* .42
Df (4,77) (5, 72) (2,70)
Note: '^*p<.01, *p<.05
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T able 7.16: H ierarch ical m ultip le regressions: P redicting  strength  o f  national
identification  (C ontrol) at the p re-th reat stage
Variables
Entered
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
National .15 .15 .10
Distinctiveness
National .37** .34* .28
Continuity
National .25** .14 .13
Private-Esteem
National- .10 .10 .11
Efftcacy
Religious
Distinctiveness
-.03 -.04
Religious .05 .06
continuity
Religious
Public-Esteem
.17 .08
Religious
Efficacy
.01 .01
Student .07
Distinctiveness
Student .24
Continuity
Student Public- .11
Esteem
Student Efficacy -.06
R' .42 .44 .49
R? Change .02 .05
.39 .38 .40
Adj.R  ^Change .01 .02
F change 14.02** .64 1.66
Df (4, 76) (4, 72) (4, 68)
Note: **p <.01, *p<.05
Explaining the strength o f religious identification at the pre-threat stage
The regression coefficients obtained in the second set of analyses indicated that, in all 
groups, "strength of religious identification was predicted only by its own identity 
principles as the values of AR  ^ were not significant after the national and student 
motivations were included. More specifically, the beta coefficients suggested that
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religious continuity and private-esteem were interchangeably the best predictors followed 
by religious efficacy in the first and second groups. For the third group of this study, 
strength of religious identification was predicted only by religious continuity principle 
(see Tables 7.17, 7.18 and 7.19).
Table 7.17: Hierarchical multiple regressions: Predicting strength of religious
identification (Threatening ND condition)at the pre-threat stage
Variables
Entered
Step 1 Step 2
/S
Step 3
Religious
Distinctiveness
.10 .11 .10
Religious
Continuity
.26* .22* .19
Religious .33** 30** .29**
Private-Esteem
Religious
Public-Esteem
.12 .05 .04
Religious
Efficacy
.24* .35** .34**
National .02 .08
Distinctiveness
National .03 -.06
continuity
National .05 .06
Private-Esteem
National Public- .12 .16
Esteem
National -.14 -.21
Efficacy
Student .17
Continuity
Student Efficacy .06
.65 .67 .70
Rf Change .02 .03
.62 .62 .64
Adj.R^ Change - .02
F change 26.95** .86 2.86
Df (5, 73) (5, 68) (2, 66)
Note: ^*p<.01, *p<05
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T able 7.18: H ierarch ica l m ultip le regressions: P red icting  strength  o f  relig ious
identification  (T hreaten ing  N ational C ontinuity  condition) at the p re­
threat stage
Variables
Entered
Step 1
/S
Step 2 Step 3
Religious
Distinctiveness
.10 .11 .10
Religious
Continuity
.40** .37** 39**
Religious
Private-Esteem
.23* .28** .27**
Religious
Public-Esteem
.03 .05 .03
Religious
Efficacy
.22* .15 .14
National -.03 -.02
Distinctiveness
National .09 .08
continuity
National -.09 -.11
Private-Esteem
National .08 .08
Efficacy
Student Public- .10
Esteem
R^ .65 .66 .67
R? Change .01 .01
Adj.R‘ .62 .62 .62
AdJ.R  ^Change - -
F change 27.94** .57 1.52
Df (5,76) (4,72) (1,71)
Note: **p<.01, *p<.05
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T able 7.19: H ierarch ica l m u ltip le  regressions: P redicting  strength  o f  relig ious
identification  (C ontrol) at the pre-th reat stage
Variables
Entered
Step 1
fi
Step 2 Step 3
Religious
Distinctiveness
-.03 .01 -.01
Religious
Continuity
.66** .69** .69**
Religious I 
Private-Esteem
.08 .07 .06
Religious
Efficacy
.13 .16 .16
National -.14 -.17
Distinctiveness
National .08 .07
continuity
National -.09 -.11
Efficacy
Student .10
Distinctiveness
R^ .60 .62 .62
R  ^Change .02
Adj.R' .58 .58 .58
Adj.RiChange
F change 28.16** 1.77 1.10
Df (4, 76) (3, 73) (1,72)
Note: *p<.05
Explaining the Strength o f Student Identification at the Pre-Threat Stage
Finally, the last set of analyses regressed student identification in the pre-threat stage. 
Based on the previous correlation analysis, the strength of associations between 
student identity principles, related identity principles and student identification 
variable varied quite a lot across the groups. As expected this was reflected in the 
present findings. The regression analysis performed on the first experimental group 
indicated that the second model, which also included national motivations, remained 
significant with Fchange (5, 74) = 4.16, p<.002 explaining more variance with Adj.R^= 
.74. According to the calculated beta coefficients, student identification in this group 
was predicted mainly by levels of student continuity (/?= .40, p<.01) followed by
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student private-esteem (/3=.21 p<.05), national distinctiveness (j3=.23, p<.05) and 
national private-esteem (/3=.24, p<.05).
Table 7.20: Hierarchical multiple regressions: Predicting strength of student
identification (Threatening ND condition) at the pre-threat stage
Variables
Entered
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Student .35** 40** .39**
Continuity
Student 30** .21* .22*
Private-Esteem
Student .29** .12 .20
Efficacy
National .23* .24*
Distinctiveness
National -.08 .-.09
continuity
National .24* .23**
Private-Esteem
National Public- .17 .14
Esteem
National -.04 -.03
Efficacy
Religious
Public-Esteem
.07
R' .42 .55 .55
R  ^Change .13 -
.40 .50 .49
F change 19.05*» 4.16** .56
Df (3, 79) (5,74) (1,73)
Note: **p<.01, *p<.05
For participants in the second experimental group, none of the student identity and the 
related identity elements’ principles seemed to contribute in predicting the levels of 
strength of pre-threat student identification (see Table 6.21). Finally, in the third 
group the first model, which included only the student identity principles, revealed to 
be significant with F  (4, 79) = 14.15, p<.01. Based on the obtained regression 
coefficients student continuity ((3= .33, p<.01) and student public esteem (fi=.29, 
p<.01) were the only significant predictors (see Table 7.22).
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T able 7.21: H ierarch ica l m ultip le regressions: P redicting  Strength  o f  student
identification  (T hreaten ing N C  condition)) at th e p re-th reat stage
Variables
Entered
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
B
Student .17 .14 .09
Distinctiveness
Student .12 .08 .10
Private-Esteem
Student Public- .13 .06 .06
Esteem
Student .17 .05 .06
Efficacy
National .19 .10
continuity
National .08 .10
Private-Esteem
National .13 .04
Efficacy
Religious
Distinctiveness
-.08
Religious
Continuity
.25
Religious
Private-Esteem
-.12
Religious
Efficacy
.18
R' .14 .21 .26
R  ^Change .07 .06
Adj.R' .09 .13 .14
F change 2.96* 2.11 1.30
Df (4, 75) (%72) (4, 68)
Note: **p<.01, *p<.05
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T able 7.22: H ierarch ical m ultip le regressions: P red icting  strength  o f  student
identification  (C ontrol) at th e pre-th reat stage
Variables
Entered
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Student .11 .17 .17
Distinctiveness
Student .33** .35** .34**
Continuity
Student 29** .31** .31**
Public-Esteem
Student .18 .19 .19
Efficacy
National -.13 -.13
Distinctiveness
Religious
Public-Esteem
.001
R' .42 .43 .43
R  ^Change .01 -
AdfR' .39 J9 .38
F change 14.15** 1.54 .00
D f (4, 79) (1, 78)
Note: **p<.01,
7.7.4 Summary o f  findings I
To summarise at this point, the findings from the present set of analyses examining 
identity structure and processes in a non-threatening context suggested that:
1. National and religious identifications at the pre-threat stage were predicted only 
by their corresponding set of identity principles. Despite their strong a priori 
relationships, no overlapping was evidenced between these two identity elements 
pertaining to their identity principles.
2. In line with our expectations, other motivations, and not just collective esteem and 
distinctiveness, contribute to identification with these two social categories. The 
continuity principle performed as well as private-esteem in predicting these two 
identification processes, accounting for a great percentage of variance. Levels of
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national and religious distinctiveness and public-esteem did not contribute at all 
whereas levels of efficacy contributed only to predicting religious identification.
The present finding was also in agreement with the assumption that different 
principles may be functionally important for different identities. However, it needs to 
be mentioned that religious efficacy was revealed to be a significant predictor in the 
two experimental groups, but not in the control group. In the latter group religious 
continuity was the only principle found to guide levels of strength of religious 
identification process at the pre-threat stage.
3. A far less consistent pattern of results was revealed for pre-threat student 
identification, not only with regard to the contribution of its own identity 
principles, but also relevant to the relationship with the pre-threat national 
identification process and its principles. The regression models obtained in each 
group for identifying which motivations were perceived as being the most 
important in predicting strength of student identification suggested that there was 
a lot of variation. For participants allocated in the first experimental group 
(Threatening ND condition) there seemed to be a perceived overlap between 
student and nationality elements in the sense that pre-threat student identification 
was not only associated with student motivational principles (continuity, private- 
esteem) but also with levels of national distinctiveness and private-esteem. 
However, the same was not true for participants allocated in the other two groups. 
Strength of student identification was not predicted by any of the student or 
nationality motivational principles in the second experimental group (Threatening 
NC condition). Additionally, for participants in the control group, student 
continuity and the public rather than the private aspect of student esteem predicted 
levels of pre-threat student identification.
It should be noted that, overall, some motivational principles like distinctiveness and 
continuity were often strongly correlated, within each of the three identity elements, 
particularly in the case of national and religious, in all three groups. The regression 
models carried out earlier suggested that the strength of the identification processes at
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the pre-threat stage were guided by the continuity and not the distinctiveness 
principles. In order to clarify the findings, after checking the collinearity diagnostics^ 
(tolerance and variance inflation factor-VIF) which indicated no multi-collinearity 
problems, the part correlations of these variables were examined.
Table 7.23: Part correlations between Distinctiveness and Continuity (IVs) 
principles and Identification process (DV) obtained for all three 
groups
Variables National ID Religions ID
(IVs) (DV) (DV)
National distinctiveness Threatening ND Condition: .10 
Threatening NC Condition: .12 
Control: .10
National continuity
Threatening ND Condition: .28 
Threatening NC Condition: .25 
Control: .27
Religions distinctiveness Threatening ND Condition: .08 
Threatening NC Condition: .07 
Control: -.02
Religions continuity
Threatening ND Condition: .17 
Threatening NC Condition: .24 
Control: .40
Note: Different colours are used for the part correlations obtained in each group to illustrate 
the difference.
The advantage of using part correlations rests on them reflecting the unique relationship 
between a predictor and the outcome. In its squared form the part correlation represents 
the percentage of full variance in the dependent uniquely and jointly attributable to the
 ^Tolerance and VIF are both good methods for identifying multicollinearity. When tolerance is less than 
.02 and VIF has a value of 10 then there are signs of multicollinearity problems (Myers, 1990 and Menard, 
1995 cited in Field, 2000, p. 132)
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given independent after the linear effects of the other independents are removed (Field, 
2000). Table 7.22 presents the part correlations of distinctiveness and continuity at the 
pre-threat stage regression models and for all the groups where the second principle 
revealed to be a significant predictor of identification processes. It is obvious that in the 
case of national and religious identity elements, the part correlations of continuity with 
the respective dependent variables (strength of identification processes) were revealed to 
be consistently stronger compared to the ones obtained for distinctiveness principle. The 
part correlations provided further support that continuity rather than distinctiveness was a 
significant predictor of identification with the target identity elements.
7.8 Results (Post-experimeutal phase)
7.8.1 Has the strength o f the relationships changed? Exploring the relationships
between identity elements in the post-threat stage
The fifth research hypothesis (H5) stated that the threat posed on the two national 
motivational principles would affect the strength of the relationships between national 
and religious identifications in the post-threat condition. Our previous findings indicated 
that national and student identifications were also strongly related. Therefore, it can be 
assumed that a threat to national identity posed on national distinctiveness and continuity 
could also affect the strength of the relationship between these two types of 
identifications.
In order to test whether the obtained correlation coefficients between ratings of the three 
types of identification differed significantly at the pre- and post-threat stages, raw 
correlations of identification with all three identity elements were transformed into z 
scores. Steiger’s formula (1980) was considered appropriate for use in comparing the 
pairwise correlation obtained in the same sample before and after threat on national 
identity was induced (e.g. ^P re  National ID -Pre Religious ID is significantly different 
from Post National ID-Post Religious ID). The purpose of this test is to calculate the 
difference between the correlation coefficients when: 1) correlations do not share a 
common variable; and 2) they have been obtained in the same sample.
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Table 7.24: Time 1 & Time 2 relationships between identity elements based on
strength of identification: Threatening National Distinctiveness: 
Scenario I (Listwise n= 82)
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
PRE-Threat
1.Religious 1.000
Identification
2. Student .28 1.000
Identification .012
3. National .42 .58 1.000
Identification .000 .000
POST-Threat
4. Religious 1.000
Identification
5. Student .27 1.000
Identification .014
6. National .46 .68 1.000
Identification .000 .000
Table 7.25: Time 1 & Time 2 relationships between identity elements based on
strength of identification: Threatening National Continuity: Scenario
II {Listwise n= 83)
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
PRE-Threat
1.Religious 1.000
Identification
2. Student .39 1.000
Identification . .000
3. National .69 .42 1.000
Identification .000 .000
POST-Threat
4. Religious 1.000
Identification
5. Student .44 1.000
Identification .000
6. National .73 .39 1.000
Identification .000 .000
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Table 7.26: Time 1 & Time 2 relationships between identity elements based on
strength of identification: Control (Listwise n=84)
Variable____________1_________2________ 3________4________5________6
PRE-Threat
1.Religious 
Identification
2. Student 
Identification
3. National .44 .58 1.000
Identification 
POST-Threat
4. Religious 
Identification
5. Student 
Identification
6. National .41 .56 1.000
Identification
1.000
.16 1.000
ns
.000 .000
.000
.22 1.000
.044
.000 .000
Results revealed that none of the z values was greater than 1.96 (2-tailed test with 
alpha=0.05) suggesting that the strength of the relationships between all three identity 
elements based on their relative strength of identification did not change significantly as a 
result of threat (see Table 7.27) in the two experimental conditions. This may be an 
indication that there is a strong sense of stability in the strength and direction of these 
relationships which is not affected by a short-term query on the content dimension of one 
of the related identity elements (national). Regarding the strength of these relationships 
in the control condition, no significant changes were revealed as was expected.
However, since threat on national identity was directed towards two of the national 
motivational principles (national distinctiveness and national continuity), one may 
anticipate that a change may occur in the strength of the relationship of these two identity 
motivations with the respective motivational principles of religious and student identity 
elements (distinctiveness, continuity). The main focus of the study was on the strength of 
the relationship between national and religious identity elements, therefore the 
transformations into z scores were initially applied on the pre- and post-threat correlation
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coefficients for national-religious distinctiveness and national-religious continuity 
principles obtained within each experimental condition.
Analysis using Steiger’s formula revealed that, although the strength between the 
coefficients was changing, the relationships between national-religious distinctiveness did 
not differ significantly between Time 1 and Time 2 in any of the two experimental groups 
(see Table 7.28). Furthermore, the results indicated that in the presence of threat on 
national continuity (second experimental condition) there was a significant increase in the 
strength of the relationship between national and religious continuity principles after 
participants read the relevant experimental scenario.
However, to be able to suggest with more certainty that the change observed between 
these two variables (national-religious continuity principles) is a response to the threat 
induced on national continuity principle, and not a function of prior variations in the 
strength of this relationship, no significant differences should be revealed when 
comparing the pre-threat nationality-religion continuity coefficient in this group with 
those obtained in the other two groups.
The correlation coefficients between national and religious continuity principles obtained 
for all three groups in the pre-threat condition were transformed into z scores and Fisher’s 
z test was used for probing any significant differences. The z scores indicated that the 
relationship between these two variables did not differ significantly between the second 
and the other two groups in the pre-threat condition (Threatening ND condition -  
Threatening NC condition: z=1.48, ns; Threatening NC condition-Control (.50, p<.01): 
z= 0.27, ns). Thus, it can be suggested that the increase in the strength of the relationship 
between national and religious continuity principles in the second condition was due to 
the experimental manipulation.
Finally, the strength of the relationships between national - student distinctiveness and 
national - student continuity principles also did not change significantly between the two
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time-conditions in the two experimental groups. Once again, as expected, there were no 
significant changes in the control group.
Table 7.27: Testing differences on strength of the relationships between Identity
elements based on their relative Identification (Time 1 versus Time 2)
Pearson’s r Z score (significance level)
Experimental Group 1 (Listwise n= 82) 
Pair 1: Pre-Threat NID-RID .42**
Post-Threat NID-RID .46** -0.50 (ns)
Pair 2: Pre-Threat NID-SID .58***
Post-Threat NID-SID .68*** -1.45 (ns)
Experimental Group 2 (Listwise n= 83) 
Pair 1: Pre-Threat NID-RID .69***
Post-Threat NID-RID -0.85(ns)
Pair 2: Pre-Threat NID-SID .42**
Post-Threat NID-SID .39** 0.36 (ns)
Control Group (Listwise n= 84) 
Pair 1: Pre-Threat NID-RID .44**
Post-Threat NID-RID 41** 0.64 (ns)
Pair 2: Pre-Threat NID-SID .58***
Post-Threat NID-SID 56*** 0.44(ns)
Note: NID, RID, SID stand for national, religious and student identifications respectively
***p<.001, **p<.01
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Table 7.28: Testing differences on strength of the relationships between Identity
elements based on their motivational principles (pre vs. post threat)
Pearson’s r Z score (significance level)
Threatening ND condition (Listwise n=85)
Pair 1: Pre ND-RD .46**
Post ND-RD .64** -1.92 (ns)
Pair 2: Pre NC-RC .27*
PostNC-RC .34** -0.63 (ns)
Pair 3: Pre ND-SD ,46**
PostND-SD .44** 0. 20(ns)
Pair 4: Pre NC-SC .32**
PostNC-SC .47** -1.40 (ns)
Threatening NC condition (Listwise n= 84)
Pair 1: Pre ND-RD 60**
Post ND-RD .73** -1.94 (ns)
Pair 2: Pre NC-RC 47**
PostNC-RC 64** -2.09 (p<.05)
Pair 3: Pre ND-SD .46*
Post ND-SD .48* -0. 22(ns)
Pair 4: Pre NC-SC .19
PostNC-SC .29** -0.94(ns)
Control (Listwise n= 84)
Pair 1: Pre ND-RD .44**
Post ND-RD .48** -0.57 (ns)
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Pearson’s r Z  score (significance level)
.50**
Pair 2: Pre NC-RC
60* *PostNC-RC -1.48 (ns)
Pair 3: Pre ND-SD
PostND-SD .61**
39»» -1.15 (ns)
Pair 4: Pre NC-SC
39**
PostNC-SC -
Note: ND, RD, SD stand for national, religions and student distinctiveness, NC, RC, SC for national, 
religions, student continuity respectively
**p<.01
7.8.2 How does threat to one identity element affect the structure and processes of 
not only the target identity element, but of other related identity elements?
The analysis presented in this section aimed to address how threat induced in the two 
nationality motivational principles would affect: 1) the predictive power of the 
corresponding identity principles of post threat national identification; and 
2) the principles relating to the other related identities (religious and student).
According to the sixth hypothesis (H6), it was expected that there would be changes in 
the relative contribution of nationality identity principles in relation to the types of threat 
induced. More specifically, it was assumed that when National Distinctiveness is 
threatened (Scenario I) national continuity may become a better predictor of the strength 
of post national identification and vice versa. However, the regression models examining 
the contribution of nationality identity principles at the pre-threat stage indicated that 
national continuity and national private-esteem were the only significant predictors of the 
pre-national identification process in all three groups. Two questions seemed relevant at 
this stage of analysis. To what extent would these two identity principles sustain their 
predictive power in the post-threat condition? Should we expect that other nationality
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identity principles may also become predictors of post-national identification? And if yes, 
would their predictive power be affected by the type of threat induced?
As was the case at the pre-threats stage, Pearson’s correlations examining the 
relationships between post-national identification process and post national identity 
principles indicated that in all three groups the post-national identification variable 
related positively and strongly to all four post-national motivations (distinctiveness, 
continuity, national-self esteem and efficacy).
In addition, it was expected that after threat was induced to national distinctiveness and 
continuity principles, the corresponding principles of a related identity element would 
also contribute in predicting post-national identification as a means of coping with the 
threat experienced on this identity element (H7). Taking into consideration the 
interconnectedness of the identity elements within identity structure and also that the 
strength and direction of these relationships was sustained in the post threat phase, threat 
to national identity was expected to not only affect the principles of this identity element, 
but to change the predictive power of the identity principles guiding the identification 
processes with the other two related elements (religion and studentship).
A series of hierarchical regression analyses were carried out to test all these hypotheses. 
Prior though, Pearson’s correlations were performed in each group separately to examine 
the strength and directions of the relationships between the variables of interest. More 
specifically the reason for doing the correlation was: 1) to decide whether there were any 
variables that are not related and therefore should not be included in the analysis; and 
2) to identify any really strong correlations that should be taken into account later in the 
interpretation of the findings. The results are presented in Tables 7.29, 7.30 and 7.31.
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7.8.3 Hierarchical regression analyses
The results from the hierarchical regression analyses, predicting the strength of post 
threat identification with the three examined identity elements based on their 
corresponding principles and those of the related identity elements, are presented and 
discussed for each group separately.
Explaining the strength o f post national identification at the post-threat stage
The first model regressed strength of national identification at the post threat stage based 
only on the four national motivational principles, whilst the second and third models 
assessed the influence of religious and student identity principles on levels of national 
identification at the post threat level.
Threatening national distinctiveness condition: Language Scenario
Participants in the present group read the scenario threatening their levels of national 
distinctiveness. Analysis indicated that the first model which included only the post 
threat national identity principles was the best with F (5, 73) = 22.05, p~0 and 
Adj.R^=.57. The obtained regression coefficients revealed that national continuity 
(/3=.39, p<.01), national private-esteem (/?=.25, p<.01) and national distinctiveness (j8=
.20, p< 05) were significant predictors of the national identification at the post treat stage. 
Further analysis indicated that continuity and private esteem performed equally well in 
predicting national identification [t (76) =1.77, ns] at the post threat stage, while national 
distinctiveness was a relatively weak predictor compared to national continuity [t (76) 
=2.38, p<.05] but not in relation to private-esteem [t (76) =.34, ns].
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T able 7.32 H ierarch ica l m ultip le regressions: P red icting  strength  o f  national
identification  (T hreaten ing  N D  condition) at th e post th reat stage
Variables Step 1 Step 2
fi
Step 3 
fi
National
Distinctiveness
.20* .25 .23
National
Continuity
.39** .35** .39**
National
Private-Esteem
.25** .17 .25*
National Public- 
Esteem .13 .10 .10
National-
Efficacy .13 .17 .20
Religious
Distinctiveness -.09
-.12
Religious
Continuity .11
.12
Religious
Private-Esteem .12
.15
Religious
Public-Esteem .05
.07
Religious
Efficacy -.08
-.09
Student
Continuity
.09 -.08
Student Private- 
Esteem
-.18
Student Efficacy .04
R' ..60 .62 .64
R  ^Change .02 .02
..57 .57 .57
F change 22.05** .72 1.25
Df (5, 73) (5, 68) (3, 65)
Note: **p<.01, ^p<.05 
Threatening National Continuity Condition: History Scenario
Participants allocated in the present group read the scenario posing threat to national 
continuity principle. The hierarchical regression analysis indicated that the third model, 
which also allowed for the contribution of student identity principles (student
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distinctiveness) to be assessed, was still significant with Fchange (1, 69)=12.05, p<.01 [ F  
(10, 69) = 20.74, p<.01] explaining more variance of the post national variable with 
Adj.R^=.71. The beta coefficients indicated that there was an overlap between nationality 
and student identity elements, in the sense that national identification at the post threat 
stage was not only guided by national motivations [national distinctiveness: /3=.47; 
private: j8=.23, public-esteem /5=. 14] but also by student distinctiveness principle with 
/3=-.27, p<.01. The obtained negative beta coefficient indicated a reverse relationship 
between post national identification and student distinctiveness. Moreover, it also 
suggests that some of the other motivational principles entered in the same model 
moderated the relationship between these two variables.
A closer inspection of the relative size of the standardised beta coefficients suggested 
that, in this condition, national distinctiveness was the best predictor followed by student 
distinctiveness, national private and public-esteem [ND>SD: t (77) =6.60; ND>NPREST: 
t (77) =4.47; SD=NPREST: t(77)=-.48, ns; NPREST=NPUB: t(77)=.08, ns; SD: t(77)=- 
.49] .^ Although national continuity was revealed to be a weak but significant predictor in 
the first model, which included only the nationality motivational principles, in the third 
model it was no longer a significant predictor of national identification at the post-threat 
stage.
 ^ND & SD: stand for National and Student Distinctiveness respectively 
NPREST& NPUB: stand for National Private and Public Esteem respectively
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T able 7.33 H ierarch ica l m ultiple regressions: P red icting  strength  o f  national
identification  (T hreaten ing N C  condition) at the p ost-th reat stage
Variables Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
jS
National
Distinctiveness
.47** .44** .47**
National
Continuity
.19* .17 .12
National
Private-Esteem
.19** .21* .23**
National Public- 
Esteem .14* .14 .14*
National-
Efficacy .20* .13 .16
Religious
Distinctiveness -.04
.07
Religious
Continuity .09
.14
Religious
Private-Esteem -.04
-.09
Religious
Efficacy .12
.15
Student
Distinctiveness
• -.27**
.70 .71 .75
R  ^Change .01 .04
..67 .67 .71
F change 33.84** .66 12.05**
Df (5,74) (4, 70) (1,69)
Note: **p<.01, *p<.05 
Control
Participants in the present group were not exposed to any type of threat. Therefore, no 
changes were expected between the pre and post regressions models for national 
identification.
Similar to the first experimental condition, the analysis performed in the control group 
indicated that the motivational principles of the two related identity elements did not 
contribute significantly to the prediction of national identification. More specifically, the 
values did not change significantly between the three regression models which
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suggested that the first model including only the national motivational principles was the 
best with F  (5,76)=18.06, p~0 with AdjR^= .51. The obtained regression coefficients 
indicated that similar to the pre-threat condition national continuity (/5=.31, p<.01) and 
private-esteem (j(5=.33, p<.01) were the best predictors. Contrary to our expectations, 
national distinctiveness and national public esteem also appeared to be significant, but 
weak predictors with fi=. 25 and /5=.16 significant at p<.05 respectively.
Table 7.34 Hierarchical multiple regressions; Predicting strength of national 
identification (Control) at the post-threat stage
Variables Step 1 Step 2
/S
Step 3
National
Distinctiveness
.25* .22 .21
National Continuity 31** .25* .21
National Private- 
Esteem
.33** .33** .43**
National Public- 
Esteem .16* .11 .06
National-Efficacy .02 -.07 -.05
Religious
Distinctiveness
.09 .09
Religious Continuity .04 .01
Religious Private- 
Esteem -.03
-.01
Religious Public- 
Esteem
.15 .12
Religious Efficacy .14 . .12
Student
Distinctiveness
• -.02
Student Continuity .16
Student Private- 
Esteem
-.14
Student Public- 
Esteem
.02
.54 .59 .61 "
R  ^Change .05 .02
Adj.R' .51 .53 .53
F change 18.06** 1.66 .78
Df (5, 76) (5, 71) (4, 67)
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7.8.4 Summary of findings II
The previous analysis explored how the different types of induced threat to nationality 
motivational principles may be associated with changes in the relative contribution of the 
nationality identity principles in the post-experimental phase. In addition, having 
established the interconnectedness of nationality with both religious and student identity 
elements in both pre and post threat conditions, threat directed to a core identity element 
within identity structure (nationality) was expected to affect not only the underlying 
motivational principles of this identity, but the principles of the other related identity 
elements. The analysis examined the similarities and differences in the patterns of 
change across the three identities in relation to the types of threat induced. Moreover, it 
examined whether threat to national identity would elicit an overlap between these 
identity elements as a responsive reaction to this threat, with the principles of a strongly 
related identity element also contributing to the prediction of national identification 
process at the post threat stage.
Firstly, the results from the post threat regression models on post national identification 
indicated that the two types of threat affected differentially the relative contribution of 
nationality identity principles. Moreover, the findings obtained in the second 
experimental condition supported our expectations that related identity principles may 
also have an effect in the prediction of post national identification process.
The present section aims to summarize the changes in the contribution of motivational 
principles observed in the pre-post threat models of national identification within each 
experimental group. The changes in the models are also graphically represented (See 
Figures 7.2 and 7.3 below).
> Threatening National Distinctiveness Condition: In the pre-threat condition, 
national identification was predicted by national continuity and private-esteem 
with the second being a stronger predictor. In the post threat condition, post 
national identification was guided by more motivational principles, levels of
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national continuity, national private-esteem and national distinctiveness, with the 
latter being a significant but weak predictor.
> Threatening National Continuity Condition: In the pre-threat condition
national identification was predicted equally by levels of national continuity and 
private-esteem. In the post threat condition, national continuity was no longer a 
predictor, but it was substituted by national distinctiveness which overall was the 
best predictor. Moreover, the corresponding principle of student identity element 
(student distinctiveness) emerged as a predictor followed by national private and 
public esteem. However, the beta coefficient obtained for student distinctiveness 
suggested a reverse relationship between this variable and the dependent, meaning 
the higher the state of student distinctiveness the lower the strength of post 
national identification.
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F igure 7.2: P re-post threat regression  m odels o f  national identification  for
experim ental group 1 (T hreaten ing  N ation al D istinctiveness)
National
Continuity
National
Private-Esteem
(3=28
I3=A3
(PRE) 
National 
Strength of 
Identification
F  (5, 75) = 15.34, p<.01, Adjusted R"=47%, R^= 51%
National
Distinctiveness
National
Continuity
National
Private-Esteem
(3=20
^=39
(3=.25
(POST)
National 
Strength of 
Identification
F  (5, 73) = 22.05, p<.01. Adjusted R^= 57%, R^=60%
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F igure 7.3: P re-post threat regression  m odels o f  national identifica tion  for
experim ental group 2 (T hreaten ing  N ational C ontinuity)
National
Distinctiveness
National
Continuity
National
Private-Esteem
National
Public-Esteem
National Self- 
Efficacy
^—3 1
(PRE) 
National 
Strength of 
Identification
F  (4, 77) = 34.05, p<.01, Adjusted R^=62%, R^= 64%
National
Distinctiveness
■ National 
Private-Esteem
National
Public-Esteem
Student
Distinctiveness
j@=.47
/5=.23
(POST)
National 
Strength of 
Identification
/3=.14
]8=-.27
F  (10, 69) = 20.74, p<.01. Adjusted R^= 67%, R"=71%
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7.8.5 Explaining the strength of religious identification at the post-threat stage
The analysis carried out for predicting strength of religious identification in the pre-threat 
condition revealed that in the two experimental groups religious continuity, private- 
esteem and religious efficacy were the significant predictors. However, for participants 
in the control group, strength of pre-threat religious identification was predicted only by 
religious continuity. The second set of hierarchical regression analysis regressed post 
threat religious identification measures and explored how threat to national identity 
affected the relative contribution of the post religious identity principles and if the 
principles of the related identity elements contributed in any way. The strength of the 
relationship between post threat religious - student identifications was weak in the first 
experimental and the control groups. Therefore, post threat student identity principles 
were not expected to contribute significantly to the prediction of post threat religious 
identification in these two conditions.
Threatening National Distinctiveness Condition
The results indicated that post threat religious identification was predicted only by 
religious identity principles with F  (5, 73) = 26.66, p~0 with Adj.R^=.62. Post threat 
religious continuity (j8=.34) and private-esteem carried on being significant predictors of 
levels of post threat religious identification (j8=.34) followed by religious distinctiveness 
(|3=.27) and public-esteem (i3=.20) principles, which also emerged as significant 
predictors of post religious identification after participants read the administered scenario. 
The fact that levels of religious distinctiveness guide the religious identification process 
in the post-threat phase is particularly interesting when considering that threat in the 
present condition was induced on the corresponding principle of the strongly related 
identity element (national distinctiveness). However one should not forget that according 
to the manipulation check the participants allocated in the present group reported that the 
scenario, in downplaying the importance of ethno-linguistic distinctiveness, not only 
threatened their sense of national distinctiveness but also their continuity.
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T able 7.35 H ierarch ical m ultip le regressions: P red icting  strength  o f  relig ious
identification  (T hreaten ing  N ational D istinctiveness C ondition ) at the
p ost -threat stage
Variables Step 1
jS
Step 2 
B
Step 3
Religious
Distinctiveness
.27** .25* .27*
Religious
Continuity
.34** .37** .37**
Religious
Private-Esteem
.34** -.03 -.04
Religious
Public-Esteem
.20* .34** .33**
Religious
Efficacy
-.03 .22* .20*
National .05 .03
Distinctiveness
National -.09 -.08
continuity
National .02 .004
Private-Esteem
Student Private -.002
Esteem
Student Public .08
Esteem
R' .65 .65 .65
R  ^Change - -
Adj.R' .62 .61 .60
F change 26.66** 29 .40
Df (5,73) (3, 70) (2, 68)
Note: "^ *p<.01, *p<.05 
Threatening National Continuity Condition
The analysis performed for predicting the strength of post threat religious identification in 
the second experimental condition showed a different pattern. The third model, which 
allowed the influence of student principles to be assessed, was revealed to be significant 
[Fchange (2, 76) = 4.69, p<.05] indicating that except from the religious motivational 
principles, levels of student distinctiveness guided the post-threat religious identification 
process with /3=-.27. This finding was expected to some extent since religious and 
student identifications were strongly related in the present sub-sample in both the pre and
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post threat conditions. However, the direction of the relationship between post threat 
student distinctiveness and religious identification as suggested by the beta coefficient 
was reversed. With respect to the religious motivational principles, religious efficacy and 
continuity remained significant but weak predictors, while religious distinctiveness was 
the best predictor of the dependent variable with ]8=.51, p~0.
Table 7.36: Hierarchical multiple regressions: Predicting strength of religious
identification (Threatening National Continuity Condition) at the 
post-threat stage
Variables Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Religious
Distinctiveness
.42** ..38** .51**
Religious
Continuity
.21* .16* .28*
Religious
Private-Esteem
.21** T8* .14
Religious
Efficacy
.23** 23* .25*
National .05 .13
Distinctiveness
National -.08 -.16
continuity
National .004 -.001
Private-Esteem
National Public .06 .070
Esteem
National -.005 .014
Efficacy
Student -.27**
Distinctiveness
Student .12
Continuity
R? .73 .74 .77
R  ^Change .01 .03
.72 .70 .73
Adj.R  ^Change .02 .03
F change 50.99** .25 jlJS*
Df (4,75) (5,70) (2, 68)
Note: **p<.01, *p<.05
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Control
The change in R of .05 in the second model, which included the national identity 
principles, was statistically significant with Fchange (2, 76)= 4.69, p<.05 and Adj.R^=.56. 
The analysis of the present group was comprised of only two stages, as none of the post 
threat student identity principles related significantly to the dependent variable.
Similar to the pre-threat condition, religious continuity was the stronger predictor 
accounting for 63% of the post threat religious identification variable, followed by 
religious private-esteem and national continuity principles. The emergence of the latter 
mentioned motivations as predictors was against our expectations, since no threat was 
introduced to the scenario read by participants of this group to justify these changes.
Table 7.37: Hierarchical multiple regressions: Predicting strength of
religious identification (Control) at the post-threat stage
Variables Step 1 Step 2 
B
Religious
Distinctiveness
.12 .15
Religious
Continuity
.49** .63**
Religious
Private-Esteem
.20* .22**
Religious
Efficacy
.13 ..17
National
Continuity
-.23*
National
Efficacy
-.11
R' .55 .60
R  ^Change .05
.52 .56
Adj.R  ^Change .04
F change 23.44** 4.69*
Df (4, 78) (2, 76)
Note: **p<.01, * f< ^ #
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7.8 .6  Explaining the strength of student identification at the post-threat stage
In the last set of analyses the levels of student identification at the post threat stage were 
regressed after entering the student, national and religious identity principles.
Threatening National Distinctiveness Condition
Contrary to the pre-threat condition that indicated that pre-threat student identification 
was also predicted by two national identity principles (distinctiveness and private- 
esteem), the present results indicated that none of the related motivational principles 
contributed significantly in predicting student identification after threat on national 
distinctiveness was induced in the first experimental condition. The first model F  (4, 76) 
= 12.18, p<.01 identified post student continuity (/5=.34, p<.004), efficacy (/3=.30, 
p<.007) and private-esteem (jS=.22, p<.05) as significant predictors of the post student 
identification variable.
353
T able 7.38: H ierarch ica l m ultip le  regressions: P red icting  strength  o f  student
identification  (T hreaten ing N ational D istin ctiven ess C ondition ) at th e
post-threat stage
Variables Step 1 
P
Step 2 
B
Step 3
Student -.04 -.17 -.14
Distinctiveness
Student .34** .35** .35**
Continuity
Student Private- .22* .13 .10
Esteem
Student Efficacy .30** .35** .33**
National .21 .17
Distinctiveness
National .05 .06
continuity
National .11 .05
Private-Esteem
National Public ^8 .08
Esteem
National -.11 -.11
Efficacy
Religious
Private-Esteem
.13
Religious- 
Public Esteem
.01
R' .39 .47 .48
R  ^Change .08 .01
Adj.R' 26 .40 .40
F change 12.18** 2.14 (.07) .69
Df (4,76) (5,71) (2, 69)
Note: **p<.01.
Threatening National Continuity Condition
It should be noted that the pre-threat regression models performed for predicting levels of 
pre-threat student identification, revealed that none of the identity principles, neither 
student nor related identity elements, contributed significantly. According to the 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients student identification was related to a number of 
student, national and religious identity principles at the post-threat stage. The analysis 
did not yield any overlap between the identity elements relevant to the contribution of the 
related identities’ principles. Post-threat student identification was predicted only by the
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student efficacy principle (j8=.33, p<.01). By observing the F  change values it can be 
suggested that the first model was the best [F (3, 77) = 10.70, p<.01] since there was no 
significant change in the second and third stage of the regression analysis.
Table 7.39: Hierarchical multiple regressions: Predicting strength of student
identification (Threatening National Continuity Condition) at the 
post-threat stage
Variables Step 1 Step 2
/S
Step 3
Student .16 .10 .01
Distinctiveness
Student .18 .18 .19
Continuity
Student Efficacy .33** .30** .20
National .05 -.09
Distinctiveness
National .12 .10
continuity
Religious
Distinctiveness
.07
Religious
Continuity
.12
Religious
Public-Esteem
.16
Religious
Efficacy
.15
R' 29 .32 .38
R  ^Change .02 .06
.27 .27 29
F  change 10.70** .30 .18
Df (3, 77) C^75)
Note: **p<.01, * f< ^ #
Control
In the control condition the regression coefficients indicated that post threat student 
identification was predicted only by levels of student continuity with j8=.42, p~0. The 
model had an F  (4, 77) = 14.67, p<.01 and explained 40% of the dependent variable’s 
variance (see Table 7.40).
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T able 7.40: H ierarch ical m ultip le regressions: P red icting  strength  o f  student
identification  (C ontrol) at the p ost-th reat stage
Variables Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Student .20 .30* .30*
Distinctiveness
Student .42** .39** .38**
Continuity
Student Private .13 .13 .13
Student Efficacy .08 .06 .06
National -.14 -.14
Distinctiveness
National Public- .10 .10
Esteem
Religious
Distinctiveness
.02
Religious
Public-Esteem
.001
R^ .43 .45 .45
R  ^Change .02 .001
AdJ.R‘ .40 .41 .39
F change 14.67** 1.36 .05
Df (4, 77) (2, 75) (2, 73)
Note: **p<.01, * f< ^ #
7.8.7 Summary o f findings III
Further analysis was conducted to identify the principles guiding the processes of post 
threat identification with the other two related identity elements (religious and student).
It also considered whether their relative contribution was affected by the two types of 
threat posed on nationality identity principles. More specifically:
> Threatening National Distinctiveness Condition: In the pre-threat regression 
model strength of pre religious identification was predicted by religious 
continuity, private-esteem and efficacy. The post-threat regression model 
indicated that religious continuity and private-esteem were still significant 
predictors, but other principles such as religious distinctiveness and public-esteem
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were also revealed to be significant predictors after threat was induced to the 
nationality identity element.
> Threatening National Continuity Condition: In the pre-threat regression model 
strength of religious identification was also predicted by religious continuity, 
private esteem and efficacy. The post-threat regression models suggested that 
identification was guided mainly by religious distinctiveness, and similar to the 
results obtained for post threat national identification in the present group, student 
distinctiveness was a significant predictor followed by religious efficacy.
With respect to post threat student identification measures, the results indicated that:
> Threatening National Distinctiveness Condition: Pre and post student 
identification were predicted by the same list of identity principles, continuity, 
private-esteem and efficacy.
> Threatening National Continuity Condition: Although the pre threat regression 
model indicated that none of the student principles was a significant predictor of 
pre-student identification, in the post-threat model student identification was 
guided by levels of student efficacy.
Finally, there were some unanticipated changes in the contribution of identity principles 
at the post threat stage evinced in all three identity elements for the control group of this 
study. According to the manipulation check, participants who were allocated in the 
present condition reported that they did not perceive any threat on the nationality 
principles. Therefore, the variations observed between the pre and post regression 
models may be due to maturation effects with the administered measurements.
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7.9 C hanges in the sa lience o f  identifications and  m otivational princip les
Prior to the discussion of the statistical analysis that addresses the relevant research 
hypotheses, we need to clarify the use of the term salience. As discussed in the previous 
chapters, its popularity has also been accompanied by a variety of definitional and 
empirical treatments. In the present chapter, salience refers to the observed changes in 
the levels of identification with the examined identity elements and the state of their 
motivational principles as a result of contextual effects (threat to identity structure).
Testing the effect o f threat on the salience o f the three identifications
This section of analysis examines how threat posed to the two national motivational 
principles (distinctiveness and continuity) affects the levels of strength of identification 
with the three identity elements. The level changes from time 1 to time 2 (pre and post 
threat) and the effect of scenarios were examined using a 2 x 3 repeated measures, mixed 
MANOVA. The within-subjects factor was time (Time 1 and Time 2) and the between- 
subjects factor was the three experimental conditions (scenarios). The Table below 
presents the obtained means and standard deviations for the three groups on the pre-post 
identification measures (Table 7.41).
The analysis revealed a significant main effect for type of identification suggesting that, 
irrespective of the scenarios and the pre-post measurements, participants identified with 
the three types of identifications to a differing degree with F  (2, 245)= 75.83, p<.01 ; 
Wilks’ Lambda: .62, 7]^ = 38.2%. For the combined identification scales there were no 
main effects of time (F (1, 246) = 2.42, ns and 7]^ = 1%) and condition with F  (2, 246) = 
2.29, ns and 7j^ = 1.8%. Moreover, there was no significant interaction between time (pre- 
to post threat) x condition with F  (2, 246) = 2.53, ns and 7}^ = 2% suggesting that there 
were no differences in patterns of change by condition.
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T able 7.41: M eans and SD  for  th e p re and  p ost th reat identification  m easures
SCENARIA Mean SD N
Pre NID Language
scenario
35.85 6.95 82
History scenario 33.47 7.74 83
Control 35.86 628 84
Post NID Language
scenario
3626 6.57 82
History scenario 33.99 7.81 83
Control 34.74 6.68 84
Pre RID Language
scenario
31.00 8.40 82
History scenario 28.11 820 83
Control 2920 8.30 84
Post RID Language
scenario
30.97 820 82
History scenario 29.84 926 83
Control 2929 7.91 84
Pre SID Language
scenario
34.02 2,96 82
History scenario 32.19 529 83
Control 32.51 6.70 84
Post SID Language
scenario
33.80 6.15 82
History scenario 32.30 5.98 83
Control 32.52 6.65 84
Note: NID, RID, SID stand for national, religious and student identifications respectively
The multivariate tests revealed no interaction between type of identification x condition 
[F (4, 490) = .65, ns; Wilks’ Lambda= .99 and = 0.5%]. However, the fact that time 
(pre- to post threat) interacted with types of identification (national, religious, student) 
with F(2, 245)= 8.98, p<.01; Wilks’ Lambda: .93, 7]^ = 6.8% suggested that time had a 
different effect depending on which type of identification was rated by the respondents, 
irrespective of the experimental condition they were allocated in. From the plot below, it 
can be observed that overall participants reported higher levels of national identification 
(M= 35.04) than student (M= 32.91, t (253) = 5.22, p~0) and
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religious (M=29.06, t (253) = 12.40, p~.0) in the pre-threat condition (Time 1). In Time 
2 there were still significant differences between national, student and religious 
identifications based on their relative strength, with national showing the highest mean 
and religious the lowest. Furthermore, only strength of religious identification increased 
significantly in the post threat condition (Time 2) with t (252) = -3.73, p<.01
Figure 7.4: Levels of Identification with target identity 
elements * Time
■1 {Pre-threat stage) 
•2 (Post-threat stage)
N ational R e lig io u s  S tu d en t  
T a r g e t  Id en tity  e l e m e n t s
Type o f identification x time x condition
A significant increase was expected in the salience of the national and religious 
identifications from Time 1 and Time 2 within each experimental condition. The three- 
way interaction for type of identification x time x condition revealed to be marginally 
significant with F  (4, 490) = 2.38, p<.05; Wilks’ Lambda= .96 and 1.9%. A series of 
paired-test analyses on each experimental condition (with Bonferroni critical value 
applied) were performed as follow-up tests to explore these differences further. The 
results revealed that, for participants who read the scenario threatening their national 
distinctiveness, there was no significant change in the pre- and post threat measurements 
in any of the three types of identification (see Table 7.42 and Figure 7.5 below).
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T able 7.42: M eans and SD for the 3 identifications for T hreaten in g N D  C ondition
{Listwise n= 82y df = 81)
Variables Mean SD t p-value
National PRE: 35.85 6.95 -.95 ns
Identification POST: 36.36 6.58
Religious PRE: 30.10 8.40
-1.61Identification POST: 30.97 8.81 ns
Student PRE: 34.02 5.96
.49 nsIdentification POST: 33.80 6.15
Note: **/?<■ 01; Bonferroni adjusted alpha, p < . 02
Figure 7.5: Levels of identification with target identity 
elements*Time*Threatening National Distinctiveness Condition
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On the contrary, the calculated mean scores of the pre and post threat identification 
measures in the second experimental group indicated that religious identification 
increased significantly after participants read the scenario threatening their national 
continuity (Time 2) with t (82) = -3.25, p<.02. A similar increase in the salience of 
identification was not revealed for national and student identity elements.
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T able 7.43: M eans and SD for the 3 identincations for T hreaten ing NC C ondition
{Listwise n= 83y df= 82)
Variables Mean SD t p-value
National PRE: 33.47 7.74 ns
Identification POST: 33.99 7.81 -1.06
Religious PRE: 28.11 8.80
-3.25 .002**Identification POST: 29.84 9.66
Student PRE:32.19 5.89
-.23 nsIdentification POST: 32.30 5.98
Note: * *p<. 01; Bonferroni adjusted alpha, p < . 02
c0>15
'o
(ti
o>o
Figure 7.6: Levels of identification with target identity 
elements*Time*Threatening National Continuity Condition
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Figure 7.7: Levels of identification with target identity
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Table 7.44 Means and SD for the 3 identifications for the Control group 
{Listwise n= 84  ^df= 83)
Variables Mean SD t p-value
National PRE:35.86 6.18 3.81 .001
Identification POST: 34.74 6.68
Religious PRE: 29.30 8.30 -1.16 ns
Identification POST: 29.59 7.91
Student PRE:32.51 6.70
-.05 nsIdentification POST: 32.52 6.65
Note: p~. 0; Bonferroni adjusted alpha, p < . 02
In summary, the results showed that, despite our prediction, there was no change in the 
strength of national identification in the two experimental conditions although it was 
threatened. Unexpectedly, national identification decreased significantly from Time 1 to 
Time 2 in the control even though no threat was induced in the present condition. With 
respect to the effect of the types of threat (experimental conditions) on the salience of the 
related identifications between Time 1 and Time 2, levels of religious identification 
increased in Time 2, but only for the second condition.
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Testing the effect o f threat in the salience o f the national and the related identities ’ 
motivations
It was assumed that the two types of threat would affect differentially the levels of 
national, religious and student distinctiveness and continuity identity principles of the 
three groups from Time 1 to Time 2.
A series of 2x3 repeated measures mixed MANOVAs were conducted for these two 
identity principles respectively. The within-subjects factor was time (Pre-threat and Post­
threat) and the between-subjects factor was the two experimental conditions and the 
control. A series of paired-tests and univariate analyses of variance were performed 
(using Bonferroni adjustments) as follow-up tests on each of the identity principles 
measures.
Examining the level o f distinctiveness maintained by each identification
The multivariate tests revealed that there was a strong main effect for type of 
distinctiveness suggesting that participants, irrespective of the time and the condition to 
which they were allocated, scored differently on the distinetiveness principles measures 
with F  (2, 247) = 103.76, p<.01; Wilks’ Lambda= .54 and 7}^ = 45.7%. Moreover, there 
was a main effect of time F  (1, 248) = 18.12, p<.01; Wilks’ Lambda =.93, rj^ = 6.8% 
while there was no significant main effect for condition with F  (2, 248) = 2.43, ns. There 
was also a significant interaction between time x condition indicating that there were 
significant differences in patterns of change in time by the type of scenario participants 
read with F(2, 248) = 4.26, p<.05; Wilks’ Lambda: .97 and a small effect with t]^=3.3%.
The significant two-way interaction between time x type of distinctiveness shows that 
from Time 1 (pre-threat) to Time 2 (post threat) there were significant changes in the 
levels of the types of distinctiveness [F (2, 247) = 7.11, p=.001; Wilks’ Lambda= .95 and 
a medium size effect with r]^ = 5.4%]. Further analysis revealed that, irrespective of the 
condition, there was a significant increase in the salience of both religious and student 
distinctiveness principles from Time 1 to Time 2 (see Table 7.45 and Figure 7.8 below).
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Figure 7.8: Distinctiveness maintained by each identity
element * Time
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Table 7.45: Paired t-tests on pre and post threat measurements of the 3
distinctiveness principles {Listiwise n= 252, df=  251)
Variables Mean SD t p-value
National PRE: 18.22 5.85 -1.56 ns
Distinctiveness POST: 18.66 6.12
Religious PRE: 13.13 5.83 -4.79 .001
Distinctiveness POST:14.71 6.30
Student PRE:15.35 4.70
-3.37 .001Distinctiveness POST: 16.14 5.21
Note: **p<.01, Bonferroni adjusted alpha, p<.02
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Distinctiveness associated with each identity element x Time x Condition
The three-way interaction, which tested whether the scoring of participants on the three 
measures of distinctiveness at the pre- and post threat stages varied significantly based on 
the condition participants were allocated to, revealed to be significant with F  (4, 494) = 
2.60, p=.035 p<.05; Wilks’ Lambda= .96 with a small effect size 7]^ = 2.1%.
A series of paired-t test analyses followed to identify whether there was a significant 
difference in the pre- and post threat distinctiveness measures within each group. The 
analysis in the Threatening ND condition indicated that there was no change in the levels 
of national distinctiveness between the two time conditions. However, the calculated 
mean scores obtained for the distinctiveness principle of the two related identities 
indicated a significant increase in levels of both religious and student distinctiveness 
principles in Time 2.
In a similar way, the results obtained for participants in the Threatening NC condition 
suggested that there was no change in the salience of national distinctiveness. With 
respect to how the levels of distinctiveness principle of the two strongly related identity 
elements changed in Time 2, after levels of national continuity were threatened, the 
findings indicated a significant increase only in the levels of post religious 
distinctiveness. Finally, as expected the levels of all three types of distinctiveness 
remained the same between the two time conditions in the control.
Table 7.46: Paired t-tests on pre and post threat measures of the 3 distinetiveness
principles for Threatening ND condition {Listwise n= 84, df= 83)
Variables Mean SD t p-value
National PRE: 18.82 4.99 -1.66 ns
Distinetiveness POST: 19.68 5.35
Religious PRE: 13.45 5.77 -3.95 .001
Distinetiveness POST:16.18 6.06
Student PRE: 15.95 4.85
-2.33 .02Distinetiveness POST: 16.89 5.13
Note: Bonferroni adjusted alphap<.02
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Figure 7.9: Distinetiveness associated with each identity 
element*Time*Threatenlng National Distinetiveness
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Table 7.47: Paired t-tests on pre and post threat measures of the 3 distinetiveness
principles for Threatening NC condition {Listwise n= 84, df= 83)
Variables Mean SD t p-value
National PRE: 17.27 6.19 -1.43 ns
Distinetiveness POST: 18.07 &58
Religious PRE: 12.34 5^2
-3.78 .001Distinetiveness POST: 14.46 &85
Student PRE: 14.64 4.47
-1.65 nsDistinetiveness POST: 15.48 5.55
Note: Bonferroni adjusted a lp h ap< .02
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Figure 7.10: Distinetiveness associated with each Identity
element*Time*Threatening National Continuity Condition
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T able 7.48: P aired  t-tests on Pre and Post threat m easures o f  the 3 d istinetiveness  
princip les for C ontrol {Listwise n= 85, df= 82)
Variables M ean SD t p-value
National PRE: 18.73 6.21 .04 ns
Distinetiveness POST: 18.70 5.16
Religious PRE: 13.75 5.89 .39 ns
Distinetiveness POST: 13.61 5.73
Student PRE: 15.53 4.68 -1.75 nsDistinetiveness POST: 16.05 4.90
Note: Bonferroni adjusted alpha p < .0 2
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Figure 7.11; Distinetiveness associated with each identity
element*Time*Control
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Further analyses on the dependent variables revealed that although in Time 1 (pre-threat 
condition) there were no significant differences across the three groups on levels of the 
three types of distinetiveness, in Time 2 (post-threat stage) the One-way ANOVA F tests 
illustrated that the condition (scenario) had a significant effect on the religious type of 
distinetiveness with F  (2, 248) =3.65, p<.05.
Post-hoc tests (Bonferroni) indicated that there was no significant difference on levels of 
post religious distinetiveness between the two experimental groups. However, 
participants who read the vignette posing a threat to national distinetiveness reported 
relatively higher levels of post religious distinetiveness compared to those reported by 
participants in the control group of this study.
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Table 7.49: Testing the effect of conditions on the pre-post distinetiveness
principle measures of the three identity elements (Univariate F tests)
PRE THREAT - Levels of Distinetiveness N Mean Df F p-value
National Distinetiveness 
Threatening ND (Language) 86 18.79
(2,254) 2.14 ns
Threatening NC (History) 85 17.12
Control 86 18.65
Religions Distinetiveness 
Threatening ND (Language) 85 13.45
(2,252) 1.44 ns
Threatening NC (History) 85 12.25
Control 85 13.68
Student Distinetiveness 
Threatening ND (Language) 86 16.01
(2,254) 2.05 Ns
Threatening NC (History) 85 14.56
Control 86 15.48
POST THREAT 
Levels of Distinetiveness
National Distinetiveness 
Threatening ND (Language) 86 19.71
(2,253) 1.85 ns
Threatening NC (History) 85 18.09
Control 85 18.23
Religious Distinetiveness 
Threatening ND (Language) 85 16.18a
(2,250) 3.65 .03
Threatening NC (History) 84 14.46
Control 84 13.64
Student Distinetiveness 
Threatening ND (Language) 85 16.98
(2,253) 1.94 ns
Threatening NC (History) 84 15.42
Control 82 15.99
Note: a stands for the significant difference between experimental group 1 and control with p=.02, p<.05
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To encapsulate, contrary to our prediction national distinetiveness maintained its levels 
after being threatened in the condition Threatening ND. However, in line with our 
second part of the hypothesis, the levels of distinetiveness of the two strongly related 
identity elements increased in Time 2. The manipulation check showed that the present 
scenario did not manage to affect differentially the two motivational principles.
Therefore, the fact that both levels of religious and student distinetiveness principles 
changed suggests that participants in the present condition needed more compensation. 
Threat posed to national continuity (second experimental condition) did not affect the 
levels of post national distinetiveness; however it did affect the levels of religious 
distinetiveness.
Examining the level o f continuity maintained by each identification
The mixed within-between analysis of variance testing the impact of the experimental 
conditions on the pre and post threat measures of the three types of continuity revealed 
significant interactions between the dependent and the independent variables. Initially, 
the multivariate tests indicated main effects of types of continuity [F (2, 246) = 56.32, 
p<.01; Wilks’ Lambda; .69 and a large effect with 7)^= 31.4%], of time [F (1, 247) = 5.07, 
p<.05; Wilks’ Lambda; .98 and 2%] while the main effect of condition failed to reach 
significance with F  (2, 247) = .51, ns. There was a significant interaction between time x 
condition with F  (2, 247) = 9.46, p<.01; Wilks’ Lambda; .93 with a medium effect size 
■q^=l.\Vo.
Furthermore, the within-subjects effect test indicated that, irrespective of the condition 
that participants were allocated in, time interacted with the types of continuity with F  (2, 
246) = 3.56, p<.05; Wilks’ Lambda; .97 and if=  2.8%. Analysis showed that similar to 
the types of distinetiveness, only levels of religious continuity increased in Time 2 [Mpre 
= 15.88, Mpost= 16.74 with t (250) = -3.09 and p=.02]. The plot below presents the 
obtained results.
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Figure 7.12: Continuity maintained by each identity 
element* Time
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The significant three-way interaction revealed between the three types of continuity x 
time X condition suggested that the scores of participants in the three scales measuring 
continuity differed between the two phases of the experiment and in the three 
experimental groups with F (4, 492) = 2.98, p <.05 and rj^ = 2.4%. A series of paired t- 
tests analyses revealed that in the first experimental group there was no significant 
change in the levels of the three types of continuity.
In agreement with our hypothesis, the scenario threatening national continuity affected 
significantly the levels of national continuity between the two time conditions, but in a 
reversed way. Although levels of national continuity were expected to decrease as a 
result of threat, the findings suggested that participants of this group reported even higher 
levels of national continuity in the post threat condition. Moreover, in line with our 
prediction the levels of religious continuity also increased significantly from Time 1 to 
Time 2 as a means of coping with the threat experienced on the continuity principle of the 
strongly related identity element (national). These findings are in line with the previous 
analysis testing the strength of the relationship between national and religious continuity
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principles in the present group, which indicated that the relationship between these two 
variables became stronger only after threat was induced on national continuity.
It should also be noted that the fact that the changes in the salience of both national and 
religious continuity principles were revealed to be significant only in the second 
experimental condition, and not in the first, it should be interpreted with some caution. It 
should not be attributed only to the type of threat induced in the present condition. 
According to the manipulation check participants in the first experimental condition 
reported that they perceived the administered scenario (language) as equally threatening 
to their national continuity levels. Therefore, the fact that participants in this condition 
did not respond to the threat to national continuity by increasing their levels of national 
and/or religious continuity in Time 2, may be explained as a response to a simultaneous 
threat on two motivations. In this situation an individual may need to prioritise his/her 
actions and adopt coping strategies to ameliorate the threat experienced at least in one of 
them. Moreover, for participants allocated to the second condition the relationship 
between national and religious identity elements was relatively stronger in Time 1 
compared to the other two groups. This may suggest that in the present condition 
participants of this group may need more compensation.
The results obtained for the control group of this study seemed to suggest that there was a 
significant decrease in levels of national continuity in Time 2. Once again this was not 
expected since participants of this group were not exposed to any types of identity threat 
(see Tables 7.50, 7.51, 7.52 and Figures 7.13, 7.14, 7.15 below).
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T able 7.50: P aired  t-tests on P re and P ost threat m easures o f the 3 continu ity
princip les for T hreatening N D  condition  {Listwise n= 83, df= 82)
Variables Mean SD t p-value
National PRE: 19.41 4.29 -35 ns
Continuity POST: 19.76 4.51
Religious PRE: 15.55 5J6 -137 ns
Continuity POST: 16.52 538
Student PRE: 17.00 432
.18 nsContinuity POST: 16.89 434
Note: The numbers in the parentheses represent the mean scores on the 7-point Likert scale. 
Bonferroni adjusted alpha p<.02
Figure 7.13: Continuity associated with each identity 
element*Time*Threatening National Distinctiveness Condition
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T able 7.51: P aired  t-tests on pre and p ost threat m easurem ents o f  the 3
continu ity  princip les for T hreaten ing N C  condition
{Listwise n = 84, df= 83)
Variables Mean SD t p-value
National PRE: 18.17 5.64 -2.52
Continuity POST: 19.40 5.21 .014
Religious PRE: 15.23 6.80
-3.88 .001Continuity POST: 17.38 6.14
Student PRE: 15.84 4.50
-1.52 nsContinuity POST: 16.48 5.13
Note: Bonferroni adjusted alpha p < . 02
Figure 7.14: Continuity associated with each identity 
element*Time*Threatenlng National Continuity Condition
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T able 7.52: P aired  t-tests on pre and post threat m easures o f  the 3 con tin u ity
princip les for C ontrol {Listwise n= 83, df= 82)
Variables Mean SD t p-value
National PRE: 19.97 5.21 3.54 .001
Continuity POST: 18.70 5.16
Religious PRE: 16.72 5.86
1.65Continuity POST: 16.19 6.16 ns
Student PRE: 17.05 5.20
-.52 nsContinuity POST: 17.19 5.48
Note: Bonferroni adjusted alpha p < .0 2
Figure 7.15: Continuity associated with each identity 
element*Time*Control
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One final analysis seemed relevant to perform within each of the two experimental 
groups to examine whether these two types of threat affected differentially the post threat 
measures of national, religious, and student distinctiveness and continuity principles. The 
results obtained for the first experimental group indicated that there was no difference 
between the reported levels of distinctiveness and continuity in any of the identity
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elements. On the contrary, participants in the second experimental condition reported 
higher levels of post threat national continuity (M= 19.40) than national distinctiveness 
(18.07) with t (83) =-2.68, p<.009. Accordingly, levels of religious continuity (M=
17.38) were significantly higher from those reported for religious distinctiveness 
(M= 14.46) with t (83) =-6.05, p~0. As already mentioned, analysis comparing the 
findings obtained for the two experimental groups indicated that the scenario 
administered in the first condition, even though directed to national distinctiveness, was 
perceived to be equally threatening for national continuity. This may explain why there 
were no significant differences between the post-threat measures of distinctiveness and 
continuity principles, not only in the national but in the related identity elements.
Testing how the two types o f threat to national identity affected the levels o f esteem and 
efficacy o f national and o f the other related identities
The threats posed to the state of the two nationality principles (distinctiveness and 
continuity) were expected to initiate changes in the levels of national distinctiveness and 
continuity motivations. They were also expected to affect the levels of the other two 
motivations, esteem and efficacy, responsible for ascribing a rate of importance (value) in 
the examined element (national). The initial analyses of variance assessing the 
manipulation effectiveness indicated that national esteem and efficacy principles were 
less threatened than national distinctiveness and continuity in the two experimental 
conditions. However, compared to participants in the non-threatening condition 
(control), participants in the two experimental conditions reported higher levels of 
perceived threat on national esteem and efficacy principles. This was an indication that 
the threats directed to the principles informing the content dimension of an identity 
(distinctiveness and continuity) do not leave completely unaffected the principles 
affirming its value dimension (esteem and efficacy). Moreover, the findings from the 
manipulation check corroborate our assumption that changes may occur in the levels of 
these two nationality principles in the post threat phase, even though compared to the 
other two motivations the levels of perceived threat experienced to the state of these two 
motivations were relatively lower.
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In addition, as previously, we did not expect that in the event of threat to a core identity 
element such as nationality, only the salience of nationality identity principles would be 
affected. On this basis, we predicted that threat directed to national distinctiveness and 
continuity principles would elicit changes from Time 1 to Time 2 in the salience of not 
only the national but also of the religious and student esteem (private and public) and 
efficacy identity principles (HIO, H ll). No specific predictions were made as to how the 
levels of these identities’ principles would be affected (direction of change) and whether 
these two types of threats would affect them differentially.
Examining the level o f efficacy maintained by each identification
To explore whether the were significant changes in the relative strength of efficacy levels 
for the three identity elements between Time 1 and Time 2 and across the three 
conditions, a 2x3 repeated measures multivariate analysis was carried out. There was a 
main effect for type of efficacy suggesting that participants, irrespective of the time (pre­
post) and the condition they were allocated to, they scored differently on the efficacy 
principles measures with F  (2, 235) =16.22, p~0;Wilks’ Lambda: .88 and Tf=\2A%. 
Moreover, the main effects of time [F (1, 236) = 15.18, p~0; Wilks’ Lambda: .94 and 
7J^ =6Vo] and condition [F (2, 236) = 3.06 p~.05] revealed to be significant. The two-way 
interaction between time x condition indicated that there were differences in patterns of 
change (pre and post) by the conditions (scenarios) participants were allocated in with F  
(2, 235) = 3.47, p~0; Wilks’ Lambda: .97 and 7/^=2.9%.
Moreover, the multivariate tests indicated a significant two-way interaction between the 
types of efficacy relevant to the identity studied and time, with F  (2, 235) = 13.68, p~0 
with Wilks’ Lambda: .90 and 10.4%. Paired t-tests were carried out as follow up 
tests to compare efficacy levels of the three identity elements in both time conditions (see 
Table 7.52). The results indicated that levels of both national and religious efficacy 
increased significantly in the post threat condition.
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T able 7.53: P a ired-t tests on levels o f  efficacy  m easures betw een  T im e 1 and T im e 2
Variables Time 1 Time 2 t df p-value
National
Efficacy
23.05 28.14 -5.23 239 .001
Religious
Efficacy
21.85 22.92 -2.90 239 .004
Student
Efficacy
25.33 25.22 -.37 239 ms
Note: Bonferroni adjustmentp<.02
Most importantly, the multivariate tests revealed that there was a significant three way 
interaction between efficacy x time x condition, with F  (4, 472) =5.32, p~0 with Wilks’ 
Lambda: .91 and 4.3%. In order to investigate how the two types of threat introduced 
in the two experimental conditions respectively affected the salience of national, religious 
and student efficacy measures from Time 1 to Time 2, a series of paired t-tests were 
carried out for each condition separately (see Table 7.53).
Firstly, for participants allocated to the condition reading the scenario threatening 
national distinctiveness, the levels of both national and religious efficacy increased from 
Time 1 to Time 2. Secondly, the results obtained for the second experimental condition 
(reading the scenario threatening national continuity) indicated that the levels of religious 
efficacy did not change significantly between the two time conditions. However, similar 
to the first experimental condition, national efficacy was relatively stronger at Time 2 
than at Time 1. The results firom the analysis on the pre and post threat student efficacy 
measures showed that none of the two types of threat affected significantly the levels of 
these variables from Time 1 (pre-threat) to Time 2 (post-threat). Finally, as expected 
there were no changes in any of the variables for participants allocated in the control.
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T able 7.54: P aired  t-tests on the pre-post th reat m easures o f  the 3 types o f  efficacy
for each condition
Condition Time 1 Time 2 t df p-value
National Threat to ND 23.58 27.18 -4.42 77 .001
Efficacy
Threat to NC 21.36 23.76 -3.27 79 .002
Control 24.21 24.48 -.66 80 ns
Religious Threat to ND 22.60 24.65 -2.93 77 .004
Efficacy
Threat to NC 20.41 21.66 -1.65 79 ns
Control 22.53 22.44 .23 80 ns
Student Threat to ND 26.32 25.13 2.15 77 .03
Efficacy
Threat to NC 23.31 24.21 -1.65 79
(p>.02)
ns
Control 26.35 26.32 .10 80 ns
Note: Bonferroni adjustment of p<.02
Further analysis was carried out to examine whether the two types of threat introduced in 
the two experimental groups of the study affected differentially the salience of national 
and religious efficacy variables at Time 2 (post threat). Previous analysis suggested there 
were no variations among the three groups, based on their levels of national and religious 
efficacy in the pre-threat condition [Pre National Efficacy: F  (2, 240) = 2.27, ns; Pre 
Religious Efficacy: F  (2, 240) = 2.00, ns]. The post-hoc tests (Bonferroni) performed, 
testing the differences between the two experimental groups on these two variables in the 
post experimental phase, indicated that there was a significant difference only on the 
levels of post national efficacy with t (156) = 2.36, p=.02 with the participants in the first 
experimental condition scoring significantly higher. The fact that the manipulation check 
showed that the scenario in the present condition, although directed to national 
distinctiveness, was perceived as equally threatening for national continuity, needs to be 
taken consideration when explaining why in the first experimental condition both national
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and religious efficacy principles increased and that the levels of the former principle 
(national efficacy) differed significantly from those reported in the second condition.
Examining the level o f esteem (private and public) maintained by each identification
The same set of analyses (a 2 x 3 repeated measures MANOVA) was carried out for 
testing the changes in the salience of the three identity elements’ private and public 
aspects of self-esteem (national, religious and student) in the two time conditions and 
across the three groups (two experimental and control). Therefore, as previously, we 
were interested mainly in the three-way interaction between the dependent variables by 
both time and condition.
The analysis performed, with the three identities’ private-esteem as the dependent 
variables, revealed initially a main effect for types (national, religious and student) of 
private-esteem [F(2, 247) = 6.04 p<.01; Wilks’ Lambda: .95, 4.7%], no main effect
for time [F (1, 248) =.80, ns; Wilks’ Lambda: .90 and 7}^ = .03%] and for time x condition 
{F (2, 248) =.11, ns; Wilks’ Lambda: .99, f=0.l% ]. The between-subject effects 
indicated a main effect for condition with F  (2, 248) = 3.91, p<.05.
Moreover, there was no significant two-way interaction between the types of private- 
esteem X time, which suggests that there were no differences on the levels of the three 
types of private-esteem fi-om Time 1 to Time 2 [F (2, 247)=.84, ns; Wilks’ Lambda: .99 
and 7)^ =0.lYo]. Most importantly the three way interaction between types of private- 
esteem X time X condition was not significant, with F  (4, 494) =.93, ns; Wilks’ Lambda: 
.98 and r/^=0.7%. The only significant two-way interaction was between the three types 
of private-esteem by the condition with F  (4, 494) = 3.42 with p<.01 and Wilks’ Lambda: 
.94 and 7]^ = 2.7%.
With respect to public-esteem, similar to the results obtained for the private esteem, there 
was a main effect for the types of public-esteem which suggests that irrespective of the 
time (pre-and post threat measures) and the condition, participants answered differently
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based on the type of private-esteem measured (national, religious and student). There was 
no main effect of time [F (1, 246) = .12, ns] and condition [F (2, 246) = .99, ns] while the 
interaction between time x condition was not significant which indicated that there were 
no differences in the pattern of changes by the condition participants were allocated in.
The analysis showed that time interacted significantly with the three types of public 
esteem, which means there were some changes in the public esteem principles of the 
three identity elements from Time 1 to Time 2. Further analysis conducted to identify 
where these differences lay showed that only the levels of the national public esteem 
seemed to increase [t (249)= -2.02, p<.04]. However, after Bonferroni adjustment 
(p<.02) this difference was no longer significant.
Finally, and most importantly, whilst the levels of public-esteem principles for all identity 
elements may have changed from Time 1 to Time 2 within and across the three groups (2 
experimental and control), there was no significant three-way interaction, with F  (4, 490) 
= 1.60, ns with Wilks’ Lambda: .96 and rj^ = 0.9%.
To summarise, the analysis testing how levels of both esteem and efficacy principles of 
all three identity elements changed after threat was induced to national distinctiveness 
and continuity, indicated that only levels of the efficacy principles were affected, but yet 
again not in all identity elements and not to the same extent across the two experimental 
conditions. In the first experimental condition, both national and religious efficacy 
increased significantly fi"om Time 1 to Time 2, whereas the levels of post national 
efficacy were significantly higher from those reported in the second condition. In the 
second condition, only religious efficacy increased and there were no changes, as 
expected, in the control. Tke levels of student efficacy did not change significantly in 
any of the groups.
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7.10 B rin gin g it a ll together: D iscu ssion  o f  the findings
The purpose of the present study was four-fold. Firstly, it set out to clarify some 
theoretical considerations in the study of social identity processes relevant to the 
importance of principles other than self-esteem and distinctiveness in shaping identity. 
Secondly, to identify which principles guide identification with different social categories 
(national, religious and student) and whether there are any variations in their relative 
contribution based on the type of identification studied (pre-threat stage). Thirdly, to 
examine how contextual changes may affect the contribution of these identity principles 
in guiding social identification processes. Specifically, whether threat directed to the 
content dimension of national identity, challenging the state of national distinctiveness 
and continuity principles respectively, would bring about a rearrangement in the 
principles’ relative salience according to their relevance and efficiency to deal with the 
type of threat experienced on that identity element. The advantage of manipulating levels 
of national distinctiveness and continuity was that it made it easier to distinguish between 
the different identity processes and examine their impact on identity states at the post 
threat stage. The different types of identity threat induced were expected to affect both 
the state of identity motivations and the degrees of identification with the relevant group 
membership (national) between the two time conditions.
Fourthly, and most importantly, the central aim of the present study was to address the 
‘multiplicity’ of identity structure (Breakwell, 1986; Deaux, 1992) alluded to its 
composition of many interrelated aspects (identity elements), by investigating 1) the 
presence or absence of strong interrelationships among identity elements, and 2) their 
potential impact on an individual’s identity system in the context of identity threat. An 
unusual feature of this study was the additional way that the relationship between these 
two identity elements was measured. The interplay between identity elements was 
studied in terms of relative strength of identification (Study 1), and in relation to the 
functional role (motivational processes) they may serve for the individual as member of 
these social groups. Our aim was to explore how the strength of the relationship between 
two identity elements can be affected but at the same time affect the way identity
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processes (strength of identification and state of identity principles) play themselves out 
in a context in which threat is directed towards one of the purported strongly or weakly 
related identity elements. Therefore, changes in the degree of national identification and 
in the relative salience of its respective motivational principles were not studied in 
isolation in the present study, but instead they were studied in the context of the other 
related identity elements.
Before embarking on the discussion of findings, we need to mention some problems that 
we have encountered that made our task far more difficult than expected, and in some 
instances made us revisit some of our pre-stated theoretical expectations.
Unexpected Findings and Limitations
Despite our prediction (HI), also corroborated in the findings of the first pilot study, the 
relationship between national and student identifications was revealed to be consistently 
strong across all three groups in the pre-threat condition of the main experimental study. 
There is no doubt that this finding deserves attention. Several considerations, both 
conceptual and methodological, are offered in the next section of the present discussion 
to explain this strong relationship between national and student identifications in the 
Greek students’ identity systems.
Nevertheless, the current results suggested that our intention to examine the differential 
impact of threat to related versus non-related (or relatively weaker related) identity 
elements was no longer plausible. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, in the 
current study our goal was not just to investigate whether and how an induced threat to 
national identity may affect its relationship and the identity processes (levels of 
identification, identity principles) with an identity element that is expected to be strongly 
related (religious identity element) in the given social context (Greece). It was also to 
examine whether an identity element (student identity element), that is not expected to be 
related (or weakly related) to national identity in the pre manipulation phase, may be also 
affected after a threat is induced (H5, H6, H7). Further analysis in the pre-threat
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condition measures showed that this hypothesis could only be tested in the second 
experimental group (Threatening National Continuity Condition) for which the relative 
strength of the relationship between nationality and studentship was significantly weaker, 
compared to the one obtained between nationality and religion.
Given this finding, it was considered necessary to explore whether there were more 
variations across the three groups in the examined research variables. The pre-test 
analysis, carried out to detect if there were significant differences across groups in all the 
dependent variables of the study, indicated that the groups were similar and comparable 
before the intervention. There were some variations in the levels of national private- 
esteem and student efficacy, but these differences cannot account for the variations later 
obtained in the correlation matrices. This analysis examined the strength of relationships 
existing between all three types of identifications, with their corresponding identity 
principles and with principles of a related identity element in the pre-threat stage. As 
stated in the results section, these variations cannot be explained by certain demographic 
variables, as there were no differences in gender and age distribution among these groups. 
There is no doubt that the variations evinced, which may possibly be attributed to other 
psycho-social variables (e.g. political ideology) that the present set of data cannot account 
for, did affect our ability to draw inter-group comparisons (between-group analysis) 
making the interpretation of findings much more difficult. However, the existing 
variations across groups did not compromise our ability to examine the changes occurring 
in participants’ identity systems over time in relation to the type of threat induced in each 
condition separately (within-group analysis), which was our main research interest. The 
rationale behind focusing more on within-group analysis was that the temporal change of 
identity(s) should be gauged if one aims to understand better the implications of different 
types of threat and the strategies oriented towards dealing with these threats (Breakwell, 
1986; Ethier and Deaux, 1994, Cassidy and Trew, 2004), even when threat to identity 
does not emanate from irreversible and pervasive changes in the broad social structure 
(e.g. change in regime, war), nor in an individual’s immediate social environment 
(migration or loss of fid ends, family members). Instead, it is a short-term, experimentally
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induced contextual change that may pose a threat to an individual’s identity system as 
part of being a member of a socially valued group, like the national.
Manipulation Checks: How effective were the experimental manipulations?
As Breakwell (1986) argues, threat cannot become manifested unless the individual 
acknowledges its existence and appreciates its implications. In the manipulation check 
measurements, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which the administered 
texts were posing a threat to the desirable states of national distinctiveness, continuity, 
self-esteem and efficacy. The effectiveness of the two vignettes depended on their 
ability: a) to differentially threaten the two motivations informing the content dimension 
of national identity in the respective experimental conditions; and b) to pose relatively 
more threat to the state of these two motivations compared to the other two nationality 
principles responsible for determining the value dimension of this identity element 
(esteem and efficacy). The results showed that the first scenario failed to introduce threat 
only to the national distinctiveness principle. Instead, participants allocated to this 
condition perceived that any implementation of a set of assimilationist techniques 
proposed by the EU cultural committee with respect to the present and future status of 
Greek language, was also posing a threat to their national continuity. For the purpose of 
our discussion, we will refer to this group as the ‘combined threat condition’ as both 
national distinctiveness and continuity principles were found to be threatened. On the 
contrary, the second experimental scenario and the text read by participants allocated in 
the non-threat condition (control) achieved their aims.
However, although the manipulation check indicated that the text administered to 
participants allocated in the non-treatment /control condition did not threaten any of the 
four national motivational principles, analyses revealed that there were some unexpected 
changes in the relative contribution of motivational principles, levels of national 
identification and levels of national continuity between Time 1 and Time 2. One possible 
explanation for the variations observed in the control condition of the present repeated 
measures experimental study may be the fact that participants in this condition had more
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time to rethink and reinterpret their answers as the text they read was relatively shorter, 
simpler and completely irrelevant to the variables studied. What we mean by this is that 
maturation effects may have been processed at a faster rate in this condition as 
participants may have come to know better what they were being asked about and 
probably spent more time in reading and changing the answers at the second stage of the 
research (Fife-Schaw, 1995). On this basis, the control group is omitted from the current 
discussion of our findings.
Despite the limitations just noted, that unquestionably may challenge to some extent the 
validity of our findings and also making their interpretation a much more difficult task, 
we believe that the data set still provided a propitious opportunity to address some of our 
pre-stated hypotheses. As will become apparent in the subsequent sections, the findings 
from this study contributed to our understanding of the extent to which identity elements 
and their respective motivational processes relate in participants’ identity systems and the 
ways they change, both in absolute and relative terms, to respond in the different types of 
threat induced.
Examining the strength o f the structural relationships between the target identity 
elements
The first aim of this study was to investigate the strength of relationship that exists 
between national and religious identifications in Greek students’ identity systems.
The findings from this set of analyses, testing the strength and direction of the 
interrelationships between all three target identity elements (national, religious and 
student), supports further the theoretical underpinnings of IPT (Breakwell, 1986) and of 
other theorists (Deaux, 1992; Cinnirella, 1997; Cassidy and Trew, 2004) that propose that 
identity elements (or identities) do not exist in isolation within identity structure, but 
instead they are related to each other, albeit to different degrees. The strength and 
direction of the relationships, initially measured based on their associated levels of 
identification in a non threatening context, varied between identity elements, but was 
always positive. This prevailing positivity reflects their harmonious nesting within Greek 
students’ identity structure (Hofman, 1988) and the perceived compatibility of their
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associated meanings and respective psychological functions. Contrary to our prediction, 
there was also a strong and positive relationship between national and student 
identifications. In the following sub-section, three alternative explanations are provided 
regarding the present finding.
It is also important to note that the structural type of relationship that existed among the 
target identities, based on the relative strength of identification at the pre-threat condition, 
was a hierarchical one. Participants identified more strongly with the national category 
compared to both student and religious categories.
A strong interrelationship between student and national identifications: An unexpected 
finding
Studies that use student samples for examining the cultural adaptation of minority groups 
and their ways of coping with the migration experience as a long-term type of identity 
change, suggest that the strength of the relative salience between ethnic and student 
identifications and the direction of their relationships (strongly positive or negative), is 
indicative of participants’ levels of adaptation (Ethier and Deaux, 1990, 1994). In our 
case, the Greek students are not the group in the minority position. However, in line with 
research that reports strong relationships between ethnic and student identifications in 
multicultural contexts (Cassidy and Trew, 2004) it may be suggested that, with the advent 
of immigrant populations in Greece, the Greek students may perceive that Greek 
universities are increasingly becoming a culturally diverse environment.
Alternatively, it may be suggested that the strong and positive relationship evinced 
between national and student identifications could reflect the collectively shared and 
enduring social representation of the past politicized role of the student community in 
starting a revolution to overthrow the dictatorial political regime (Athens Polytechnic 
Uprising, November 1973). In Simon and Klandermans’ (2001) own terms in the case of 
a politicized collective identity “ group members should intentionally engage, as a 
mindful and self-conscious collective (or as representatives thereof), in such a power
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struggle knowing that it is the wider, more inclusive societal context in which this . 
struggle takes place and needs to be orchestrated accordingly” (p. 323). Therefore, the 
meanings and functions associated with the student identity may also evoke notions of 
past and future collective action for the common good of the national group. This finding 
may also be associated with the fact that civic engagement is an important part of the 
student identity in the Greek context (student elections). University in Greece is a 
micro environment of the broader political scene, as the majority of the parties that Greek 
students are involved in, either as active members or as voters, are representative of the 
greater national parties. Further research on the content of the student identity element, 
both at the individual and social representational level, is needed to shed light on the 
strength and functions of the nationality-studentship interrelationship. In the present 
study the relationship between the two was explored only in relation to their respective 
motivations.
The last explanation offered, draws on the methodological procedure adopted in the 
present experimental study which, although unintentionally, may have had an impact on 
the relationship between these two social identifications. More specifically, it can be 
assumed that Greek students engaged in inter-group social comparisons and both 
nationality and student identity elements were made salient, after the researcher 
introduced herself as a Greek student of a British University.
Changes in the strength o f the relationship between the target identity elements
According to our prediction (H5), the strength of the relationship between national and 
religious identifications was expected to increase as a response to threat induced to 
national distinctiveness and continuity principles. The results did not support our 
assumption since the size of correlations did not change significantly from Time 1 to 
Time 2, in either of the two experimental groups. Moreover, threat to the content 
dimension of national identity did not bring a rearrangement in the way identities were 
organised based on their relative strength of identification. As will be discussed in much 
more detail in a later section, although religious identification increased in the post-threat
389
condition as a response to threat experienced to national continuity (second experimental 
group), it did not manage to gain priority over national and student identifications. These 
findings seem to suggest that there is a sense of stability in the way identities relate and 
are organised in individuals’ identity systems that is not likely to be affected by a short­
term contextual change. However, further analysis showed that under certain conditions, 
threat to the content dimension is likely to impinge upon the strength of the relationship 
that exists between the respective motivations of national and religious identity elements. 
More specifically, the strength of the relationship between national and religious 
continuity principles increased as a response to the particular type of identity threat 
induced to the states of a principle satisfied by both national and religious identities 
(threat to national continuity), and when the relationship between nationality and religion 
was perceived as relatively stronger (second experimental group).
Which motivations are important for which identities and when?
As stated in the introduction of the present chapter, this question emerged after a number 
of prominent authors challenged the utility of the theoretical reliance on self-esteem and 
distinctiveness motivations in understanding intra and inter-group behaviour (Abrams and 
Hogg, 1988; Hogg and Abrams, 1993; Deaux et al., 1995; Brown, 2000; Deaux, 2000a; 
Vignoles et al., 2002; Vignoles et al., 2006). The treatment of these two motivations as 
primary, and even sometimes as the only motivations in guiding social identification 
processes, has been proved problematic mainly for two reasons.
Firstly, such an approach fails to acknowledge that identification with a particular group 
may satisfy a distinct set of psychological needs (Deaux et al., 1999; Brown, 2000;
Deaux, 2000a). Even if the same set of motivations appears to be relevant, they may be 
associated to a different degree with the different types of social identifications examined.
Secondly, it seems to adopt a context void, a universalistic approach in the study of 
motivations and social identification processes. Context (cultural embedded-ness and 
situational demands) has a foremost role in determining the psychological importance of
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motivational processes, as their unique and relative contribution in explaining strength of 
social identification processes is culturally specific and may change depending on the 
type of threat experienced to identity structure (Breakwell, 1986, 1993; Ethier and Deaux, 
1994; Reicher and Hopkins, 2001).
Addressing the first point, different measures were used in the present study for assessing 
the extent to which membership in the three target categories (nationality, religion and 
studentship) satisfied Greek students’ need for distinctiveness, continuity, self-esteem and 
efficacy. Although this is not an exhaustive list of identity motivations, their inclusion, 
supported also by our previous research findings (open-ended measures and interview 
study), was considered a good starting point for studying the unique and relative effect of 
multiple motives in shaping identity (Breakwell, 1986; Vignoles et al., 2002). Moreover, 
the use of identity specific motivational measures was considered eminent in the present 
study for exploring the strength of the relationship between multiple identities and the 
potential overlap that may exist between them, regarding their respective motivational 
processes.
The dependency of motivations on context was addressed in the present study, after 
examining their relative contribution in guiding identification processes with the target 
identity elements in the Greek student population, both before and after threat was 
experimentally induced. By employing a repeated-measures design, we were in a 
position to firstly explore their relative and ‘chronic’ salience and then to study their 
malleability-the contextual fluctuation in their importance in the context of threat to 
identity. In that sense, the pre-threat stage of the analysis helped us to identify which 
motivations are chronically more salient (assessed at the time of responding in a non­
threat context) than others in the present sample, whereas the post-threat stage provided 
us with valuable information about how individuals may react in the face of a threat to a 
given principle, and whether change in the relative priority of these motivational 
principles as Breakwell (1986) suggested would occur.
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First of all, the set of regression analyses in the pre-threat condition of national and 
religions identifications produced clear-cut findings that self-esteem concern, mainly its 
private aspect, is not the only motivational influence on the choice of a particular identity 
and of its incorporation into an individual’s self-definition. Continuity performed equally 
well compared to private-esteem and in some instances it held a relatively primary 
position in the hierarchy of motivational principles (especially when explaining religious 
identification). Therefore, our findings corroborate the argument that other principles 
deserve equal theoretical and empirical consideration to self-esteem, measured either at 
the global or at the collective level (see also Vingoles et al., 2006).
It should also be noted that participants’ ratings of their identity elements for satisfaction 
of each identity principle were often found to be closely correlated. According to 
Breakwell (1986) identity principles are correlated with each other, influencing together 
identity processes. More specifically, distinctiveness and continuity principles (content 
dimension of identity) were found to be strongly related in all three target identity 
elements. However, these findings did not compromise the validity of our results, as the 
analytical method used in the regression methods, as well as the analysis testing the part 
coefficients, helped us estimate the unique contribution of each motivational principle in 
predicting strength of identification with the target identity elements.
Identification with the national group at the pre-threat stage was perceived by participants 
as a source of private-esteem and continuity, whereas identification with the religious 
identity element (Christian Orthodox) satisfied the need for continuity, private-esteem 
and efficacy. The results did not support our assumption of a potential overlap between 
national and religious identity elements (H2) since each of the two identifications was 
predicted by its own respective motivations (Deaux et al., 1999). However, the set of 
motives revealed as psychologically relevant in predicting levels of national and religious . 
identifications respectively, were by and large the same (continuity and self-esteem), and 
were strongly and positively related. This finding provides empirical support for the 
assumption made by Deaux et al. (1995) that a strong relationship evinced between two 
identities represents similarities in their motivational basis.
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The results obtained for the student identification at the pre-threat stage revealed a less 
consistent pattern of results across the groups as to which motivational principles 
contribute to identification with this identity element. However, it needs to be mentioned 
that for participants allocated in the first experimental group (Threatening ND 
Condition), identifying with the student group was not only associated with student 
motivational principles (continuity and private-esteem), but was also perceived as 
maintaining a sense of national distinctiveness and private-esteem.
The next phase of the study aimed to explore how the two different types of threats 
induced to the national identity element (threat to national distinctiveness and continuity) 
affect not only the relative contribution of the motivational principles of this identity, but 
the principles of the other related identity elements. In line with our prediction, the 
experience of threat to national identity did not only change the relative contribution of 
national motivational principles in predicting strength of national identification. The 
relative contribution of both religious and student motivational principles also changed to 
cope with the specific types of identity threats induced to national identity element. For 
instance, in the combined threat condition (experimental group 1), distinctiveness 
principle was added to the list of motives previously predicting levels of national and 
religious identifications (e.g. continuity and private-esteem), whilst national and religious 
continuity principles remained the strongest predictors. In addition, national 
distinctiveness no longer contributed to identification with the student group.
In the second group, after participants read the scenario threatening national continuity, 
belonging to the national group was no longer viewed as satisfying the need to feel 
continuous but nationally distinct. Moreover, religious distinctiveness motive also 
appeared to take precedence over religious continuity in predicting post religious 
identification.
The findings support IPT claims that when threat ensues a person will naturally resort to 
an array of coping strategies in the attempt to remove the threat. The two types of threat
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made salient particular identity concerns (identity states). Hence, the resulting responses 
and cognitive strategies used by individuals to remove the threat experienced, and enable 
this identity to operate again in accordance to the four identity principles, led to the 
modification of the unique and relative contribution of these motivations. However, the 
revision of the content and value dimensions did not occur only to the identity element 
that has been directly threatened, but also to the other related identity elements. The 
analysis aimed to examine changes in the salience of the identity processes also 
corroborated this assumption.
Absolute and relative changes in the salience o f identity processes
Changes in the absolute and relative salience of the target social identifications and of 
their respective motivational processes between the pre-threat and post threat conditions 
were also examined. As previously, we expected that threat to a core identity element 
like nationality, would not only instigate changes in the salience of the identity processes 
(strength of identification, state of motivations) of this identity element, but that it would 
elicit changes in the identity processes of the other related identity elements (i.e. 
religious). Firstly, it was assumed that individuals would display even stronger group 
affiliation and stick together with their devalued group in terms of identification 
(national). However, no changes were found in relation to levels of national 
identification. This finding may suggest that this identity is either barricaded and 
perceived as being resistant to change, or that in the context of European integration it 
may be perceived more tenable, or appropriate, to defend and achieve continuity via 
religious identification which may also be considered a valued cultural dimension of 
nationality. In line with the second part of our hypothesis, levels of religious 
identification significantly increased in the post-threat condition but only in the second 
experimental group. In addition, there was a significant increase in the salience of 
national and religious continuity principles in this condition. Given the fact that the 
continuity principle was an important motivation in guiding strength of national and 
religious identification at the pre-threat condition, considering the type of threat induced 
(history scenario-threat to national continuity) and that for participants in this condition
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the relationship between these two identities was relatively stronger, it may be suggested 
that national identification needed more compensation in this condition. Furthermore, 
both manipulations affected significantly religious distinctiveness while student 
distinctiveness increased only in the ‘combined threat condition’. As discussed earlier, 
the relationship between national and student identifications was relatively stronger in 
this group and there was also a perceived overlap between student and nationality 
elements in the sense that pre-threat student identification was not only associated with 
student motivational principles (continuity, private-esteem) but also with levels of 
national distinctiveness and private-esteem. Finally, the analysis showed that the value 
dimension of the target identity elements did not remain completely unaffected. National 
and religious efficacy principles also increased as a response to threat to the content 
dimension of nationality identity element.
The models studying change in identity structure, and the coping strategies individuals 
adopt to cope with the threat experienced to its content and/or value dimensions, tend to 
focus on single identities, salient at any one time (Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Doosje, 
Ellemers and Spears, 1995; Jetten, Spears and Manstead, 1997). However, in agreement 
with a number of theorists (Breakwell, 1986; Ethier and Deaux, 1994; Deaux, et al.,
1995; Stets, 1995; Cinnirella, 1996, 1997; Crisp et al., 2001; Timotijevic and Breakwell, 
2000, Roccas and Brewer, 2002; Cassidy and Trew, 2004; Burke, 2006) that propose that 
the interactions between multiple ingroup memberships are important assets in 
understanding better how identities may change over time and the mechanisms involved 
in order to meet the identity standards (relevant meanings and state of motivations), we 
also believe that excessive focus on a single salient social identity tends to ignore or even 
neglects: a) the psychological utility of belonging to a number of different categories; and
b) the potential impact of change in context (short-term or long-term) in the respective 
identity processes of those social categories as well.
More specifically, in the current study, threats induced to one aspect of identity 
(nationality) were found to impinge on the identity processes of other identity elements
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(religious, student) that reside in an individual’s identity structure, calling for the revision 
of their respective identity processes relevant to:
a) the type of threat (content dimension) induced to one of the related identity elements 
(nationality), which may be also relevant for the other identity elements (religious, 
student)
b) the strength o f their preexistent relationship, in terms of content, structure and 
motivational processes, with that element; and/or
c) their function as coping mechanisms employed in a later stage to modify the type of 
threat experienced.
Concluding remarks
The findings from this study demonstrate the responsiveness and adaptability of identity 
systems to threat, and support the literature that argues that holding multiple identities 
that interrelate may be an effective coping strategy when one of the identity elements in 
the existing identity structure is threatened (Breakwell, 1986; Thoits, 1986; Linville,
1987; Roccas and Brewer, 2002). They also clarified the way that identities relate, based 
on their respective motivational principles and the conditions under which they may 
operate in a mutually reinforcing way to ameliorate the type of threat experienced. The 
next study aims to examine the psychological functions of the strong interrelationship 
between national and religious identity elements in the inter-group context. More 
specifically it investigates how levels of a strong perceived overlap between the two 
identities may contribute to perceptions of threat that cultural diversity may bring to the 
fore and influence inter-group attitudes.
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Chapter 8: Investigating the Role of the Nationality-Religion
Relationship in the Context of the Greek Majority’s 
Acculturation Theories about Immigrant and 
Minority Groups Living in their Society
The present chapter reports a study that investigates the ways in which Greek host 
majority members think about acculturation, and the factors and conditions that may 
inhibit the endorsement of strategies that value multiculturalism and encourage 
intercultural contact. The central aim of the current study is to explore whether and 
under what conditions the degree to which host majority members view their in-group 
identity as a compound category, defining it on exclusive terms based on nationality 
and religion, may influence the levels of endorsement and preference of certain 
acculturation attitudes towards minority and immigrant groups that share one or none of 
these group memberships. It should be noted that the acculturation items are 
contextualised for different target groups (Albanians, Russians and Moslems of 
Thrace), domains (intermarriage, education, citizenship) and locus of expectation 
(immigrant/minority vs. state). A model is proposed and tested, mapping the effects 
(direct and indirect) of both levels of national identification, and levels of nationality- 
religion overlap, on the endorsement of the five types of host majority acculturation 
orientations. Based on extant literature on determinants of inter-group and intercultural 
attitudes (Stephan and Stephan, 1996; van Oudenhoven and Eisses, 1998; Verkuyten 
and Nekuee, 1999a; Stephan, Diaz-Loving and Duran, 2000), levels of perceived threat 
to national identity and prejudice are expected to mediate the strength of the 
relationship between acculturation constructs, levels of national identification and levels 
of nationality-religion overlap respectively.
8.1 Introduction
Praxithea: '"''First I  could not have a better city than this, whose people were not 
brought in from outside, but rather we were born from this very soil. Other 
cities are divided as i f  by throws o f the dice, and some are colonized from  
others. A person who moves from one city to another is like a peg badly fixed on 
wood; in name he is a citizen, but not in his actions.^"'
Euripides, Erectheus
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Although most theorising about acculturation is relatively recent, fragments of ancient 
Greek poetry such as this one of Euripides’s play “Erectheus” provide a good example 
that, as long as migration has been a common feature of ancient and modem societies, 
there have been lay immigration theories about how and whether it is plausible for 
people bom and socialised in different cultures to adjust to the novelty of each “other”. 
Ancient Greeks also acknowledged that in immigration there is not an encounter of two 
equally powerful groups. The main difficulties are encountered by those who find 
themselves in environments where they are a minority in terms of culture, economic 
status and/or political power.
Usually, those who belong to the majority culture are historically the ones who are in 
the advantageous position of creating, or not, the living space for the newcomers after 
their settlement in the host society. They shape the social psychological reality of 
immigrants by determining their social and legal status. It is the majority’s belief- 
systems about nationhood and cultural diversity which usually prevail and define the 
ideological milieu that influence acculturation strategies and immigration policies.
The strong position of the majority members is apparent in the extract of Praxithea’s 
talk presented above. She is the ‘legitimate’ Athenian citizen, bom and raised in that 
society. Taking pride in the fact that Athenians are autochthons, and by constmcting 
boundaries of the group membership on an ethno-genealogical basis, she legitimises the 
disadvantageous status of foreigners. Immigrants are described as ''pegs badly fixed in 
wood" who, due to their ethnic/cultural descent, would never become an integral part of 
the host majority society. In name they would be citizens, but not in their actions!
What is striking about this extract is that it is still relevant nowadays. If one forgets for 
a moment that this is the public discourse on migration in 5* century BC Athens, one 
can easily imagine this being the immigration discourse of someone living in a 21®^ 
century nation-state that in general:
a) values monoculturalism;
b) propagates an ethnic rather a civic conception of national identity which
may be defined by common origin, language and religion; and
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c) tends to view inter-group situations and cultural diversity not as 
opportunities for group inclusion and for enriching identities respectively, 
but as a threat.
To what extent Praxithea represents Greek nationals’ acculturative attitudes towards the 
immigrant and the minority groups living in modem Greek society? Which factors are 
likely to influence Greek nationals’ or generic host majority members’ acculturation 
preferences? Is acculturation a stable individual characteristic or is it context specific, 
with variations being based on the target group and the private or public domain under 
investigation? To what extent does the host majority’s group choice of intercultural 
attitudes also vary depending on their expectations from the ethno-religious groups and 
the State? In what way, and under what conditions, do different modes of multiple 
social categorisations, and especially the invocation of a definition that represents the 
in-group as a compound category based on two identities (i.e. nationality and religion), 
influence the host majority’s inter-group perceptions (ie. threat to national identity) and 
consequently their attitudes (prejudice and acculturation strategies) towards people from 
different cultural and religious minorities?
These different sets of research questions have been the focus of two distinct research 
fields, the social psychology of inter-group relations and cross-cultural psychology. 
Despite the differences in the models used, and in the different definitions and 
measurement of key concepts (e.g. acculturation), both these sets of literature share a 
common objective. They both aim to broaden our understanding, as researchers and as 
citizens of multi-ethnic and multi-faith societies, of the social psychological factors that 
may restrain or facilitate the process of building socially cohesive societies 
(Chryssochoou, 2004). As Liebkind argues (2001), any attempt that integrates these 
two fields of research, and uses identity dynamics for explaining what precedes 
individuals’ choices in how they would eventually come to orient themselves in the 
acculturation process (either from a minority or from a majority perspective), should be 
encouraged.
To this end, the literature review in this chapter aims to identify the crucial dimensions 
to be included in the study of the host majority’s acculturation preferences and is 
comprised of three sections. The first section starts of with a review of the relevant
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literature on acculturation models and discusses some conceptual and methodological 
issues relevant to the assessment of these attitudes. The focus is on whether 
acculturation attitudes have trait like characteristics or whether they are context- 
sensitive responses to situations that bring to the fore issues of culture and change. 
Relevant literature is quoted in support of the context-specificity argument based on 
which levels of endorsement of acculturation strategies vary with respect to the culture 
(ethnic and host) or the target group under consideration, and across different life- 
domains.
Additionally, it is argued that to better understand host nationals’ diverse views on 
acculturation, one must make a distinction in their beliefs about: 1) what the target 
groups should do in order to be accepted in the host society (expectations from the 
immigrants and minorities), and 2) how the state should deal with immigration issues 
and the extent to which it should interfere in domains of private (e.g. intermarriage) and 
public (e.g. education) values (expectations from the state).
The second section includes a discussion of the social psychological determinants of 
inter-group relations deemed important in the study of acculturation phenomena. This 
part mainly seeks to integrate the literature between multiple identities and acculturation 
models. It is argued that, in the context of migration and in countries like Greece, where 
nationality seems to be culturally reified along religious faultlines, the strength of the 
perceived interplay between these two identities will also contribute or even be a better 
predictor compared to the strength of national identification of how host community 
members would perceive and respond to opportunities for inter-cultural contact. For 
instance, it is suggested that the extent to which individuals perceive these two 
identities as overlapping may determine if they would experience the presence of 
moderately similar, or dissimilar, ethno-cultural groups as a threat to the meanings and 
values attached to their national identity.
Finally, in the last section, the rationale of the present study and the working 
assumptions of the conceptual model proposed and tested by the researcher are 
discussed.
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8.2 Addressing the context specificity argument of the host majority’s
acculturation orientations: The effect of target groups, life domains and two 
sources of perceived expectations (immigrant/minority-state) on 
acculturation preferences
8.2.1 Definitions o f acculturation modes and empirical issues
Over the course of almost forty years, the study of acculturation processes has 
dominated the research on migration and inter-group relations. As stated in Chapter 2, 
in their classic definition Redfield et al (1936) refer to acculturation as the whole of the 
processes and changes that members of different cultural groups may experience when 
they come into direct and continuous contact with each other. Although the 
intercultural contact is likely to affect both parties (minority and majority members), 
most studies focused on the immigrant and minority perspective. However, when 
integration and assimilation turned out to be the two most preferred acculturation 
strategies by the minority groups living in Western European countries, researchers 
realized that models that neglect the influence of the mainstream culture (host majority 
members-state policies) could not explain why certain strategies are preferred or when 
preferred whether they are possible. The degree to which members of immigrant or 
minority groups will successfully assimilate or integrate into the society clearly depends 
on whether these strategies are encouraged by the state policies and accepted by the 
host majority members.
In the literature on acculturation, there seems to be a recent turn of emphasis in the 
majority mainstream culture, with acculturation usually being conceptualized and 
measured as an interactive process. The development of the Interactive Acculturation 
model (Bourhis et al., 1997), and Berry’s (1997, 2001) changes in his original heuristic 
bidimensional model of acculturation so as to include the majority perspective, may 
explain why there is increasingly more research interest in the attitudes of the host 
majority (van Oudenhoven and Eisses, 1998; Zagefka and Brown, 2002). Before 
reviewing the theoretical tenets of the lAM model, also used in the study presented in 
this Chapter, we need to discuss the two main theoretical perspectives that led to 
different conceptualizations and psychometric assessments of acculturation as a 
psychological and socio-cultural process.
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Unidimensional V6'. Bidimensional Models of Acculturation
Focusing mainly on the immigrant/minority perspective, there are two rival models of 
acculturation: the unidimensional (UDM) and the bidimensional (BDM). The first 
model (unidimensional assimilation model) was proposed by Gordon (1964) and aims 
to portray the adaptation process that an individual undergoes as part of being 
‘absorbed’ into the host community culture. The power differentials that exist between 
host and immigrant groups, based on the premise that afi;er migration (voluntary or not) 
the immigrants need to redefine, negotiate and regain their social and economic status, 
designates that immigrants’ assimilation to the ‘dominant’ society is the only plausible 
option. This process can be schematically represented either as unidirectional line or as 
a continuum that has two opposing ends or poles (see Figure 8.1 below). The first pole 
represents the maintenance of the culture of origin whilst the other end symbolizes the 
adoption of the mainstream culture. There is a midpoint in this scale which represents 
the bicultural option as a transitional stage during the immigrants’ assimilation into the 
host culture.
Figure 8.1: The Unidimesional model
Immersion in Biculturalism Adoption of
Culture of Host Majority
Origin culture
At the core of this approach is the idea that the main intention of an immigrant after 
his/her settlement in the host society is to become gradually a ‘fully fledged’ citizen of 
this society usually at the cost of loosing ties with the culture of origin. Proponents of 
this model (Triandis, Kashima, Hui et al., 1982; Taylor, 1991) argued that this model 
can also be considered as multidimensional in the sense that the assimilation of 
immigrant and minority groups varies depending on different domains (i.e. linguistic, 
social, economic and civic).
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The unidimensional model and the instruments used for testing its assumptions (e.g. 
Acculturation Rating Scale for Mexican Americans by Cuellar, Harris and Jaso, 1980) 
have been strongly criticized, mainly by proponents of the second model (BDM). The 
most noted limitation associated with the unidimensional model is that it presents 
acculturation as a fragmented process, during which individuals are forced to choose 
one culture over the other (Berry, 1990; LaFromboise et al., 1993; Berry and Sam, 
1997). Another limitation of the unidimensional model, also observed in bidimensional 
models, is that acculturation of immigrants is frequently viewed and assessed as a one­
way change process, which does not affect the host majority and that is not affected at 
the same time by the state immigration policies (Bourhis et al., 1997; Berry, 1999, 
2001).
Despite its limitations, the influences of the time and context are crucial in 
understanding the theoretical basis and the utility of a unidimensional approach to 
acculturation. In our opinion, the theoretical tenets of the UDM model mirror, to a 
great extent, the political and social climate of the time (i.e. mass migration flows in 
American society following World Wars I and II). In that sense, the model is more 
appropriate for describing the acculturation experience and the needs of first generation 
immigrants, who, in order to be accepted more rapidly in the new society, are often 
more inclined to adopt the ‘new’ identity, although it may require the relinquishment of 
their old one. At present, increasingly more individuals, either from a minority or 
majority perspective, have multiple national/ethnic identities and mixed cultural 
backgrounds. For instance, in the case of some second and/or third generation 
immigrants, neither the option of biculturalism is considered a transitional phase nor 
does the maintenance of their distinct cultural values imply rejection of the dominant 
culture or unsuccessful adaptation.
The criticism of the unidimensional models have led to the development of 
bidimensional models in which acculturation is described as a multilinear rather than as 
a unilinear process. The bidimensional model of acculturation, which dominated the 
study of acculturation in the last few decades, describes the acculturation process based 
on two orthogonal dimensions: 1) maintenance of the culture of origin and 2) adoption 
of the host majority culture. With respect to the second dimension, at the core of this 
approach is that acculturation should not be equated with the relinquishment of the
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culture of origin nor with the complete absorption of the host culture. Such an approach 
then allows the option of biculturalism, based on which individuals can integrate both 
cultures.
Several theorists have taken on the challenge of conceptualising and measuring 
acculturation as a bidimensional process (e.g. Hutnik, 1986, 1991; Phinney, 1990; La 
Fromboise et al., 1993; Sayegh and Lasry, 1993; see also Rudmin, 2003a, for a review). 
However, from a social psychological perspective, the most popular and well tested 
model is the psychological acculturation model (Berry, 1980, 1990, 1997, 1999, 2001; 
Berry and Kim, 1988; Berry and Sam, 1997). The model addresses the various 
psychological and cultural changes that an individual from an immigrant/minority 
group experiences, both at an individual and a collective level, after settling in the host 
society. The simultaneous evaluations of an immigrant’s position in relation to his/her 
own culture of origin and to the dominant culture generates a fourfold model comprised 
of four acculturation strategies (assimilation, integration, separation, and 
marginalization).
Figure 8.2: The Bidimensional Model
Positive Relationship to Dominant 
Society
Retention YES 
of Cultural 
Identity NO
YES NO
Integration Segregation
Assimilation Marginalization
(Adopted from Keefe and Padilla, 1987)
An assimilation strategy is preferred when immigrants perceive the maintenance of 
their culture of origin as a barrier to their intercultural contact with the host majority 
members and they decide to distance themselves completely from their own culture and 
to adapt to the host majority culture. The integration option is preferred when 
immigrants wish to maintain their culture of origin but at the same time become integral 
members of the society by adopting features of the host majority culture. A separation 
strategy is preferred when immigrants do not value positively the outcomes of
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intercultural contact and place value in retaining their culture of origin. Finally, as 
Berry (1998) suggested, the marginalization option which is usually strongly related to 
high levels of psychological distress and confusion in relation to one’s cultural identity 
and to the adaptation process in the host society, is preferred when immigrants wish to 
distance themselves both from their culture of origin and from the host majority culture.
Researchers who assess immigrants’ acculturation strategies based on this model 
(Berry and Kim, 1988; Berry, 1997) also acknowledge that the choice of acculturation 
strategy may vary in different life domains (e.g. public versus private) and may also be 
influenced by other contextual factors such as the social context that immigrants move 
into, their length of stay and the socio-historical conditions (i.e. economic, political) 
that resulted in their settlement in the host society (see Cabassa, 2003, for a detailed 
description of the contextual factors influencing acculturation process).
Bidimensional models also received various criticisms in relation to the 
conceptualization and psychometric assessment of the proposed acculturation 
orientations. Sayegh and Lasry (1993) criticized Berry’s model for not measuring in its 
second dimension immigrants’ adoption of the host majority culture, but their appraisals 
regarding intercultural contact with members of the host community. According to the 
authors, this speaks against the assumed orthogonality in Berry’s proposed model. In 
addition, van de Vijver, Helms-Lorenz and Feltzer (1999) in their study failed to 
replicate the four-factorial structure of acculturations and reported that the four distinct 
scales of orientations measured only one dimension.
Finally, some researchers (Horenczyk, 1996; Bourhis et al., 1997; Rudmin, 2003a) refer 
to misconceptions and problematic definitions of some orientations (e.g. 
marginalization) and comment on the shortcoming of all these models to provide a full 
understanding of the dynamic nature of the acculturation phenomena due to their 
excessive focus on the immigrant perspective.
Other theorists developed bidimensional models focusing on the role of ethnic and 
national identities in the process of adaptation of the immigrant groups in the host 
society (Phinney, 1990, 1998; Hutnik, 1991; Liebkind, 1996). Based on her research on 
the Indian youth population in the UK, Hutnik (1986, 1991) examined the four
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acculturation strategies proposed by Berry (1990) in the realm of two dimensions of 
identification, nationality and ethnicity. She proposed four possible identity strategies 
labeled as: assimilative (strong identification with the host majority culture), 
acculturative (strong identification with both the majority and immigrant culture), 
marginal (weak identification with both types of identifications) and dissociative 
(identification only with the immigrant culture).
Similarly, following the two-dimensional paradigm, Phinney (1990) proposed that 
according to immigrants’ levels of identification with the national (host majority’s 
culture) and/or with the ethnic (immigrant’s culture of origin) categories, four types of 
identity may emerge that reflect the choices of immigrants in the host society: 1) 
bicultural or integrated identity; 2) separated identity; 3) assimilated identity; and 4) 
marginalized identity.
One of the main criticisms in these types of models is that the concepts of ethnic 
identification and acculturation are frequently used interchangeably (Phinney, 1998; 
Phinney, Horenczyk, Liebkind and Vedder, 2001). However, as Hutnik (1991) 
suggested there should be a clear conceptual and empirical distinction between the two, 
as the degree of identification with minority and majority ethnic groups is usually 
relatively independent of modes of cultural adaptation (cultural attitudes and behavior). 
Moreover, as Phinney et al. (2001) argued, the examination of acculturation styles using 
ethnic and national identity measures suggests that acculturation is dynamic and varies 
in response to contextual factors such as comparative group context, domain and across 
different life-stages (Verkuyten and de Wolf, 2002; Arends-Toth and van de Vijver,
2003).
In a more recent study, Flannery, Reise and Yu (2001) compared and validated both the 
UDM and BDM models in a sample of 291 Asian Americans, and proposed that since 
both models performed equally well in predicting some criteria, like Asian preferences, 
ethnic identification, cultural knowledge and generational status, the choice of the 
model depends mainly on the social context and the target group under consideration. 
Moreover, they argued that when two or more categories are combined, as in the case of 
multiple identities based on ethnicity, a third dimension (TDM) emerges that goes 
beyond integration strategy and represents the ‘genesis’ of a new culture (see also Kim,
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Okazaki and Gotto, 2001, for an empirical study comparing unidimensional vs. 
multidimensional acculturation models).
8.2.2 The contribution o f lAM  model
The Interactive Acculturation Model (lAM) which was developed by Bourhis et al 
(1997) addressed some of the problems mentioned earlier by the researchers, and 
provided a two-stage model that conceptualized acculturation process as a dynamic 
interplay between immigrants and host community’s acculturation preferences.
Initially, the first part of the model, which was based on Berry’s immigrant 
acculturation scale (IAS), was refined by the researchers in two main areas. Firstly, the 
question proposed by Berry (1980) to represent the second dimension of the model 
measuring immigrants’ intention to engage in intercultural contact was rephrased to 
assess the value ascribed by members of immigrant and minority groups in adopting the 
host majority culture (lASm). Secondly, proponents of the lAM model (Bourhis et al., 
1997) proposed that the preference of a marginalization option, occurring when 
immigrants are distancing themselves both from their culture of origin and from the 
host majority culture, may not only be a result of cultural alienation (anomie) (Berry, 
1990, 1997) but also of the choice of those immigrants to be treated as individuals 
rather than as in-group or out-group members ‘judged’ upon their ethno-cultural 
background.
Moreover, members of minority or immigrant groups who favor the individualist 
option do not necessarily experience high levels of psychological distress (Moghaddam 
and Taylor, 1987). According to Bourhis et al. (1997), they are likely to originate from 
individualist cultures, where the personal goals are valued beyond the in-group ones and 
the individual defines the self separately from the in-group feeling emotionally detached 
from the fate of its members (Triandis et al., 1988; Markus and Kitayama, 1991). 
Therefore, the researchers emphasised the importance of including distinct measures of 
individualist and anomie orientations in the scale measuring the acculturation strategies 
preferred by the immigrant and the minority groups living in the host society.
In the second part of the LAM model, the impact of the presence of these immigrant and 
minority groups on the host society is examined by monitoring the host majority’s
407
acculturation expectations focusing along two dimensions: 1) acceptance of the 
immigrants’ maintenance of culture of origin; and 2) acceptance of the immigrants’ 
adoption of the host majority culture. Based on these two dimensions, and similar to 
the acculturation strategies proposed for immigrant and minority groups (assimilation, 
separation, anomie, integration and individualism), five types of host majority 
acculturation orientations emerge: assimilation, exclusionism, segregation, 
individualism and integration. Fpr instance, assimilation refers to the host majority 
members’ expectation that the immigrants would abandon their culture and adopt 
completely the mainstream culture. On the contrary, support for integration indicates 
that host majority members not only acknowledge the right to maintain one’s own 
ethnic culture, but also value any form of intercultural contact (see Chapter 2 for the full 
description of each of these strategies).
These five types of acculturation orientations are assessed by the Host Community 
Acculturation Scale (HCAS, Bourhis and Montreuil, 2002), and are contextualized in 
different life domains and towards different target groups. One of the basic premises of 
the model is that the host majority’s preference and degree of endorsement of 
acculturation orientations are not stable, but they would vary depending on:
1) the existence of negative or positive stereotypes relevant to the ethno-cultural 
origin of the target groups under consideration (valued vs. devalued groups),
2) the length of stay of these groups in the country,
3) the amount of contact with the immigrant groups,
4) the level of national identification as a member of the host society and
5) some demographic characteristics like class, age, gender and the regional origin 
of the host majority members.
8.2.2.1 The target group effect
Sometimes researchers tend to brush over the target group effect when studying host 
majority acculturation strategies. Based on the out-group homogeneity effect (see 
Mullen and Hu, 1989) that presupposes that in-groups members have a tendency to 
perceive less variability in out-groups, they asked host majority members to indicate 
how they expected “immigrants in general” to acculturate (e.g. Billiet, Maddens and 
Beerten, 2003). The main problem with using only such a measure is that it may leave
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the researcher uncertain of which target group the participant had in mind when 
completing the questionnaire. The proponents of the lAM model (Bourhis et al., 1997) 
and the work of Piontkowski, Florack, Hoelker and Obdrzalek (2000) postulate that the 
host majority’s inter-group evaluations and intercultural attitudes depend on the ethno­
cultural origin of the immigrant group in question, and vary depending on stereotypical 
beliefs about the target groups, their length of stay in the host society, their relative 
status and cultural similarity with the host community culture.
Montreuil and Bourhis (2001) in their recent study on Québécois’ francophones’ 
acculturation orientations towards immigrants from France and Haiti examined the 
effect of target group and revealed subtle, but consistent, differences in the levels of 
endorsement of host majority acculturation orientations in relation to the national origin 
of the immigrant groups (‘valued and devalued’ hypothesis). However, the fact that the 
order of preference of host majority’s acculturation orientations were revealed to be the 
same for both the Haitian and French origin immigrants, disconfrrmed partially their 
previous hypothesis providing some support for the out-group homogeneity effect 
hypothesis on host majority acculturation orientations. Alternatively, as will also be 
discussed in Section 8.3.2, it can also be suggested that preference of certain 
acculturation attitudes may not always be based on evaluations of these immigrant and 
minority groups, but may also rely on the extent to which particular group memberships 
render their incorporation into the host majority group impossible (i.e. when national 
identification is based on ethno-genealogical and/or religious criteria). The findings 
from the research conducted by Piontkowski et al (2000) in the German sample 
provided some support as to how the permeability of the group boundaries and 
perceived inter-group similarity can influence both preference and levels of 
acculturation strategies. German nationals were more inclined to ‘integrate’ the 
Yugoslavian than the Turkish origin immigrants, reporting that the ethno-cultural 
identity was incompatible with the German national identity. Similarly, our findings 
from the qualitative study demonstrated that, when religion was used as a dimension of 
cross-cultural comparisons, generally Greek nationals perceived themselves more 
similar to Russian immigrants compared to Moslems of Thrace using religious and 
cultural differences as a justification for the different absorption of these two groups 
into the Greek society.
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8.2.3 The ignored effect o f domain specificity
One of the main problems in acculturation literature studied, either from a minority or a 
majority perspective, is that although proponents of both types of models (UDM, BDM) 
conceptualize acculturation as a multidimensional construct, and always contextualize 
the items measuring acculturation orientations for different life-domains (i.e. 
endogamy-exogamy, language, employment), in the later stages of the analysis the 
majority of researchers tend to construct “generic” orientations based on a cross-domain 
stability assumption (Horenczyk, 1996; Liebkind, 1996, 2001; Berry, 1997, 2001; 
Phinney et al., 2001; Montreuil and Bourhis, 2001; Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2003). This 
issue is far from a methodological one. Going back to the question raised in the 
introduction of this Chapter, of whether acculturation should be conceived as a stable 
individual characteristic or as context specific attitude, answering yes to the first part of 
the question means that someone agrees with an approach that presupposes that 
acculturation strategies have trait-like characteristics and that an individual is likely to 
prefer the same strategy across social situations and even across different target groups 
(see van de Vijver and Phalet, 2004).
In addition to the target group effect, recent trends in research demonstrate that the 
effect of domain should not be precluded from the analysis, since private or public 
oriented domains are likely to affect differentially the preference and the degree of 
endorsement of each acculturation orientation (Mendoza, 1984; Tsai, Ying and Lee, 
2000; Kim, Okazaki and Gotto, 2001; Arends-Toth and van de Vijver, 2003; Phalet and 
Andriessen, 2003; Phalet and Swyngedouw, 2003; Breugelmans and van de Vijver, 
2004; van de Vijver and Phalet, 2004).
Phalet and Swyngedouw (2003) in their cross-cultural research tested the context- 
dependency of acculturation strategies by comparing immigrants’ (Turkish and 
Moroccan) and host majority’s (Dutch) acculturation orientations and values in private 
and public life-domains. Their results showed that, despite the fact that the groups 
(immigrants and host community members) differed originally in the levels of 
importance ascribed in the maintenance of ethnic and host majority cultures 
respectively, both immigrant and host majority members in private domains (family and 
home) adopted separation strategies to ensure the adherence of their cultural values
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whilst in public domains (work, school) both groups showed a strong preference for the 
bicultural option by endorsing integrationist attitudes.
Moreover, the salience of identity elements also varies depending on the type of domain 
under consideration. For example, religious identity may psychologically predominate 
in the context of intermarriage compared to the context of employment. Religious 
beliefs and customs are expected to influence one’s attitudes towards marital 
relationships. In these terms, a preference towards certain acculturative attitudes in 
domains such as intermarriage or education are indicative of the role ‘ascribed’ by 
individuals and groups to these domains in sustaining and affirming the conceptual and 
the structural integrity of an identity (or identities) that may be perceived as being 
contested/and or threatened in multicultural settings (i.e. national, ethnic and religious). 
These domains are also frequently used by the state and/or by other authorities (church, 
ethno-cultural communities and political organizations) to monitor individuals’ 
acculturation choices and the conditions for inter-group contact between the contending 
groups. In the following paragraphs, the previous points are elaborated in relation to 
the three life domains (2 public and 1 private) also used in the present study: education, 
citizenship and intermarriage.
Education
Cohen (2004) discussed the role of informal ethnic education as a means used by ethnic 
minorities in diaspora^ to ‘revitalize’ second and third generations’ ethno-religious 
bonds with their culture of origin. A number of scholars noted that informal or formal 
structures of ethno-cultural education that usually have a strong religious character, 
often become a valuable resource for immigrant and minority groups in secular 
societies or in contexts where the official policy favors the national culture and supports 
the idea that all nationals irrespective of their ethnic-background should share common 
cultural values and political concerns (Molokotos-Liederman, 2000; Kurien, 2001).
 ^The term diaspora is used to “describe practically any population.. .which has originated in a land other 
than which it currently resides, and whose social, economic and political networks cross the borders of 
nation-states, o r , indeed span the world” (Vertovec, 1999, p.xvi).
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Alternatively, in contexts stigmatized by a long history of tension and inter-group 
conflict, intercultural education (e.g. bilingual education) might be employed as a state 
policy to promote positive attitudes towards a multicultural ideology (Sagy, Orr and 
Bar-On, 1999; Kelman, 2001; Bekerman and Horenczyk, 2004). From the host 
majority perspective, rejection or support of the reformation of educational policies and 
institutions, so that students from different ethno-cultural backgrounds would 
experience educational equality, depends on the extent to which the proposed changes 
and in general intercultural accommodation are freed from feelings of cultural 
insecurity and negative inter-group stereotypes. It requires citizens who are sensitized 
to inequalities in the system and socialized to value pluralism and cultural diversity.
There is no doubt that education, and especially the state-educational system, can play a 
constructive role not only in gradually altering the content of group identities, but 
mainly in changing the rules of interethnic contact between the contending groups. As 
Postman rightly argues:
“...public education does not serve a public. It creates a public. The question is 
what kind ofpublic does it create? A conglomerate o f self-indulgent consumers? 
Angry, soulless, direction-less masses? Indifferent, confused citizens? Or a 
public imbued with confidence, a sense ofpurpose, a respect fo r  learning and 
tolerance? ”
(Postman, 1996, p. 18)
Citizenship
Possessing citizenship in the state of one’s residence unquestionably constitutes a 
fundamental factor for social integration and political participation, whilst not being a 
citizen is likely to cause social exclusion. According to Isin and Wood (1999) 
“citizenship can be defined as both a set of practices (cultural, symbolic and economic) 
and a bundle right of duties (civil, political and social) that define an individual’s right 
in the polity” (p. 4).
In relation to this broad working definition, which assumes that there is a civic identity 
that all citizens can share and identify with, two points need further elaboration. Firstly,
412
it should be acknowledged that boundaries of citizenship, in the sense of who has the 
access to this collectivity, under what conditions will be incorporated into the nation 
and the nature of rights and obligations associated with it, are defined and controlled by 
the state laws and institutions (see Chapter 4 for a discussion of how the ties between 
the nation, ethnicity and identity are inscribed in the different models of citizenship).
Secondly, within culturally diverse societies there are no unitary and singular 
representations of this political community. The representations of citizenship held by 
ethnic bom-host majority members (general public and state actors) may differ from 
those of ‘naturalized’ citizens (i.e. post-immigration populations) whilst their 
perspectives are not necessarily symmetrical. For the host majority members, 
nationality, ethnicity and citizenship are to some extent interchangeable, conflated and 
taken for granted concepts in their every day life. For the immigrant populations the 
acquisition of citizenship is the gateway to the host society, although in some instances 
the criteria for qualifying for admission to the nation may even require conformity to 
the national culture. As Aguilar (1999) argues “the premise .of naturalization process is 
often the submersion of the ‘alien’ in the national culture as a manifestation of political 
love and loyalty” (p. 315).
Immigrants and minority groups need to negotiate identity meanings and loyalties, 
whilst contesting over a social and legal ‘space’ in the new environment. Undoubtedly, 
the ‘newcomers’ and the minority claims for social equality and political representation 
also bring to the foreground questions of citizenship and its ties to national belonging to 
the host majority members who may view cultural diversity as a disruption of the 
nation’s normative narrative of cultural and ethnic homogeneity. As Barbieri (1998) 
argues, immigrants and minorities are likely to present legal, political and ethical 
questions of citizenship both for the state and its indigenous people. Especially, for 
those whose orientation to the nation and its identity is relatively more sentimental than 
instrumental in nature (cf. Kelman, 1997).
The study of intercultural attitudes based on comparative representations of citizenship 
(majority and minority) can be prescriptive and diagnostic for the quality of 
intercultural contact. Nevertheless, with the majority of studies analysing the political 
discourse on citizenship and migration issues of professional (e.g. trade unionists) and
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elite groups (e.g. politicians and minority representatives), the ‘unsophisticated’ 
perspectives are generally underresearched (Reicher and Hopkins, 1996;
Trandafyllidou, 2000; Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins, 2004).
Using the data from the Brussels Minority Survey, set up to compare identifications 
(national, ethnic and religious) and representations of dual citizenship in samples of 
Turkish and Moroccan minorities and working-class Belgian citizens, Phalet and 
Swyngedouw (2002) address this gap in literature. Their findings demonstrate that, 
although minority members share a social contract type of citizenship with the Belgian 
nationals, they also retain a communal type of citizenship with their countries of ethnic 
origin defined by a strong ethno-religious identity dimension.
Intermarriage
Finally, in relation to the domain of intermarriage, O’Leary’s (2001) research in 
Northern freland asserts that attitudes towards cross-cultural marriages tend to be more 
negative when religious identities overlap with political partisanships. Moreover, 
research in studying attitudes towards intermarriage with Jews and/or of Jewish 
population and Christians indicated that attitudes were strongly related to negative 
stereotypes, perceptions of cultural contamination and with prejudice towards the 
respective religious groups (Basavarajappa, Norris and Hall, 1988; Eaton, 1994; Sousa, 
1995; Trafimow and Gannon, 1999). Anthropological research in Greece has shown 
that in some villages, even until the 60’s, individuals who married a ‘foreigner’ 
(someone of different religion, different nationality or even from a different place in 
Greece) were strongly stigmatized, socially excluded and economically deprived for 
being disloyal and disrespectful to the values and beliefs of the community (Hirschon,
2004).
It is also noteworthy to mention that the role of the church and the religious dogmas 
have become an integral part in shaping attitudes towards mixed-marriages. According 
to Reynolds and Tanner (1995), “religions express the social and moral integration of 
individuals in their communities” (p. 45). Following a social identity approach, we 
could argue that via their religious ceremonies and their dogmas, religious organizations 
construct and sustain the boundaries between the in-group and the out-group members.
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In the majority of religious dogmas, heterogamy is seen as breaking the religious ties 
that connect the individual with the ingroup. Thus, intermarriage may be forbidden or 
allowed only after religious conversion (Voas, 2003).
For some immigrant and minority groups, similar to the role of education, marriage 
within the religious and/or ethnic community is considered another primary strategy to 
retain their sense of belonging to the culture of origin. As was discussed in Chapter 4, 
this role of religion and in particular the role of the religion of their ethnic group, as 
most times the latter differs from that of the host majority, may also serve as an 
indicator of the level of adaptation of these groups in the society (Berry, 1990; Phinney, 
1990; Raj, 2000). The same can be argued for majority groups especially for those that 
religion comprises a defining aspect of their nationality (e.g. Israeli and Greek). The 
host majority’s attitudes towards intermarriage may also be used as an indication of 
their level of acceptance and willingness to come into contact with the different ethno­
cultural groups living in the society (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998a).
8.2.4 Majority's acculturation expectations from their state and 
immigrant/minority groups
According to the LAM model, the influential role of the state should not be ignored from 
the factors that relate to acculturation orientations of both immigrant and host 
community members (Bourhis et al., 1997). With respect to immigrants and minorities, 
the state, with its régularisation immigration programs, determines their successful 
adaptation. Likewise, the state has a huge impact on the host majority’s acculturation 
orientations. It is via education, state-controlled media and the implementation of 
immigration laws that the state can develop a public discourse that would favour or 
level out the importance of cultural demarcation. Not all citizens would be equally 
influenced by, and agree with, the policy measures. Host majority members also have 
their own theories in relation to which is “the best way forward” for the different 
immigrant and minority groups to acculturate.
In these terms, the relationship between an individual’s perceptions on immigration 
issues and state policies is not a unidirectional one. People’s beliefs and expectations 
about immigrants’ acculturation also influence state policies. In the case of a
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democratically elected government, the state policies, also monitored by international 
organisations (Human Rights Protection), reflect to a greater extent the public’s theories 
of acculturation and their popular concepts of national identity.
It is our contention that host majority acculturation preferences are fluid and dynamic, 
and may be shaped differently depending on the representations that an individual holds 
for the immigrant and minority group and for the state and its ideologies. To test this 
assumption, a new dimension is introduced by the researcher that aims to assess a host 
majority’s member perceived expectations (or ‘ideal’ acculturation strategies as 
suggested by Navas, Garcia, Sanchez et al., 2005) based on 1) how immigrant/minority 
groups should acculturate in the host community and 2) the acculturation policies that 
the state should implement for immigrants’ and minority’s adaptation.
Similar to what Horenczyk (1996,1997) has proposed about the importance of studying 
any possible discrepancies between immigrants’ own acculturation preferences and 
their views regarding the perceived acculturation ideologies held by the host community 
members (see also Roccas, Horenczyk and Schwartz, 2000), the researcher suggests 
that inconsistencies might also be evidenced in the endorsement of the Greek host 
majority’s acculturation orientations depending on their divergent anticipations of the 
immigrant and minority groups in the society and the state immigration policies.
Research on host majority attitudes towards multiculturalism in Dutch society revealed 
that, although the Dutch nationals accepted cultural diversity in their society, they 
expected the minority groups to assimilate into the mainstream culture (Breugelmans 
and van de Vijver, 2003). EU research (EUMC Report, 2001; European Social Value 
Survey, 2003) conducted in the Greek context revealed that Greek nationals do not 
value cultural pluralism and expect their government to adopt generally an exclusionist 
policy towards migration from poor European or poor non-European countries.
Although these findings may provide some evidence that Greek nationals think that 
cultural diversity is not a desirable feature of their society, and endorse rather 
exclusionist positions towards other ethno-cultural groups, the survey cannot answer 
whether they have the same expectations from all immigrant groups (target group 
effect) or whether their expectations from these groups and the state would differ based 
on the life-domains under consideration (private or public).
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8.2.5 Gender and geographical proximity
Literature of studies mainly concerning the acculturation process of immigrant and 
minority groups in relation to psychological factors, such as subjective well-being and 
acculturative stress, proposes that immigrants’ gender can have a significant impact on 
their adaptive experience in the host society (Berry, 1990; Verkuyten and Nekuee, 
1999b). It has been suggested that women distance themselves from the host culture by 
taking on the role of the ‘culture carrier’. Thus, more than males they value the 
adherence to customs and traditions (Liebkind, 1996; Ghuman, 2000; Phinney et al.,
2001).
Either from a minority or majority perspective there are strong social representations 
that is part of the female stereotypical role to sustain the cultural values and customs in 
the family (Duveen, 2001). Our results from the interview study also provided some 
support for this assumption when one participant referred explicitly to the responsibility 
of Greek mothers to pass on to their children their religious morals and customs.
Moreover, following to some extent the contact hypothesis assumption (Allport, 1954; 
Pettigrew, 1998a; van Dick, Wagner, Pettigrew et al., 2004), it was expected that 
individuals living in geographical areas where immigrants and minorities are settled 
should have opportunities to develop more positive relationships with these groups 
which might eventually induce expressions of inter-group bias. Although the quality 
and the amount of contact were not assessed directly in the present study, the researcher 
expected that participants’ place of residence and their potential familiarity would affect 
differently their acculturative attitudes based not only on the target group, but also on 
the type of domain under consideration. As discussed in Chapter 5, due to the 
geographical proximity with the immigrants’ country of origin (Albania, Russia), 
opportunities for employment or as part of political arrangements (e.g. War Treaties) 
that resulted in an ethnic minority’s segregation in a certain region (Western Thrace), 
some geographical areas have a great proportion of immigrant and minority groups. 
Host majority members living in these areas have more opportunities for intercultural 
contact. Alternatively, it may be suggested that the presence of more immigrant and 
minority group members may lead to stronger perceptions of threat and therefore to the
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endorsement of stronger negative attitudes as coping mechanisms to the cultural 
diversity of their local societies.
8.3 Psychological correlates of acculturation
Thus far, the effect of different target groups, domains, locus of perceived expectations 
and socio-demographic variables have been enlisted as determinants of host majority 
members’ levels and choice of acculturation strategies. It is time now to change our 
focus and discuss the social psychological correlates that have been theorised so far, to 
account for the variations evinced in a host majority’s acculturation preferences. What 
do we know so far about the psychological correlates o f the host majority's 
acculturation preferences and what is missing from the models?
8.3.1 Prejudice and identity threat as strong determinants o f acculturation attitudes
Prejudice has been defined and measured as the expression of unfair negative attitudes 
towards a social group or an individual perceived to be a member of that group (Allport, 
1954; Brown, 1995; Dovidio, 2001). As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, research in 
different societal contexts has demonstrated that there is a strong association between 
prejudicial beliefs and the intercultural attitudes of host majority members (Pettigrew 
and Meertens, 1995; Stephan and Stephan, 2000a, 2000b; Zick et al., 2001).
According to these findings host majority members are likely to be prejudiced towards 
immigrant and minority groups and in turn endorse acculturation attitudes that do not 
favour intercultural contact (e.g. exclusionism), when they experience the change that 
immigrant and minority groups bring into their society as a threat to the material 
existence of their group (realistic threat see also Campbell, 1956; Esses, Jackson and 
Armstrong, 1998; Esses et al., 2001) or to its cultural integrity, the meanings and values 
attached to their national identity (Breakwell, 1986). The research conducted by 
Jackson, Brown, Brown and Marks (2001) on EU data indicated that high levels of 
perceived threat, group position and prejudice predicted the host majority’s support for 
send-back immigration policies. Therefore, when members of the host majority groups 
classify the presence of these groups as threatening to the survival of the group or to its
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identity, creating cognitive images (stereotypes) that would justify lack of inter-cultural 
contact, expression of subtle and blatant prejudicial beliefs and endorsement of non­
egalitarian acculturation strategies, may all take on the role of coping mechanisms to 
ameliorate the threat associated with the presence of immigrant and minority groups in 
the society.
What happens when host majority members perceive themselves similar to the target 
out-group on dimensions valued important fo r  defining in-group membership?
Depending on the theoretical approach, a different direction would be expected between 
perceptions of threat, prejudice and perceived similarity. According to SIT, high levels 
of perceived similarity with an out-group are likely to accentuate perceptions of threat 
to distinctiveness in relation to this group’s distinct cultural character, status and power. 
It is only in contexts of moderate similarity that the direction between the two may be 
revealed to be positive (Brewer, 1993; Vansbelaere, 1987), although research did not 
reveal consistent findings in relation to this assumption. Hypotheses derived from 
frustration-aggression theory predict less antagonism with dissimilar or highly similar 
groups compared to groups of moderate similarity (Dollard, Doob, Miller et al., 1939; 
Jetten et al., 1996, 1998). On the other hand, based on the similarity-attraction 
hypothesis and some research on cross-categorisation groups, within contexts that 
groups perceive to hold similar cultural norms and values, both perceptions of threat 
and out-group bias maybe reduced (Byrne, 1971; Doise, 1978; Hewstone, et al., 1993; 
Crisp, 2002). The relationship between similarity, threat and prejudice is also examined 
in the present study in order to clarify whether, for Greek nationals, dissimilar or 
moderately similar “others” are perceived as more threatening to the security of one’s 
national identity.
8.3.2 Perceived interrelationships between multiple identities: A neglected aspect in 
the study o f acculturation
Although the context of intercultural contact brings to the psychological fore usually 
more than one identity, the majority of studies examining the extent to which the 
majority values cultural diversity, as well as their views on issues of contact and 
cultural maintenance, use only a single identity at a time. The degree of national 
identification is often used as an antecedent of inter-group behaviour or as a moderator
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of the strength of the relationship between prejudice and acculturative attitudes or 
ideologies (see Jackson, Brown, Brown and Marks, 2001; Montreuil and Bourhis,
2001). With the prospect of individuals having multiple sources of national belonging 
with the acquisition of citizenship, the discourse of host majority’s ‘otherness’ is 
constantly contested as the boundaries of social categories are redefined to include the 
immigrant and minority groups. This real and symbolic cultural infusion caused by the 
recent migration movements or by the long presence of ethno-cultural groups as a result 
of historical relations between the two nations (international treaties) might be 
perceived as a threat to the host majority’s national identity affecting in a direct or in a 
indirect way (prejudice attitudes) the preference and the levels of their expectations 
about newcomers’ acculturation orientations.
Recently the need to also incorporate how people subjectively represent the 
relationships between their multiple in-group memberships and how they may use them 
in making judgements is increasingly discussed (Brewer, 1999b; Brown, 2000; Roccas 
and Brewer, 2002). It has been found that when an individual perceives high overlap 
between two identity elements this may be associated with stronger feelings of threat 
and consequently with the endorsement of less tolerant attitudes towards those who are 
considered out-groups based on both identities (Roccas and Brewer, 2002). In the 
present study, the effect of both levels of national identification and of the perceived 
overlap between national and religious identities on inter-group attitudes and especially 
the individual members of majority groups’ preference of acculturation orientations 
towards target immigrant groups, varying in perceived similarity are examined. Our 
conceptualisation and measurement of the interrelationship between nationality and 
religion is based on our findings from Study 1 (Parti and Part 2) that suggested that 
Christian Orthodoxy is an integral part of the cultural aspect of Greekness. Moreover, 
similar to Roccas and Brewer (2002) some of the items used are meant to indicate 
exclusivity in belonging to the national in-group with religion being its defining 
criterion.
The study of the strength of the perceived overlap between these two identities can be 
indicative of the criteria that Greek host majority members use to construct their in- 
group-out-group boundaries, the perceived permeability of these boundaries and may 
facilitate a deeper understanding of the choice and level of their acculturation
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orientations on specific domains that national and religions identities are salient and 
towards target groups that share one or none of these identities. Which are the target 
groups in the present study and why were they chosen?
8.3.3 Choosing the target groups and the life domains
Greek nationals’ inter-group perceptions and inter-cultural attitudes were monitored 
towards two immigrant groups, Albanians and Russians, and members of one minority 
group, Moslems of Thrace. As discussed in Chapter 5, Albanians and Russians are the 
two largest immigrant groups in the Greek society, whereas the Moslems of Thrace are 
officially the largest religious minority group.
Consistent with the reasoning of the cross-categorization paradigm (Doise, 1978; 
Hewstone et al., 1993), the choice of these specific immigrant and minority groups was 
made on the assumption that they share with the host community one or none of the two 
dimensions of categorisation, national and religious.
1) Albanian Immigrants (double out-group: different religion-different nationality)
2) Russian Immigrants (single in-group: same religion-different nationality)
3) Moslems of Thrace (single in-group: different religion-same nationality)
Measures of levels of perceived similarity of the self to members of these target groups 
in relation to different domains (e.g. values, religion, ethos and customs) were used as a 
manipulation check for testing whether our assumption that the target groups would be 
perceived, by the Greek host majority members, as moderately similar or dissimilar was 
correct.
In addition, research in the Greek context has demonstrated that Greek nationals have 
stronger negative stereotypes towards the Albanian immigrants compared to Russians 
whose culture, religion and value-systems is felt to differ less from their own (EUMC, 
2002; Triandafyllidou and Veikou, 2002; Hatziprokopiou, 2004). In line with the lAM 
model (Bourhis et al., 1997), it can be assumed that Albanians have been ascribed a 
‘devalued’ status compared to Russians. Although there are no studies measuring 
Greek nationals’ perceptions of similarity and attitudes towards the Moslems of Thrace,
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it can be suggested that members of this group are expected to be considered as more 
‘valued’ compared to Albanians, due to the fact that they are Greek nationals but at the 
same time less ‘valued’ compared to Russians due to cultural differences (e.g. religion).
The host majority acculturation orientations were also contextualised for different life 
domains: Citizenship, Education and Intermarriage. The choice of the specific domains 
was based on the rationale that:
1) individuals express implicit and/or explicit forms of inter-group bias based on these 
domains (Yinon, 1975; Pettigrew, 1998b; Dovidio and Gaertner, 1998; Trafimow 
and Gannon, 1999; O’Leary, 2001).
2) all three domains are relevant to a different degree (directly or indirectly) to 
religious and national identity elements (e.g. intermarriage involves both 
nationality and religion via the grant of citizenship and the religious ceremony) 
and,
3) the domains also vary in terms of the interpersonal involvement (private vs. public) 
and the perceptions of nationhood and attachment (see Phalet and Swyngedouw,
2002).
8.3.4 The present study
The theoretical model on which this study is based examines the effect of the previously 
discussed variables on Greek host majority acculturation preferences, taking into 
consideration potential variations based on the target groups, domains and state vs. 
immigrant/minority expectations. Results are divided into separate sections addressing 
each of our aims in the course of the study. In the beginning of each section the 
relevant hypotheses tested are presented. Our first aim is to explore the psychometric 
properties of the Greek host majority acculturation orientations in relation to their 
expectations fi*om the immigrant/target groups and state policies respectively.
Secondly, to examine the effect of domain, target group, source of expectation 
(immigrant/minority vs. state) and of some demographic variables (gender and place of 
residence) on participants’ levels of endorsement and preference of acculturation
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strategies. In addition, to examine how levels of nationality-religion overlap and 
national identification in isolation or as a combined effect may explain variations in the 
choice and levels of host majority attitudes in different domains, target groups and 
perceived expectations. Finally, a path analytic model is proposed, based on some 
theoretical statements, argued in the introduction of this Chapter, which examines the 
relationships between host majority acculturation attitudes and social psychological 
variables, such as levels of national identification, perceived nationality-religion 
overlap, threat on national identity and prejudice.
The model is progressively built allowing for full explanation of all the relationships 
between the variables at each stage of the model. The first part of the model aims to 
examine the extent to which levels of in-group identification (national) and levels of 
perceived overlap (national-religious) predict the extent to which Greek host majority 
members feel that the presence of the respective immigrant and minority groups is 
threatening to their national identity. In the second stage, all three variables are entered 
to predict levels of prejudice expressed towards the target groups. In the last stage of 
the model, the contribution of each of these variables in explaining the endorsement of 
the five acculturation attitudes contextualised for different domains, target groups and 
sources of expectations is examined. Although we expected that levels of perceived 
overlap would influence the endorsement of certain acculturation attitudes, both in a 
direct aud an indirect way (i.e. the relationship between them is expected to be mediated 
by levels of perceived threat and prejudice towards the target groups under 
investigation), no specific predictions are made a priori as to which these acculturation 
attitudes will be.
8.4 Method
8.4.1 Design
A cross-sectional design survey was used. The study adopted a mixed factorial design. 
Within-subject factors were: 5 types of host majority acculturation orientations; 
domain (1 Private and 2 Public); target group (Albanian, Russian and Moslem of 
Thrace); and expectation from immigrant/minority vs. state. Between-subject factors 
were: gender, place of residence, levels of perceived nationality-religion overlap and 
national identification.
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8.4.2 Participants
A total of 316 participants from the general public (147 male and 169 female; Age 
M=37 years, age range from 16 to 80 years old) were recruited from four different 
geographical locations in Greece: Athens (N= 75, Attica region), Thessaloniki (N=84, 
Central Macedonia region), Xanthi and Komotini (N=108, Western Thrace) and Kozani 
(N= 49, Western Macedonia region).
Criteria for participation: For taking part in the current study, participants had to be 
Greek nationals, both in terms of origin and nationality (bom in Greece and their 
parents also bom in Greece) and residents in one of the aforementioned geographical 
areas for at least five years. The largest proportion of participants (68.7%) reported that 
they had been residents in the geographical regions of interest for 20 years and above 
whereas a further 19.9% and 11.4% were residents of these areas for 10-20 and 5-10 
years respectively.
In terms of participants’ educational status, only a small percentage (2.8%) attended 
only the elementary school. The majority of them attended a university (53.8%) with a 
further 26.9% who completed both elementary and high school, and 16.9% who, after 
completing elementary and high school education, attended the technological institutes.
8.4.3 Sampling Method and Procedure
A self-completed questionnaire was administered comprising of three sections. The 
study-questionnaires were either distributed personally or via the researcher’s personal 
contacts to people living in the four areas of interest who were invited to nominate other 
people to complete the questionnaire (snowball sampling method). According to Fife- 
Schaw (1995b), although this sampling method might help a researcher to recmit 
participants from ‘a difficult to get to population’, it might also result in a biased 
sample, since participants from a similar educational and occupational status to that of 
the researcher might be recruited. In retrospect, the selection process has worked quite 
well in the present study, since the total response rate was 66%, and also, as the 
demographic data revealed, both the educational and the occupational statuses varied 
across the sample. The description of participants’ occupation is presented in the table
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below. It should be noted that participants’ occupations were coded using the 
International Standard Classification of Occupation (ISCO-88-COM). This 
classification system is also used by the General Secretariat of the National Statistical 
Service of Greece.
Table 8.1: Demographic Data: Occupational status
ISCO-CIassification Categories for Occupation N
1. Legislators, senior officials and managers 25
2. Professionals 58
3. Technicians and associate professionals 20
4. Clerks 80
5. Service workers and shop and market sales 24
6. Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 6
7. Craft and related trade workers 11
8. Plant and machine operators and assemblers 1
9. Elementary Occupations 6
10. Armed Forces -
SUB-TOTAL 231
Not classified -
Unemployed 4
Pensioners 17
Students 47
Housewife 15
Missing  ^ 2
TOTAL 316
Participants were also provided with a stamped envelope for returning their 
questionnaire and they were encouraged to write their own views and comments on the 
nature of the study.
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8.4.4 The Questionnaire: Measures (see Appendix HI)
National and Religious Strength o f Identification and Motivational Principles
In the first section participants were asked to indicate, using a 7-fixed point Likert scale 
(l=strongly disagree to 7= strongly agree), the strength of their national and religious 
identification and the level of the four national and religious motivations 
(distinctiveness, continuity, self-esteem and self-efficacy) as proposed by Identity 
Process Theory (Breakwell, 1986). Cinnirella’s scale (1997) was again used for 
measuring strength of identification with the national and the religious group (Christian 
Orthodox) respectively. National and religious motivations were assessed, also using 
the same scales as in the previous study. More specifically, distinctiveness and 
continuity motivational principles were assessed for each identity element (nationality 
and religion) based on eight items in total (4 items for distinctiveness and 4 for 
continuity) which were developed by the researcher.
The two aspects of national and religious collective self-esteem (private-esteem: 4 items 
and public self-esteem: 4-items) were measured based on Luhtanen and Crocker’s 
Collective Self-Esteem scale (1992). Finally, participants’ levels of self efficacy based 
on their national and religious memberships were measured based on the General 
Perceived Self-Efficacy (10 items) developed by Schwarzer and Jerusalem (1995) (see 
Chapter 6 and 7, for a full description of the measures).
Reliability analyses were performed to examine the internal consistency of the scales 
measuring strength of identification with the two identity elements (national and 
religious), and the levels of their corresponding motivational principles for the present 
sample. The obtained alphas for the scales indicate that the measures used were reliable 
with the exception, yet again, of the reliability coefficient obtained for the scale rating 
national-public esteem with a=.68 (see Table 8.2 below).
4 2 6
T a b le  8.2: R e lia b ility  an a lysis on n a tio n a l and  re lig iou s p r in c ip les  and
id en tifica tio n  sca les (T ota l S am p le)
Variables N Mean SD Scale’s
alpha
National Identification 316 35.37 6.19 .81
Religious Identification 316 31.71 9.84 .94
National Distinctiveness 316 17.57 5.79 .89
National Continuity 316 19.14 4.88 .87
Religious Distinctiveness 316 15.76 6.04 .92
Religious Continuity 316 17.38 6.03 .94
National Efficacy 315 26.95 8.25 .95
Religious Efficacy 315 23.86 8.95 .96
National Private-Esteem 316 21.01 4.41 .81
Religious Private-Esteem 316 21.38 4.80 .86
National Public-Esteem 316 17.35 3.69 .68
Religious Public-Esteem 316 19.14 3.55 .75
Perceived nationality-religion overlap
In the same section there was a scale, developed by the researcher of the present study, 
for assessing the strength of the perceived overlap in terms of meaning and membership 
between nationality and religion within the Greek context. Based on the category 
^Religion and Nationality Relationship^ that emerged from the open ended measures 
used in the first study as part of exploring the content of Greek national identity, 
religion, and more specifically the Christian Orthodox religious affiliation, was 
perceived both at an individual and a group level as a defining aspect of Greekness. 
Therefore, the researcher decided to construct a scale to assess the strength of this 
overlap in terms of content between national and religious identity elements. We will 
refer to this relational aspect of the two identity elements, based on their associated 
meanings, as the ‘perceived overlap between nationality and religion”.
The 7-item-set was scored on a 7-point fixed response rate (1= strongly disagree and 7= 
strongly agree). Examples of some of the items used are presented below:
1. “I would hardly call myself Greek if  I wasn’t a Christian Orthodox.”
2. “As a Greek I believe that my Christian ideals are an important part of 
my national identity.”
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3. “My customs and traditions as a Greek are closely linked to 
Orthodoxy.”
To our knowledge, it is the first time that the relationship between two identity elements 
was operationalised in this way. Usually researchers following different theoretical 
paths (Self-Categorization ‘nested identities’; Symbolic Interactionism and Identity 
Theory; Identity Process Theory) examine the correlation between levels of 
identification with two or more social categories focusing on their relative salience 
and/or centrality (e.g. Stryker, 1987; Reid and Deaux, 1996; Cinnirella, 1997; Cassidy 
and Trew, 1998; Vignoles et al., 2002).
Factor analysis (PCA) performed on the seven items produced a single-factor solution 
with loadings ranging from .66 to .89, total variance explained= 70% and an 
eigenvalue= 4.88. The obtained reliability coefficient (Cronbach a= .92) illustrated that 
the scale was internally reliable for measuring the ‘perceived overlap between national 
and religious identity elements’, thus the items were collapsed to form a single scale 
and were calculated as one composite score.
Perceived Similarity
Similarity to self with each of the three target groups (Moslems of Thrace, Albanians 
and Russians) was assessed in relation to eight domains: values, religious beliefs, 
physical characteristics, ethos-customs, and intellectual abilities, educational, cultural 
and economic status (8 items x 3 target groups). Participants were asked to rate the 
similarity between themselves and members of the three target groups concerning these 
domains on 7-point Likert scales ranging from not similar at all (=1) to very much 
similar (=7).
Unifactorial solutions were found for the three scales measuring perceived similarity 
with the target groups [Perceived Similarity with Moslems of Thrace: eigenvalue:
4.66, variance explained 58.2%, Perceived Similarity with Albanians: eigenvalue:
4.61, variance explained: 57.61%, Perceived Similarity with Russians: eigenvalue: 
4.82, variance explained: 60.28%]. After preliminary analysis, three composite scores 
of the degree of similarity with each target group emerged [similarity with the Moslem
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minority of Thrace a= .89 (N= 316), similarity with Albanian immigrants a = .89 (N= 
316), similarity with Russian immigrants a = .90 (N=316)].
Perceived Threat on National Identity
Finally, in the last section of the first part of the administered questionnaire, in line with 
Identity Process Theory (Breakwell, 1986, 1993) perceptions of threat to the content 
(distinctiveness and continuity) and value (self-esteem and self-efficacy) dimensions of 
national identity were assessed. The 12 items used (4 items x 3 target groups) asked 
respondents to indicate the extent to which the presence of the specific immigrant and 
minority group members in the Greek society was posing a major threat to their four 
national identity principles (national distinctiveness, national continuity, national self­
esteem and national self-efficacy). Principal component factor analysis with oblique 
rotation was performed on the items measuring perceived threat to national identity 
based on the four identity principles. Unifactorial solutions were also found for the 
scales measuring the levels of threat experienced to national identity by the presence of 
each group [Threat to national identity due to the presence of Moslems of Thrace: 
eigenvalue: 3.14, total variance explained: 78.5%, Threat to national identity due to 
the presence of Albanians: eigenvalue: 3.13, total variance explained: 78.2% and 
Threat to national identity due to the presence of Russians: eigenvalue: 3.09, total 
variance explained: 77.3%]. Reliability analysis on each scale revealed that all three 
scales were internally consistent with a Threat posed by Moslems of Thrace "91, a  Threat posed by 
Albanians 91 and a Threat posed by Russians 90 respectively.
Prejudice
The second section of the administered questionnaire started off with a set of scales that 
assessed the host majority’s levels of prejudice towards the three target groups.
Prejudice was measured using a 15-item scale (15x3  target groups) that was developed 
by Lepore and Brown (1997), based on well-validated scales of covert (modem and 
subtle) forms of racism (see also McConahay, Hardee and Batts, 1981, and Pettigrew 
and Meertens, 1995). Similarly to what the authors report in their article, the scale was 
revealed to be unifactorial and internally reliable. The items were factor-analysed
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separately for each target group and loaded on single-factors^. It should be noted that 
one item (e.g. Item 5: Albanian minority groups are more likely to make progress in the 
future by being patient and not pushing so hard for change) was excluded from all three 
scales, since the obtained factor loadings appeared to be consistently less than .3. The 
internal consistency of the scales proved to be high with alphas ranging from .87 to .90. 
Moreover, some items of the scales were reversed. High scores on the prejudice scales, 
represent endorsement of strong prejudicial beliefs towards the three target groups 
(l=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree).
Host Majority Acculturation Attitudes
Host majority’s acculturation orientations scales were constructed using the Host 
Community Acculturation Scales (HCAS) developed by Montreuil and Bourhis (2001). 
The items were slightly rephrased to address the theoretical and methodological 
arguments of the present thesis and to account for, or be relevant to, the socio-historical 
conditions of the target groups living in the Greek context in relation to the pre-selected 
life-domains.
Firstly, two separate scales were developed (5 acculturation items for each dimension) 
and the items were phrased to measure if there were any differences in the choice and 
level of host majority’s acculturation orientations relevant to: 1) how they expect the 
immigrant and minority groups to acculturate and 2) their expectations of the Greek 
state’s implementation of immigration and minority related policies. Some examples 
are listed below of how assimilation and individualism orientations were measured of 
Albanians contextualized in the domain of citizenship (Items adapted from HCAS scale 
developed by Bourhis and Montreuil, 2002):
Assimilation: “Albanian immigrants should abandon their Albanian citizenship for the 
sake of adopting the Greek citizenship”.
(Expectations from Immigrants; Domain: Citizenship)
 ^Prejudice towards Moslems of Thrace Scale: eigenvalue: 5.38, total variance explained: 35.86%; 
Prejudice towards Albanians Scale: eigenvalue: 6.42, total variance explained: 42.81; Prejudice towards 
Russians Scale: eigenvalue: 5.59, total variance explained: 37.27.
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Assimilation: “The Greek state should grant Albanians Greek citizenship only if the 
latter conform and accept the laws, and participate in the national culture, of this 
country”.
(Expectations from the State, Domain: Citizenship) 
Individualism: “Whether Albanian immigrants wish to retain their Albanian citizenship 
or adopt the Greek citizenship makes no difference, because every individual is free to 
choose the citizenship that he/she chooses”.
(Expectations from Immigrants; Domain: Citizenship)
Individualism: “For Greek citizenship to be granted, the Greek state should investigate 
the applicant’s legal and political rights, irrespective of whether he/she is an Albanian”.
(Expectations from the State, Domain: Citizenship)
With reference to the contextualized nature of acculturation orientations in relation to 
the domain (Phalet and Andriessen, 2003; Phalet and Swyngedouw, 2003 Vijver, Phalet 
and Phalet 2004) and target specificity arguments (Bourhis et al., 1997; Montreuil and 
Bourhis, 2001), in the present study the five types of acculturation orientations, which 
were measured by two different scales based on the two loci/sources of host majority’s 
perceived expectations, were contextualized for the three life-domains (citizenship, 
education and intermarriage) and the target groups separately (Albanians, Russians, 
Moslems of Thrace). The authors of the HCAS scale recommend that at least three 
domains should be used in order to obtain scale reliability.
Due to the fact that Moslems of Thrace are Greek nationals, the items used to assess the 
five types of acculturation orientations in the domain of citizenship referred to the host 
majority’s attitudes towards this minority members’ claim to be legally entitled to 
establish their own political party in order to consolidate their socioeconomic position 
in state politics. The items presented below are an example of how assimilation 
orientation was contextualized for the two different sources of expectation in this 
domain:
Assimilation: “Moslems of Thrace should not have the right to establish their own 
political parties in order to be eligible to participate in the current Greek political 
parties”.
(Expectations of Minority; Domain: Citizenship/Political Rights)
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Assimilation: “The Greek state should acknowledge the right of the Moslems of Thrace 
to establish their own political parties only if  they become accustomed to and accept the 
electoral system of this country”.
(Expectations from Minority, Domain: Citizenship/Political Rights)
In relation to the target group effect, Bourhis and Montreuil (2002) suggest that the host 
majority’s acculturation orientations can be also measured using a broader term 
‘immigrants in general’, instead of specific immigrant and/or minority groups. Despite 
the fact that this option might elicit information on how the host majority’s perceptions 
of immigrant and minority groups as ‘homogeneous’ could affect their levels of 
endorsement of acculturation orientation, the researcher decided to specify the target 
groups of interest. This choice was not only based on the fact that these groups shared 
with the host majority members one or none (10 vs. 0 0 ) of the two identity elements 
(nationality and religion) of interest, but also, as advised by the authors, the use of the 
term ‘immigrants in general’ leaves the researcher uncertain about which target group 
the participant considered during the completion of the administered questionnaire 
(Bourhis and Montreuil, 2002).
Moreover, due to the fact that among the immigrant populations coming from Albania 
and Russia are also two groups of immigrants whose ethnic origin is Greek (Pontic- 
Greeks and Greek Albanians), it was considered important that participants read a 
paragraph that clarified that the scales only referred to immigrants of Albanian and 
Russian ethnic origin. For instance:
“The following statements deal with opinions concerning Albanian immigrants 
who have settled in Greece. Albanian immigrants are individuals bom in 
Albania who have immigrated to Greece, and who have received the Greek 
citizenship or will receive it in the near future. Please answer thinking about 
this specific immigrant group only. For each statement, please provide your 
opinion using the following scale, circling the number that applies to you the 
most.”
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In a similar vein, prior to the completion of the acculturation scales in relation to the 
minority group (Moslems of Thrace), participants read a paragraph including 
information about the civic status of the group and their ethnic origin. More 
specifically, it was considered important to mention that Moslems of Thrace are bom in 
Greece, are Greek nationals and that their ethnic origin is either Turkish or Bulgarian.
Therefore, the host majority’s acculturation orientations were measured by 45 items in 
total for each dimension, which included 5 items per orientation contextualized in 
relation to the 3 domains and the 3 target groups of interest. The scale was scored on a 
7-point Likert-scale (with l=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree).
Demographic data relating to participants’ education, occupation, place and length of 
residence and political ideology was also collected in the last part of the questionnaire.
8.4.5 Research Hypotheses: Section 1
The first set of analyses aims to contribute to the debate, discussed in the introduction 
of this chapter, as to whether the preferred host majority acculturation orientation is a 
stable individual characteristic (trait) or if  it varies depending on the domain, the target 
group and the locus of expectation (immigrant, minority/state) under consideration. In 
addition, it aims to firstly examine whether socio-demographic variables such as 
gender, place of residence, and secondly whether psychological variables such as levels 
of national identification perceived nationality-religion overlap also explain variations 
in the choice and the levels of endorsement of those intercultural attitudes.
A set of hypotheses were formulated in order to address all these theoretical and 
methodological arguments:
I. Levels of endorsement of the host majority’s acculturation orientations 
would be affected by the type of life-domain, the target group under 
consideration.
II. The host majority’s different locus of perceived expectations of acculturative 
attitudes as they should be endorsed by the immigrant/minority vs. by the
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State, would affect differentially the levels of endorsement of acculturation 
orientations.
III. The host majority’s different locus of perceived expectations of acculturative 
attitudes, as endorsed by the immigrant/minority vs. by the state, would 
affect differentially the levels of endorsement of acculturation orientations 
when contextualized for different domains and towards different groups.
IV. Participants’ gender is expected to affect differentially their levels of 
endorsement of acculturation orientations
V. Participants’ place of residence is expected to influence their level of 
endorsement of acculturation orientations in different life-domains and/or 
towards the different target groups.
VI. Levels of nationality-religion relationship and levels of national 
identification are expected to affect differently the levels of endorsement of 
the five acculturation orientations contextualized for the two sources of 
expectations separately (immigrant/minority and state), for the three target 
groups and in the life-domains examined.
Before addressing the set of hypotheses presented above, a series of preliminary 
analyses were conducted. The first analysis aimed to explore the metric structure of 
host majority acculturation orientations, contextualized to measure the new 
dimension proposed by the researcher: expectations from immigrant/minority 
groups vs. the state. The second was a manipulation check to examine whether the 
choice of target groups, based on the perceived similarity and valued and devalued 
assumptions, were correct. Finally, in order to address the point raised in the 
introduction to this chapter about which theoretical approach (SIT, similarity- 
attraction hypothesis or frustration-aggression hypothesis) can best describe how 
perceived threat, similarity and prejudicial attitudes relate in the Greek sample, the 
intercorrelations between them were also examined.
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8.5 R esu lts  (S ection  I)
8.5.1 Preliminary Analysis: Validating the HCAS Scale in the Greek sample
including the proposed immigrant/minority vs. state dimensions (source o f  
expectation)
The internal consistency of the scales measuring the five acculturation orientations 
concerning the two different sources of expectations (irrespective of the type of domain 
and target group) were revealed to be satisfactory, with the exception of the reliability 
coefficients obtained for the scales measuring the two different sources of the host 
majority’s expectations in relation to assimilation orientation (a ûmmgrant=-71 and a state= 
,71 respectively). Moreover, a comparatively low but acceptable Cronbach’s alpha was 
obtained for segregation orientation, but this time only for the scale assessing the first 
source of expectation (a immigrant=-65). The table below illustrates the obtained reliability 
coefficients.
Table 8.3: Reliability analyses on host majority acculturation scales:
Immigrant/Minority and State Dimensions
A.O EXPECTATIONS OF N Mean SD Scale’s
THE
IMMIGRANT/MINORITY
alpha
Assimilation (9 items) 313 29.03 8.42 .71
Segregation (9 items) 312 34.03 8.01 .65
Individualism (9 items) 312 38.97 12.04 .88
Integration (9 items) 313 37.05 9.95 .81
Exclusionism (9 items) 311 31.25 12.61 .90
A.O EXPECTATIONS OF
THE STATE
Assimilation (9 items) 311 34.68 8.26 .71
Segregation (9 items) 312 28.89 10.93 .85
Individualism (9 items) 312 43.55 10.90 .86
Integration (9 items) 311 36.98 11.30 .87
Exclusionism (9 items) 311 29.77 10.87 .86
Note: A.O stands for the five types o f acculturation orientations
In line with the authors of the HCAS scale (Montreuil and Bourhis, 2001; Bourhis and 
Montreuil, 2002), the direction of the intercorrelations between the five types of 
orientations were examined, in our case contextualized to measure the perceived 
expectations fi*om the immigrant/minority groups and the state. To begin with, the
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obtained Pearson coefficients obtained for the five acculturations for the first dimension 
(expectations fi*om immigrant/minority) indicated a different pattern of correlations 
firom the one suggested by the authors. Assimilation orientation was not related to 
segregation. Rather unexpectedly, segregation was revealed to be positively related to 
individualism and integration (see Table 8.4). If one considers that segregation usually 
encourages the cultural distance between the contending groups, the fact that it is 
positively related particularly to integration raises questions about what meanings 
Greek host majority members associate with this orientation and the underlying 
processes that guide the preference of this strategy.
As expected a strong positive correlation was obtained between individualism and 
integration (r=.70, p~0). Furthermore, these two orientations were negatively related to 
both assimilationist and exclusionist orientations, which suggests that participants 
perceived them as antithetical constructs. For instance, integration orientation favors 
the intercultural contact between the groups and fosters the idea of a cultural 
intersection and/or of a union. On the contrary, exclusionism supports the maintenance 
of ethno-cultural homogeneity and rejects the positive outcomes of an intercultural 
contact with any of the immigrant and minority groups living in the host society.
Table 8.4: Correlations between acculturation orientations: Expectations
of the immigrant/minority groups {Listwise n= 310)
Types of A.O 1 2 3 4 5
1. Assimilation -
2. Segregation ns -
3. Individualism -.31** .11* -
4. Integration -.33** .19** .70*** -
5. Exclusionism .57** .12* -.52** -.57**
Note: **^p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05
Most of the correlations obtained between acculturation orientations for the second 
dimension, measuring participants’ expectations of the state, were in the expected 
direction, with the exception this time of assimilation orientation (see Table 8.5). 
Similar to the findings obtained in the first dimension for segregation, assimilation was 
not significantly related to both segregation and integration, but it was positively related 
to both individualism and exclusionism.
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Table 8.5: Correlations between acculturation orientations: Expectations
of the State {Listwise n= 309)
Types of A.O 1 2 3 4 5
1. Assimilation
2. Segregation
3. Individualism
4. Integration
5. Exclusionism
ns
ns
.16**
-.66***
-.68***
.82*** -.62*** -,74***
Note: *^*p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05
To clarify the findings from this set of analyses and to detect the metric structure of host 
majority acculturation orientations in each of the two proposed dimensions 
(expectations fi*om immigrant/minority group members vs. state), the composite scales 
were submitted to second-order factor analyses, with oblique rotation, in which the 
correlation matrix of the common factors is itself factor analyzed to provide second- 
order factors.
The pattern matrix obtained for the scales, measuring the host majority’s acculturation 
expectations of the immigrant and minority groups, revealed a two-factor solution 
which accounted for 73.86% of the variance. The eigenvalue of the first factor was 
2.52 and accounted for 50.49% of the variance and the eigenvalue of the second factor 
was 1.17 accounting for 23.37%. The scales measuring assimilation, individualism, 
integration and exclusionism loaded under the first factor with loadings ranging from - 
.66 to +Z-.84 (see Table 8.6). The scale measuring segregation orientation loaded under 
the second factor (.90).
Table 8.6: Pattern matrix of structural coefficlents-two factor solution for host
majority orientations based on their expectations of the 
immigrant/minority groups
ACCULTURATION SCALES COMPI3NENT
1 2
Assimilation -.66
Segregation .90
Individualism .82
Integration .84
Exclusionism -.84
Note: Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. Absolute 
values less than 0.3 were suppressed. Rotation converged in 2 iterations
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A two-factor solution was also obtained for the scales measuring the host majority’s 
acculturation expectations from the state, which explained 85.21% of the variance. The 
first factor included the scales measuring segregation, individualism, integration and 
exclusionism orientations with the lowest loading being -.86 and the highest +/-.90 
[Factor 1: eigenvalue= 3.16 accounting for 63.19% of the total variance]. The 
assimilation scale loaded highly under the second factor with the factor loading being 
.98 [Factor 2: eigenvalue=1.10 accounting for 22.02% of the variance].
Table 8.7: Pattern matrix of structural coefficients-two factor solution for host
majority orientations based on their expectations of the state
ACCULTURATION SCALES COMP43NENT
1 2
Assimilation .98
Segregation .89
Individualism -.86
Integration -.90
Exclusionism .90
Note: Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. Absolute values less than 0.3 were 
suppressed. Rotation converged in 2 iterations.
Overall, the two-factor solutions indicate that, either looking at the expectations from 
the immigrant/minority groups or from the state, host majority acculturation 
orientations are two-dimensional. Although individualism, integration and 
exclusionism orientations always loaded under the same factor, irrespective of the 
source of expectation under consideration, the metric structure for assimilation and 
segregation orientations differed. This was an indication that variations exist in 
participants’ answers on these two acculturation orientations, depending on the source 
of expectation being considered. The analyses employed in later stages was expected to 
clarify whether these variations could be explained by the type of domain and target 
group under consideration, and also by the relative contribution of different 
psychological factors predicting the endorsement of these acculturation strategies.
8.5.2 Testing the ^valued and devalued hypothesis* and perceived similarity 
assumptions in relation to the three target groups
One of the aims of the first set of analyses was to examine the effect of target group on 
host majority acculturation orientations contextualised for different life-domains. This
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also accounted for potential differences in participants’ responses in relation to 
expectations from these immigrant/minority groups and state policies respectively. 
However, prior to that, it was considered important to examine whether the choice of 
target groups was valid, given the assumptions that Greek nationals: 1) would perceive 
these target groups as moderately similar (i.e. Russians, Moslems of Thrace) or 
dissimilar (i.e. Albanians), and 2) would also express relatively more or less favourable 
attitudes towards them (valued and devalued target groups).
8.5.2.1 Manipulation check
Perceived similarity judgments: Comparing the self to the target groups
Initially, the composite scores obtained on the eight items measuring levels of perceived 
similarity with each target group were used. The paired sample t-tests showed that 
Greek participants perceived themselves as being more similar to Russians (M=27.95) 
compared to both Albanians [M= 19.641 (315) = -16.97, p~0] and Moslems of Thrace 
[M= 21.97, t (315) = 12.10, p~0]. Moreover, participants perceived themselves more 
similar to Moslems of Thrace than to Albanians [t (315) = -5.82, p~0]. Although the 
previous results show that overall there are notable variations on participants’ perceived 
similarity judgments based on the target group under consideration (Russians>
Moslems of Thrace>Albanians), it was considered important to examine in which 
domains (e.g. religion) Greek participants felt relatively more or less similar with each 
of these groups.
In light of this, the single-items measuring similarity between the self and the members 
of the immigrant and minority groups concerning the eight domains (values, religious 
beliefs, physical characteristics, ethos-customs, intellectual abilities, educational, 
cultural and economic status) were used in further statistical analysis (see Table 8.8 
below).
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Table 8.8: Paired t-test analyses on levels of perceived similarity with the 3
target groups in the 8 domains: Means and standard deviations 
{Listwise n= 316, df= 315)
Perceived Similarity 
With 
Based on:
Target Group 
(Means)
SD t p-value Summary 
of Results
1. Values Moslems: 2.83 1.52 5.14a .001
Albanians: 2.42 1.41 10.12c .001 R>M>A
Russians: 3.34 1.60 -5.64b .001
2. Religious Beliefs Moslems: 1.92 1.25 -3.69a .001
Albanians: 2.20 1.39 -17.88c .001 R>A>M
Russians: 4.33 1.82 -20.06b .001
3. Physical Characteristics Moslems: 2.99 1.48 4.40a .001
Albanians: 2.61 1.47 -3.70c .001 R=M>A
Russians: 2.92 1.43 .82b ns
4. Ethos-Customs Moslems: 2.29 1.37 -1.23a ns
Albanians: 2.38 1.34 -9.50c .001 R>M=A
Russians: 3.24 1.50 -10.03b .001
5. Intellectual Abilities Moslems: 3.49 1.61 2.33a .02
Albanians: 3.31 1.59 -8.02c .001 R>M>A
Russians: 3.97 1.59 -5.70b .001
6. Educational Status Moslems: 2.72 1.44 4.89a .001
Albanians: 2.31 1.33 -14.41c .001 R>M>A
Russians: 3.68 1.58 -9.88b .001
7. Cultural Status Moslems: 2.75 1.43 6.15a .001
Albanians: 2.27 1.35 -14.72c .001 R>M>A
Russians: 3.68 1.62 -9.15b .001
8. Economic Status Moslems: 2.98 1.47 9.79a .001
Albanians: 2.14 1.30 -8.69 c .001 M>R>A
Russians: 2.79 1.37 2.27b .02
Note: The subscripts used portray the different comparisons (a=Moslems-Albanians, Moslems-
Russians, c-Albanians-Russians); Bonferroni adjusted alpha, p<.02
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Overall, the findings demonstrate that Greek respondents perceived themselves as 
relatively more similar to Russians, compared to Albanians who in general were rated 
as the most dissimilar out-group. Interestingly, the reported levels of perceived 
similarity to members firom the Moslem minority varied a lot depending on the domain 
under consideration. For instance, the mean scores obtained in terms of values, 
intellectual abilities, cultural and educational status, seem to suggest that they were 
perceived as the second most similar group to self after the Russian immigrants. 
However, in terms of economic status, Moslems of Thrace were perceived as the most 
similar group to self. Moreover, in terms of physical characteristics Russian 
immigrants and Moslems of Thrace were perceived as equally similar to the self. 
Finally, in terms of religion, Moslems of Thrace were perceived as the most dissimilar 
group, followed by the Albanian immigrants. Greek participants felt that their own 
religious beliefs, values, cultural status, ethos and customs were more similar to those 
of Russian immigrants compared to the other two target groups.
Concluding this section, it needs to be mentioned that although there were variations in 
the reported levels of perceived similarity, based on the target group and domain under 
consideration, the obtained mean scores were generally low given that participants were 
asked to indicate their levels of perceived similarity using a 7-point Likert scale.
Which are the ‘valued’ and ‘devalued’groups?
This set of analyses aimed to test the contention of differential prejudice targeted at 
different groups. Participants’ scores on the administered prejudice scales revealed that 
Albanians were the most ‘hated’ group compared to both Russian immigrants and 
Moslems of Thrace (see Table 8.9).
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Table 8.9: Paired t-test analyses on levels of prejudice expressed towards the 3
target groups: Means and standard deviations {Listwise n= 315, df= 
314)
Mean SD t p-value Summary 
of Results
Levels of Moslems: 60.99 13.61 -10.76a .001
Prejudice towards Albanians: 66.87 15.12 6.60c .001 A>R>M
Russians: 63.68 13.65 -5.28b .001
Note: The subscripts used portray the different comparisons (a=Moslems-Albanians, b= Moslems- 
Russians, c=Albanians-Russians); Bonferroni adjusted alpha, p<.02
Based on both the reported levels of perceived similarity and prejudice, we could expect 
relatively more unfavourable acculturation orientations, such as exclusionism, to be 
endorsed toward the Albanian immigrant group (devalued and dissimilar target group).
However, it is also possible that host majority members may not endorse distinctive 
acculturation orientations toward the different target groups, but instead have 
undifferentiated ‘generic’ acculturation orientations toward all three target groups (out­
group homogeneity effect), or alternatively endorse a similar pattern of acculturation 
styles towards ‘immigrants’ vs. the ‘minority’. The main analysis presented in the 
subsequent sections aims to address this question (See Section 8.5.4).
Which target group is perceived as the most threatening one?
One last analysis seemed appropriate to understand how Greek respondents evaluated 
the presence of these three target groups in their society. The obtained mean scores on 
perceptions of threat posed to the content and value dimensions of Greek national 
identity due to the presence of the three target groups revealed a reverse pattern of 
results from the one obtained for the perceived similarity judgments (R>M>A). 
Albanians were perceived as posing relatively more threat to national identity, followed 
by Moslems of Thrace and Russians (A>M>R).
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Table 8.10 Paired t-test analyses on levels of perceived threat to national 
identity posed by the 3 target groups: Means and standard 
deviations {Listwise n= 316, dj= 315)
Mean SD t p-value Summary 
of Results
Levels of Moslems: 15.44 7.13 -4.36a .001
Perceived Threat Albanians: 16.67 7.35 8.29c .001 A>M>R
to NI by Russians: 14.55 6.99 3.28b .001
Note: NI: stands for national identity; The subscripts used portray the different comparisons 
(a=Moslems-Albanians, Moslems-Russians, c=Albanians-Russians); Bonferroni adjusted
alpha, p<.02
8.5.3 Examining the relationship between levels o f  perceived similarity, 
threat to national identity and prejudice
The findings seem to suggest so far that similarity judgments are inversely related to 
perceptions of threat to national identity. Put another way, for instance, the group 
perceived as the least similar to self (Albanians) was perceived as posing relatively 
more threat to the integrity of national identity. Calculation of intercorrelations 
between the two variables obtained in relation to each of the three target groups 
revealed a low and negative correlation between the variables [Perceived Similarity 
with Moslems of Thrace- Perceived Threat by Moslems: r= -. 27; Perceived Similarity 
with Albanians - Perceived Threat by Albanians: r=-. 31; Perceived Similarity with 
Russians - Perceived Threat by Russians: r=-.30 (Listwise n= 316)].
Next, we explored the relationships between perceived similarity judgments and 
prejudice expressed towards each of the three target groups. Since perceived threat to 
the ingroup and inter-group bias tend to be positively related (e.g. Stephan and Stephan, 
2000a), the valence of the correlations between these two variables, was also expected 
to be negative. Results showed that the obtained correlations were strong and negative 
[Perceived Similarity with Moslems of Thrace - Levels of Prejudice towards Moslems 
of Thrace: r= -. 53; Perceived Similarity with Albanians - Levels of Prejudice towards 
Albanians: r=-.54; Perceived Similarity with Russians - Levels of Prejudice towards 
Russians: r=-.40 (Listwise n= 315)].
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Further analysis was conducted in order to test whether and in what way levels of 
perceived similarity between the self and the “other” may moderate the strength of the 
relationship between levels of perceived threat to national identity and outgroup 
derogation. Before progressing with the analysis, perceived similarity measures were 
recomputed in dichotomous variables, divided by the median split, with 1 representing 
the low levels of perceived similarity and 2 the high levels.
A review of the tables of correlations reveals that levels of perceived similarity 
moderate the strength of the relationship that exists between perceived threat and 
prejudice only with respect to Russians and Moslems of Thrace. The correlation 
coefficients were transformed into z scores and Fisher’s z test was used for probing 
significant differences between the high and low similarity groups. The results 
suggested that, for participants who reported high levels of similarity to Russians, the 
relationship between threat to national identity and prejudice is significantly weaker 
compared to the relationship obtained for those who perceived themselves as less 
similar (z=2.71, p<.05). In contrast, in the case of Moslems of Thrace, the moderating 
effect of perceived similarity on the perceived threat to national identity-prejudice 
relationship was reversed. Despite the fact that the relationship between the two 
variables did not differ significantly between high vs. low similarity groups (z=-1.02), 
just looking at the size of the obtained correlations, it is noticeable that the relationship 
between threat to national identity and prejudice was stronger when participants 
perceived high levels of similarity to the Moslems of Thrace.
Table 8.11 Correlations between perceived threat to NI and prejudice towards 
Russians in high and low perceived similarity groups
Low Levels of Perceived Similarity (N=161)
1 2
1. Perceived Threat 
toNI
2. Levels of Prejudice towards Russians
1.000
.55** 1.000
High Levels o f Perceived Similarity (N=155)
1. Perceived Threat 
toNI
1.000
2. Levels of Prejudice towards Russians .30** 1.000
Note: **p<.01, ^p<.0 5 ; NI: stands for national Identity
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Table 8.12 Correlations between levels of perceived threat to NI and prejudice 
towards Moslems of Thrace in high and low perceived similarity 
groups '
Low Levels of Perceived Similarity (N= 158) 
 1________ 2
1. Perceived Threat 1.000 
to ND
2. Levels of Prejudice towards Moslems .43** 1.000
of Thrace
High Levels o f Perceived Similarity (N=157)_________________
1. Perceived Threat 1.000 
toND
2. Levels of Prejudice towards Moslems .52** 1.000
of Thrace__________________________________________
Note: **p<.01, *p<.05; NI: stands for national Identity
Table 8.13 Correlations between levels of perceived threat to NI and prejudice 
towards Albanians in high and low perceived similarity groups
Low Levels of Perceived Similarity (N= 162)
1 2
1. Perceived Threat 
toND
2. Levels of Prejudice towards Albanians
1.000
.49** 1.000
High Levels of Perceived Similarity (N=154)
1. Perceived Threat 
to ND
1.000
2. Levels of Prejudice towards Albanians .49** 1.000
Note: **p<.01, *p<.05; NI: stands for national Identity
8.5.4 Testing the context specificity o f  host majority acculturation orientations
The multivariate analysis presented in this section explored the impact of gender and 
place of residence (between-subj ects factors) on the levels of endorsement of the host 
majority’s acculturation orientations, contextualized in the three real life-domains, 
towards the three target groups and based on the two sources/loci (immigrant/minority 
vs. state) of perceived expectations (within-subjects factors). Participants were divided 
into two gender groups and into four groups based on their place of residence.
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The between subject effects tests revealed no main effects for gender [F (1, 300) = .14, 
ns] and place [F (3, 300) = .49, ns]. Moreover, there was no significant main effect for 
the interaction between the two independent variables (combined effect of gender x 
cities) with F  (3, 300) = 1.64, ns (see Section 8.5.5).
Within-subject effects
Initially, by checking the multivariate tests, it was revealed that there were significant 
main effects of domain, target group, locus of expectation and type of orientation. As 
can be observed from Table 8.14, the five types of acculturation orientations along with 
the types of domains seemed to have the strongest main effects. The table below 
summarizes the obtained main effects, the significant two-way and three-way 
interactions (within).
Table 8.14: Summary of the main effects and significant interactions (within-
subjects)
D f F p-value V
Domain (2, 305) 107.19 .000 41%
Target (2,305) 6.30 .000 4%
Dimension (immigrant vs. state) (1,306) 10.94 .000 3%
Type o f Orientation (4,303) 66.85 .000 47%
Domain x Type o f Orientation (8,293) 72.09 .000 66%
Target x Type o f Orientation (8,293) 10.43 .000 22%
Locus o f expectation x Type o f  
Orientation
(4,297) 44.06 .000 37%
Domain x  Target x Type o f 
Orientation
(16,285) 6.35 .000 26.%
Domain x Locus o f expectation x 
Type o f Orientation
(8,293) 34.12 .000 48%
Target x Locus o f expectation x 
Type o f Orientation
(8,293) 11.04 .000 23%
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The main effect o f type of acculturation orientations
The calculated means for the five types of acculturation orientations revealed that, at a 
collective level irrespective of the target group, the type of domain and the two sources 
of expectations measured (immigrant, minority vs. state) Greek respondents preferred 
certain acculturation strategies more than others (see graph below). More specifically, 
it was revealed that the two most egalitarian acculturation orientations, individualism 
and integration, were preferred over the less tolerant ones such as assimilation, 
segregation and exclusionism. Paired samples t-test illustrated that individualism was 
endorsed more strongly than integration with t (307) = 13.12, p~0, while there were no 
significant mean differences revealed among the other three types of acculturation 
orientations.
T ab le  8.15: M ean s and  stan d ard  d ev ia tion s o f  th e  five typ es o f  A .O
N M ean SD d f t p -va lu e
a. Assimilation 308 63.60 13J4 307 .86ab ns
C153) -12.55ac .001
b. Segregation 308 6Z82 14.88 307 -7.07ad .001
(3.49) 2 3 1 ^ .02 (ns)
c. Individualism 308 82.61 2E28 307 -1L29^ .001
(4.59) -6.64bd .001
d. Integration 308 74.11 19.90 307 2.00be .05 (ns)
(4T2) 13.12cd .001
e. Exclusionism 308 60.98 222 0 307 9.60ce .001
(3.39) 5.88de .001
N ote: M eans with different subscripts are significantly different fro m  each other (Bonferroni 
adjusted  alpha, p< .0 0 5 ). High scores indicate stronger level o f  endorsem ent o f  the 
acculturation strategy.
F igu re 8.3: T h e effect o f  typ e o f  accu ltu ration  orien tation s
assimilation segregation individualism integration exclusionism
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The effect o f type o f domain on the five acculturation orientations
The analysis indicated a significant two-way interaction between the five types of 
orientations and the three types of domains used with F  (8, 293) =72.09, p~0 and a large 
effect size rj^=66Vo. Prior to the post-hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni 
adjusted alpha levels, a series of reliability analyses were performed for each type of 
acculturation in the three life-domains. Overall, the scales revealed to be internally 
consistent for measuring host majority’s acculturation orientations in all three domains 
with the exception though of the reliability coefficients obtained for the assimilation in 
the domain of citizenship, and segregation orientation in the domains of citizenship and 
education which appeared to be problematic. These variables were excluded fi*om 
further analysis. The reliability coefficients are presented in the table below.
T a b le  8.16: R e lia b ility  an alysis on accu ltu ration  sca les b a sed  on th e  d o m a in s
A.O IN THE 3-LIFE DOMAINS N SCALE’S ALPHA
Citizenship
Assimilation (6 items) 312 .53
Segregation (6 items) 311 .43
Individualism (6 items) 311 .73
Integration (6 items) 311 .71
Exclusionism (6 items) 310 .82
Education
Assimilation (6 items) 312 .72
Segregation (6 items) 313 .51
Individualism (6 items) 312 .81
Integration (6 items) 313
Exclusionism (6 items) 312 .82
Intermarriage
Assimilation (6 items) 313 .68
Segregation (6 items) 313 .82
Individualism (6 items) 313 .87
Integration (6 items) 313 .84
Exclusionism (6 items) 311 .83
Paired t-tests were performed to evaluate the impact of the type of domain on 
participants’ scores on each of the five types of acculturation orientations. The results 
revealed that assimilation was preferred more as an acculturation strategy in the domain 
of education than in the domain of intermarriage. Exclusionism orientation was
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preferred more in the domains of citizenship and intermarriage compared to the domain 
of education. Moreover, the type of domain did not affect differently participants’ 
scores on individualism orientation while integration was preferred more in the domain 
of education and less in the domains of citizenship and intermarriage (education> 
citizenship, intermarriage) (see Table 8.17 for calculated means and standard 
deviations).
T ab le  8.17: M ean s an d  stan d ard  d ev ia tion s o f  th e  five  typ es o f  A .O  b y  d om ain  
{Listwise n =  308 , df= 307)
M ean SD t p -v a lu e
Assimilation Education 21.40 &82 11.06 .001
Intermarriage 17.02 5.44
Individualism Citizenship 27.45 7.09 -1.26 ns
Education 27.85 7.73
Citizenship 27.45 7.09 .36 ns
Intermarriage 2 2 3 2 & 80
Education 27.85 7.73 1.49 ns
Intermarriage 2 2 3 2 2 8 0
Integration Citizenship 2 2 8 6 6.92 -18.10 .001
Education 28 .69 7.94
Citizenship 2 2 8 6 & 92 .89 ns
Intermarriage 2 2 5 5 2 8 0
Education 28.69 7.94 15.28 .001
Intermarriage 2 2 5 5 2 8 0
Exclusionism Citizenship 22.01 8.14 15.16 .001
Education 17.52 2 5 8
Citizenship 22.02 8.14 2.08 .039 (ns)
Intermarriage 21.43 8.24
Education 17.52 2 5 8 -12.38 .001
Intermarriage 21.43 8.24
Note: Bonferroni adjusted alpha, p<.005
Moreover, the researcher conducted a second set of analyses to identify the impact of 
the type of domain on the levels of endorsement of the five acculturation strategies, this 
time though not across the different domains but within each domain separately. The 
post-hoc tests revealed that, within the domain of education, the most preferred 
acculturation strategy is integration (M= 28.67), followed by individualism [M= 27.83, 
t (310) integration-individuaiism= -2 .98 , p<.003] whilst the host Community members seem to 
agree to a lesser extent with the implications of assimilation (M=21.45) and
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exclusionism in matters of education [M= 17.57, t (310) Assimiiation-Exdusionism= 10.90, 
p-q.
When Greek participants were asked to indicate their acculturation preferences in 
relation to the political rights (i.e. dual citizenship, right to form a political party) of the 
ethno-cultural groups living in the society, a strong preference for the option of 
individualism (M= 27.44) was revealed, followed by integration [M= 22.85, t (308) 
integration-individuaiism =15.43, p~0] and exclusionism (M= 21.99), which were endorsed at 
the same level [t (308) Megration-Exdusionism =1.11, ns]. Finally, in the domain of 
intermarriage, the Greek participants endorsed more the individualist orientation (M = 
27.29) followed by both integration (M= 22.54) and exclusionism [M=21.42, t (310) 
integration-Exdusionism = 1.36, ns]. The Segregation (M=20.01) and assimilation (M= 17.04) 
were the least preferred acculturative options for the present domain [t (310) Assimilation- 
Segregation 5.69, p~0].
The effect o f target group on acculturation orientations
In accordance with the theoretical propositions of the Interactive Acculturation Model 
(Bourhis et al, 1997) and with recent research findings (Montreuil and Bourhis, 2001) 
suggesting that the host majority’s preference and degree of endorsement of 
acculturation strategies may vary based on the target group under consideration 
(‘valued/devalued hypothesis’), the analysis revealed a large size effect (r]^=22Vo) of the 
target group on acculturation scores [F (8, 293) = 10.43, p~0]. The reliability analysis 
performed on the items measuring each acculturation orientation towards the three 
target groups living in the society (irrespective of the life-domain) indicated once again 
that the scales measuring the host majority’s assimilation and segregation orientations 
towards the two groups of immigrants and the minority group lacked internal 
consistency. Thus, these scales were excluded from further analysis. The reliability 
coefficients are illustrated in the table below.
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T a b le  8.18: R e lia b ility  an a lysis  on accu ltu ration  item s b a sed  on  ta rg et grou p
A.O TOWARDS THE 3 TARGET GROUPS N SCALE’S ALPHA
Assimilation towards Moslems of Thrace (6 items) 315 .39
Segregation towards Moslems of Thrace (6 items) 315 .51
Individualism towards Moslems of Thrace (6 items) 315 .78
Integration towards Moslems of Thrace (6 items) 315 .79
Exclusionism towards Moslems of Thrace (6 items) 314 .81
Assimilation towards Albanians (6 items) 315 .52
Segregation towards Albanians (6 items) 315 .51
Individualism towards Albanians (6 items) 314 .82
Integration towards Albanians (6 items) 314 .80
Exclusionism towards Albanians (6 items) 314 .86
Assimilation towards Russians (6 items) 312 .58
Segregation towards Russians (6 items) 312 .54
Individualism towards Russians (6 items) 312 .80
Integration towards Russians (6 items) 313 .78
Exclusionism towards Russians (6 items) 311 .87
Post-hoc mean comparisons revealed that, irrespective of the type of domain, 
respondents adopted stronger exclusionist and less integrationist attitudes towards 
Albanian immigrants. Note that scores on the administered prejudice and perceived 
threat scales revealed that this group was the most ‘devalued’ and ‘threatening’ for the 
maintenance of Greek national identity. Moreover, individualist orientation was chosen 
as an acculturative strategy more for Russian immigrants than for members of the 
Albanian immigrant and the Moslem minority groups (see Table 8.19).
Interestingly, further analyses conducted to identify which acculturation orientation was 
the most preferred one for each target group, revealed the same pattern of results for all 
three groups, with individualism and integration being the most preferred acculturation 
strategies. The endorsement of an exclusionist attitude towards all three target 
outgroups was the least favored acculturative option (see Tables 8.20, 8.21, 8.22).
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T a b le  8.19: M ean s an d  sta n d a rd  d ev ia tion s o f  th e  fiv e  typ es o f  A .O  b y  ta rg et
grou p  {Listwise n =  307 , df=3tS6)
Mean SD t p-value
Individualism Moslems 26.65 7.81 -2.14 .033 (ns)
Albanians 27.40 8.07
Moslems 26.65 7.81 -5.65 .001
Russians 28.56 7.58
Albanians 27.40 8.07 -4.13 .001
Russians 28.56 7.58
Integration Moslems 25.42 7.59 4.58 .001
Albanians 23.71 7.49
Moslems 25.42 7.59 1.38 ns
Russians 24.97 7.21
Albanians 23.71 7.49 -4.35 .001
Russians 24.97 7.21
Exclusionism Moslems 19.68 7.62 -4.21 .001
Albanians 21.31 8.66
Moslems 19.68 7.62 -.80 ns
Russians 19.98 8.43
Albanians 21.31 8.66 4.31 .001
Russians 19.98 8.43
Note: Bonferroni adjusted alpha, p<.005
Table 8.20: Paired t-test analyses on levels of the five A.O in relation to Mos 
of Thrace: Means and standard deviations {Listwise n= 314,
A .0 towards Moslems of 
Thrace Mean SD t p-value
c. Individualism 26.64 7.75 4.40cd .001
d. Integration 20.56 7.51 9.12ce .001
e. Exclusionism 19.66 7.59 7.54de .001
Note: The subscripts used portray the different comparisons
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Table 8.21: Paired t-test analyses on levels of the five A.O in relation to
Albanians: Means and standard deviations {Listwise n= 314, 
^/=313)
A.O towards Albanians Mean SD t p-value
c. Individualism 27.38 8.02 12.91cd .001
d. Integration 23.68 7.50 7.1 Ice .001
e. Exclusionism 21.30 8.62 2.83de .001
Note: The subscripts used portray the different comparisons
Table 8.22: Paired t-test analyses on levels of the five A.O in relation to
Russians: Means and standard deviations {Listwise n= 314, =3
A.O towards Russians
Mean SD t p-value
c. Individualism 28.55 7.57 12.32cd .001
d. Integration 24.98 7.20 10.61ce .001
e. Exclusionism 19.98 8.41 6.19de .001
Note: The subscripts used portray the different comparisons.
The effect o f host majority’s expectations o f the immigrant/minority groups ’ 
acculturation orientations and o f the state’s policies
There was also a significant two-way interaction between the two different sources of 
expectations (immigrant/minority vs. state) and the five acculturation orientations with 
F  (4, 297) = 44.06 with ij^=37%.
Post-hoc mean comparisons revealed that Greek respondents expected the state to 
endorse stronger assimilationist attitudes towards the immigrant and minority groups 
compared to what they expected fi*om these groups (Mimmigrants= 28.94, M state= 34.66, t 
(307) =-10.53 and p<.005); to be less segregationist (Mimmigrants= 33.99, M state= 28.83, t 
(307) = 7.42 p<.005), more individualist (Mimmigrants= 39.03, M state= 43.58, t (307) =- 
8.93, p<.005), and less exclusionist (Mimmigrants= 31.23 Mstate= 29.75, t (307) =3.29, 
p<.005). There was no significant difference revealed regarding the degree of 
endorsement of integrationist orientation. In summary, with the exception of the scores 
obtained on the assimilation scales, the results demonstrate that participants expected
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the Greek state to adopt a more liberal attitude towards the immigrant and minority 
groups living in the country, whilst they seemed to expect the groups to marginalize 
themselves from the host majority culture by adopting stronger segregationist and 
exclusionist attitudes.
Testing the combined effect o f Domain and Target group on A. O
There was a significant three-way interaction produced for the five acculturation 
strategies based on the type of domain and target group that these orientations were 
contextualized with F  (16, 285) = 6.35, p~0 and large effect size, 7j^=26%. The 
calculated mean scores indicated that irrespective of participants’ expectations of the 
state and the ethno-cultural groups (source of expectation effect), they endorsed 
different levels of acculturation orientations based on the type of domain and the target 
group under investigation. Inter-item correlations were performed for checking the 
internal consistency of the scales measuring endorsement with each of the acculturation 
orientations in the three domains, and towards the three target groups irrespective of the 
two sources of perceived expectations. Items that were not significantly correlated were 
excluded from further statistical analysis. The obtained correlation coefficients are 
presented in the tables below:
Table 8.23:, Inter-item correlations for Acculturation Orientations in 3 domains 
towards Moslems of Thrace
Variables N Pearson’s r
Citizenship
Assimilation (2 items) 315 ns
Segregation (2 items) 315 .14*
Individualism (2 items) 315 .34**
Integration (2 items) 315 .41**
Exclusionism (2 items) 315 .37**
Education
Assimilation (2 items) 315 .21**
Segregation (2 items) 315 ns
Individualism (2 items) 315 .31**
Integration (2 items) 315 .43**
Exclusionism (2 items) 315 .40**
4 5 4
T a b le  8.23 Continued
Variables N Pearson’s r
Intermarriage
Assimilation (2 items) 315 ns
Segregation (2 items) 315 .40**
Individualism (2 itemsj 315 .42**
Integration (2 items) 315 .41**
Exclusionism (2 items) 315 .41**
Note: *p<.05
Table 8.24: Inter-item correlations for Acculturation Orientations in 3 domains
towards Albanians
Variables N Pearson’s r
Citizenship
Assimilation (2 items) 315 .11*
Segregation (2 items) 315 ns
Individualism (2 items) 314 .23**
Integration (2 items) 314 .32**
Exclusionism (2 items) 314 .50**
Education
Assimilation (2 items) 315 .22**
Segregation (2 items) 315 ns
Individualism (2 items) 314 .30**
Integration (2 items) 315 .47**
Exclusionism (2 items) 314 .41**
Intermarriage
Assimilation (2 items) 315 20**
Segregation (2 items) 315 .47**
Individualism (2 itemsj 315 .66**
Integration (2 items) 315 .49**
Exclusionism (2 items) 315 .54**
Note: **p<.01, *p<.05
Table 8.25: Inter-item correlations for Acculturation 
towards Russians
Orientations in 3 doi
Variables N Pearson’s r
Citizenship
Assimilation (2 items) 313 ns
Segregation (2 items) 312 ns
Individualism (2 items) 312 .24**
Integration (2 items) 313 .30**
Exclusionism (2 items) 311 .61**
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T ab le  8 .25  Continued
Variables N Pearson’s r
Education
Assimilation (2 items) 313 .31**
Segregation (2 items) 314 ns
Individualism (2 items) 314 .41**
Integration (2 items) 314 .49**
Exclusionism (2 items) 314 .51**
Intermarriage
Assimilation (2 items) 314 .34**
Segregation (2 items) 314 .50**
Individualism (2 itemsj 314 .59**
Integration (2 items) 314 .51**
Exclusionism (2 items) 314 .46**
Note: **p<.01, *p<.05
In the domain of citizenship, Greek respondents endorsed higher levels of individualist 
orientation towards Russians, followed by Albanians and less for the members of the 
Moslem minority, for whom respondents preferred stronger integrationist orientations 
compared to the two immigrant groups living in Greek society. It should be reminded 
that the items measuring host majority’s acculturation attitudes towards Moslems of 
Thrace in the domain of citizenship referred to the right to form a political party. 
Moreover, exclusionism was more endorsed for the Albanian group of immigrants than 
for Russian immigrants.
Table 8.26: Paired t-test analyses on levels of A.O contextualized in the domain
of citizenship and towards the 3 target groups: Means and standard 
deviations {Listwise n = 309, df= 308)
Citizenship Means SD t p-value
Levels of Moslems: 8.60 3.02 -3.80a .001
Individualism towards: Albanians: 9.22 2.81 -3.01c .003
Russians: 9.62 2.74 -5.73b .001
Levels of Integration Moslems: 8.18 3.00 5.32a .001
towards: Albanians: 7.13 2.93 -2.71c .007 (ns)
Russians: 7.54 2.93 3.36b .001
Levels of Moslems: 7.21 3.09 -2.43a .016 (ns)
Exclusionism towards: Albanians:7.66 3.34 3.39c .001
Russians:7.12 3.29 .47b ns
Note: The subscripts used portray the different comparisons (a=Moslems-Albanians, p
Moslems-Russians, c=Albanians-Russians); Bonferroni adjusted alpha, p<.005
4 5 6
Figure 8.4: L evels  o f  A .O  in the dom ain  o f  citizen sh ip  tow ards th e  3 ta rg et
grou p s
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As it can be also observed in the table and graph below, apart from the exclusionist 
orientation, which was endorsed significantly less for the members of the minority group 
compared to the two immigrant groups, generally there were no significant differences to 
the levels of endorsement of the other three acculturation strategies for the three target 
groups living in the Greek society concerning the domain of education.
Table 8.27: Paired t-test analyses on levels of A.O contextualized in the domain
of education and towards the 3 target groups: Means and standard 
deviations {Listwise n = 311, df=?>lQi)
Education Means SD t p-value
Levels of Assimilation Moslems: 7.08 2.81 -L47a ns
Towards: Albanians: 7.31 2.64 L7Ic ns
Russians: 7.06 2.83 .22 b ns
Levels of Moslems: 9.28 2.97 .90a ns
Individualism towards: Albanians: 9.15 2.91 -1.92 c ns
Russians: 9.40 2.94 -.83 b ns
Levels of Integration Moslems: 9.65 3.13 1.63a ns
towards: Albanians: 9.39 2.94 -1.8Ic ns
Russians: 9.63 2.95 .16b ns
Levels of Moslems: 5.46 2.77 -4.43a .001
Exclusionism towards: Albanians: 6.15 2.92 1.52 c ns
Russians: 5.96 3.08 -3.23 b .001
Note: The subscripts used portray the different comparisons (a=Moslems-Albanians, p
Moslems-Russians, c=Albanians-Russians); Bonferroni adjusted alpha, p<. 004
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F igu re 8.5: L evels  o f  A .O  in th e dom ain  o f  ed u cation  tow ard s th e  3 targ et
grou p s
Education* Target* A.0
y
□ Moslems 
B Albanians
□ Russians
Finally, in the domain of intermarriage, the results showed that levels of acculturation 
strategies also varied based on the target groups under investigation. More specifically, 
stronger exclusionist, segregationist and less integrationist attitudes were preferred for the 
Albanian immigrant group, whereas individualist attitudes were mostly preferred for the 
Russian immigrant group.
Table 8.28: Paired t-test analyses on levels of A.O contextualized in the domain
of intermarriage and towards the 3 target groups: Means and 
standard deviations {Listwise n = 311, df= 310)
Intermarriage Means SD t p-value
Levels of Assimilation Albanians: 5.53 2.28 - 2.42c .016(ns)
Towards: Russians: 5.85 2.40
Levels of Segregation Moslems: 6.65 3.12 -1.64a ns
towards: Albanians: 6.93 3.22 3.63c .001
Russians: 6.44 3.11 1.27b ns
Levels of Moslems: 8.76 3.26 -1.49a ns
Individualism towards: Albanians: 9.00 3.51 -3.68c .001
Russians: 9.53 3.23 -4.66b .001
Levels of Integration Moslems: 7.59 2.97 2.89a .004
towards: Albanians: 7.17 3.08 -4.46 c .001
Russians: 7.79 2.90 -1.38b ns
Levels of Moslems: 7.00 3.01 -3.15a .002
Exclusionism towards: Albanians: 7.50 3.36 3.94c .001
Russians: 6.92 3.10 .52 b ns
Note: The subscripts used portray the different comparisons (a^Moslems-Albanians, p
Moslems-Russians, c=Albanians-Russians); Bonferroni adjusted alpha, p<.004
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F igu re 8.6: L evels  o f  A .O  in th e dom ain  o f  in term a rria g e  tow ard s th e  3 ta rg et
grou p s
lntermarriage*Target*A.O
/ / / < / /S? cÿ>- ^
□ Moslems 
■ Albanians
□ Russians
Testing the effect o f the perceived host majority’s expectations o f the state and 
immigrant/minority groups across the three different life- domains on acculturation 
orientations
The present analysis aimed to test whether there were any significant differences in 
levels of endorsement of each acculturation orientation, when contextualized in the 
three different domains, and also when measuring participants different expectations of 
the state and of the immigrant and minority groups. As stated in Table 8.14, there was 
significant three-way interaction obtained between the type of domain, the source of 
expectation and the levels of endorsement of each acculturation orientation with F  (8, 
293) = 34.12, p~0 and 7]^ = 48%. Considering the small number of items, the scales 
measuring each acculturation orientation, for the two different sources of expectations 
and in the three life-domains, were of moderate and satisfactory reliability with alphas 
ranging from .62 to .83. However, as can be seen in Table 8.29, the scales measuring 
perceived expectancies of immigrant/minority groups, regarding the segregation and 
integration orientations in the domain of citizenship and the assimilation orientation in 
the domain of intermarriage, were not internally consistent. Thus, these scales were 
omitted from further statistical analysis.
4 5 9
T ab le  8 .29 R e lia b ility  an alysis fo r  accu ltu ration  item s co n tex tu a lised  for
exp ecta tion s o f  th e  im m ig ra n t/m in o r ity  grou p s an d  d om ain s
A .0 based on perceived 
expectations of the 
immigrant/minority groups
N Cronbach’s alpha
Citizenship
Assimilation (3 items) 314 .63
Segregation (3 items) 313 .53
Individualism (3 items) 313 .67
Integration (3 items) 314 .54
Exclusionism (3 items) 312 .71
Education
Assimilation (3 items) 313 .68
Segregation (3 items) 313 .67
Individualism (3 items) 312 .79
Integration (3 items) 313 .71
Exclusionism (3 items) 312 .74
Intermarriage
Assimilation (3 items) 313 .58
Segregation (3 items) 313 .67
Individualism (3 items^ 313 .83
Integration (3 items) 313 .75
Exclusionism (3 items) 311 .76
Table 8.30: Reliability analysis for acculturation items contextualised for
expectations of the state and domains
A.O based on perceived N Cronbach’s
expectations of the state Alpha
Citizenship
Assimilation (3 items) 312 .62
Segregation (3 items) 312 .73
Individualism (3 items) 314 .67
Integration (3 items) 311 .71
Exclusionism (3 items) 311 .67
Education
Assimilation (3 items) 312 .68
Segregation (3 items) 312 .68
Individualism (3 items) 313 .80
Integration (3 items) 313 .80
Exclusionism (3 items) 313 .76
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T a b le  8 .30  Continued
A.O based on perceived 
expectations of the state
N Cronbach’s
Alpha
Intermarriage
Assimilation (3 items) 313 .69
Segregation (3 items) 313 .77
Individualism (3 itemsj 313 .78
Integration (3 items) 313 .77
Exclusionism (3 items) 313 .78
The findings indicated that, in both the domains of citizenship and education, participants 
expected their state to adopt more individualist and integrationist policies compared to 
their expectations of the immigrant and the minority groups. On the contrary, the 
individualist and the integration orientations were perceived more as immigrants’ and 
minority’s private choices in the domain of intermarriage. Moreover, Greek participants 
seem to perceive that assimilation and exclusionism orientations should be more preferred 
by the state in the domain of citizenship, whilst in educational matters they expected the 
members of ethno-cultural groups to show stronger support than the state for segregation 
and exclusionism orientations (see Tables 8.31, 8.32, 8.33).
Table 8.31: Paired t-test analyses on levels of A.O contextualized for the two
sources of expectations in the domain of citizenship: Means and 
standard deviations {Listwise n = 309, (^308)
Citizenship Means SD t p-value
Levels of Assimilation 
expected from:
Immigrant/Minority: 11.13 
State: 14.08
4.43
4.03
-8.83 .001
Levels of Individualism 
expected fi*om:
Immigrant/Minority: 12.23 
State: 15.21
4.51
3.96
-11.20 .001
Levels of Exclusionism 
expected from:
Immigrant/Minority: 10.72 
State: 11.26
4.55
4.28
-2.75 .006
Note: Bonferroni adjusted alpha, p<.02
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F igu re 8.7: L evels  o f  A .O  b ased  on th e  tw o  sou rces o f  p erceived  exp ecta tion s
in th e d om ain  o f  c itizen sh ip
Source of Perceived Expectation* Citizenship^ 
A.0
o 16
co 14
I 12
2 10o o
8T3C <0) 6
o
(/) 4
1 2o_l 0
□ Immigrant/Minority 
a  State
Assimilation Individualism Exclusionism 
T y p e s  o f  A .0
Table 8.32: Paired t-test analyses on levels of A.O contextualized for the two
sources of expectations in the domain of education: Means and 
standard deviations {Listwise n = 311, </^310)
Education Means SD t p-value
Levels of Assimilation 
expected from:
Immigrant/Minority: 10.71 
State: 10.74
4.19
3.97
-.14 ns
Levels of Segregation 
expected from:
Immigrant/Minority: 12.18 
State: 8.17
3.90
3.50
13.49 .001
Levels of 
Individualism 
expected from:
Immigrant/Minority: 12.53 
State: 15.29
4.63
4.42
-10.21 .001
Levels of Integration 
expected from:
Immigrant/Minority: 13.86 
State: 14.80
4.15
4.57
-4.49 .001
Levels of
Exclusionism expected 
from:
Immigrant/Minority: 9.80 
State: 7.77
4.52
3.92
9.50 .001
Note: Bonferroni adjusted alpha, p<.01
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F igu re 8.8: L evels  o f  A .O  b ased  on the tw o  sou rces o f  p erce iv ed  exp ecta tion s
in th e dom ain  o f  ed u cation
Source of Perceived Expectation* Education* A.0
i
ho
0  
w
1
20
15
10
5
0
y
T y p e s  o f  A .0
y
□ Immigrant/Minority 
a  State
Table 8.33: Paired t-test analyses on levels of A.O contextualized for the two
sources of expectations in the domain of intermarriage: Means and 
standard deviations {Listwise n = 311,
Intermarriage Means SD t p-value
Levels of Segregation 
expected from;
Immigrants/Minority: 10.23 
State: 9.78
4.07
5.00
1.88 ns
Levels of Individualism 
expected from:
Immigrants/Minority: 14.23 
State: 13.06
4.86
4.77
5.27 .000
Levels of Integration 
expected from:
Immigrant/Minority: 11.91 
State: 10.64
4.80
4.26
6.26 .000
Levels of Exclusionism 
expected from:
Immigrant/Minority: 10.72 
State: 10.70
4.53
4.62
.07 ns
Note: Bonferroni adjusted alpha, p<.01
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F igu re 8.9: L evels  o f  A .O  b ased  on th e tw o  sou rces o f  p erceived  ex p ecta tio n s
in th e dom ain  o f  in term arriage
Source of Perceived Expectation* Intermarriage^ 
A.0
1
□ Immigrant/Minority 
B State
Testing the effect o f the perceived host majority’s expectations o f the state and 
immigrant groups towards the three different target groups on acculturation 
orientations
Finally, the analysis revealed that the source of perceived expectation (state vs. 
immigrant and minority groups) and the type of target group under investigation, 
significantly affected the level of endorsement of the host majority’s acculturation 
orientations with F  (8, 293) = 11.04, p~0 and 23%. Initially, the scales, measuring 
the combined effect of target and sources of perceived expectations (irrespective of 
domain) on the five acculturation orientations, were checked for internal consistency.
Table 8.34: Reliability analysis for acculturation items contextualised for
expectations of the immigrant/minority and the 3 target groups
A.O based on perceived 
expectations of the 
immigrant/minority groups
N Cronbach’s alpha
For Moslems
Assimilation (3 items) 315 .32
Segregation (3 items) 315 .38
Individualism (3 items) 315 .69
Integration (3 items) 315 .73
Exclusionism (3 items) 314 .79
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T a b le  8 .34 Continued
A.O based on perceived 
expectations of the 
immigrant/minority groups
N Cronbach’s alpha
For Albanians
Assimilation (3 items) 315 .43
Segregation (3 items) 315 .23
Individualism (3 items) 314 ..74
Integration (3 items) 315 .59
Exclusionism (3 items) 314 .85
For Russians
Assimilation (3 items) 314 .51
Segregation (3 items) 313 .25
Individualism (3 items) 313 .75
Integration (3 items) 314 .60
Exclusionism (3 items) 312 .84
Table 8.35: Reliability analysis for acculturation items contextualised for
expectations of the state and the 3 target groups
A.O based on perceived N Cronbach’s alpha
expectations of the state
For Moslems
Assimilation (3 items) 315 .30
Segregation (3 items) 315 .64
Individualism (3 items) 315 .66
Integration (3 items) 315 .63
Exclusionism (3 items) 315 .60
For Albanians
Assimilation (3 items) 315 .50
Segregation (3 items) 315 .71
Individualism (3 items) 315 .73
Integration (3 items) 314 .75
Exclusionism (3 items) 315 .70
For Russians
Assimilation (3 items) 314 .42
Segregation (3 items) 313 .74
Individualism (3 items) 313 .65
Integration (3 items) 314 .70
Exclusionism (3 items) 312 .73
Given the low alphas obtained for assimilation and segregation orientations when 
measuring expectations of the target immigrant/minority groups, these two scales were
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not included in the follow up analysis. Moreover, the scales measuring the extent to 
which host community members expected of the state to employ assimilationist policies 
towards the three target groups were also precluded from further analysis.
The findings revealed that, irrespective of the domain, participants believed that 
Albanian and Russian immigrants should adopt stronger exclusionist attitudes compared 
to the members of the minority group living in Greece. Integrationist acculturative 
attitudes were expected to be endorsed more by the Russian immigrants and the 
Moslems of Thrace, whereas the individualist orientation was expected to be preferred 
significantly more by Russian immigrants compared to the other two target outgroups.
Table 8.36: Paired t-test analyses on levels of A.O contextualized for perceived
expectations of immigrant/minority groups and towards the 3 target 
groups: Means and standard deviations {Listwise n = 310, df= 309)
Perceived Expectations 
of Immigrant & Minority 
groups (Dimension 1) Means SD t p-value
Levels of Individualism
towards: Moslems: 12.74 4.52 -.03a ns
Albanians: 12.75 4.68 -3.91c .001
Russians: 13.48 4.51 -3.31b .001
Levels of Integration
towards: Moslems: 12.92 4.42 4.98a .001
Albanians: 1.72 3.88 -3.74c .001
Russians: 12.41 3.73 2.16b .03 (ns)
Levels of Exclusionism
towards: Moslems: 9.62 4.46 -5.24a .001
Albanians: 11.01 5.12 2.05 c .04 (ns)
Russians: 10.60 4.96 -4.03 b .001
Note: The subscripts used portray the different comparisons (a=Moslems-Albanians, 
Moslems-Russians, c=Albanians-Russians); Bonferroni adjusted alpha, p<.005
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F igu re 8.10: L evels o f  A .O  b ased  on p erce iv ed  exp ecta tion s o f  th e
im m ig ra n t/m in o rity  to w a rd s the th ree targ et grou p s
Perceived Expectations from 
Immigrant/Minority* Target* A.0
□ Moslems 
■ Albanians
□ Russians
y
Interestingly, participants’ perceived expectations of the state were found to influence 
in a different way their levels of endorsement of each acculturation towards the three 
target groups. More specifically, a different pattern of results emerged indicating that 
respondents expected their state to show less support for the endorsement of 
individualist orientations to the members of the Moslem minority group compared to 
the two immigrant groups. In addition, it was apparent that hosts favoured the adoption 
of stronger integrationist and less exclusionist acculturative policies towards the 
Russian immigrants and the Moslems of Thrace, compared to the Albanian immigrants 
living in the country.
Table 8.37: Paired t-test analyses on levels of A.O contextualized for perceived
expectations of state and towards the 3 target groups: Means and 
standard deviations {Listwise n = 309, 6^308)
Perceived Expectations of 
the State (Dimension 2) Means SD t p-value
Levels of Segregation Moslems: 9.83 4.12 .57a ns
towards: Albanians: 9.69 4.33 2.07c .04(ns)
Russians: 9.32 4.36 2.17 b .03(ns)
Levels of Individualism Moslems: 13.89 4.25 -3.42a .001
towards: Albanians: 14.61 4.29 -2.44c .01 (ns)
Russians: 15.06 3.93 -5.93b .001
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T able  8 .37  Continued
Perceived Expectations of 
the State (Dimension 2) Means SD t p-value
Levels of Integration Moslems: 12.49 4.08 2.40a .02(ns)
towards: Albanians: 11.98 4.43 -3.29c .001
Russians: 12.56 4.27 -.36b ns
Levels of Exclusionism Moslems: 10.05 4.00 -1.22a ns
towards: Albanians: 10.30 4.28 5.05c .001
Russians: 9.41 4.15 3.05b .002
Note: The subscripts used p o rtra y  the different com parisons (a=M oslems-Albanians, *= 
M oslem s-Russians, c=Albanians-Russians); Bonferroni adjusted  alpha, p < .0 0 4
Figure 8.11 : Levels of A.O based on perceived expectations of the state towards 
the three target groups
Perceived Expectations from the State 
* Target* A.0
16 
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12 
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8 4-  
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y y
□ Moslems 
■ Albanians
□ Russians
8.5.5 Testing the effect o f  gender and the proximity-familiarity hypothesis on host 
majority’s acculturation orientations
The effect o f gender
Although there was no significant main effect of participants’ gender [F (1, 300) =.14, 
ns], the effect was qualified by a significant three-way interaction (domain*types of 
acculturation orientation* gender) which suggests that depending on the type of domain 
being considered, mean scores on the five types of acculturation orientations differed 
between the two gender groups with F  (8, 293) = 3.24, p<.001 with 8%. However, 
the post-hoc mean comparisons revealed no significant differences between the two
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sexes on any of the five orientations, when contextualized in the three life-domains. 
This finding indicated no need to account for gender differences in the following stages 
of analysis.
Table 8.38: Means and standard deviations of gender groups on acculturation 
orientations across the 3 life-domains {Listwise n=307, df= 306)
DOMAINS GENDER N Mean SD t p-value
Citizenship
individualism
M 145 27.24 7.15 -.48 ns
F 163 27.63 7.06
Citizenship
integration
M 145 23.27 7.23 .99 ns
F 163 22.50 6.64
Citizenship
exclusionism
M 145 21.85 8.69 -.33 ns
F 163 22.16 7.64
Education
assimilation
M 145 22.03 7.08 1.52 ns
F 163 20.84 6.55
Education
individualism
M 145 27.98 7.82 .28 ns
F 163 27.73 7.67
Education
integration
M 145 28.07 8.48 -1.28 ns
F 163 29.24 7.41
Education
exclusionism
M 145 17.65 7.56 .28 ns
F 163 17.40 7.62
Intermarriage
assimilation
M 145 17.35 5.55 1.00 ns
F 163 16.73 5.35
Intermarriage
segregation
M 145 19.94 7.68 -1.00 ns
F 163 20.04 8.50
Intermarriage
individualism
M 145 26.41 8.91 -1.71 ns
F 163 28.12 8.66
Intermarriage
integration
M 145 22.91 8.14 .76 ns
F 163 22.23 7.50
Intermarriage
exclusionism
M 145 20.96 8.04 -.95 ns
F 163 21.85 8.42
The effect o f  cities
As mentioned before, geographical proximity-familiarity also failed to reveal a 
significant main effect with F  (3, 300) = .49, ns. Moreover, the analysis showed that 
the relevant hypothesis (HV) was not confirmed, since the effect of target group [F (24, 
850.39) = 1.20, ns] and the effect of type of domain [F (24, 850) = 1.21, ns] 
respectively, did not affect the level of endorsement of acculturation strategies 
differentially across the four cities.
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Interestingly though, there was a significant three-way interaction between sources of 
expectation x type of acculturation orientation x cities with F  (12, 787) = 1.96, p<.05. 
This suggests that there were significant differences among cities as to how perceived 
expectations of the immigrant/minority groups and/or the state {locus o f  expectation 
effect) affected the level of endorsement of the five distinct types of acculturation 
orientations. Separate ANOVAs were carried out on each of the five types of the host 
majority’s acculturation orientations contextualized to assess the two sources of 
expectations to investigate the effect of participants’ place of residence (‘cities’ effect) 
on these measures.
This time the Tukey’s HSD comparisons tests were chosen as a conservative method for 
controlling the type I and the type II error rates. According to Field (2000), although 
both Tukey’s and Bonferroni tests are considered the best statistical methods for 
controlling the type I error, they might lack statistical power which increases the 
probability of rejecting an actual difference in the data (type II error). However, he 
proposes that Tukey’s test should be preferred over the other tests since it is more 
powerful when it comes to a large number of comparisons (Field, 2000). Thus, it was 
considered appropriate for the present analysis.
The post-hoc analysis revealed that participants’ place of residence did not 
systematically influence the effect of the two sources of perceived expectations (locus 
of expectation effect) on the degree of endorsement of the five acculturative attitudes. 
More specifically, it was demonstrated that only in the second dimension (measuring 
expectations of the state acculturative policies) there were significant mean differences 
in the reported levels of endorsement of three types of acculturation orientations 
(segregation, individualism and integration) between participants who lived in the two 
biggest cities (Athens and Thessaloniki).
The analyses presented in Tables 8.39 and 8.40 compared the mean levels obtained for 
each acculturation orientation and source/Iocus of expectation accordingly (immigrant/ 
minority vs. state) across the four cities.
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Table 8.39: Analyses of variance for each acculturation orientation by
dimension I and by cities {Listwise n: Athens= 75, Thessaloniki= 82, 
Western Thrace= 106, Kozani = 47)
Dimension I: Perceived Expectations 
of Immigrant & Minority Groups Mean df F p-value
Assimilation (3,306) .72 ns
Athens 28.02 (3.11)
Thessaloniki 29.51 (3.28)
Thrace 28.73 (3.19)
Kozani 30.08 (3.34)
Segregation (3,306) .88 ns
Athens 32.75 (3.64)
Thessaloniki 34.10(3.79)
Thrace 34.43 (3.82)
Kozani 34.81 (3.87)
Individualism (3,306) 1.39 ns
Athens 39.27 (4.36)
Thessaloniki 37.21 (4.13)
Thrace 38.94 (4.33)
Kozani 41.69(4.63)
Integration (3,306) .71 ns
Athens 38.00 (4.22)
Thessaloniki 36.41 (4.04)
Thrace 36.37 (4.04)
Kozani 38.21 (4.24)
Exclusionism (3,306) 1.45 ns
Athens 29.49 (3.28)
Thessaloniki 33.55 (3.73)
Thrace 30.80 (3.42)
Kozani 30.91 (3.43)
Note: Numbers in brackets represent the means/no of items
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T a b le  8.40: A n a ly ses  o f  v a r ia n ce  fo r  each  a ccu ltu ra tio n  orien ta tion  b y
d im en sion  II an d  b y  cities {Listwise n: A th en s=  75 , T h essa lo n ik i=  82, 
W estern  T h ra ce=  106, K o za n i =  47)
Dim ension II: Perceived Expectations 
from State
M ean df F p-value
Assimilation (3, 305) .61 ns
Athens
35.66 (3.96)
Thessaloniki
34.82(3.87)
Thrace
34.03 (3.78)
K ozani 34.24 (3.80)
Segregation (3, 305) 2.98 .03
Athens 26.07b (2.90) O '?
Thessaloniki 30.88b (3.43)
Thrace 29.70 (3.30)
Kozani 27.65 (3.07)
Individualism (3, 305) 2.91 .03
Athens 46.27b (5.14) O ' )
Thessaloniki
41.22b (4.58) • U Z
Thrace 43.25 (4.80)
Kozani 44.17(4.91)
Integration (3, 305) 338 .02 .
Athens
40.1 la (4.46)
Thessaloniki 34.51a (3.83)
. U 1
Thrace 36.57 (4.06)
Kozani
37.65 (4.18)
Exclusionism (3, 305) 1.97 ns
Athens
27.32 (3.03)
Thessaloniki 31.37 (3.48)
Thrace 29.80(3.31)
Kozani
30.65 (3.40)
Note: Scores on the scales range from 1 (do not agree at all) to 7 (totally agree). Means 
with subscripts a, t are significantly different from each other at p<.01 and p<.05 
respectively.
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As it can be observed by the calculated mean scores, irrespective of the national origin, 
the cultural background of the groups and the domain under consideration, respondents 
living in Athens tend to approve more the adoption of egalitarian policies by the state, 
compared to the residents of Thessaloniki. The latter, although they support the 
individualist orientation to some extent, seem quite indecisive as to whether the Greek 
state should encourage the ‘cultural fusion’ of its citizens (integration) or endorse 
policies that would ensure cultural separateness (segregation).
Further analysis indicated that although there were no differences across the four cities 
on perceived threat to national identity associated with the presence of these three target 
groups, a number of differences by cities were indicated on some of the prejudice 
measures. Residents of Thessaloniki expressed relative more outgroup bias towards the 
Moslems of Thrace (M= 64.31) than residents of Athens [(M=57.17), F  (3, 314) = 3.75, 
p<.01]. Also, there was a significant mean difference between the two cities based on 
the reported levels of prejudice towards the Russian immigrants [M prejudice towards Russians= 
66.63 for the Thessaloniki sample, and M prejudice towards Russians = 59.75 for the Athenian 
sample, F  (3, 315) = 3.56, p<.01]. Therefore, although participants’ inter-group 
perceptions (i.e. threat to identity) and intercultural attitudes (i.e. degree of endorsement 
of acculturation orientations) towards the target ethno-cultural groups did not differ 
across cities, participants’ place of residence did have an impact on the levels of 
prejudicial attitudes. Living in some geographical areas, like Thessaloniki, was 
associated with stronger negative attitudes towards minority members and the 
immigrant group, which is proportionally the largest one in this area.
To encapsulate, the findings so far revealed that both the type of domain and the ethno­
cultural background of the target group affect differentially the choice and the degree of 
endorsement of host majority’s acculturation orientations (HI). In addition, preference 
and levels of endorsement of acculturation attitudes differed significantly depending on 
what Greek nationals expected of the immigrant/minority groups and of the state (HII). 
Consistent with our prediction (HIII), both the types of domain and target group under 
consideration were also revealed to affect differentially host majority’s expectations of 
immigrant/minority groups’ acculturation orientations and of the state respectively. 
Finally, the results suggest that the choice and levels of endorsement of Greek 
nationals’ acculturative attitudes towards specific minority and immigrant groups living
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in the society and in relation to different life domains, were not affected significantly by 
socio-demographic variables, like gender and place of residence (HIV and HV). The 
effect of ‘cities’ only affected participants’ levels of endorsement acculturation 
orientations when the latter was contextualized to assess their perceived expectations of 
the state’s immigration policies.
The next set of analyses aimed to test the final hypothesis of this section (HVI) that 
assumed that social psychological variables like levels of national identification and 
perceived overlap between national and religious identities, as a combined effect or in 
isolation, would affect differently host majority’s preferences of acculturation strategies 
contextualized in the two sources of expectations, in the three life domains and towards 
the three target groups. Based on the results from the previous analysis, that indicated 
that participants endorsed different levels of acculturation orientations based on their 
expectations of how the target groups should acculturate in the host society and how the 
state should acculturate them (source of perceived expectation effect), the statistical 
analysis was performed for each source of perceived expectation separately (see Section 
8.5.7).
Before embarking on this analysis, however, an investigation of the antecedents of the 
‘perceived nationality-religion overlap’ concept seemed in order. In particular, we were 
interested in exploring which motivational needs predict the perceived overlap variable 
and which socio-demographic variables may affect its levels.
8.5.6. Exploring the antecedents and the impact o f  perceived nationality-religion
overlap on identity processes
The set of analyses presented in the subsequent sections aimed to identify the 
underlying psychological processes that contribute to perceptions of a strong overlap 
between national and religious identities in the Greek context. It was expected that both 
national and religious motivational principles would predict the levels of the perceived 
overlap between the two target identity elements. Moreover, the analysis reported 
below aimed to re-examine the strength of the relationship between national and 
religious identity elements in the present sample, and the assumption tested in the 
previous study that the motivational principles of a strongly related identity element, 
like the religious one, may contribute to predicting strength of national identification.
4 7 4
However, based on the results from Study 2, it was assumed that the overlap between 
the two identity elements based on their respective motivational processes, would occur 
under conditions of high perceived nationality-religion overlap. Finally, it aimed to test 
whether the degree of perceived overlap would vary depending on participants’ gender, 
age, place of residence and political ideology. Thus, the analyses aimed to test the 
following hypotheses:
VII. A strong relationship is expected between national and religious 
identifications amongst Greek nationals.
VIII. Both national and religious motivational principles are expected to 
contribute to levels of perceived overlap between national and religious 
identities.
IX. The degree to which religious identity motivations would contribute to 
levels of national identification would vary based on participants’ 
perceptions of the overlap between national and religious identity elements. 
More specifically, it is expected that for participants who report a strong 
overlap between national and religious identity elements, levels of national 
identification would be predicted not only from national motivations, but 
from religious ones.
X. Levels of perceived overlap between nationality and religion is expected to 
vary based on gender, age, place of residence and political ideology.
To what extent levels o f national and religious identifications are strongly related 
amongst the present sample o f Greek nationals? (HVII)
In line with our previous findings (Study 1 and Study 2), the present analysis 
demonstrated that the strength of the relationship between national and religious 
identifications was positive and strong (N= 316, r=.49, p<.01).
Which motivational principles contribute in predicting levels ofperceived nationality- 
religion overlap? (HVIII)
The correlation matrix obtained for testing the relationships between strength of 
perceived nationality-religion overlap measure, national and religious identity principles 
respectively, showed that the association between religious motivational principles and 
the perceived overlap variable was by and large stronger. Therefore, in the first model
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strength of perceived overlap was predicted only by religious motivational principles, 
while the second model also allowed the influence of national identity principles to be 
assessed. Analysis indicated that only the first model which included the four religious 
motivational principles was significant F  (5, 309) = 65.42, p~0 explaining a great 
percentage of variance with Adj.R^= 51%. According to the calculated beta 
coefficients, religious efficacy (/3= .28, p~0) and continuity (/?= .27, p~0) were the best 
predictors followed by religious private-esteem (]6= .17, p<.003) and public-esteem (j(3= 
.10, p<.05).
Testing the effect o f levels ofperceived overlap between national and religious identity 
elements in predicting strength o f national identification (HIX)
To test our prediction about the moderating role of the perceived nationality-religion 
overlap construct on the strength of the relationship between multiple identity principles 
(national and religious) and degrees of national identification, the continuous variable 
that measures the perceived overlap between the two identity elements, was recomputed 
and divided by the median split with 1 representing the low levels of association 
between nationality and religion identity elements and 2 the high levels. Moreover, 
prior to running the set of hierarchical regression analyses, for testing whether the 
contribution of national and religious motivational principles (IVs) in predicting 
strength of national identification (DV) varies based on levels of perceived overlap, 
correlation matrixes were obtained for each of the two groups separately (high vs. low 
perceived nationality-religion overlap).
As it can be inferred from the correlation matrices below, national and religious identity 
principles were significantly related to national identification in both groups. However, 
the strength of the association between national identification and religious motivations, 
such as religious distinctiveness, continuity, private-esteem and efficacy, was stronger 
for those who perceived an extensive overlap between national and religious identity 
elements.
4 7 6
Table 8.41: Correlation matrix for levels of national identification with
identity principles (national-religious) for individuals with low 
perceived nationality-religion overlap (JListwise n =158)
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. National -
Identification
2. National .41** -
Distinctiveness
3. National .54** .57** -
Continuity
4, National .55** .17* .43** -
Private-Esteem
5. National .30** ns ns .51** -
Public-Esteem
6. National .42** .32** .46** .31** .21** -
Efficacy
7. Religious .19* .45** .35** ns ns .28** -
Distinctiveness
8. Religious .25** .20* .49** ns ns .22** .71** -
Continuity
9. Religious .16* ns .18* .32** .25** .20* .42** .56** -  .
Private-Esteem
10. Religious .20** ns ns .36** .39** ns ns .26** .58** -
Public-Esteem
11. Religious .18* .24** .35** ns .20* .62** .55** .50** .44** ns
Efficacy
Note: **p<.01, *p <.05
Table 8.42: Correlation matrix for levels of national identification with
identity principles (national-religious) for individuals with high 
perceived nationality-religion overlap {Listwise n =157)
Variables Ï 3  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ÏÔ ÏT
1. National
Identification
2. National .39** -
Distinctiveness
3. National 42** .51** _
Continuity
4. National 39** ns .21** -
Private-Esteem
5. National 22** .27** ns .37** -
Public-Esteem
6. National 29** .32** 24** .09 .31** _
Efficacy
7. Religious 30** .66** .46** .09 ns .21** -
Distinctiveness
8. Religious 41** .37** .65** .16* ns 21** .62** -
Continuity
9. Religious 34** ns .30** .42** .22** ns .27** .42**
Private-Esteem
10. Religious 23** ns ns .23** .49** ns .22** 29** ,45**
Public-Esteem
11. Religious .36** .34** .24** ns .30** .80** .27** .32** ns ns
Efficacy
Note: ^*p<.01, */?<.05
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Predicting strength o f national identification in the low and high perceived nationality- 
religion overlap groups
The first model regressed strength of national identification based only on national 
motivational principles, whilst the second model also allowed the influence of religious 
identity principles to be assessed. Analysis indicated that strength of national 
identification was predicted only by national identity motivational principles, whilst the 
second model, which also included religious motivations, was not significant with 
Fchange= 1.50, ns. The obtained beta coefficients indicated that strength of national 
identification was predicted by national private-esteem (/3=. 33), national distinctiveness 
(/?= .20), national continuity (/3= .20) and national efficacy (/3= .15).
On the contrary, the results from the hierarchical regression analysis, obtained for 
participants who perceived a strong overlap between their national and religious 
memberships revealed that the second model which also included the religious 
motivational principles, explained more variance with Adj.R^= 36% compared to 31% 
obtained from the first model and with Fchange (5, 146) = 2.97, p<.01. More specifically, 
the beta coefficients revealed that national private-esteem was the best predictor of 
levels of national identification, followed by religious efficacy (/5=.27) and national 
distinctiveness (/3=. 24). Although this finding supported our prediction, the fact that 
national and religious efficacy identity principles were so strongly related (r=.80, p~0) 
questioned the validity of our result. For that purpose, the researcher decided to check 
the part correlations between each type of efficacy (national and religious) with the 
dependent variable (national identification). Part correlations indicate the unique 
relationships between the two variables when the effect of a set of predictor variables is 
controlled (Field, 2000). The part correlations obtained in the second model indicated 
that national efficacy explained no variance (-.02) of the outcome variable (i.e. strength 
of national identification), whereas religious efficacy did (.15).
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T a b le  8.43: H iera rch ica l M u ltip le  R egression  S tatistics: P red ic tin g  stren gth  o f
n a tio n a l id en tifica tio n  (L ow  p erceiv ed  n a tio n a lity -re lig io n  overlap )
Variables Step 1 Step 2
National Distinctiveness .20** .24**
National Continuity 20** .15
National Private-Esteem .33** .30**
National Public-Esteem .08 .10
National-Efficacy .15* .26**
Religious Distinctiveness -.07
Religious Continuity .17
Religious Private-Esteem -.05
Religious Public-Esteem .07
Religious Efficacy -.17
.46 .49
Change .03
Adj.R^ .44 .45
Adj.R^ Change .01
F  change 25.86** 1.50
D f (5, 304)
Note: **p<.01, *p<.05
Table 8.44: Hierarchical Multiple Regression Statistics: Predicting strength of
national identification (High perceived nationality-religion overlap)
Variables Step 1 Step 2
National Distinctiveness .20** .24**
National Continuity .22** .12
National Private-Esteem .32** .30**
National Public-Esteem -.03 -.10
National-Efficacy .15* -.04
Religious Distinctiveness -.13
Religious Continuity .15
Religious Private-Esteem .07
Religious Public-Esteem .09
Religious Efficacy .27**
R^ .33 .40
R‘‘ Change .07
Adj.R" .31 .36
Adj.R^ Change .05
F  change 15.25** 2.97**
D f (5, 146)
Note: **p<.01, ’^ p<.05
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Testing the variations on levels o f perceived nationality and religion overlap as a 
function o f socio-demographic variables (HX)
The purpose of the analyses was to shed light to the characteristics of the individuals 
that perceive their national in-group (Greek) as a joint membership with the religious 
membership (Christian Orthodoxy). To this end, the effect of: a) gender; b) age; c) 
place of residence and d) political ideology on levels of perceived overlap were 
examined.
a) Are there any gender differences on levels o f perceived nationality-religion 
overlap?
An independent t-test analysis was carried out to examine whether levels of reported 
identity perceived overlap differed significantly between male and female participants. 
The results showed that there was no significant mean difference between Greek males 
(M= 29.88) and females (M=31.99) with t (314) =-1.79, ns.
b) Age differences in relation to levels o f perceived nationality-religion overlap
A univariate analysis of variance was conducted initially to test if the levels of 
perceived nationality-religion overlap differed significantly across the three age groups 
of the study. The results showed that age had no significant effect on levels of 
perceived overlap construct with F  (2, 313) = .19, ns.
c) Differences among the four cities on levels ofperceived overlap between national 
and religious identities
It was expected that the degree to which participants perceived their national and 
religious identities as overlapping would vary based on their place of residence. In line 
with our prediction, the univariate F-test was highly significant with F  (3, 315) = 9.76, 
p<.001. More specifically, it was revealed that the Athenian sample (M=25.73) 
reported lower levels of nationality-religion overlap than residents of Thessaloniki 
(M=33.$2), Kozani (M=32.71) and Thrace (M=31.62).
d) Differences in political ideology in relation to perceived nationality-religion overlap
With respect to whether political beliefs may differentially affect individuals’ subjective 
representation of the degree of overlap that may exist, or better should exist, between
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national and religious group memberships, the one-way ANOVA F test illustrated that 
the type of ideology had a significant main effect on levels of perceived nationality and 
religion overlap [ F  (4, 309)= 4.77, p<.001]. The post-hoc comparisons indicated that 
participants who favour capitalism reported a stronger overlap between notions of 
Greekness and Christian Orthodoxy, compared to those whose political beliefs are 
better represented by the ideologies of socialism, communism and anarchy respectively. 
However, due to the small number of participants who support anarchy, the yielded 
significant mean difference in levels of perceived nationality-overlap between the two 
groups should be interpreted with some caution.
In addition, as it can be seen in Table 8.45, a number of participants reported that none 
of the enlisted ideologies represented their political stances. Interestingly, these 
participants, who may support other political ideologies (e.g. far right-wing), or 
alternatively may be less involved and interested in politics, also seem to perceive that 
there is a strong and culturally important overlap between national and religious 
identities in the Greek context. The results indicated that their mean scores did not 
differ significantly from the other four groups.
Table 8.45: Testing the effect of political ideology on levels of perceived
nationality-■religion overlap (Univariate F-tests)
N Mean Df F p-value
Levels of perceived overlap (4, 309) 4.77 .001
Support for:
Capitalism 71 34.73
Communism 56 28.82a
Socialism 135 29.94b
Anarchy 13 25.38b
None of the above 39 33.23
Note: Means with subscript a. t differ from the calculated mean score obtained for 
Capitalism atp<.01 andp<.05 respectively
In summary, in this section, we presented some factors that may affect the degree to 
which individuals, and in particular Greek nationals, would represent their national and
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religious identities as overlapping. The findings showed that high perceived overlap 
between national and religious identities in terms of content and membership (single 
convergent social identity) is determined by the state of religious and not national 
motivations, and by some socio-demographic variables such as political beliefs and 
place of residence. In addition, the present analysis addressed the moderating effect of 
the perceived nationality-religion overlap on the relationship between strength of 
national identification, national and religious principles. Overall, the findings helped us 
clarify the social psychological conditions under which an extensive overlap between 
these two related identities is likely to occur.
8.5.7 Testing the effect o f  the levels o f  national identification and the perceived 
overlap between national-religious identities on the host majority's 
acculturation orientations
A  series of mixed between-within subject analyses of variance were performed to 
explore the impact of the levels of the ‘perceived nationality-religion overlap and the 
levels of national identification on the degree of endorsement of the host majority’s 
acculturation orientations for each source of expectation separately, with repeated 
measures on the latter when contextualized for specific domains and target groups. 
Before progressing with the analysis and to test the relevant research hypothesis (HVI), 
the strength of national identification measure was also recomputed in a dichotomous 
variable, divided by the median split with 1 representing the low levels of national 
identification and 2 the high levels.
8.5.7.1 The effect o f levels o f national identification and perceived nationality-
religion overlap on majority's acculturation expectancies o f immigrant 
and minority groups
The multivariate analysis showed significant main effects for type of acculturation [F 
(4, 303) = 36.68, p~0, ff=33%], domain [F (2, 305) = 44.13, rj^=22A%], and target 
group [F (2, 305) = 5.51, 3.5%]. Moreover, in contrast to the levels of national
identification, which failed to reveal a significant main effect [F (1, 306) = 3.44, ns], 
levels of perceived nationality-religion relationship revealed a significant main effect 
with F  (1, 306) = 12.56, eta^=3.9%. The interaction between the two independent 
variables (combined effect) did not reveal a significant main effect, with F  (1, 306) = 
3.73, ns. The table below summarises the unique and combined effects of the two IVs
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on acculturation orientations contextualised for the three life domains and target groups
I
respectively.
Table 8.46: Summary of the main findings
Df F p-valne
A.O* NID (4,303) 3.33 .01 4.2%
A.O* Nat-Rel (4,303) 4.53 .001 5.6%
A.O*NID*Nat-Rel (4, 303) 1.75 ns 2.3%
Target*A.0* NID (8, 299) 1.28 ns 3.3%
Target*A.0* Nat-Rel (8,299) .66 ns 1.7%
Domain*A.O* NID (8,299) 2.20 .03 5.6%
Domain*A.O* Nat-Rel (8, 299) 2.00 .05 5.1%
Target* A.0* NID*Nat-Rel (8,299) .43 ns 1.2%
Domain* A.O*NID*Nat-Rel (8,299) .69 ns 1.8%
Domain*T arget* A.O*NID (16, 291) 1.72 .04 9%
Domain*Target* A. 0*Nat- 
Rel (16,291) .47 ns 2.5%
Domain*Target* A. 0*NID* 
Nat-Rel (16, 291) .55 ns 2.9%
Note: A.O stands for the five types o f acculturation orientations; NID; stands fo r  
levels o f national identification; Nat-Rel; stands for levels ofperceived overlap 
between nationality-religion
The effect o f levels o f national, identification on levels o f endorsement ofA. O
The analysis showed that there was a significant two-way interaction between the types 
of acculturation orientation and degrees of national identification. Independent sample 
t-tests were carried out as follow up tests to compare the levels of endorsement of each 
acculturation strategy in the two groups (high vs. low identifiers). The findings 
indicated that participants who scored low in national identification measures expected 
the immigrant/minority groups to be more individualist, integrationist and less 
exclusionist compared to those participants who identified strongly with their national 
membership (see Table 8.47).
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T ab le  8.47: M ea n s an d  stan d ard  d ev ia tion s fo r  th e  fiv e  typ es o f  A .O  b a sed  on
levels o f  n a tio n a l id en tifica tio n  {Listwise n: L o w  N ID =  171, H ig h
N ID =  139, # = 3 0 8 )
Means SD t p-valne
Assimilation Low: 28.75 7.84 -.51 ns
High: 29.24 9.13
Segregation Low: 33.95 7.42 -.11 ns
High: 34.05 8.72
Individualism Low: 40.93 11.50 3.20 .002
High: 36.57 12.39
Integration Low: 38.72 8.76 3.31 .001
High: 35.01 11.01
Exclusionism Low: 28.99 11.46 -3.53 .001
High: 33.98 13.46
Note: Bonferroni adjusted alpha: p<. 01
The effect o f the strength o f the nationality-religion relationship on levels o f  
endorsement o f A. O
With the exception of integration, participants’ levels of endorsement of acculturation 
orientations varied depending on levels of perceived nationality-religion overlap. As 
expected, participants who reported high levels of perceived overlap between national 
and religious identities were more likely to endorse more intolerant attitudes towards 
the immigrant and minority groups, irrespective of the ethno-cultural origin of these 
groups (target group effect) and the life-domain under consideration.
Table 8.48: Means and standard deviations for the five types of A.O based on 
levels of perceived nationality-religion overlap {Listwise n: Low Nat- 
Rel= 159, High Nat-Rel= 151, df= 308)
Means SD t p-valne
Assimilation Low: 27.21 8.55 -3.87 .001
High: 30.83 7.91
Segregation Low:32.29 8.04 -3.93 .001
High: 35.79 7.61
Individualism Low: 40.85 12.30 2.83 .005
High: 37.01 11.56
Integration Low: 38.03 10.24 1.77 ns
High:36.03 9.64
Exclusionism Low:28.22 12.47 -4.43 .001
High: 34.40 12.03
Note: Bonferroni adjusted alpha: p<.01
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Testing the effect o f levels o f national identification on host majority acculturations 
across the three-life domains
The significant three-way interaction obtained between domain x type of acculturation x 
levels of national identification, indicated that the scoring of participants on the five 
types of acculturation orientations in the three life-domains varied significantly 
depending on their degree of national identification. A series of independent t-tests 
were performed to examine the differences between the two groups in levels of 
endorsement of acculturation orientations for each domain separately. It should be 
noted that mean score differences in segregation and integration orientations, regarding 
the domain of citizenship, and the assimilation orientation in the domain of 
intermarriage, could not be tested due to the low internal consistency of these scales.
In the domain of citizenship, high national identifiers were more likely than low 
identifiers to expect immigrant and minority groups to endorse less individualist and 
stronger exclusionist orientations. In the domain of education, significant differences 
between the two groups were revealed, based on reported levels of endorsement of two 
orientations: assimilation and exclusionism. Once again, participants who identified to 
a greater extent with their national identity endorsed relatively stronger assimilationist 
and exclusionist attitudes. Finally, in the domain of intermarriage, high national 
identification led to the expression of relatively stronger segregationist and exclusionist 
attitudes, and to relatively weaker support for the individualist and integration 
orientations respectively.
Table 8.49: Means and standard deviations for the five types of A.O in the 
domain of citizenship based on levels of national identification 
{Listwise n: Low NID= 171, High NID= 141, df= 310)
Citizenship Means SD t p-value
Assimilation Low: 10.92 4.04 -.98 ns
High: 11.41 4.82
Individualism Low: 12.82 4.38 2.61 .009
High: 11.50 4.52
Exclusionism Low: 10.07 4.13 -2.95 .003
High: 11.57 4.89
Note: Bonferroni adjusted alpha, p<.02
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Table 8.50: Means and standard deviations for the five types of A.O in the 
domain of education based on levels of national identification
{Listwise n: Low NID= 171, High NID= 141, df= 310)
Education Means SD t p-value
Assimilation Low: 10.17 3.92 -2.49 .01
High: 11.35 4.41
Segregation Low: 12.50 3.67 1.52 ns
High: 11.81 4.15
Individualism Low: 13.08 4.51 ,2.38 .02 (ns)
High: 11.83 4.71
Integration Low: 14.36 3.75 2.40 .02(ns)
High:13.24 4.51
Exclusionism Low: 8.91 3.98 -3.83 .001
High: 10.84 4.90
Note: Bonferroni adjusted alpha, pf.Ol
Table 8.51: Means and standard deviations for the five types of A.O in the
domain of intermarriage based on levels of national identification 
{Listwise n: Low NID= 171, High NID= 140, df= 309)
Intermarriage Means SD t p-valne
Segregation Low: 9.67 3.81 -2.67 .008
High: 10.91 4.29
Individualism Low: 15.03 4.49 3.27 .001
High: 13.25 5.12
Integration Low: 12.56 3.82 3.00 .003
H ig h :ll.ll 4.71
Exclusionism Low: 10.00 4.28 -3.11 .002
High: 11.59 4.69
Note: Bonferroni adjusted alpha, p<.01
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Testing the effect o f levels ofperceived nationality-religion overlap on host majority 
acculturations across the three-life domains
The multivariate analysis indicated that the levels of the perceived overlap between 
national and religious identities also significantly affected the levels of endorsement of 
acculturation orientations in the three life-domains examined. More specifically, in the 
domain of citizenship participants who perceived that the relationship between national 
and religious identity elements is weak expected both immigrants and minority 
members to endorse stronger individualistic attitudes, to be less assimilated, and to 
favour less the exclusionist orientation. Regarding the domain of education, 
participants who perceived high overlap between national and religious identity 
elements expected the immigrants and the minority groups to endorse stronger 
exclusionist and assimilationist attitudes. Finally, in the domain of intermarriage, the 
results revealed that when there was an extensive perceived overlap between national 
and religious identities, immigrants and minority groups were expected to endorse less 
integrationist and stronger exclusionist and segregationist attitudes.
Table 8.52: Means and standard deviations for the five types of A.O in the 
domain of citizenship based on levels of perceived nationality- 
religion overlap {Listwise n: Low Nat-Rel= 159, High NID= 153, 
# 3 1 0 )
Citizenship Means SD t p-value
Assimilation Low: 10.17 4.42 -4.06 .001
High: 12.15 4.18
Individualism Low: 12.96 4.52 3.01 .003
High: 11.45 4.34
Exclusionism Low: 9.71 4.44 -4.23 .001
High: 11.83 4.41
Note: Bonferroni adjusted alpha, p<.02
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Table 8.53: Means and standard deviations for the five types of A.O in the
domain of education based on levels of perceived nationality-religion 
overlap {Listwise n: Low Nat-Rel= 159, High Nat-Rel= 153, df= 310)
Education Means SD t p-value
Assimilation Low: 10.12 4.22 -2.50 .01
High: 11.31 4.08
Segregation Low: 11.85 4.12 -1.57 ns
High: 12.54 3.64
Individualism Low: 13.11 4.69 2.32 .02 (ns)
High: 11.89 4.51
Integration Low: 14.01 4.36 .68 ns
High:13.69 3.91
Exclusionism Low: 8.89 4.28 -3.61 .001
High: 10.70 4.59
Note: Bonferroni adjusted alpha, p<.01
Table 8.54: Means and standard deviations for the five types of A.O in the
domain of intermarriage based on levels of perceived nationality- 
religion overlap {Listwise n: Low Nat-Rel=159, High Nat-Rel= 152, 
# 3 0 9 )
Intermarriage Means SD t p-value
Segregation Low: 9.07 3.86 -5.34 .001
High: 11.45 3.95
Individualism Low: 14.78 4.95 2.05 .04(ns)
High: 13.66 4.70
Integration Low: 12.50 4.21 2.47 .01
High: 11.30 4.32
Exclusionism Low: 9.62 4.51 -4.53 .001
High: 11.87 4.27
Note: Bonferroni adjusted alpha, p<.01
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Finally, the main effect of national identification on levels of endorsement of 
acculturation orientations was also qualified through a four-way interaction. This 
significant four-way interaction between domain x target x type of acculturation 
orientation x degrees of national identification suggests that, depending on the domain 
and target group under consideration, high and low identifiers endorsed significantly 
different levels of acculturation orientations. Further analysis was carried out to 
identify where these differences lie. The results showed that there was a lot more 
variation between high and low identifiers in the levels of endorsement of acculturation 
strategies towards the target groups in the domains of education and intermarriage. In 
general, high levels of national identification signified stronger endorsement of 
intolerant acculturation strategies towards the three target groups, like assimilation, 
segregation and exclusionism. However, it is also worth noting that in the domain of 
intermarriage levels of national identification influenced in a reverse way the levels of 
endorsement of assimilation orientation. It was revealed that low identifiers expected 
relatively more than high identifiers that members of the Moslem minority and 
Albanian immigrants should intermarry with the host community members after they 
assimilate into the Greek culture and customs. The results are presented in Table 8.55 
below.
Table 8.55: Summary of findings of the mean differences between high vs. low
identifiers on levels of acculturation strategies in the 3 life domains 
and towards the 3 target groups
Domains Target
Groups
A.O t-test results
Citizenship Moslems
Russians
Individualism
Exclusionism
Low NID>High NID 
LowNID<HighNID
t(309)= 2.98, p<003
t(309)=-2.75, p<.006
Education Moslems
Russians
Albanians
Russians
Assimilation
Individualism
Exclusionism
Exclusionism
LowNEXHighNID 
Low NID>High NID 
Low NID<HighNID 
LowNID<HighNID
t(310)=-2.46, p<.01 
1310)= 2.62, p<.009 
t(310)=-3.33,p<.001 
t(310)=-4.76, p~0
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T a b le  8 .55 Continued
Domains Target
Groups
A.O t-test results
Intermarriage Moslems
Albanians
Assimilation
Assimilation
Low NID>High NID 
Low NID>High NID
t(309)= 4.74, p~0 
t(309)=2.45, p<.01
Albanians Segregation Low NDZXHigh NID t(309)=-3.18, p<.002
Albanians
Russians
Individualism
Individualism
Low NID>High NID 
Low NID>High NID
t(309)=2.59, p<.01 
t(309)=3.69, p~0
Moslems Integration Low NID>High NID t(309)= 3.60, p~0
Albanians
Russians
Exclusionism
Exclusionism
Low NID<High NID 
Low NID<High NID
t(309)=-2.80, p<005 
t(309)=-3.13,p~0
Note: Bonferroni adjusted alpha, p<.01
8.5.7.2 The effect o f levels o f national identification and perceived nationality- 
religion overlap on the majority’s acculturation expectancies o f the state
The multivariate tests indicated that there were significant main effects of type of 
acculturation [F (4, 302) = 88.93, p~0, ff=54%], domain [F(2, 304) = 112.24,
42.5%], and target group [F (2, 304) = 4.80, p<.009 'tf= 3.1%].
The between-subjects effect tests revealed that there was a significant and strong main 
effect for levels of nationality-religion relationship, with F  (1, 305) = 18.80, p~0 yf= 
5.8%, whereas levels of national identity failed yet again to reveal a significant main 
effect, with F (1, 305) = .002, ns. In addition, the interaction between the two 
independent variables did not reveal a significant main effect, with F  (1, 305) = 2.36, 
ns.
The table below summarises the unique and combined effects of the two IVs on 
acculturation orientations, contextualised to measure participants’ expectations of the 
state in the three life domains and towards the three target groups respectively.
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T ab le  8 .56: S u m m a ry  o f  th e  m ain  fin d in gs
Df F p-value
A.O* NID (4, 302) 3.30 .01 4.2%
A.O* Nat-Rel (4, 302) 2.83 .02 3.6%
A.O*NID*Nat-Rel (4, 302) 1.01 ns 1.3%
Target*A.O* NID (8,298) 1.10 ns 2.9%
Target* A.0* Nat-Rel (8, 298) 1.08 ns 2 .8%
Domain*A.O* NID (8,298) 2.28 .02 5.8%
Domain *A.O* Nat-Rel (8,298) 2.45 .01 6.2%
Target* A.O* NID*Nat-Rel (8, 298) .64 ns 1.7%
Domain* A. 0  *NID *Nat-Rel (8, 298) .86 ns 2.3%
Domain*Target* A. 0 . *NID (16,290) 1.05 ns 5.5%
Domain*Target*A.O*Nat-Rel (16,290) .79 ns 4.2%
The effect o f levels o f national identification on levels o f endorsement o f A.O
Significant differences were revealed between high and low nationality identifiers, 
based on their expectations of the state in all five acculturation orientations. As 
expected, participants who reported low levels of national identification believed 
relatively more than the high identifiers that the state needs to respect the individual 
characteristics of the immigrant and minority groups [Mlownid = 45.05, MnighNiD = 
41.73 with t(307) =2 .68, p<.01], to promote a more multicultural ideology [Mlownid = 
38.70, M High NID = 39.49 with t(307) =2.94, p<.01] and to avoid the implementation of 
segregationist [Mlownid = 26.78, MnighNiD = 31.40 with t(307) =-3.76, p<.01] and 
exclusionist policies [Mlownid = 27.43, MnighNiD = 32.63 with t(307) =-4.30, p<.01] 
towards the ethno-cultural groups living in the society.
The effect o f the strength o f the nationality-religion relationship on levels o f  
endorsement o f A.O
Post hoc-analysis carried out to explore the two-way interaction obtained between 
nationality-religion and acculturation orientations, revealed that individuals who scored 
high in the perceived nationality-religion overlap measure expected that the state should 
implement relatively less tolerant policies on migration and minority issues compared to 
participants who perceived less overlap between these two identities. More specifically, 
there were significant differences between the two groups on assimilation [MLowNat-Rei= 
33.35 , MnighNat-Rel = 36.04 with t (307) = -2.89], segregation [M LowNat-Rei = 25.99,
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Mnigh Nat-Rel = 31.87 with t(307) =-4.88, p<.01], integration [M LowNat-Rei = 38.53, Mnigh 
Nat-Rel = 35.42 with t(307) = 2.44, p<.01] and exclusionism orientations [MnowNat-rei = 
26.85, M n ig h  Nat-Rel = 32.84 with t(307) =-5.03, p<.01].
Testing the effect o f levels o f national identification on host majority acculturations 
across the three-life domains
The findings revealed that different levels of acculturation orientations were endorsed in 
the three life domains, depending on the levels of national identification. Post-hoc 
analysis revealed that, in the domain of citizenship, those who identify strongly with 
their national group expected their state to favour less integration and to adopt more 
segregationist and exclusionist policies. In the domain of intermarriage, high identifiers 
exhibited a strong preference for their state to promote segregationist and exclusionist 
policies and to favour less individualism. The mean differences between the two 
groups in the domain of education exceeded the Bonferroni adjusted alpha value 
(P < 0 1 ).
Table 8.57: Means and standard deviations for the five types of A.O in the
domain of citizenship based on levels of national identification 
{Listwise n; Low NID=171, High NID=139, df= 308)
Citizenship Means SD t p-value
Assimilation Low: 14.47 3.57 1.90 ns
High: 13.60 4.49
Segregation Low: 10.29 4.27 -2.73 .007
High: 11.68 4.75
Individualism Low: 15.51 3.64 1.54 ns
High: 14.82 4.30
Integration Low: 12.34 4.21 3.52 .001
High: 10.59 4.54
Exclusionism Low: 10.36 3.86 -4.28 .001
High: 12.39 4.51
Note: Bonferroni adjusted alpha, p<.01
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Tables 8.58: Means and standard deviations for the five types of A.O in the 
domain of education based on levels of national identification
{Listwise n: Low NID=171, High NID=141, # 3 1 0 )
Education Levels of NID SD t p-value
Assimilation Low: 10.51 3.49 -1.12 ns
High: 11.02 4.48
Segregation Low: 7.98 4.26 -1.06 ns
High: 8.40 3.75
Individualism Low: 15.84 4.01 2.31 .02 (ns)
High: 14.69 4.82
Integration Low: 1.32 4.31 2.13 .03 (ns)
High: 14.21 4.82
Exclusionism Low: 7.39 3.65 -1.85 ns
High: 8.20 4.19
Note: Bonferroni adjusted alpha, p<.01
Tables 8.59: Means and standard deviations for the five types of A.O in the
domain of intermarriage based on levels of national identification 
{Listwise n: Low NID=171, High NID=142, #=311)
Intermarriage Levels of NID SD t p-value
Assimilation Low: 9.89 3.27 -.03 ns
High: 9.90 4.16
Segregation Low: 8.52 4.26 -5.24 .001
High: 11.39 5.41
Individualism Low: 13.70 4.40 2.70 .007
High: 12.25 5.08
Integration Low: 11.03 4.31 1.93 ns
High: 10.10 4.82
Exclusionism Low: 9.69 3.86 -4.54 .001
High: 12.01 5.16
Note: Bonferroni adjusted alpha, p<.01
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Testing the effect o f levels ofperceived nationality-religion overlap on host majority 
acculturations across the three-life domains
The findings indicated that levels of the perceived overlap between nationality-religion 
also affected participants’ levels of endorsement of the five acculturation orientations in 
the three domains under consideration. More specifically, post-hoc analysis revealed 
that, in the domain of citizenship, individuals who perceived that religion was a 
defining characteristic of their nationality expected the state to adopt more exclusionist, 
segregationist and less integrationist policies towards the immigrant and minority 
groups. Regarding the domain of education, the only significant difference between 
participants who scored low and high on the perceived overlap measure was found with 
respect to the assimilation orientation. Finally, participants who believed that there is a 
great overlap between national and religious identities expected their state either not to 
encourage intermarriage (segregation and exclusionism) or to implement policies to 
ensure that intermarriage between host community members and immigrant/minority 
groups would happen only if the latter groups conform and accept the host majority 
culture (assimilation).
Table 8.60: Means and standard deviations for the five types of A.O based on
levels of perceived nationality-religion overlap in the domain of 
citizenship {Listwise n; Low Nat-Rel=159, High Nat-Rel= 151, df= 
308)
Citizenship Means SD t p-value
Assimilation Low: 14.13 4.26 .24 ns
High: 14.02 3.77
Segregation Low. 9.72 4.41 -4.83 .001
High: 12.16 4.36
Individualism Low: 15.45 4.24 1.11 ns
High: 14.95 3.63
Integration Low: 12.33 4.54 3.15 .002
High: 10.75 4.20
Exclusionism Low: 10.07 3.96 -5.23 .001
High: 12.52 4.25
Note: Bonferroni adjusted alpha, p<.01
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Table 8.61 : Means and standard deviations for the five types of A.O based on
levels of perceived nationality-religion overlap in the domain of 
education {Listwise n; Low Nat-Rel=159, High Nat-Rel=153, df= 310)
Education Means SD t p-value
Assimilation Low: 10.02 3.87 -3.34 .001
High: 11.50 3.94
Segregation Low: 7.88 3.68 -1.48 ns
_ High: 8.46 3.28
Individualism Low: 15.58 4.59 1.08 ns
High: 15.04
4.24 ■
Integration Low: 15.11 4.74 1.14 ns
High: 14.53 4.38
Exclusionism Low: 7.28 3.86 -2.19 .029 (ns)
High: 8.25 3.92
Note: Bonferroni adjusted alpha, p<.01
Table 8.62: Means and standard deviations for the five types of A.O based on
levels of perceived nationality-religion overlap in the domain of 
intermarriage {Listwise n;Low Nat-Rel=159, High Nat-Rel=154, 
# 3 1 1 )
Intermarriage Means SD t p-value
Assimilation Low: 9.21 3.62 -3.40 .001
High: 10.60 3.66
Segregation Low: 8.38 4.59 -5.37 .001
High: 11.30 5.02
Individualism Low: 13.64 5.00 2.26 .024 (ns)
High: 12.43 4.45
lûtegration Low: 11.11 4.40 2.06 .04 (ns)
High: 14.53 4.07
Exclusionism Low: 9.49 4.18 -5.06 .001
High: 12.04 4.74
Note: Bonferroni adjusted alpha, p<.01
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In summary, the results presented above yielded partial support for HVI, since levels of 
national identification and perceived overlap between national and religious identities 
systematically affected the degrees of endorsement of acculturation orientations in the 
private and public domains under consideration, but not in relation to the different 
target groups. Overall, perceptions of a strong overlap between the two identities and 
high levels of national identification triggered the support of less egalitarian attitudes 
and state policies towards minorities and immigrants in general. Levels of national 
identification influenced the degree of endorsement of acculturation attitudes towards 
the three target groups, and in the different domains only in the first dimension 
measuring the host majority’s acculturative expectancies from the immigrant and 
minority groups (four-way interaction). It is also important to note that in the domain 
of citizenship by and large levels of national identification and perceived overlap 
influenced the degree of endorsement of the same set of orientations. On the contrary, 
more variations were evinced in the domains of education and intermarriage.
8.6 The path analytic model
This last section aimed to test the proposed model that progressively examines the 
influence of psychological correlates such as degrees of national identification, 
perceived nationality-religion overlap, threat to national identity and prejudice on the 
levels of endorsement of the five acculturation strategies. Based on the previous 
findings the paths of this model were examined separately for the host majority’s 
acculturation expectations of the immigrant/minority and the state, towards all three 
target groups (Moslems of Thrace, Albanians and Russians) and in relation to two life- 
domains (education and intermarriage^).
The model will be discussed in three parts: a) predictors of perceived national identity 
threat; b) the effect of perceptions of identity threat, degrees of national identification 
and perceived nationality-religion overlap on levels of prejudice; and c) predictors of 
acculturation attitudes. In the last part of the model, the relative contribution of all the
 ^The focus of the study was to examine the relative power of strength of national identification and 
perceived nationality-religion overlap in predicting inter-group perceptions and acculturation attitudes. 
Thus, it was considered important to use a sub-sample of the private and public domains to test this 
assumption. Since there were differences among the target groups based on their citizenship status, the 
domain of education was chosen over the domain of citizenship.
4 9 6
previously mentioned variables in explaining acculturation attitudes was examined. 
Based on previous literature and our own research findings the model proposed enabled 
us to generate some testable hypotheses.
Research Hypotheses (Section II)
X. Degrees of national identification and the perceived overlap between 
nationality and religion are expected to affect perceptions of threat to 
national identity and prejudice towards the target immigrant and 
minority groups. However, some differences are expected in the relative 
power of perceived nationality-religion overlap to influence levels of 
perceived threat and prejudice, depending on the target group under 
consideration. In particular, we propose that perceived nationality- 
religion overlap would be a stronger predictor than national 
identification, both for perceived threat and prejudice for groups which 
are perceived as relatively similar (i.e. Russians) or dissimilar (i.e. 
Moslems of Thrace, Albanians) based on religion.
XL Levels of prejudice towards the three target groups will be largely 
determined by perceived threat to national identity.
XII. Levels of perceived threat to national identity and, mainly, prejudice are 
expected to be the strongest predictors of the five acculturation strategies 
for each source of expectation separately, in the two domains and 
towards the three target groups.
XIII. Levels of national identification and perceived-overlap are also expected 
to influence acculturation orientations, both in a direct and indirect way 
(mediated through perceived threat and prejudice).
XIV. The unique and relative contribution of each of the four psychological 
variables in predicting host majority acculturation attitudes was expected 
to vary based on the domain, the target group, and the source of 
expectation under consideration.
It is important to note that although we expected that perceptions of nationality-religion 
overlap, national identification and perceived threat to national identity would influence
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the host majority’s acculturation attitudes also in a direct way, no hypotheses were 
formulated a priori as to which these acculturation attitudes would be.
For the clarity of presentation, each segment of the path model will be presented and 
discussed in three separate sections. However, the Discussion section will primarily 
focus on the final path-diagrams which depict all variables predicting the host 
majority’s acculturation strategies based on expectations of immigrant/minority groups 
and the state separately, in relation to different life-domains and target groups (see 
Figures 8.14 through 8.25).
8.6.1 Predicting national identity threat
The first part of the model aimed to test the relative contribution of the degrees of 
national identification and perceived nationality-religion overlap in explaining 
perceived threat to national identity induced by the presence of each of these immigrant 
and minority groups in Greek society. Thus, the model was tested in relation to each 
target group separately. The correlation matrices showed that perceived threat to 
national identity variables was always positively related to both strength of national 
identification and perceived nationality-religion overlap variables (identity variables). 
Moreover, the relationship between levels of national identification and perceived 
overlap was also significant with r= .43, p<.01.
Table 8.63: Correlations between perceived threat to national identity,
national identification and perceived nationality-religion 
overlap (Listwise n= 316)
Variables Threat to national Threat to national Threat to national identity
identity posed by identity posed by posed by Russians
Moslems Albanians
National .20** .23** .16**
Identification
Perceived 29** .28** .28**
Overlap
Note: **p<.01
A set of hierarchical regression analyses were carried out to examine whether levels of 
the perceived nationality-religion overlap entered in the second stage of the analysis 
would better explain levels of perceived threat, and whether there would be any
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variations on its unique effect in predicting the dependent variable based on the target 
group under consideration (see Table 8.64). Our decision to enter national 
identification first in the analysis was based on previous literature that argues that levels 
of identification or identity commitment is a strong determinant of the extent to which 
an individual would perceive threat to that identity and of the behavioural responses 
employed in later stages for ameliorating its impact (see Branscombe et al., 1999; 
Ellemers et al., 2002).
In line with our prediction (Hypothesis X, first part), the results showed that perceptions 
of nationality-religion overlap had a unique and/or a substantially stronger effect than 
national identification in predicting perceived threat to national identity associated with 
the presence of all three target groups in the Greek society. More specifically, the 
findings revealed that, in relation to the Moslems of Thrace and Russian immigrants, 
perceived threat to national identity was predicted only by perceived nationality- 
religion overlap (second model). In the case of Albanians, although both degrees of 
national identification and perceived nationality-religion overlap appeared to have a 
unique role in explaining levels of perceived threat to national identity, the effect of the 
second (perceived overlap) was relatively stronger. More specifically, the part 
correlations obtained in the second model, showed that the unique relationship between 
national identification (IV) and perceived threat to national identity (DV) was much 
weaker (.12) from the one obtained between perceived nationality-religion overlap and 
the dependent variable (.20).
The findings supports our suggestion that in contexts where religion is a salient 
dimension in inter-group perceptions and that nationality is defined by religion, it is the 
subjective representation of national identity as a compound category with religion that 
would determine the extent to which host majority members would experience the 
presence of specific target outgroups as a threat to their national ingroup. However, as 
seen in Table 8.64, both identity variables had only very small percentage of variance 
explained.
499
Table 8.64: Hierarchical Multiple Regression Statistics: Predicting levels of
perceived threat to NI posed by each target group from degrees of 
national identification and perceived nationality-religion overlap
Threat to NID Threat to NID posed by Threat to NID posed by
posed by Moslems of Albanians Russians
Thrace
IVs /5 t-value
Significance
Level
P<
jS t-value
Significance
Level
P<
/5 t-value
, Significance 
Level 
P<
Model 1:
Levels ofNID .20 3.66 .001 .23 4.24 .001 .16 2.84 .001
.04 .05 .02
.04 .05 .02
.04 .05 .02
F Change 13.42*** 1796*** 8.08**
D f (1,314) (1, 314) (1,314)
Model 2:
Levels ofNID
Perceived
Overlap
.010
.24
1.63
4.99
ns
.001
.14 2.32 
.22 3.70
.02
.001
.05
.26
.76
4.38
ns
.001
.09 .09 .08
.08 .09 .08
.05 .04 .06
F Change 16.80*** 13.69*** 19.18***
D f (1,313) (1,313) (1,313)
Note: The Table is a summary of three sets of separate regressions. 
^**p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05
Figure 8.12 Path Models Section I
National
Identification
Overlap between 
national-religious 
identities
Threat to NI by 
Moslems of 
Thrace
(R2=.08)
/5=.14
Threat to NI by 
Albanians
National
Identification
Overlap between 
national-religious 
identities
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F igu re 8 .12 Continued
/5=.26
National
Identification
Threat to NI by 
Russians
Overlap between 
national-religious 
identities
Note: figures are adjusted
Colour coding is introducedfor clarity of presentation
8.6.2 Predicting prejudice towards the target immigrant and minority groups
The middle section of this model aimed to test the extent to which each of the 
previously mentioned variables would explain unfavourable attitudes towards the three 
target groups. It was assumed that levels of prejudice would be proportionally related 
to levels of perceived threat to national identity (Hypothesis XI). Moreover, it was 
expected that depending on the target group under consideration, levels of perceived 
nationality-religion overlap would affect levels of prejudice relatively more than 
national identification (Hypothesis X, second part).
Table 8.65 presents the intercorrelations for all variables by the target group under 
consideration. The relationships between the variables were in the expected direction.
It was found that the way participants construct and manage their multiple group 
memberships, the degree to which they identify with their national ingroup and perceive 
the presence of each target group as a threat to national identity, were all positively 
related to levels of prejudice.
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T a b le  8.65: In terco rre la tio n s o f  v ariab les b y  p reju d ice  tow ard s each  ta rg et
grou p
Variable 1 2 3
Prejudice towards 
Moslems of Thrace
1.NID
2. Perceived Overlap
3. Threat to NI
.26**
.31**
.51**
Prejudice towards Albanians -
1.NID
2. Perceived Overlap
3. Threat to NI
.33**
.27**
.54**
Prejudice towards Russians -
1.NID
2. Perceived Overlap
3. Threat to NI
.30**
.28**
.48**
Note: **p<.01
A series of hierarchical regression analyses were carried out to investigate which 
variables would predict levels of prejudice and whether there are variations in the 
relative contribution of these variables based on the target groups under consideration. 
In all three regressions (one for each target group) national identification was entered 
first, perceived overlap between national and religious identities was added in the 
second stage of the model, whilst the third model included all three predictor variables: 
national identification, perceived overlap and threat to national identity. The analyses 
showed that the change in R of the third model(s), which included all three predictor 
variables, was statistically significant and explained more variance of the dependent 
variable(s). Compared to both national identification and perceived nationality-religion 
overlap variables, perceived threat to national identity was consistently a stronger 
predictor of levels of prejudice. In other words, the findings suggest that the strong 
perception that the target minority and immigrant groups constitute a threat to the 
content and value dimensions of Greek national identity justified and lead to stronger 
negative attitudes toward these groups.
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Moreover, there were variations in the unique (direct effect) and relative contribution of 
the other two variables in predicting levels of prejudice from model one to model three, 
depending on the target group under consideration. More specifically, regarding the 
inter-group attitudes towards Albanian and Russian immigrants, model one which 
significantly accounted for 33% and 30% of the variance respectively, showed that 
ingroup identification was a significant predictor of prejudice. The second regression 
model, which included perceived nationality-religion overlap variable, increased the 
explained variance by a further 2% and 3% respectively. The results indicated that 
although both national identification and perceived nationality-religion overlap 
significantly predicted levels of prejudice towards Albanians and Russians, the direct 
paths of the second one (perceived overlap) were relatively weaker (see Table 8.66).
The inclusion of perceived threat to national identity as a predictor in model three, not 
only explained significantly more variance (R^A=.21 and .17 respectively), it also 
rendered non-significant the second predictor from model two. This indicates that any 
direct effects of perceived nationality-religion overlap on prejudice levels towards the 
two groups of immigrants are fully mediated by perceived threat.
On the contrary, in the case of Moslems of Thrace, the results indicated that in the 
presence of perceived overlap between national and religious identities (model two) the 
effect size of national identification on prejudice was reduced whilst the former variable 
was a relatively stronger predictor, fri the third model, the inclusion of perceived threat 
to national identity explained significantly more variance (R^A=.19). However, this 
time the mediating effect of perceived threat on national identification was rather weak. 
The direct path from national identification to prejudice did not decrease substantially 
when perceived threat was added to the analysis (from .16 to .12). Moreover, although 
the direct path from perceived overlap to prejudice decreased (from .24 to .13), it was 
not completely eliminated. Therefore, levels of prejudice towards Moslems of Thrace 
were predicted by all three variables, with perceived threat yet again being its strongest 
predictor.
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Table 8.66: Hierarchical Multiple Regression Statistics: Predicting levels of
prejudice towards each target group from degrees of national 
identification, perceived nationality-religion overlap and threat to 
NI
Target Group
Moslems of Thrace Albanians Russians
/5 t-value
Significance
Level
P<
B t-value
Significance
Level
P<
/5 t-value
Significance
Level
P<
Model 1:
Levels ofNID .26 4.86 .001 .33 6.20 .001 .30 5.65 .001
R .26 .33 .30
R^ .07 .11 .09
.07 .11 .09
R^A .07 .11 .09
F Change 23.60*** 38.44*** 31.93***
D f (1,313) (1, 314) (1,314)
Model 2:
Levels ofNID
Perceived
Overlap
.16
.24
2.72
4.16
.007
.001
.26
.16
4.46
2.79
.001
.006
.23
.18
2.85
3.08
.001
.002
R .34 .36 .34
R^ .12 .13 .12
.11 .12 .11
R^A .05 .02 .03
F Change 17.31*** 7.81** 9.48**
D f (1,312) (1,313) (1,313)
Model 3:
Levels ofNID 
Perceived 
Overlap 
Threat to NI
.12
.13
.45
2.20
2.51
9.16
.03
.01
.001
.19
.06
.48
3.77
1.09
10.00
.001
ns
.001
.21
.07
.43
3.90
1.25
8.59
.001
ns
.001
R .55 .58 .54
R^ .31 .34 .29
.30 .34 .28
R^A .19 .21 .17
F Change 83.89*** 100.08*** 73.85***
D f (1,311) (1,312) (1,312)
Note: The Table is a summary of three sets of separate regressions. 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05
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F igu re 8.13 P ath  M od els S ection  II
jg=.12
j@=.45iS=.24
i8=13
i8=14
jg=.22
]8=.21
National
Identification
National
Identification
National
Identification
Threat to NI by 
Albanians
Threat to NI by 
Russians
Prejudice
Prejudice
Prejudice
Threat to NI by 
Moslems of 
Thrace
Overlap between 
national-religious 
identities
Overlap between 
national-religious 
identities
Overlap between 
national-religious 
identities
Note: figures are adjusted
Colour coding is introduced for clarity ofpresentation 
8.6.3 Predicting acculturation attitudes o f the dominant group
As stated in the introduction, our main interest in the present study was to investigate 
not only the influence of variables like national identification and perceived threat on 
inter-group attitudes, but also explore the effect and psychological implications of 
identity configurations (national and religious) for inter-group relations. So far, our 
findings indicated that a perception of a strong overlap between nationality and religion 
was positively related to levels of perceived threat and prejudice towards all three target 
groups. Moreover, it was found that it made unique contribution in predicting levels of
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prejudice only towards the most dissimilar group based on religion, the Moslems of 
Thrace.
The analyses presented in this final section of the path model were designed to evaluate 
the unique contribution of each of the four psychological variables to predictions of host 
majority’s attitudes towards issues of intercultural adaptation. Hierarchical regression 
analyses were considered appropriate for use as they enabled us to investigate whether 
and when degrees of national identification, perceptions of nationality-religion overlap 
variables would make unique contributions to predictions of each of these attitudes or 
whether they would be redundant after threat to national identity and prejudice are 
entered in the analysis.
Overall, it was expected that the inclusion of perceived nationality-religion overlap 
would improve predictions and our understanding of the psychological processes 
involved in the endorsement of each acculturation strategy, in relation to different target 
groups, and in the context of private (intermarriage) and public (education) life domains 
where both national and religious identities may be salient (i.e. intermarriage and 
education). Moreover, as proposed in the last hypothesis (XIV), variations in the 
relative and unique contribution of all four variables (not just in relation to national 
identification and perceived overlap) in predicting intercultural attitudes were not only 
expected based on the domain and target group, but also based on the source of 
expectation (immigrant/minority vs. the state) under consideration.
8.6.3.1 What factors predict Greek nationals ’ acculturative expectancies o f the
three target immigrant and minority groups in the domains o f education 
and intermarriage?
In order to test which variables (IVs) may explain Greek nationals’ levels of 
endorsement of each acculturation strategy (DVs) in relation to the three target groups, 
and in the domains of education and intermarriage respectively (single item measures), 
four regression models were tested in a hierarchical multiple regression. For instance, 
ih.Q first model regressed assimilation strategy (type of acculturation orientation) on 
national identification variable, in relation to the Moslems of Thrace (target group) and 
in the domain of education (public domain). To take into account the influence of
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perceived nationality-religion overlap, this variable was added in the second model.
The third model also allowed the influence of perceived threat to national identity to be 
assessed. The final model, which included all three previous variables, also allowed the 
effect of prejudice on assimilation strategy to be assessed. The analysis was repeated 
for each type of acculturation strategy in relation to each target group and the two life- 
domains. The results are presented in the Tables 8.67 and 8.68 and are graphically 
depicted in Figures 8.14, 8.16, 8.18, 8.20, 8.22 and 8.24. To aid the reader, a summary 
of these results is also provided. It should be noted that only the final models with 
significant F  values are presented. Moreover, the relationships reported here, were 
those with direct effects upon the acculturation variables.
Summary o f findings
Education
• Predictors o f assimilation regarding the three target groups in the domain o f  
education: The findings indicated that the degree to which Greek nationals 
expected the Moslems of Thrace and Russian immigrants to accept completely 
the Greek education and abandon the one of their culture of ethnic origin, was 
determined by the levels of prejudice towards members of these two groups. 
Therefore, the stronger the prejudicial attitudes towards these groups, the more 
likely it was for Greek nationals to believe that the Greek education should have 
an overpowering effect on the immigrants’ and the minority’s ethnic education. 
Assimilationist attitudes towards Albanian immigrants were not predicted only 
by prejudice but also from levels of perceived threat to national identity. 
However, the effect of perceived threat was relatively weaker.
• Predictors o f segregation regarding the three target groups in the domain o f  
education: In the case of both Albanian and Russian immigrants Greek 
nationals’ segregation orientation was predicted only by levels of prejudice. 
However, the relationship between the two variables was not positive but 
negative. None of the four independent variables was significantly related to 
segregation orientation in relation to Moslems of Thrace.
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Predictors o f individualism regarding the three target groups in the domain o f  
education: The results showed that Greek nationals who believed that in matters 
of education individuals are free to choose their education irrespective of 
whether they are members of the target immigrant (Albanians and Russians) and 
minority groups (Moslems of Thrace) were less likely to be prejudiced against 
these groups. Moreover, in relation to the Russian immigrant group perceived 
threat to national identity was also negatively and weakly related to 
individualism orientation.
Predictors o f integration regarding the three target groups in the domain o f  
education: Similar to the results obtained for individualism the analyses 
indicated that Greek nationals who favoured the idea of intercultural education 
were less prejudice towards all these three target groups and also felt that the 
presence of Russian and Moslems of Thrace was not threatening to the 
maintenance of the Greek national identity.
Predictors o f exclusionism regarding the three target groups in the domain o f  
education: Finally, exclusionism was mainly predicted by prejudice. However, 
in relation to the two immigrant groups, perceived threat to national identity also 
contributes in predicting its levels. Another interesting finding is that national 
identification was also a significant but relatively weaker predictor of 
exclusionist attitudes towards the Russian immigrants.
Intermarriage
Predictors o f assimilation regarding the three target groups in the domain o f  
intermarriage: The results showed that the variables predicting assimilation 
orientation in the domain of intermarriage varied depending on the target group 
under consideration. For instance, the endorsement of assimilationist attitudes 
towards the Moslems of Thrace was predicted by levels of national 
identification and perceived threat to national identity. Interestingly, national 
identification was negatively related to assimilation, whilst perceived threat was
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positively related. In the case of Albanians, assimilation orientation was 
predicted only by levels of prejudice but the relationship between the two 
variables was negative. Finally, Greek nationals’ expectation of Russians to 
assimilate was determined by the extent to which they perceived national and 
religious identities as overlapping and the presence of this group as a threat.
Predictors o f  segregation regarding the three target groups in the domain o f  
intermarriage: There was also variation in the variables predicting 
segregationist attitudes depending on the target group under consideration. 
More specifically, Greek nationals’ segregationist attitudes towards the 
Albanian immigrants were shaped by levels of perceived overlap, threat to 
national identity and prejudice. Segregationist attitudes towards the Russian 
immigrants were predicted by prejudice and perceived identity threat. Finally, 
Greek nationals were more likely to expect the Moslems of Thrace not to 
intermarry with other Greek nationals when they held negative beliefs and 
attitudes towards this group.
Predictors o f individualism regarding the three target groups in the domain o f  
intermarriage: The findings showed that the endorsement of stronger 
individualist attitudes was negatively related to prejudice (towards Moslems of 
Thrace, Albanians, Russians) and to perceived threat to national identity. It is 
worth noting that degrees of national identification also explained the 
endorsement of individualist attitudes towards the Russian immigrants. As 
expected, the relationship between these two variables was negative.
Predictors o f integration regarding the three target groups in the domain o f  
intermarriage: Prejudice was the only significant predictor of integration 
attitudes endorsed towards the two immigrant groups in the domain of 
intermarriage. Integrationist attitudes towards the Moslems of Thrace were not 
only predicted by prejudice, but also by perceived threat to national identity.
Predictors o f exclusionism regarding the three target groups in the domain o f  
intermarriage: Finally, exclusionism attitudes towards the three target groups
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were mainly predicted by prejudice. However, in relation to the two immigrant 
groups, perceived threat to national identity was also foimd to contribute in 
predicting its levels.
To encapsulate, the findings from this part of analysis seem to suggest so far that 
prejudice, followed by perceived threat to national identity were the two best predictors 
of Greek nationals’ acculturative expectancies of the target immigrant and minority 
groups. However, it is also worth noting that levels of perceived overlap between 
nationality and religion also had a direct effect on Greek nationals’ acculturative 
attitudes in relation to specific target groups in the domain of intermarriage. In 
particular, perceived overlap was a significant predictor of assimilation orientation 
towards Russians and segregation orientation towards Albanians in the domain of 
intermarriage. The direction of the relationship between levels of perceived nationality- 
religion overlap and these two types of orientations (assimilation, segregation) was 
always positive. Moreover, degrees of national identification also contributed in 
predicting exclusionist attitudes in the domain of education and individualist attitudes in 
the domain of intermarriage towards the Russian immigrants. Finally, national 
identification was a significant predictor of the extent to which Greek nationals 
expected the Moslems of Thrace to assimilate in the domain of intermarriage.
However, the relationship between the two revealed to be negative.
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S.3.6.2 What factors predict Greek nationals ' acculturative expectancies o f the
state in relation to the three target immigrant and minority groups in the 
domains o f education and intermarriage?
The same set of hierarchical regression analyses were carried out as before, however, 
this time our aim was to investigate which variables predict the acculturation policies 
that Greek nationals expect of their state to implement in relation to the three target 
groups and in the domains of education and intermarriage. The results from the 
regression analysis are presented in Tables 8.69 and 8.70 (see also figures 8.15, 8.17, 
8.19, 8.21, 8.23 and 8.25). A summary of the main results is presented below:
Education
• Predictors o f assimilation regarding the three target groups in the domain o f 
education: The findings showed that when Greek nationals held strong 
prejudicial beliefs and attitudes towards these ethno-cultural groups, they were 
more likely to expect of their state to implement educational policies that would 
prioritise the national over the ethnic education.
• Predictors o f segregation regarding the three target groups in the domain o f  
education: Greek nationals expected of their state to adopt a segregationist
. policy when they felt threatened by the presence of the target group (Moslems of 
Thrace, Albanians, Russians), and also had unfavourable attitudes towards them 
(Albanian, Russians). National identification was also negatively related to 
segregationist attitudes towards Albanian immigrants.
• Predictors o f individualism regarding the three target groups in the domain o f  
education: The results showed that Greek nationals who believed that the state 
should not interfere in matters of education and allow individuals irrespective of 
their ethnic and cultural background choose the education they prefer, was 
predicted by levels of prejudice (Moslems of Thrace, Albanians, Russians) and 
perceived threat to national identity associated with the presence of these groups 
(Moslems of Thrace and Russians).
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Predictors o f integration regarding the three target groups in the domain o f  
education: Greek nationals support of multicultural educational policies was 
also determined by the extent they considered the presence of these target 
groups a threat to the maintenance of national identity (Moslems of Thrace, 
Russians) and their levels of prejudice (Moslems of Thrace, Albanians and 
Russians).
Predictors o f  exclusionism regarding the three target groups in the domain o f  
education: Support of exclusionist state policies in the domain of education were 
yet again predicted by levels of prejudice and perceived threat to national 
identity.
In term a rria g e
Predictors o f assimilation regarding the three target groups in the domain o f  
intermarriage: In relation to the two immigrant groups, host majority’s 
preference of a state assimilationist policy was determined by the extent to 
which participants perceived their national and religious groups as overlapping 
(Albanians and Russians), and the degree to which they identified with their 
national ingroup (Russians). However, support for assimilationist state policies 
in the domain of intermarriage in relation to the Moslems of Thrace was only 
predicted by perceived threat to national identity.
Predictors o f segregation regarding the three target groups in the domain o f  
intermarriage: Perceived nationality and religion overlap, threat and prejudice 
were all significant predictors of segregationist state policies in the domain of 
intermarriage. Greek nationals, who perceived a strong overlap between national 
and religious identities, were more likely to support policies that would ensure 
that no mix marriages take place between members of their own group and the 
Moslems of Thrace. In relation to the Albanian immigrants, national 
identification along with perceived threat revealed to be significant but weak 
predictors.
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• Predictors o f individualism and integration regarding the three target groups 
in the domain o f intermarriage. Greek nationals’ preference for individualist and 
integrationist state policies in the domain of intermarriage was found to be 
negatively related to levels of perceived threat and prejudice.
• Predictors o f exclusionism regarding the three target groups in the domain o f  
intermarriage: Perceived threat to national identity (Russians) and mainly 
prejudice towards the target groups (Moslems of Thrace, Albanians and 
Russians) influenced the degree to which Greek nationals would support the 
decision of the state to implement exclusionist policies in the domain of 
intermarriage. However, preference for exclusionist policies against the 
Moslems of Thrace in the domain of intermarriage was also predicted by levels 
of perceived nationality-religion overlap.
In summary, the results from this set of analyses showed that levels of perceived 
threat and prejudice were consistently predicting the extent to which Greek 
nationals would support each of the five state acculturation policies in the domain of 
education. Perceived nationality-religion overlap, contributed significantly in 
explaining participants’ support for assimilationist (for Russians and Moslems of 
Thrace) and segregationist policies (for Moslems of Thrace and Albanians) only in 
the domain of intermarriage. Furthermore, national identification revealed to be a 
significant predictor of assimilationist policies in the domain of intermarriage 
towards Russian immigrants and of segregationist policies towards Albanians, in 
both the domains of education and intermarriage.
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Figure 8.14: Path analysis predicting majority’s expected acculturation orientation of
Moslems of Thrace in the domain of education
ExclusionismNational
Identification -.16.12
.49
Integration
.46 -.26PrejudiceThreat
-.22.24
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National and 
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Figure 8.15: Path  analysis predicting m ajority’s expected acculturation policies of the 
State regarding Moslems of Thrace in the dom ain of education
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Figure 8.16: Path analysis predicting majority’s expected acculturation orientation of
Albanian immigrants in the domain of education
.26National
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Figure 8.17: Path analysis predicting m ajority’s expected acculturation policies of the 
State regarding Albanian im m igrants in the domain of education
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Figure 8.18: Path analysis predicting majority’s expected acculturation orientation of
Russian immigrants in the domain of education
Exclusionism
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Figure 8.19: Path analysis predicting m ajority’s expected acculturation policies of the 
State regarding Russian im m igrants in the dom ain of education
ExclusionismNational
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National and 
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Individualism
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Figure 8.20: Path analysis predicting majority’s expected acculturation orientation of
Moslems of Thrace in the domain of intermarriage
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Figure 8.21: Path analysis predicting m ajority’s expected acculturation policies of the 
State regarding Moslems of T hrace in the domain of in term arriage
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Figure 8.22: Path analysis predicting majority’s expected acculturation orientation of
Albanian immigrants in the domain of intermarriage
ExclusionismNational 
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PrejudiceThreat
Overlap between  
National and 
Religious Identities
Individualism
Segregation
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Figure 8.23: Path  analysis predicting m ajority’s expected acculturation policies of the 
State regarding Albanian im m igrants in the domain of in term arriage
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Figure 8.24: Path analysis predicting majority’s expected acculturation orientation of
Russian immigrants in the domain of intermarriage
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Figure 8.25: Path  analysis predicting m ajority’s expected acculturation policies of the 
State regarding Russian im m igrants in the dom ain of in term arriage
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8.7  R ev iew  an d  d iscu ssion  o f  th e  m ain  fin d in gs
The study presented in this chapter aimed to investigate whether and in what way the 
extent to which an individual represents the national ingroup as a compound category 
with religion being its defining criterion, would also contribute or even be a better 
predictor than national identification per se in explaining inter-group perceptions (i.e. 
perceived threat) and intercultural attitudes towards groups that may differ in terms of 
religion (the Moslems of Thrace), nationality (Russian immigrants) or both (Albanian 
immigrants). It was expected that group boundaries crossing based on perceived 
similarities would enrich our understanding of the conditions under which these 
immigrant and minority groups can be integrated in the host majority’s political and 
cultural realms.
The introduction to this chapter listed a number of social psychological factors that 
have been found so far to explain the variations evinced in the endorsement of host 
majority’s acculturation attitudes, such as levels of national identification, perceived 
threat(s) to an individual’s group identity (i.e. national) and prejudice. However, it 
was also argued that both the ‘character’ of the social context and issues of 
intercultural adaptation in relation to some life-domains and/or target immigrant and 
minority groups in contact usually bring to the fore more than one identity. Our basic 
premise in the present study was that, the inclusion of multiple identities, and in 
particular perceptions of the relative strength of the interrelationship between national 
and religious identities would increase and deepen our understanding about why and 
in what contexts Greek host majority members would customize their views on 
acculturation.
To explore this possibility, we constructed a measure that assessed the degree to 
which Greek nationals perceived this virtual identification of Greekness and 
Orthodoxy as psychologically meaningful and appropriate for use in their self in­
group definitions and inter-group judgments. The antecedent motivational processes 
of the perceived nationality-religion construct were also investigated. Contrary to our 
prediction, levels of perceived overlap between Greekness and Orthodoxy were 
predicted only by religious motivations. This finding was later used in explaining the
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findings fi*om the path analyses model that showed that perceived nationality-religion 
overlap was a significant predictor of intercultural attitudes only in the domain of 
intermarriage. However, before embarking on the discussion of the findings on the 
relative and the unique influence of single vs. multiple identities on perceptions of 
other groups and on host majority intercultural attitudes in the different domains and 
in relation to the different target groups, let us consider to what extent first of all the 
chosen target groups were perceived as similar to the host majority, how threatening 
they were perceived for their maintenance of national identity and the extent to which 
they were ‘valued’ or ‘devalued’.
Findings on perceived similarity, threat and prejudice
Individuals tend to show some solidarity with those individuals or groups that are 
perceived to share similar cultural backgrounds. Moreover, it was expected that 
knowing the extent to which Greek nationals perceive these groups as similar to self 
would help us explain better their choices of acculturation strategies both in relation 
to the target groups and the domains under consideration.
Two sets of analysis were conducted to assess the extent to which Greek nationals felt 
similar or different to the three target groups. The findings on similarity judgments 
showed that Russian immigrants were rated as the most similar group to the self, 
followed by Moslems of Thrace and Albanians. Greeks perceived themselves as more 
similar to the Russian immigrants in terms of religion, cultural values ethos and 
customs whereas Moslems of Thrace were perceived as more similar based on their 
economic status. The findings also revealed that Greeks expressed stronger 
prejudicial attitudes towards the two immigrant groups compared to the Moslems of 
Thrace, but they felt that their presence along with the Albanian immigrants is more 
threatening to their national identity.
Perceived similarity was also found to moderate the strength of the relationship 
between perceived threat to identity and prejudice. However, depending on the target 
group under consideration the results showed a different pattern. In line with 
similarity attraction hypothesis (Byrne, 1971), the relationship between perceived 
threat to national identity and prejudice was reduced under the context of high levels
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of perceived similarity to Russians. On the contrary, the findings in relation to the 
Moslems of Thrace provide some support for social identity claims that high levels of 
similarity may be associated with stronger perceptions of threat to national identity 
and consequently the expression of negative inter-group attitudes.
Conceptual and methodological issues on acculturation
One of the aims of the present study was to test whether the extent to which a 
particular acculturation orientation would be endorsed by a host majority member 
would vary according to the domain, the target group and the locus of perceived 
expectation (immigrant vs. state) under consideration. Our conceptualization and 
measurement of Greek nationals’ acculturation attitudes was based on the Bourhis et 
al. (1997) lAM model (see also Montreuil and Bourhis, 2001). However, we 
proposed that it is important to understand how Greek nationals also think of 
acculturation when it comes to state policies. It was expected that host majority 
members would endorse different acculturation strategies or the same acculturation 
strategies but to a different degree depending on their expectations of the immigrant 
and minority groups and the state.
Initial analysis revealed that overall (irrespective of the domain, target and source of 
expectations) Greek respondents endorsed overwhelmingly the individualist and 
integrationist acculturative attitudes. Although this finding suggests that there is a 
fertile ground for intercultural communication, further analysis showed that when the 
types of domain and target groups were included in the analysis, the host majority 
levels of endorsement on each of the five acculturation orientations differed. In other 
words, the three types of domains and/or of the target groups affected differentially 
the levels of endorsement of each of the five types of acculturation orientations.
Firstly, to explore the significant effect of type of domain on host majority 
acculturation orientations two sets of analyses were performed. The first examined 
the differences on each acculturation orientation across the three different life 
domains. It was revealed that assimilation and integration were preferred more in the 
domain of education whereas exclusionism was mostly preferred in the domain of 
citizenship. The second addressed the differences across the five acculturation
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orientations within each domain separately which revealed that: 1) in the domain of 
education, there was a strong preference for the integration option, followed by 
individualism, assimilation and exclusionism; 2) in the domain of citizenship, hosts 
preferred more the options of individualism and less but to the same extent integration 
and exclusionism; and 3) in the domain of intermarriage, individualism was revealed 
once again to be the most strongly endorsed acculturation attitude followed by both 
integration and exclusionism, segregation while the assimilation option was 
considered the least appropriate of all for this specific domain.
The present findings suggest that Greek respondents seem to appreciate the positive 
outcomes of intercultural education by showing their strong preference for the 
bicultural orientation and to focus more on the individual characteristics of immigrant 
and minority members when it comes to issues of citizenship and intermarriage. 
However, in our opinion one also needs to look at host members’ second favourite 
option or options to understand better the overall structure of their acculturative 
attitudes. The relative preference of acculturation orientations showed that in both the 
domains of citizenship and intermarriage individualism was the preferred 
acculturation. This choice, however, was followed by two conceptually antithetical, 
based on their meaning and latent outcomes, orientations (integration, exclusionism) 
which were endorsed at the same level.
Rudmin (2003b) reported similar findings where three or sometimes four types of 
immigrant acculturation strategies were endorsed simultaneously which at the 
construct level were conceptualized as mutually exclusive. He suggests that these 
findings might be occurring either due to response bias or to misconceptions of the 
measured acculturation strategies. In our opinion, these findings might also 
emphasize that in domains like citizenship and intermarriage which are sociopolitical 
in nature and are regulated by legal rules and/or religious dogmas, individuals might 
feel unable to control who should and should not be given the political rights, and the 
passage to intermarriage. In the domain of citizenship, the locus of control belongs to 
the state and its laws while in the case of intermarriage it is mainly the individual who 
decides and in some dogmas the church plays a main role in controlling the process. 
The choice of integration as a strategy then might not reflect necessarily the host’s
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appreciation of the multicultural ideology and of intercultural contact but a ‘safe’ 
alternative when exclusionism, although preferred, might not be a plausible solution.
There were also variations in the levels of endorsement of some acculturation 
strategies based on the type of target group under consideration (2 immigrant groups,
1 minority group). More specifically, significant differences emerged relevant to the 
extent to which acculturation orientations were endorsed towards the examined 
immigrant and minority groups. Greek respondents preferred the individualist 
orientation more for the Russian immigrants, the integration orientation for both 
Russians and members of the Moslem minority, while the strongest exclusionist 
attitudes were held towards the Albanian group of immigrants living in the society. 
This finding might be explained by what Montreuil and Bourhis (2001) labeled the 
effect of ‘valued and devalued’ target groups. The host majority’s high level of 
prejudice and negative stereotyping towards an ethnic group has been revealed by 
several studies to be one of the best correlates of assimilationist, segregationist and 
mainly exclusionist attitudes (Klink and Wagner, 1999; Zick Wagner, Dick and 
Petzel, 2001). The scores on the prejudice scales showed that Greek respondents 
displayed stronger prejudicial beliefs towards the Albanian immigrants living in 
Greece. Moreover, they tend to perceive the presence of this group as relatively more 
threatening to the maintenance of Greek national identity compared to the other two 
groups. Relevant research has shown that media coverage of the Albanian group of 
immigrants, who are a numerical majority compared to the other groups of 
immigrants, promotes these xenophobic attitudes by connecting directly the arrival of 
this group in the country with the rise of criminality and unemployment 
(Hatziprokopiou, 2004).
According to our results both the types of domain and.target groups had a significant 
impact on the extent to which the host majority endorsed each of the five 
acculturation orientations (domain x target x orient.). These results offer support to 
the theoretical and methodological argument discussed previously relevant to the 
combined effect of target and domain specificity. According to the findings, the 
individualism orientation was preferred for the Russian immigrants in both the 
domains of intermarriage and citizenship. The integration orientation was endorsed 
more for the members of the Moslem minority in the domain of citizenship while
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exclusionist orientation was the least preferred strategy for that particular group in 
relation to education. Relative to the domain of intermarriage, stronger segregationist, 
exclusionist and less integrative orientations were endorsed for the Albanian group of 
immigrants compared to the other two ethno-cultural groups.
It was also proposed that the hosts’ acculturation preferences would differ 
significantly depending on their perceived two loci/sources of expectations. As 
predicted, participants held different acculturative attitudes based on their sources of 
perceived expectations of immigrants and minority vs. those of the state. The 
findings revealed that Greek respondents expected the state to respect ethnic-group 
members’ individuality but at the same time to promote policies that would ensure 
that these groups would adopt the public values (assimilation). On the contrary, they 
expect more of the immigrant and the minority groups to keep their distance and 
marginalize themselves from society by endorsing stronger exclusionist and 
segregationist attitudes.
As part of exploring the first part of the third hypothesis of the present study, it was 
revealed that participants’ expectations of immigrant/minority vs. those of the state in 
relation to the endorsement of the five acculturative attitudes differed based on the 
domain under investigation. In particular, the findings indicated that in both domains 
of citizenship and education participants expected their state to be more individualist 
and less exclusionist compared to their expectations of the immigrant and the minority 
groups. On the contrary, in the domain of intermarriage the individualist and the 
integration orientations were perceived more as an immigrants’ and minority’s group 
choice while assimilation orientation was preferred as a state policy in the domains of 
citizenship and intermarriage. Respectively, the second part of the third hypothesis 
was addressed which as predicted showed that the type of the target group also 
moderated the effect of the two sources of perceived expectations (immigrant vs. 
state) on the levels of endorsement of acculturation orientations (target x locus of 
expectations x orient.).
Regarding the expectations Jfrom the immigrant and the minority groups in relation to 
the five acculturation orientations, participants expected the Albanian and Russian 
groups to adopt stronger exclusionist orientations compared to those held by the
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minority group living in Greece. Integrationist acculturative attitudes were expected 
to be endorsed more by the Russians and the Moslems of Thrace whereas the 
individualist orientation was expected to be preferred by the Russian immigrants.
Participants’ perceived expectations of the state affected in a different way the levels 
of endorsement of each acculturation towards the three target groups. Greek 
respondents expected the state to show less support for the endorsement of 
individualist orientations towards the members of the Moslem minority and to adopt 
an integrative and less exclusionist acculturative policy towards the Russian 
immigrants compared to the other groups living in the country.
The findings so far supported previous literature that argues against the 
conceptualisation and the empirical treatment of acculturation strategies as generic 
(Piontowski et al., 2000; Verkuyten and Wolf, 2002; Zagefka and Brown, 2002; van 
de Vijver and Phalet, 2004). Host majority’s acculturation attitudes not only vary in 
response to contextual factors such as relevant target group and domain but also based 
on expectations of the immigrant and minority groups and the state.
Place and proximity
It was also expected that gender and place of residence would also affect Greek 
nationals’ levels and choice of intercultural attitudes towards the target groups and the 
domains under consideration. Gender had no effect on the level of endorsement of 
acculturation strategies when contextualized in the three domains, the two sources of 
expectations and towards the three target groups, since there was a similar pattern for 
both male and female participants.
Although there was no direct measurement for the amount and the quality of inter­
group contact, the researcher hypothesized that the geographical proximity or the 
socio-historical conditions that resulted in the settlement of these target outgroups in 
the four selected research areas, would affect the host majority’s acculturation 
preferences especially when the latter are contextualized for specific domains and 
towards target groups with whom there is a cultural similarity in terms of religious, 
economic or educational background. However, the effect of ‘cities’ was evidenced
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only on participants’ levels of endorsement acculturation orientations when the latter 
was contextualized to assess their perceived expectations of state immigration 
policies. More specifically, the results showed that, compared to the residents of 
Athens, residents of Thessaloniki, which is the second largest city in Greece with an 
important historical and international port and a unique cosmopolitan past, feel that 
the Greek state should promote stronger segregationist attitudes and less 
individualistic and integrated attitudes towards the ethno-cultural groups. Further 
analysis showed that residents of this place tend to perceive a stronger overlap 
between their national and religious identities and are likely to be more prejudiced 
towards Russian immigrants and the Moslems of Thrace.
The path model
The analysis testing the first part of the model demonstrated that perceived overlap 
was consistently strongly and positively associated with perceived threat to national 
identity. On the contrary level of national identification was not always a strong 
predictor of levels of perceived threat to national identity posed by the presence of the 
immigrant and minority groups in the society. The findings suggested that the extent 
to which Greek nationals would perceive the presence of Moslems of Thrace and the 
Russian immigrants as a threat to their national identity was influenced only by the 
extent to which they perceived religion as a salient feature of their national identity. 
This was a particularly interesting finding and supports cross-categorisation literature 
that argues that inter-group judgments and perceptions are not solely based on single 
ingroup-outgroup memberships (Hewstone et al., 1993).
The effect of both national identification and perceived nationality-religion overlap on 
prejudice was also tested. There was a similar pattern of results with respect to the 
two immigrant groups where the effect of perceived nationality-religion overlap on 
prejudicial attitudes was always mediated by perceived threat. On the contrary, levels 
of perceived nationality-religion overlap had a direct effect on levels of prejudice 
towards the Moslems of Thrace. Interestingly, the effect of national identification on 
levels of prejudice towards the three target groups was not mediated by threat but it 
was strongly and positively related to prejudice. The fact that national identification 
still had a significant effect on prejudice demonstrates that in-group love leads to out­
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group hate not only under conditions of identity threat as most social identity theorists 
would argue (Brewer, 1999).
Finally, in the last part of the model the unique and relative contribution of each of 
these variables was considered in predicting acculturation attitudes towards the 
different target groups and in two life domains under consideration: education and 
intermarriage. In line with previous literature, prejudice was the stronger predictor of 
host majority acculturation attitudes. However, the direction of the relationship 
between prejudice and acculturation strategies, and in particular segregation 
orientation, varied depending on the source of expectation, the target group and the 
domain under consideration. Contradictory to expectation, in the domain of 
education, the relationship between prejudice and participants’ segregationist 
acculturative expectancies of the immigrant and minority groups was negative for the 
Russian and Albanians. A similar finding was revealed for the Moslems of Thrace but 
this time it was between national identification and assimilation orientation in the 
domain of intermarriage. Although there was a positive relationship between 
perceived identity threat and endorsement of assimilationist attitudes towards the 
Moslems of Thrace, it was found that the stronger someone identifies with the 
national ingroup, the lesser he/she expects of members of the minority to intermarry 
with the hosts.
National identification along with threat, prejudice and in some instances perceived 
overlap predicted host acculturation strategies mainly in relation to the Moslems of 
Thrace and Albanians and mainly in the domain of education. Perceived nationality- 
religion overlap had a direct effect on acculturation strategies but only in the domain 
that religious identity was salient: intermarriage. Moreover, the results showed that 
the unique effect of perceived nationality-religion overlap in predicting acculturation 
attitudes varied based on the target group and the source of expectation. More 
specifically, perceived nationality-religion overlap consistently predicted the 
endorsement of assimilationist attitudes towards Russians in the domain of 
intermarriage either in relation to expectations of the group or the state. However, the 
extent to which participants’ perceived their national and religious identities as 
overlapping predicted assimilationist and segregationist attitudes in relation to 
intermarriage in relation to the Moslems of Thrace and Albanians, only as state
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policies. The results from this study show that in domains that two or more identities 
become salient, inter-group attitudes and perceptions are better explained by the 
interrelationships between identities. In line with previous literature, the 
representation of the national ingroup as joint membership with a specific religious 
dogma, was associated with negative attitudes and most importantly was used to 
justify the conditions under which different target outgroups are likely or not to be 
absorbed and accepted in the host majority society (Roccas and Brewer, 2002).
Limitations and future suggestions
Two limitations can be mentioned in relation to the present study. Firstly, one of the 
main problems was the use of single item measures for assessing host majority 
acculturations contextualized for different domains, target groups and source of 
expectations. The researcher needs to device more measures to assess each host 
majority acculturation orientation and include more measures to assess participants’ 
expectations of the state.
Moreover, the correlational findings suggested that levels of national identification, 
perceived nationality-religion overlap and the perception that the new and old cultural 
minorities pose a threat to the meanings and values of national identity, may strongly 
determine prejudicial and acculturation attitudes towards these immigrant and 
minority groups. However, the correlational studies cannot always provide definitive 
information about the causal direction of effects. Although the causal direction of the 
paths examined was based on previous literature (Stephan and Stephan, 1996; Esses, 
Jackson and Armstrong, 1998; van Oudehoven and Eisses, 1998), it is also possible 
that negative mental representations about an outgroup may influence the extent to 
which host majority members of this group perceive the presence of this group as a 
threat to the national identity of the ingroup. It may be even suggested that perceiving 
the group as an exclusive category may also be a response to the fear of loss of 
identity and to the reluctance to interact and mix with a culturally perceived ‘inferior’ 
group.
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Chapter 9: Multiple Identity Dynamics and Inter-group
Perceptions: General Discussion
Reviewing the literature on multiple identities it was apparent that an area of potential 
weakness in some of the main social psychological theories of identity was the relative 
neglect of identity multiplicity and complexity in identity systems, and the overt 
empirical emphasis given on the study of single identities-assumed by researchers to be 
the most salient- in the contexts (situation specific/social) under study. It could be argued 
that this is quite paradoxical as most theories of identities accept the premise that 
identities are hierarchically arranged based on their relative salience or centrality (Tajfel 
and Turner, 1979; Breakwell, 1986; Turner, et al., 1987; Oakes, 1987; Stryker, 1987; 
Deaux, 1993) and therefore the likelihood of one identity(s) gaining psychological 
predominance over others is not only determined by factors such as the type of identity 
under consideration, levels of commitment and its contextual ‘fit’, but also by other 
identities contained in an individual’s identity structure (Cinnirella, 1997; Chryssochoou, 
2000a). Yet, the majority of studies tend to ignore this ‘interactive’ nature of identities. 
Instead, they adopt a fragmented approach studying identities in isolation.
Informed by the particularity of their social context (e.g. Northern Ireland), the need to 
study the processes that would contribute to the successful accommodation of new 
identities (e.g. European) and/or to the redefinition of old ones whilst adopting in 
contexts of migration and cultural diversity, researchers begun to consider the 
psychological implications that different identity combinations (e.g. European and 
British) and mainly their perceived compatibility and potential ‘sharedness’ (inclusion- 
exclusion) may have on in-group perceptions and inter-group attitudes (Brewer, 1991, 
1999a; Gaertner, et al., 1993; Hewstone et al., 1993; Cinnirella, 1997; Ethier and Deaux, 
1994; Cassidy and Trew, 1998; Timotijevic and Breakwell, 2000; Roccas and Brewer, 
2002; Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins, 2004).
The same questions are addressed to some extent by acculturation research that aims to 
understand the factors influencing the ways in which individuals would organise their 
multiple identities arising from membership in more than one cultural group (Berry,
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1984; Hutnik, 1986; Phinney, 1990; La Fromboise et ak, 1993; Bourhis et ah, 1997). 
Although it is recognised that some theorists refer to changes in patterns of behaviour 
rather than changes in the identity system, it could be suggested that, by definition, 
acculturation strategies are classification systems that describe how people position 
themselves in relation to their old or ‘new’ culture (minority perspective) or to changes 
occurring to the national culture that may undergo changes due to the arrival of culturally 
different groups (majority perspective).
The common themes underlying the diverse conceptual and methodological approaches 
to studying multiple identities include: 1) how individuals manage their multiple 
identities; 2) how the interrelationships among them are subjectively represented in their 
identity systems; and most importantly 3) how they are used for group-boundary 
formation and category-based evaluations of individual group members.
The current thesis set out to examine the relationship between nationality and religion in 
the Greek context. It investigated how these two identity elements relate in terms of 
structure, content and motivations. In addition, it studied the impact of this relationship 
on intercultural attitudes. The research comprised three main studies which used 
different methodological approaches, qualitative and quantitative, in order to address the 
relevant conceptual arguments. The aim of the present chapter is to review the findings 
presented in the previous chapters and synthesise them to provide answers to the general 
research questions posed at the beginning of the thesis. In an attempt to be both 
theoretical but at the same time reflexive, this chapter will examine the extent to which 
the objectives as outlined in the introduction were achieved, discussing the strengths and 
weaknesses of using the theoretical framework of Identity Process Theory (Breakwell, 
1986) and the methodological approaches adopted. The conceptual, methodological and 
the policy implications of the findings from this line of research are also discussed.
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9.1 How do national and religious identities relate in Greek nationals’ identity 
systems?
As soon as one accepts that identities do not reside in complete isolation from each other 
in an individual’s identity structure (multiplicity premise), the following question remains 
to be elucidated: In what ways do they relate to each other and why?
One of the first aims of this thesis was to explore the ways in which relationships 
between identities are manifested in individuals’ perceptual systems. For quite a long 
time the perceived relationship between or among a number of social identities has been 
examined based on the comparison of degrees of identification and centrality or with a 
correlation. This analysis may provide researchers with important information about the 
type of structural arrangement that exists between those identities and about their 
perceived compatibility within an individual’s repertoire. One may also use the obtained 
relationship between two identities for making predictions about the likelihood and the 
implications of them being jointly activated, and for understanding the extent to which 
cultural and contextual specificities are reflected in individuals’ identity systems. 
However, in order to understand better how and why social identities have become 
intertwined (or not), and most importantly to design interventions that would change 
individuals’ perceptions about their compatibility (e.g. European-national), the 
relationship between or among them needs to be examined in more than one level.
In the present approach to the study of the interrelationships between national and 
religious categories, three levels of analysis were proposed: structure, content and 
motivations. It was asserted that one cannot explain fully the strength and direction of 
the relationship between identity elements and their relative position within identity 
structure without examining whether these two categories are perceived as sharing (or 
not) common dimensions of meaning and serving similar (or not) motivational needs.
It was assumed that a closer inspection of the relative meanings and motivations 
associated with national and religious categories would shed light to the origins of the 
strength of this relationship both at the individual and the social representational level.
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and to its functional utility in relation to intra and inter-group perceptions and attitudes in 
contexts of stability and identity threat.
It was therefore necessary to adopt a multi-methodological and an integrative theoretical 
approach that acknowledges the importance of studying both the content and value 
attached to identities and the dynamic relationship between individual and social 
representational systems, like Identity Process Theory (Breakwell, 1986), to explore 
multiple identity dynamics and the type and strength of the relationship that may exist 
between national and religious identities in the Greek context.
In the following sections, the main findings from the studies are combined and discussed, 
with the aim to advance a better conceptual and methodological approach in relation to 
the study of the concept of ‘related identities’. The main theoretical and methodological 
shortcomings identified so far, and the research findings and frameworks that were 
considered a useful avenue in the present approach are also briefly revisited.
Examining the structural relationship between the two identity elements
The structural relationships between national and religious identifications were 
investigated by looking at the relative degree of psychological importance that 
individuals attach to these two memberships (perceived centrality and strength of 
identification), and the tightness and looseness of their relationships. A multidimensional 
measure of social identification (Cinnirella, 1997) was considered appropriate, since it 
reflects the individual’s readiness to self-categorise in terms of that identity, the level of 
commitment to that identity and to what it represents, and finally the standing of this 
person in relation to the other in-group members. By and large, both based on the 
reported levels of identification and the perceived centrality measures, the results showed 
that the nationality identity element holds a primary position in Greek respondents’ 
identity repertoire. However, it needs to be mentioned that the findings from Study 1 
also revealed that an alternative type of identity structure was psychologically meaningful 
for Greek women, who did not prioritise the nationality identity element over the
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religious. Instead, women perceived national and religious identity elements as equally 
important in their self-definitions. The ranking order measurement also used to assess the 
relative perceived centrality further supported that for some participants these two 
identities do not exist in isolation in their identity systems, but are combined in such a 
way that represent a single identity, which is more exclusive than either category 
membership considered separately (Urban and Miller, 1998).
The analysis exploring the perceived compatibility between the two identity elements 
based on the size and the direction of their relationship revealed that they were 
consistently strongly and positively related. This prevailing positivity denotes their 
harmonious interconnection within Greek participants’ repertoire of identities, what 
Hofinan (1988) referred to as consonant.
How can one further explain their strong relationship and their relative compatibility? Is 
there an overlap between the two identity elements in terms o f content?
After establishing a strong relationship between the two identity elements, the next phase 
of the investigation examined the content of Greek national identity and whether religion 
was considered a defining element of Greekness, at the individual and/or the social 
representational level.
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 6, the content dimension of identities has received 
relatively less empirical attention compared to identity processes. In line with those 
theorists who argue that assumptions of universality in relation to the study of 
motivational process are due to the lack of consideration given to the content dimension 
of social identities, the current line of research aimed to demonstrate how a focus on 
either would be somehow naïve and why such an approach would also limit our ability to 
study the manifold ways in which identities relate (Billig, 1995; Cinnirella, 1997; Brown, 
2000; Deaux, 2000a; Reicher and Hopkins 2001; lost and Kruglanski, 2002).
Deaux et al. (1995), for example, demonstrated that identities which are linked through a 
common dimension of meaning (traits) may be also perceived as satisfying similar
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motivational needs and tend to fall under the same cluster (e.g. ethno-religious identities). 
The authors proposed that although the motivational assumption needed empirical 
support, a similar ‘profile’ between identities seems to provide a valid answer as to why 
they are represented as being closely aligned in individuals’ identity structure and why 
they may become jointly activated or even ‘interchangeable’ in social contexts or under 
conditions that those meanings are psychological meaningful and relevant (see also 
Burke, 2003; Freeman, 2003; Verkuyten, 2005). These questions were tackled in the 
experimental study, and will be discussed in much more detail in the next section.
Understanding the meaning-making process, especially of large scale social categories 
like the nation and its potential overlap in terms of content with other social categories 
like religion, invites three levels of analysis: the individual, the group and the societal (or 
contextual). From the stance of self-categorisation framework (Turner et al., 1994), 
questions of social identity meanings are addressed based on the second (psychological 
group) and the third levels (contextual). According to this perspective, social 
identification means acceptance or engagement in a process of reaching agreement with 
the culturally defined and group shared definitions (Haslam et al., 1995) that entail 
descriptions of the value-systems and of the ‘prototypical character’ of the group 
(ingroup stereotypes). However, in the social representational framework the unit of 
analysis is mainly the broader social system (Moscovici, 1984). The theory focuses on 
the social influence processes and practices based on which meanings of social categories 
are produced, reproduced and reified. Nevertheless, the relationship between individual, 
group and the social system, that remains at the heart of academic interest, seems to be 
better addressed after bringing as Deaux (2001) argues “social representation theory and 
various models of social identification in a joint encounter” (p. 312). Cinnirella’s (1996, 
1997) work on the relationship between national and European identities in Britain and 
Italy is a good example of how such an integrative theoretical approach (SI and SR) may 
enrich our understanding about why and most importantly how different constructions 
about the “nation” and “Europe” and their perceived compatibility produced and/or 
reproduced through the national media, influence participants’ perceptions about the 
ways in which these two identities related in their identity systems. In the work presented
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in this thesis, DPT was used for analysing individuals’ constructions of national identity 
and its perceived relationship with the Christian Orthodox dogma. The theory fosters an 
interest in both the content and value dimensions of identities and recognises the role of 
social representational processes in the social context that these identities are developed 
and enacted.
Relationships between identities in terms of structure and content evinced at the 
individual level often reflect existing relationships at the social representational, 
ideological and institutional level. Moreover, in this thesis it was suggested that 
nationality and religion relationship may serve some functions both at the individual and 
the state level. To this end, it was considered important to study the time and conditions 
of its making (i.e. study of the content of nationalistic ideologies and religious dogmas).
In an effort to identify the key functions and the conditions under which religion may 
become a defining characteristic of nationhood, the social practices and processes that 
may explain how the two, as shared collective meaning systems can be learned, reified 
and accustomed to satisfy a set of common socio-psychological functions (e.g. sense of 
distinctiveness, continuity, introducing meaning and structure) for the individual, the 
group and the state were initially considered (Chapter 4). Evidently, nationalistic 
ideologies do not always have a strong religious character. However, when religion is 
politicised, it may serve the aspirations of a nation-state and a group (national or ethnic) 
across time mainly in response to two needs. Firstly, it can help the nation to establish 
and sustain a relative unique socio-political character and identity during and after the 
stages of its formation. Secondly, a ‘nationalised’ or an ‘ethnicised’ religion may be used 
by a group (minority and majority) or a state to restore a sense of cultural authenticity and 
continuity in multicultural contexts and to ‘safeguard’ the boundaries of the ingroup; 
especially when intercultural contact is perceived as a threat to national identity and is 
synonymous with cultural contamination.
All these points were further discussed in Chapter 5, which analysed the ‘character’ of 
the Greek national identity providing a detailed account of the unique role ‘assumed’ by
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one religion, Christian Orthodoxy, in defining its content in the past and present times. 
The identity-politics exercised by the Greek state and the rhetoric of the Orthodox 
Church both seem to contribute to the sustenance of a collective representation of a 
historically contingent, culturally valued and unique relationship. The primacy of the 
Christian Orthodox dogma in the religious education curriculum, the Ministry of 
Education and Religious Affairs, and the constitutional provision that declares and 
protects the state-church relationship were some of the examples provided to demonstrate 
how and why this representation circulates for good few centuries now in Greek society. 
In this thesis, interest was not only to examine the extent to which this relationship has 
been anchored in the social memory and the everyday lives of Greek individuals, but also 
on the implications that the maintenance of such a collective representation may have for 
the immigrant and minority groups living in the society (Study 3).
However, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 6, the meanings attached to these identities and 
their interrelationships are not ‘read off from the social context. According to Breakwell 
(2001), individuals are not just ‘receptors’ of the knowledge diffused through the 
channels of communication. They can also produce knowledge and have the power to 
customise the meanings of these categories in order to construct psychological 
meaningful categories that represent their own belief-systems and support their 
motivational needs (see also Stryker, 1987; Billig, 1995). This point was empirically 
addressed in Study 1 (Part 1) by asking participants to give their individual definitions of 
nationality and those shared by the majority of ingroup members.
It was considered important to allow national identity content and its potential overlap 
with religion to emerge from the participants (open-ended measures). However, one of 
the problems that a researcher may encounter whilst using generally phrased questions 
and open-ended measures is that the uniqueness that differentiates each group member, 
makes it difficult to draw general conclusions. To overcome this problem and to be in a 
position to identify the common elements that apply across individuals, the content 
analytic method (Krippendorff, 1980) was used. Such a decision does not come without 
a cost. Looking for commonalities across themes and those sub-themes that are strong in
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number (nomothetic approach), the researcher may loose differences among individuals 
that may be important in understanding individuals’ views of their national collective 
(idiographic approach). The follow-up interview study aimed to overcome this problem 
since the analysis employed, IPA (Smith, 1996), allows for the investigation of both 
common and unique accounts.
The findings from both studies, designed for eliciting information on the constructions of 
nationhood, supported our expectation. As shown, the cultural dualism that represents 
Greekness and Orthodoxy as two overlapping notions, was psychologically, culturally 
meaningful and important for Greek nationals (Chryssochoou, 1996; Triandafyllidou and 
Veikou, 2002; Mavrogordatos, 2003). The way individuals talked about this relationship 
and the meanings they used to describe these two identities, reflects the knowledge that is 
produced and diffused via the historical books and the Church rhetoric at the societal 
level (Chapters 4 and 5). Religion was described as the guardian of the Greek nation­
state and as a proof of the ‘moral superiority’ of its people. Moreover, this relationship 
was not just described as a cultural artefact used only for describing the historicity of the 
group. It was also customised to individual needs and intra-personal relationships 
assumed to be fulfilled by simultaneous membership in the two categories. One of the 
most frequently mentioned functions was the role of religion as a guide to morally 
sanctioned behaviours that can bolster the ethos and values of Greek people (Kelman and 
Hamilton, 1989). Moreover, the relationship between nationality and religion was 
strategically used for advancing inter-group judgments towards minority and immigrant 
groups of a similar or dissimilar religious affiliation. Participants who perceived this 
relationship as important were also less tolerant towards religious diversity, often 
characterising the presence of other religious groups and dogmas in the Greek society as 
‘unorthodox’. Overall, the present findings provided us with some initial findings of how 
perceiving the in-group identity as a combination of national and religious categories is 
linked to differential treatment of the minority and immigrant groups living in the society. 
Some of these dimensions of overlap mentioned by the participants were later used in 
Study 3 to construct the measure of the perceived overlap between these two identity 
elements.
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Examining the motivational basis of the relationship
Despite the fact that it has been acknowledged that emergence of dual identification 
depends on the extent to which these identities are perceived as serving similar or 
complementary but distinct motivational needs (Deaux et al., 1995; Brewer, 1993, 1999b; 
Calhoun, 1994; Cinnirella, 1996), the question of whether and how multiple identities 
interact based on their respective motivations has remained underresearched. This, 
perhaps, reflects the change of focus from the motivational basis of identification 
proposed by SIT theorists, to its cognitive and contextual determinants as discussed by 
SCT theory. Moreover, even when the functional basis for choosing identities is studied, 
the primacy of self-esteem and distinctiveness in predicting strength of social 
identification is both conceptually and methodologically assumed in the majority of 
studies. The reviewed literature on motivations points to the need for an integrated 
theory of motivations that would examine the influence of a multiple set of motives and 
their interplay in explaining identity processes (Breakwell, 1986; Abrams and Hogg,
1988; Hogg, 2000; Vignoles et al., 2006). In addition, it has been argued that the 
contribution and the cognitive priority of these motives depends on the identity type, 
content and the relevant context under investigation (cf. Deaux et al., 1999).
To progress in our understanding of the motivational basis of social identification 
processes, it was thought necessary to treat the relative contribution of different identity 
motivations in predicting the strength of social identifications of interest as an empirical 
question, rather than assume the primacy of some motives over others. Motivational 
constructs were measured in relation to each of the target identity elements allowing us to 
study the degrees to which they relate with each other and how they may change in 
‘ipsative’ and relative terms under conditions of threat.
In light of the findings from Study 1, hypotheses were made in Chapter 7 (Study 2) with 
respect to the degree to which the motivational needs that contribute to identification with 
each of the two social categories are related. Although there was no support for an 
overlap between these two identities on the levels of motivations at the pre-threat
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condition, by and large, the set of motivations predicting strength of identification with 
national and religious categories were similar and strongly related to each other. More 
specifically, the findings showed that in the Greek context it is not only self-esteem 
(private aspect) that explains why people identify with the national and religious 
categories. Continuity also made a substantial unique contribution in predicting strength 
of national and religious identifications.
Overall, it is important to recognise that the findings from this part of the study clearly 
demonstrate how an integrated model of identity motives, like IPX, and the use of 
specific measures for motivations can improve our understanding of identity processes 
(strength of identification) both in relation to single and multiple identities.
Firstly, and most importantly for the purpose of this discussion, the findings from this 
part of the study provided empirical support to the assumption discussed earlier as to 
whether identities that share common meanings would be perceived as satisfying similar 
motivational needs (Deaux et al., 1995).
Secondly, the findings show that self-esteem and distinctiveness should not be treated a 
priori as the primary motives, but other motives like continuity and efficacy should be 
given equal theoretical and empirical status. The fact that at the pre-threat condition, 
distinctiveness was not shown to be a precondition for identifying with the national and 
religious groups, and that efficacy Was associated only with religious identification, 
support literature that questions the universality and the supremacy of some motives over 
others and demonstrates that the list of motives used to study social identification 
processes should be relevant to the type of identity and the cultural context under 
consideration (Breakwell, 1986; Deaux et al., 1999; Vignoles et al., 2000; Vignoles et 
al., 2006).
Moreover, it advocates how the prior investigation of identity meanings may help a 
researcher understand and even predict the relative salience of identity motivational 
principles within individuals’ identity systems and the degree to which they may be
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associated with a group membership. For instance, in Study 1, it was shown that Greek 
participants did not rely so much on inter-group comparisons, but instead, both at an 
individual and a social representational level, the national group was described as a living 
historical entity that provides them with a strong sense of continuity and meaning across 
time. This was later evinced in Study 2 (pre-threat condition) when national continuity 
revealed to be the strongest or as strong as collective private-esteem in predicting levels 
of national identification. To what extent though the relative salience of identity 
motivations is stable? How does threat induced to specific states of motivations (national 
distinctiveness and continuity) of one related identity, is likely to affect the relative 
salience of identity processes not only of this identity but of other related identities? The 
next phase of investigation aimed to address these questions and re-examine the strength 
and the role of the nationality-religion relationship under the context of identity threat.
9.2 What is the impact of threat on the relationship between national and religions 
identities?
After examining the strength of the relationship between national and religious identity 
elements in contexts of stability, the next phase was to examine the functions of the 
interrelationships between identities under the context of threat. Initially, the relationship 
between the two was studied on the basis of levels of identification after threat was 
induced on one of the related identity elements. Opening a parenthesis here, it can be 
suggested that one of the important contributions of this thesis was that it examined the 
impact that different types of threat can make on identity systems. The fact that the 
strength and direction of the relationship between national and religious identifications 
was not affected after threat was temporarily induced may indicate that it is an enduring 
social representation that needs more time to change (Moscovici, 1988).
However, the strength of the relationship between national and religious continuity 
increased after threat was induced on national continuity. What makes this finding 
particularly interesting is that: 1) the type of threat affected only the relationship between 
these two motivations and only in the condition where the specific motivation had been 
threatened; and 2) the fact that for participants in this condition the strength between
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national and religious motivations was relatively stronger. This may be an indication that 
the levels of nationality-religion relationship can moderate the contribution of religious 
motivational principles in predicting national identification, hi other words, what Deaux 
et al. (1995) referred to as ‘interchangeability’ or overlap can occur only when 
individuals perceive a strong relationship between the two. This assumption was tested 
in Study 3 where a measure to assess the levels of perceived overlap was developed. The 
results obtained supported the prediction showing that in conditions of a strong overlap 
between national and religious memberships, strength of national identification was 
predicted not only by national motivations but also by religious ones (i.e. national 
distinctiveness, national private-esteem and religious efficacy). Moreover, which 
motivations contribute to individuals’ perceptions of a strong nationality-religion overlap 
were also examined. Although it was expected that both national and religious 
motivations would contribute to levels of perceived overlap of the two categories, the 
findings showed that it was only religious motivations (i.e. efficacy, continuity, private 
and public aspects of collective self-esteem) that explained levels of perceived overlap 
between national and religious identities.
In line with IPT claims, the results from the post-threat experimental phase showed that 
threat did bring about a rearrangement in national identity’s relative contribution to 
satisfy each of the four principles, with the national identity contributing most to those 
motivations perceived as more effective and relevant in dealing with the type of threat 
induced. However, threat also affected the levels of religious identifications and of its 
respective motivations (distinctiveness and continuity). This finding suggested that when 
identities are related, and threat is directed to one of the two, the other does not remain 
unaffected. Afi;er experiencing threat to the national identification, participants have 
increased the levels of their religious identification in order to ameliorate its impact. This 
finding supports SIT claims for social creativity mechanisms invoked by individuals as 
coping mechanisms with a stigmatised and threatened identity (Crocker and Major,
198?X
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The findings from this study support IPT claims that in the face of identity threat 
individuals would reconsider their cognitive and affective priorities in order to ameliorate 
it. However, by testing how the different types of threat induced may affect the relative 
contribution of identity principles, the present study also builds a better understanding of 
the conditions under which different processes will take place or different motivations 
will assume primacy and relative importance (see also Timotijevic and Breakwell, 2000). 
Finally and most importantly, it has provided empirical support for the theoretical claim 
made by Breakwell (1986) on how multiple memberships may be strategically used as 
coping mechanisms in dealing with these unexpected and potentially threatening forms of 
change. One such form of social change is migration.
9.3 What is the impact of the relationship on intercultnral attitudes?
To understand inter-group behaviour and inter-cultural attitudes, we need to consider the 
kinds of identities that are primed by individuals on a situation of inter-cultural contact. 
However, the majority of studies tend to focus on single identities, national and/or ethnic, 
in explaining the acculturation choices of individuals in the majority and minority 
position. Acknowledging that the way individuals represent the relationships between 
their multiple identities is also likely to affect their social judgments and views on the 
‘optimal’ and preferred conditions of intercultnral contact (Pettigrew, 1998), the next and 
final aim of this thesis was to investigate how both levels of national identification and 
the perceived relationship between these two identities may better explain Greek host 
majority’s acculturation strategies in domains and towards target groups that nationality 
and religion are salient.
Host majority acculturation strategies were not only measured in relation to what Greek 
nationals expected of the immigrant and minority groups but also based on their 
expectations of the state. Consistent with a contextualised model of acculturation, Greek 
nationals’ acculturation attitudes varied based on the domain, source of expectation 
(immigrant/minority and state) and the target group under consideration (Bourhis et al..
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1997; Montreuil and Bourhis, 2001; Van de Vijver and Phalet, 2004; Navas, Garcia, 
Sanchez et ah, 2005).
The findings indicated that defining one’s membership using multiple categorisations, 
had both a direct and an indirect effect (mediated always by perceived threat on national 
identity and prejudice), in predicting preference of Greek nationals’ acculturation 
strategies contextualised for the two sources of expectation, tested on two domains 
(education and intermarriage) and towards the three target groups. A closer inspection of 
the regression models showed that the relationship between levels of perceived overlap 
and acculturation strategies (assimilation, segregation, and exclusionism) occurred only 
in the domain of intermarriage. Its influence on these strategies varied depending on the 
target group and source of expectation under consideration. For instance, levels of 
perceived overlap seem to determine the extent to which Greek nationals expect from the 
state to device policies that would encourage members from the Moslem minority of 
Thrace not to mix with the host majority and Russians to mix only after they assimilate to 
the Greek culture. However, when the host majority’s acculturation expectancies of the 
immigrant and minority groups were investigated in the context of intermarriage, the 
degrees of perceived overlap predicted the choice of assimilationist attitudes towards 
Russians and segregationist attitudes towards the Albanian immigrants. The fact that the 
relationship was positive, and that the degree of perceived overlap between national and 
religious identity elements is predicted by religious motivations, explains the choice of 
these strategies for the target groups who were perceived as relatively more similar or 
dissimilar by Greek nationals due to their religion.
9.4 Limitations, methodological issues and future directions
Reflecting upon the limitations of the present piece of work, some points should be 
raised. First, the findings from the quantitative part of the study showed that for some 
participants, identity combinations (Greek-Christian Orthodox), what cross-categorisation 
theorists have described as an ‘embedded’ identity, were more relevant for their self- 
definitions. Although in the last study a measure was developed to assess this level of
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embeddedness between the two group memberships based on the information collected 
after exploring the content of national identity, some other dimensions that this extensive 
overlap represents may have been missed. Future research should devise measures that 
assess the perceived overlap not only based on two dimensions of categorisation but more 
(e.g. gender, religion and nationality). Moreover, instead of relying just on a correlation 
to assess levels of perceived compatibility between identities, the construction of a 
measure that may assess the dimensions (i.e. values, symbols, practices, historical 
representations and inter-group relations) based on which identities may be perceived by 
individuals as conflictual or compatible may explain better the viability of superordinate 
more inclusive categories as well as the level of adjustment of those who are in the 
minority position and the levels of acceptance and tolerance of those who are the majority 
in terms of numbers and culture.
In the present thesis, a multidimensional measure (Cinirella, 1997) was used to assess 
strength of identification with the social categories of interest (national, religious, gender 
and student). The use of this measure was part of an attempt to acknowledge its 
existence and its significance in being incorporated in the study of identification process. 
However, which aspects of identification are more important for which identities and/or 
how multiple identities relate based on the proposed dimensions is a question that was not 
empirically addressed. For instance, it is possible that the relationship between two 
identities may be stronger in terms of perceived prototypicality than in terms of affective 
importance. The position taken in this thesis is that this would be a useful avenue for 
further research in the study of multiple identities and of their interrelationships.
In the second study, the aim was to tap into the changes in identity structure and 
processes prior and under the context of threat to one of the related identity elements. 
Change in identity systems can be noted and assessed when two sets of data, gathered at 
different points in time are compared. The experimental studies constitute empirical tests 
that often can shed light into how identity processes may change across time and 
especially under the context of threat. There is no doubt that the experimental 
manipulation limits the ability in studying the dynamic relationship between identity and
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society as it says little about how identity evolves, changes over time and responds to the 
long-term contextual influences (Ethier and Deaux, 1994; Cassidy and Trew, 2004). 
Longitudinal studies are needed to capture the processes of identity change. To this end, 
the use of the word “temporality” of identity may only be used after clarifying that what 
was in actuality measured was the contextual salience of certain identity aspects at the 
time of measurement.
This research also raised some issues regarding the use of an integrative model of 
motivations in studying identity processes. The findings showed that the four 
motivations incorporated in the research design explained a good percentage of variance 
in predicting strength of identification with the identity elements of interest. The list of 
motives used did not intend to be exhaustive and it was supported both on theoretical but 
on empirical grounds by the findings of Study 1. However, some may feel that focusing 
solely on the IPT tenets, motivational constructs that may be also important in the study 
of national and mainly of religious identities may have been omitted, like the search for 
meaning motive (Baumeister, 1998) and sense of belonging (Brewer, 1993).
A further limitation of the present research is the use of single items for the assessment of 
the host majority’s acculturation orientations based on the two proposed dimensions 
immigrant/minority and state (see also Rudmin, 2003b). The inclusion of the second 
dimension offered a further understanding of how the ideological positions of host 
majority members on issues of acculturation may vary. However, more research is 
needed in order to explore the factors that contribute to differential expectations from the 
state. State acculturation expectations may be influenced by ideologies about 
representations of human rights, democracy and in general the role of the state in 
controlling migration (Staerkle, Clemence and Doise, 1998). In retrospect, the use of 
qualitative data in addition to the quantitative data available could have been more 
informative of both the meanings and repercussions associated with different 
acculturation strategies and of the psychological processes underlying host majority’s 
choices.
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In addition, the study of acculturation requires researchers to give serious consideration 
to the unique historical relations between the contending groups for understanding 
contemporary responses. The extent to which host majority members would show 
tolerance and support to the immigrant and the minority groups living in their society is 
substantially shaped by the past history and the present state of inter-group relations. For 
instance, there is a long history of positive intercultnral contact between Greece and 
Russia with the former being a culturally valued and powerful Orthodox nation which 
fought against the Ottomans. On the contrary, the diplomatic relations between Greece 
Albania and Turkey were never very harmonious. Issues about the violation of the 
human rights of the Greek minorities living in these countries are always in the political 
agendas of these nation-states. To this end, the study of individuals’ knowledge about the 
historical relations between the groups may explain better the evinced variations in inter­
group treatment and views on state policies.
Finally, in this thesis we measured and discussed inter-cultural attitudes (prejudice, 
acculturation) and proximal social psychological variables, like the concepts of threat and 
multiple identities, which explain these attitudes, only from the point of view of those 
who are members of the cultural majority. However, inclusion of the minority’s and 
immigrants’ view on issues of multiculturalism and the study of factors, like the 
ethnocultural definitions of nationality and citizenship, are also important to understand 
the current status and the future prospect of social relationships in the social context 
under investigation. As Nietzsche (1887) claims:
“ the more affects we allow to speak about a thing, the more eyes, various eyes we are 
able to speak about the same thing, the more complete will be our ‘concept ’ o f the thing, 
our ‘objectivity \
{On the Genealogy o f Morality, p. 12, cited in Isin and Wood, 1999)
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9.5 C oncluding rem arks and  policy  im plications
The studies presented in this thesis focused on the concept of related identities and 
attempted to ‘unpack’ its role in intra-group and inter-group contexts. The focal 
relationship of this research was the one that exists between nationality and religion. The 
rise of religious fundamentalism and right-wing nationalistic ideologies moved the study 
of this relationship to the centre of academic interest. Social scientists were alarmed by 
the negative repercussions it may have for inter-group relations both on a national and 
international level. The present research in the Greek context has shown that although 
the relationship between the two may consolidate the ingroup boundaries, especially in 
contexts that induce threat to one of the two identities, it seems to affect inter-group 
relations in a rather negative way.
We aim to close this discussion by shedding light upon some of the factors which may 
facilitate a more favourable climate towards the integration of the ‘other’ in the Greek 
society. In this discussion, the focus is upon the role of the state and of the social actors 
in re-introducing to the public a more inclusive notion of Greekness, based on which 
members from the minority and majority groups would view themselves as belonging to 
a common group. This new superordinate category should be freed from cultural 
dualisms that may instil social exclusion, and reconstructed to accommodate the cultural 
diversity of its members. Both the media and the state (via education) have the power to 
change the social representation circulating in the society about diversity and its 
repercussions, to domesticate the unfamiliarity of the ‘other’ and calm the fears of 
cultural ‘contamination’ and identity loss. To achieve this, statutory efforts should 
include the teaching of intercultnral education that would not prioritise one religious 
dogma over others and that would incorporate the history of the immigrant and minority 
populations in the curriculum. Moreover, the state should reconsider the state-church 
relationship asking what it represents for the majority and the minority groups living in 
the society. The next referendum vote should include also the minority (ethnic and 
religious) views on this issue. The cultural value of this relationship is important in the 
Greek context and that is what makes it more resistant to change. Thus, the state should
554
make sure that any change proposed would not be perceived as a threat to the host 
majority’s needs for distinctiveness and cultural authenticity.
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7r87roi0fjo8iç. B d l e  X o ittô v  0 8  k o k Xo  t o v  a p i0 p ô  ttoo 0 8  avTi7rpooc()7rs68i T repioooT epo.
A7idvxT|08 OXIÇ 7iapaKdxco 8pcoxf|08iç Paoiop8voç 0X0 XI (polo 8ioai:
1. Z8 71010 paGpô aioGdv8oai va 8%8iç ôovaxodç Ô8opodç p8 xooç dvôp8ç;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
KaGôloi) Se Tidpa Se Myo OuTe Xiyo/ ApKexa Se TioXu Se Tidpa 7ioA,t3
Myo Pa0|j,ô
Pa0p6 oi3xe 7ioX.t3 peyâXo Pa0pô peydXo Pa0pô
2. lïooo 8i)%apioxr|p8voç aioGdv8oai 7100 8ioai dvôpaç;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ka06Xou Se Trdpa Se Myo Odxe Myo/ ApKexa Se noXv Se Ttdpa 7ioA,i3
noXv 
Myo Pa0p6
Pa0p6 odxe Tiold peydÀo Pa0|iô peydXo Pa0pô
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3 . n ô a o  ô jx o io ç  a iq G d v e a a i  ô x i  c ia a i  p e  x o v  xotcikô (xapaK xxjpiaxiK Ô ) d v 6 p a ;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ka861oi) Se nàpa Se Myo OuxeMyo/ ApKexa Se TTolb Se Tidpa TtoXd
7toX,v Pa0pô ouxe 7ioX,t3 peyôXo Pa0pô peydlo Pa0p6
Myo PaBpô
4. nôao (JopavxiKÔ sivai yia asva xo ôxi staai dvôpaç;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
KaBôXoi) Se Ttdpa Se Myo Oüxe Myo/ ApKexa Se noXo Se Ttdpa TtoXd
TtoXi) Pa0|xô OTJxe TtoXd p ey d ^  Pa0p6 peydlo Pa0pô
Myo Pa0p6
5. Kaxa Tiôao Tciaxedsiç ôxi oi a7cô\|/8iç ooo yia xov avôiKÔ 7ilr|Goapô oopcpmvoôv ps 
xcûv dllœv avôpœv;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ka06Xou Se Ttdpa Se Myo Odxe Xiyo/ ApKexa Se TtoX,t) Se Ttdpa TtoXd
TtoXl) Pa0pô odxe TtoXd peydXo Pa0pô peydXo Pa0p6
Myo Pa0p6
6. Dxay aKodç KdTioia ydvaiKa va KpixiKdpsi xooç dvôpsç, as tcoiô PaGpô aiaGdvsaai 
ôxi KpixiKdpoov sasva TcpoaœTiiKd;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ka06)uOt) Se Ttdpa Se Myo Odxe Myo/ ApKexa Se noXv Se Ttdpa TtoXd
TtoXt) Pa0p6 odxe TtoX,i3 peydlo Pa0pô peyd^o pa0pô
Myo Pa0pô
606
7. E ivai paaiKÔ Koppdxi xoo saoxod goo  xo ysyovôç 6xi e iaa i dvôpaç;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
KaBôXou Se Ttdpa Se Myo OdxeWyo/ ApKexa Se TtoXt) Se Ttdpa TtoÀd
Ttolt) PaGpô OTjxe Ttold peydXo paGpô peydlo PaGpô
Myo PaGpô
8. nôGO GTjpavxiKÔ Koppdxi xoo saoxod goo Gecopelç xo (polo goo;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
KaGôXx)!) Se Ttdpa Se Myo Oôxe Xiyo/ ApKexa Se Ttoli) Se Ttdpa Ttolô
TtoX,u PaGpô oôxe TtoX.ô peydXo PaGpô peydlo paGpô
l(yo PaGpô
9. Ee 7C01Ô paGpo aiGGdveoai xo 6xi eloai E llrjvaç;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
KaGô v^Oi) Se Ttdpa Se Wyo Oôxe Xiyo/ ApKexa Se TtoXo Se Ttdpa TtoÀô
Ttolt) PaGpô oôxe Ttolô peydXo PaGpô peydlo PaGpô
Myo PaGpô
10. Ee Tioio paGpo aiGGdveoai va é%siç ôovaxoôç ÔEGpodç pe xooç'Ellriveç;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
KaGôXoi) Se Ttdpa Se Myo Oôxe Myo/ ApKexa Se TtoXo Se Ttdpa TtoÀô
Ttolt) PaGpô oôxe Ttolô peydXo PaGpô peyd).o PaGpô
>.{yo paGpô
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1 1 . n ô a o  eoxapiaxrigsvoç aiaG àvsaai tioo siaai'E llrjvaç;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
KaGoloi) Se Ttdpa Se lîy o Oôxe Xiyo/ ApKexa Se Ttolo Se Ttdpa TtoXô
noXo PaGpô oôxe TtoÀô peydXo PaGpô peydlo PaGpô
Xiyo PaGpô
12. nôao ôjxoia aiaGdveaai ôxi eiaai pe svav xotcikô  TllT|va;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
KaGôXoo Se Ttdpa Se Myo Oôxe Myo/ ApKexa Se noXv Se Ttdpa TtoXô
TtOÀO PaGpô oôxe TtoXô peydlo PaGpô peydÀo PaGpô
Myo paGpô
13. nôao oüpavxiKÔ elvaiyia aéva ôxi eiaai'EllTjvaç;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
KaGôlot) Se Ttdpa Se Xiyo Oôxe Xiyo/ ApKexa Se TtoXi) Se Ttdpa TtoXô
TtoXu PaGpô oôxe TtoXô peydXo PaGpô peydXo PaGpô
Xiyo PaGpô
14. Kaxd nôao Tciaxeôeiç ôxi oi a7rô\(/siç aoo yia xqv E lldôa aopcpcovoôv |xs xcov dllœv 
Ellf|vcûv;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
KaGôXou Se Ttdpa Se Xiyo Oôxe Xiyo/ ApKexa Se TtoXo Se Ttdpa TtoXô
TtoXl) PaGpô oôxe TtoXô peydXo PaGpô peydXo PaGpô
Xtyo PaGpô
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15. Dxav aKoôç KaTioiov tioo ôev sivai'Ellrivaç, va KpixiKàpsi xoogTUqvsg, as tioio 
paGpô aioGdvsaai ôxi KpixiKdpoov sasva TcpoacoTciKd;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
KaBôXou Se Ttdpa Se Xiyo Oôxe Xiyo/ ApKexa Se TtoXo Se Ttdpa TtoXô
TtoXl) paGpô oôxe TtoXô . peydXo PaGpô peydXo PaGpô
Xiyo paBpô
16. Elvai paaiKo Koppdxi xoi) saoxod aoo xo ysyovôç ôxi siaai'EllTjvaç;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
KaGôXoo Se Ttdpa Se Xiyo Oôxe Xiyo/ ApKexa Se TtoXo Se Ttdpa TtoXô
TtoXo PaGpô oôxe TtoXô peydXo PaGpô peydXo PaGpô
Xiyo PaGpô
17. nôao oqpavxiKÔ Koppdxi xoo saoxod aoo Gscopsiç xrjv sGviKÔxqxa aoo;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
KaGôXoo Se Ttdpa Se Xiyo Oôxe Xiyo/ ApKexa Se TtoXo Se Ttdpa TtoXô
TtoXo PaGpô oôxe TtoXô peydXo PaGpô peydXo PaGpô
Xiyo PaGpô
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nom slvai Tj GpriaKsia aov;.............................................
18. E 87COIO PaGpô aiaGdveaai to  ô t i  sioai Xpioxiavôç OpGôôoÇoç
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
KaGôXoo S s Ttdpa S e Xiyo Oôxe Xiyo/ ApKExa S s TtoXo Se Ttdpa TtoXô
TtoXo PaGpô 00X8 TtoXô peydXo PaGpô peydXo PaGpô
Xiyo PaGpô
19. Ee TTOiô PaGpô aioGdvsaai va éxsiç Suvaxodg ôsapodç ps xouç Xpioxiavouç 
OpGôôoÇouç;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
KaGôXoo Se Ttdpa Se Xiyo Oôxe Xiyo/ ApKexa Se TtoXo Se Ttdpa TtoXô
TtoXo PaGpô oôxe TtoXô peydXo PaGpô peydXo paGpô
Xiyo PaGpô
20. nôao suxapiaxTipsvoç aiaGdvsoai tiou  elaai Xpioxiavôç OpGôôoÇoç;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
KaGôXoo Se Ttdpa Se Xiyo Oôxe Xiyo/ ApKexa Se TtoXo Se Ttdpa TtoXô
TtoXo 
Xiyo PaGpô
PaGpô oôxe TtoXô peydXo PaGpô peydXo PaGpô
21. nôao ôpoia aioGdveoai ôxi slaai ps svav tü tiik ô  Xpiaxiavô OpGôôoÇo;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
KaGôXoo Se Ttdpa Se Xiyo Oôxe Xiyo/ ApKexa Se TtoXo Se Ttdpa TtoXô
TtoXo PaGpô oôxe TtoXô peydXo paGpô peydXo PaGpô
Xiyo paGpô
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22. nôao crugavTiKÔ sivai yia as|xa xo 6xi siaai Xpiaxiavôç OpGôôoÇoç;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
KaGôXoo Se Ttapa Se Xiyo Oôxe Xiyo/ ApKexa Se TtoXo Se Ttdpa TtoXô
TtoXo PaGpô oôxe TtoXô peydXo PaGpô peydXo PaGpô
Xiyo PaGpô
23. Kaxd nôoo Tciaxsdsiç 6xi oi a7i6\)/siç oou yia xrj GprjOKsia oou oupcpcovouv ps xcov 
dllcûv Xpioxiavcûv OpGoôôÇcov;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
KaGôXoo Se Ttdpa Se Xiyo Oôxe Xiyo/ ApKexa Se TtoXo Se Ttdpa TtoXô
TtoXo PaGpô oôxe TtoXô peydXo PaGpô peydXo PaGpô
Xiyo PaGpô
24. Dxav aKouç KdTioiov tiou ôsv sivai Xpioxiavôç OpGôôoÇoç, va KpixiKdpsi xouç 
Xpioxiavouç OpGôôoÇouç, os tioiô paGpô aioGdvsoai ôxi KpixiKdpouv sosva
TlpOOCOTClKd;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
KaGôXoo Se Ttdpa Se Xiyo Oôxe Xiyo/ ApKexa Se TtoXo Se Ttdpa TtoXô
TtoXo PaGpô oôxe TtoXô peydXo PaGpô peydXo PaGpô
Xiyo PaGpô
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25. Eivai pacyiKÔ K0|4.|j,dTi xov eauxod aov xo yeyovôç oxi eiaai Xpiaxiavôç Op0ô5oÇoç;
1 2 3 4 5 6 . 7
KaBôXoi) Se %apa Se Myo OvTsXiyo/ ApKexa Se TToli) Se Ttdpa noho
paBpô ouxe 7roX,i3 peydAx) PaBpô peydlo PaBpô
Myo Pa0|iô
26. nôao oTipavxiKÔ Koppdxi xoi) eamov aoD Gcœpeiç xrjv 0pT|aK8la cox>;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
KaBôÀoi) Se nâpa Se Myo OüxeWyo/ ApKexa Se noXv Se Tidpa 7toX,d
noXv PaBpô oûxe noXi) peyâXo PaBpô peyd^o paBpô
Xiyo PaBpô
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M E P O E  B ’
EtO Ô8VT8P0 pépoç TOT) 8p(OTT|paTOloyiOD GOD ^T]Tdp8 VO a7raVTfj08lÇ GtlÇ TrapaKdT© 
Ep©Tfjo8iç paolopévoç orqv TrpoacoTriKfj god yvwpi] kgi gtiç Ep;i8ipi£ç god. 
XpTjGipo;roiTiGE Tov %wpo 7T0D GOD 7rap8%8Tai 7iapaKdT(o y ia  va ypd\j/8iç tiç 
aTravTfjGEiç god.
27. Ti GTjpaivEi yia aeva to yEyovôç on 8iaai'EX,>.r|vaç;
28. Edv KdTcoioç god Çtitodge va 7i8piypd\i/8iç TT|v EX,X,TjviKÔTrixa, néç aKpiPœç 0a xrjv 
7C8pisypa(p8(;;
29. Edv pcoxoDGEç xrjv TcapaKdxco 8pmxT|Gr| Gxx|v 7t>Æio\|/Ti(pla xœv av0p©7i:a)v xt|ç %mpag 
GOD, Tioid TtiGXEDEiç 0X10a fjxav Tj Ttio 6r|po(piXf|g a7rdvxT|GT|;
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M E P O E  r ’
A ^ioX 6yT]G E  TIÇ TrapaKdTCO KaTTiyopiEç %piiGipo3TOi(0VTag t o d ç  TrapaKdT© apiOpodç, 
PaaiÇôpevoç g t o  ttogo OT]pavTiKéç Eivai aDxéç oi KarriyopiEç as sasxa npoaoniKa. 
Xpi]oipo7roiiia£ t o  1 yia t t \ \  KaTT]yopia ttod Eivai ndpa ttoXd  oTipavTiKfj yia oÉva, 2  
yia TT]v KaTqyopia ttod Eivai liyoTEpo onpavTiKfj ajro ti]v TrpcoTi] Kai 3  yia ti]v 
KaTiiyopia ttod Eivai liyoTEpo oripavTiKfj ajro t iç  akXsq ôdo. E e  TrapaKaloopE va 
Gopdoai OTi pjTOpEiç va %pï|GipoTTOif|GEiç TODç TTapaTidv© apiBpooç pôvo pia (popd.
'EX.À-Tjvaç
Xpiaxiavôç
Avôpaç
HAIKIA:
0 Y A O :
E0NIKOTHTA:
2e evxoipioTOüjue Osppà yia xrjv cwppexoxrj aov as avxijv xrjv épevva.
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Questionnaire Study 1 (English version)
615
Dear participant,
I  am a first year PhD student at the department o f Psychology in the University o f Surrey. 
This questionnaire is part o f my doctoral research. I  would be grateful i f  you could spend 
a couple o f minutes to fill in the questionnaire. We require you to be honest about your 
responses. There are no right or wrong answers. Your answers and your participation in 
this study will be completely anonymous and confidential.
I f  there are any further questions or queries, please feel free to contact me personally on 
my e-mail address: t. chrvsanthaki(a),surrev. ac. uk
Thank you for your time and participation
T.Chrysanthaki
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In the first part of the questionnaire, we expect from you answers to a set of 
questions based on your own experiences and beliefs. By using the scales provided 
below, try to evaluate how important these elements are to you as a person. Please, circle 
the number that represents you the most.
PART A
Everybody belongs to different and several social groups. Some put value on 
some of these groups while others perceive other social groups as being more 
important. By using the evaluation scale provided below (1 to7) answer the 
following questions based on your personal values and beliefs. Please, circle the 
number that best represents you the most.
What is your gender?.
30. To what extent do you feel strong ties with men?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
To an extremely I don’t know To an extremely
less extent great extent
31. To what extent do you feel pleased to be a man?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
To an extremely I don’t know To an extremely
less extent great extent
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32. How similar do you think you are to the average man?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not similar at all I don’t know Extremely
important
33. How important to you is being a man?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not important at all I don’t know Extremely
important
34. How much are your views about men shared by other men?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
To an extremely I don’t know To an extremely
less extent great extent
35. When you hear a woman criticise men to what extent do you feel personally 
criticised?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
To an extremely I don’t know To an extremely
less extent great extent
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36. Is the fact that you are a man a central characteristic of your self?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
To an extremely I don’t know To an extremely
less extent great extent
37. Is your gender an important part of your self?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not important at all I don’t know Extremely
important
38. To what extent do you feel Greek?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
To an extremely I don’t know To an extremely
less extent great extent
39. To what extent do you feel ties with Greek people?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
To an extremely I don’t know To an extremely
less extent great extent
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40. To what extent do you feel pleased to be Greek?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
To an extremely I don’t know To an extremely
less extent great extent
41. How similar do you think you are to the average Greek person?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not similar at all I don’t know Extremely
important
42. How important to you is being Greek?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
To an extremely I don’t know To an extremely
less extent great extent
43. How much are your views about Greece shared by other Greek people?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
To an extremely I don’t know To an extremely
less extent great extent
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44. When you hear someone who is not Greek criticise the Greek people, to what extent 
do you feel personally criticised?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
To an extremely I don’t know To an extremely
less extent great extent
45. Is being Greek a central characteristic of yourself?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
To an extremely I don’t know To an extremely
less extent great extent
46. Is your Greek nationality an important part of your self?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not important at all I don’t know Extremely
important
What is your religion?.........................
47. To what extent do you feel Christian Orthodox?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
To an extremely I don’t know To an extremely
less extent great extent
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48. To what extent do you feel strong ties with Christian Orthodox people?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
To an extremely I don’t know To an extrem ely
less extent great extent
49. To what extent do you feel pleased to be Christian Orthodox?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
To an extremely I don’t know To an extremely
less extent great extent
50. How similar do you think you are to the average Christian Orthodox person?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
N ot similar at all I don’t know Extremely
important
51. How important to you is being Christian Orthodox?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
N ot important at all I don’t know Extremely
important
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52. How much are your views about your religion shared by other Christian Orthodox 
people?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
To an extremely I don’t know To an extrem ely
less extent great extent
53. When you hear someone who is not Christian Orthodox criticise Christian 
Orthodoxs, to what extent do you feel personally criticised?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
To an extremely I don’t know To an extrem ely
less extent great extent
54. Is being Christian Orthodox a central characteristic of your self?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
To an extremely I don’t know To an extremely
less extent great extent
55. Is your religion and your religious beliefs an important part of your self?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
N ot important at all I don’t know Extremely
important
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P art B
Please answer the following questions in your own way by based on your personal 
opinion and experience. Use the space provided for writing your answers.
56. What does it mean to you being Greek?
57. If someone would ask you to describe Greekness, how would you describe it?
58. If you were asking this question to the majority of people which would be the most 
frequent response?
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P A R T C
Evaluate the following categories using the numbers provided below based on how 
important are these categories to you as a person. Use 1 for the category that is very 
important to you, 2 for the category that is less important that the first one and 3 for 
the category that is less important to you than the other two. Please note that you 
are supposed to use the above numbers just once.
Greek
Christian
Man
AGE:
GENDER:
NATIONALITY:
Thank you for your participation in this research.
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Interview Transcripts (Greek version)
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T ranscription
1 ....Kopia A.É%GTE KdTtoio npopkqpa va rixoypacprjaoops XT|V aovévxeoÇri aoxf)?
2 O xipépaïa ...
3 Opaia..nôG0  xpovcbv sloxe?
4 nGvfjvxa...
5 N a  xa 8Kaxooxf|G8X8...
6 Eoxapioxœ...
7 ETcdyyGlpa?
8 lÔlCÛXlKTI D7CdX,ri?L0Ç.
9 E .. .oxri 08GoaXov{KT|, Tcoaa xpdvia Çgixe?
10 E. . . . .axeôôv aTid xôx8 tcod y8wf|0riKa.
11 Eigx8 aTcô 8Ôd)...
12 Oi yov8lç poD 8ivai..pévav8 o8 éva x^ opiô mv Aayxaôd, tcod 8ivai tioà,i3 Kovxd axrjv
13 0 8 GGalov(KT| K ai...p8xdxovydpo xodç, Mya xpdvia, fjpOav Kai 8yKaxaGxaOf)Kav8
14 axTjv 08GGaXov{KT|. 'Opcûç 8péva yia éva ôidaxr|pa, 87i8iÔf| t| prjxspa poo 8pyaÇôxav8
15 avro xôx8, p8 TipooExs t) yiayid pou x| OTioia 0a  ..ép8V8 axo x^pid Kai ôxav fjxav va Tid©
16 oxo^Eio, f|p0a Kai 8yKaxaoxd0T|Ka povipcoç Kovxd oxT|v oiKoyévEia pou axrjv
17 08oaa>.ovtKTi, oxTjV Ka^apapid!
18 Opaia..Kai KaXapapiœxiaaa...
19 N a i...
20 Ta X8l 80xa{a xpdvia Kopta A. o apiOpôç xœv pGxavaaxœv éx£i aoÇr|08l axr|v E)ild6a
21 8 .. .aoxô 8ivai sva (paivôpEvo tüod xo 8X6X8 7capaxr|pf|a8i?
22 OoaiKd! E..ôxav pîiaiVEiç oxo aaxiKÔ E...noXkéç (popéç aKodç 7r8piaaôx8pooç Çsvooç
23 Ttapd'E^À,t|V8ç va pilodv!
24 E..7TCÛÇ 7110X808X8 ôxi 01 dvOpCDTioi oxT|V EXldSa avxip8XCû7CiÇow aoxô xo Oépa?
25 E .. .Ô8V vopiÇœ ôxi xo avxip8xœ7ilÇoop8 Kai..7cdpa 7toÀ,D Kald 8p .. .01 dtcô^oitcoi
26  8 . . .d l l o i  GupTcaOodvxooç p8xavdax8ç Kai d l l o i  ôxi! E .. .tcioxeoco ôpcoç 6x1 éxoopE
27 ôdo..7i:À€Dp8ç p8xavaoxœv, ôx|X,a6f| éxoopE p8xavdax8ç oiKovopiKodç ttoo spxovxai
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28 EÔœ, oiKovopiKODç psTavdaxeç tiod épxovxai e ô é  y ia  p ia  KaX,dxspT| Çœf| Kai é x o w
29  GKOTcô v a  (poyoDv aTcô xrjv ElM ôa KdTtoia axiypf| Kai éxoopc x a i  âXkovç.. nov fjxavs
30 EX)uT|VEç 7T0 D E i/a v  pEiVEi 0 8  KdvioiEç âXksç x^P^Ç- Kai xd)pa Tiia épxovxai y ia  povipT)
31 p 8xavdox8DOT| oxTjv EXMôa. E ...vopiÇ ©  ôxi 8 ...a v x ip 8xco7iiÇovxai p8 ôia(pop8xiKÔ
32 xpÔTio 01 p8v  Kai 01 ôe! T v a v  ...ETCEiÔfj 8yœ Elpai H ovxia, x| Kaxaycoyf| pou, Eipai aTiô,
33 T) Kaxayœyfj pou Eivai IIovT ia  Kai o i yovEiç pou..fjxav Kai a o x o i KdTcoxE pExavdoxEç
34 ÔTiÀaÔfj T) pxjxÉpa pou Kai o  Tcaxépaç pou f|p 0av  anô xrjv TpaTCEÇouvxa. Tôxe
35 8 ixav..fixav8 ekeI Tidpa Trollol'EXlTivEç, o i OTiotoi.. EKÔiœxOfjKavE Kai f|p0av8 oxx|v
36  E l ld ô a !  A ttô xrjv oxiypfi tiod f|p 0av  8Ôœ, avxipExcomoav Kai aoxo i Ttdpa T to lld
37 7tpopif)paxa, (oœ ç Kai Eycb y ia  aoxô, eiô iK d aoxoD ç to d ç  pexavdoTEç, xooç piÉTtco p 8
38 Ttdpa Ttold K a lo x sp o  p d x i aTto évav âXXov Ttoo 0 a ’p08i ..8 r |la 6 f| t o d ç  A X pavooç,
39  Ka08 aoxd  xooç A lg a v o d g ..a u ..a o x o d g  Ttoo Eivai y éw rip a  0p ép a  A ip a v o t , ôxi to d ç
40  BopElOT|7rEipCOT8Ç, Ô8V XODÇ plÉTtCO p8 XO (ÔlO pdxi TtOO plÉTtO) .. .aOXOdç TtOD fjpOavE
41 aTto 8K81, X0 DÇ"EÀ,X,T|V8Ç TtOD ÇODOaV 8K81 Kai fjpOaV EÔcb. ToDÇ p)vÉTtœ p 8  KaXOTEpO
4 2  p d x i, ÔEV pTTOpco v a  x o  Kpoij/o)! 'Exoi xooç avxipEX.. .TtioxEO.. .Tj 8pd)XT|oq f|xav8 a v . ..
43 N a i . . .ricûç TtioxEDEXE 6 x101  dvOpcûTtoi oxrjv E l ld S a  avxipExcoTttÇoovE...
44  Eyœ TtpoocoTtiKd xooç avxipExcoTtiÇo) éxoi! A l l o t ,  Ttoo ôev éxoov Kapia oxéoq p8 xx|V
45 (polf) xT|v novxiaK f), a ç  xxjv TtodpE (polf| Ttoo ôev Eivai (polf;. . .
46  N a i . . .v a i xx|v Kaxaycoyfj aç TtoopE...
47  Tt|v Kaxaycoyf)..Ô8v xooç avxipExcoTtlÇoovE Kai dpioxa!
48  E w o e ix e  Kai aoxodg Ttoo ép x o v x a i...
49  D lo o ç  yEviKd! T ooç avxip8x©TtlÇoov8 p8 KdTtoiov a o x . . .ô x i Ttold K a lo  xpÔTto! A v  Kai
50 TtioxEDCo 6x1 p8 xov Kaip6 apxiÇoDV v a  8vocopax6vovxai Kai oe l iy o  ôev 0 a  ÇExœptÇow
51 anô xodç"E11t|V8ç xodç ô ikooç p aç K a061oo aoxoi. 'Exoi, xo TtioxEoco!
52 A6ycû xoo xp6v o o  Ttoo Eivai e ô 6  Ttépa oxrjv E l ld ô a ?
53 K a i xoD xp6 voD..8 pydÇovxai 6 1 o i oe  p ia  oiKoyévEia, koixodv v a  xaKxoTtoirj0o6v aTt6
54 KaxoïKia 8 .. .aTt6  Epyaota. npooT ta0o6v 6 1 o i paÇi yta  xo K a l6 , ô lcov  to d ç  peg o x q v
55 oiKoyévEia! T o piéTtœ anô x iç .. .yvcopipiEç Ttoo... Ttoo éxoopE ydpco paç. ï lo o  Çodve
56 xpiyopco p aç o i dv0p©Ttoi, 6xiTtpooTta0odv8 v a  ...aTt6 aoxd  xa  l iy a  îtod éxodve
57 v a . . .8vocopax(û0o6v8 oxo o u v o lo . K d vow E  ôiKfj xooç, ôik6 xodç OTtixi, ôrjp ioop y...
58 ôiK Tj a lfj0 8 ia  xooç ôtvEt Kai Ttdpa Ttold pEydlrj Pofj08ia xo EllrjviKd Kpdxoç, Ttoo
59 01 ôiKoi paç TtalidxEpa ôev xo EixavEÎ TTdpa Ttold xooç pox|0odv8! K a i aox 6  TtioxEOCO
60 6 x1 PoTjOdEi 0 8  aox6 !
X p p p ...
61 D x i otyd-otyd  0 a  ytvoov éva p8 Epdç! Ao..aDTOi ttod e tv a i E llq v E ç , xo xoviÇco! Aev
62 Çép© y ia  xooç A ip a v o d ç , ôev éxco oxéorj p8 aoxodç, a l l d . .. Kai t| a lf )0 8 ia  Etvat 6xi
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63 ôev TODç ayaTid) Kai ttoI d yiaxi Tuoxeocû 6xi épxovxai Kai oi Alpavoi ttod eivai
64 KaKOTioid o xo ixsia , ôev épxovxai pôvo v a  ôooléij/ODve Kai v a  (poyouve, Kdvoov Kai
65 KaKÔ Tcolléç (popéç oxx)v ElldÔa!
66 r la x i .. .Tj eTiôpevrj epœxTjcyri tiod qGela v a  a a ç  Kdvco éx£i oxéar| pe 61a a o x d .. .aoxfj x|
67 ôiacpopd aç Tcodpe tiod OTcdpxsi lôyco xrjç aoÇrjcjTiç xœv pexavaoxœv axrjv E lld ôa
68 8.. .Tiœç 7110X808X8 6 x1 éX6l 87cr|p8d08l XTjV ellTjVlKfl Koivœvia?
69 Evcb léyape 6xiôev etpaoxe paxoioxéç, Tcioxedœ 6xi elpaoxe! E...7iœç éxeieTrrjpedoei?
70 'Oxi.. KdTioioi éxoove Ttdpei tcoI o tiio éoKola Oéoeiç tioo ôev 0a pjiopodoav oi'Ellriveç
71 va xiç Tidpoove. Tooç PoqOoove Ttdpa Ttolo! Tooç Pot|0o6v. . .xooç porjGdei yeviKd xo
72 Kpdxoç, Ttioxeôœ Ttold. Me pox|0f|paxa, pe 0éoeiç  ep y a o ia ç  ...Arjlaôfi évaTtaiôi, évaç
73 'E llr jv a ç  ôev pTtopei v a  pTtel x6 o o  eoK ola  o e  p ia  ôrjpooia ô o o le id , éoxœ  Kai
74 Ttpooœpivd! A dtoi éxoove Ttio eoKolrj e . . .
75 npôopaori?
76 riio eoKolrj Ttpôopaorj, aKpipœç! E...Tt6oo éxsi eTtripedoei? Aev pTtopdt) va nœ Kai Ttia
77 x6 o o  Ttol6 . . . 6 xi éxei 8f|p8 d o e i . . . a l l d  éxei eTtrjpedoei, Ttioxeoœ o e  aox6  Ttoo o o o  eiTta
78 6 x1 xooç poT|0dv8 Ttdpa Ttold. Tooç por|0o6v Ttolo! H a lf |0 e ia  e iv a i 6 xi Kai a oxo i e iv a i
79 Ttdpa Ttold epyaxiKol! B ép a ia , OTtdpxoov Kai o i dv0pœTtoi Ttoo eiva i xepTtélqôeç, ôev
80 pilœ yia aoxfj xtjv Kaxqyopia avOpœTtœv a lld  oxrjv Ttleiovôxrjxa xooç ôooledoov x6oo
81 Ttold Kai Kdvoov 6 xi e iôoç ô o o le id  Kai v a  xdxsi, é v a ç 'E llr iv a ç  pTtopei v a  pqv xqv
82 éKave! Aoxôç 0axrjv K dvei...xœ pa p ép aia  o iyd -o iyd  evœ xa  pepoKdpaxaKdTtoxe
83 fjxave Ttold piKpôxepa o e  aoxodç ...x œ p a  cnyd-oiyd apxiÇoov Kai éxoove xa  lô ia
84 pepoK dpaxa pe x o o ç 'E llr jv eç! A l l d  O Ttdpxoove'Ellrjveç Ttoo Kdîtoieç ô o o ls ié ç  Ttoo
85 xiç Kdvoov a oxo i ôev 0a  xiç Kdvave..Kai éxo i o iyd -o iy d  avaTtxdooovxai Kai aoxo i Kai
8 6  Ttioxedœ 6xi KdTtoxe 0 a  yivei aoxfj t| evoœpdxœoq Ttoo l é œ . . .xo  Ttioxedœ Ttdpa Ttold!
87 rioia eivai xj yvcbprj oaç, t| dTtoiprj oaç yia xooç Aipavodç pexavdoxeç Ttoo épxovxai 
oxTjv E lldôa?
8 8  n io x ed œ  6 xi Kai 8Ket OTtdpxoov ôdo Kaxxjyopieç av0pœTtœv. YTtdpxoov a o x o i Ttoo
89 acpfjvoov xxjv oiKoyéveia xooç Kai épxovxai eôcb y ia  éva K aldxepo.. .adpio, va
90 ôooléipoov v a  éxoov l iy o  Ttepiooôxepa xpfjpaxa v a  Ttdve oxo oTtixi xooç, v a  éxoov
91 Ttapoxéç 01 ôiKOi xooç K aldxepeç, y iax i 8K8i  OTtdpxei peydlxj cpxcbxeia. M a , ôev 0 a
92 ^EoqKœvôxav v a ’p0E i K a v év a ç  EÔœ, é x o v x a ç  6 1 a  x a  Kald ek eü  Siyoopa épxovxai
93 yia aox6 xov 16yo, a l l d  Ttioxedœ 6xi oTtdpxoove Kai KaKOTtoid o x o ix e ia  Ttoo épxovxai
94 oxTjv E l ld ô a  Kai a oxo i Kdvoov Ttold KaKÔ oxov xÔTto! f ld p a  Ttold KaKÔI Fiaxt
95 op yavœ vovxai o e  opdôeç,e ..K lépoove, Kdvoov kokô o e  avOpœTtooç. MTtopei 6 xi cjxa
96 p e y d la  aojiK d Kévxpa x6 o o  Ttold a l l d  aKodpe oxiç TtapapeOcopieç Ttepioxéç Kdvave 
97.Ttdpa Ttold KaKÔ! ITdpa Ttold KaKÔ! AKodpe Kai aTtô xa  p éo a  evrjpépœorjç! ATtô xrjv
98 xrjleôpaoTj.. .6 xi pTtaivoov o e  xœ pid, 6 xi cpoPodvxai o i dvOpœTtoi.. .xœ pa ôev aK odyexai
99 x6oo Ttold a l ld  xa Ttpcoxa xpôvia Ttoo OTtfjpxs aoxfj rj éÇaporj, aKooyôxav Ttdpa Ttold!
100 Kai Ttioxedœ 6xi oTtdpxoov ôdo Kaxrjyopieç avOpœTtœv o s  aoxodç. E .. .pépaia éva
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01 psxavdaxri oiKovopiKÔ aTto aoxéç xiç xœpeç, ôev xov pléTtœ p s KaKÔ p d x i.. . a l l d  Kai
02  évav dvOpODTto ôxav ôev xov Çfjoeiç ôev pTtopeiç v a  Çépeiç xi avxmpoacoTtedei aoxôç o
03 dvôpcûTtoç! MTtopei va etvat Ttdpa Ttold Kalôç a lld  ôxav xov piéTteiç .. .elpaoxe éxoi! 
0 4 Dxav éva dvOpcoTto plÇepo, tpxœxô va Çel Kdxœ...ôev xov piéTteiç pe Kalô pdxiTtdvxa!
05 riioxedeiç 6xi ôev etvat xôoo K alôç ôpcoç av ôev xov Çfjoeiç ôev pTtopelç va  xo Çépeiç!
06  n o t a  etvat xa  oovaioO fjpaxa o a ç  y ia  xooç A ip a v o d ç  pexavdoxeç? H o ia
07  oova ioô fjp axa  o a ç  TtpoKalodv?
08 Aev pTtopcô va Ttco.. .odxe oIkxoo, odxe Kai KaKd oovaioOfjpaxa! Aiyo ooôéxeprj
09  elpai!
10 F ia  xooç Pcôooooç pexavdoxeç? K a i ôxav lé œ  P œ o o o o ç  ôev ew ocb xooç
11 PœoooTtôvxiooç Ttoo éxoov Kai xrjv ellr|viKf| Kaxayœyf).. .ewocb xooç avOpcoTtoo o
12 Ttoo épxovxai aTtô xrjv P œ o o la ...
13 Flioxéoœ ôxi.. .Kai eKei OTtdpxoov pépaia pia pepiôoa KaKcbv.. .a lld  Ttioxedœ ôxi
14 aoxol éxoove pia, aTtô ôoooç yvcbpioa xooldxioxov, éxoove pia Koolxodpa. Aoxoi oi
15 dvOpœTtoi Ttoo épxovxai ano xt|v Pœoola, ano xiç Ttôleiç eKel e.. .éxoove pia dllx)
16 Koolxodpa. Na Ttodpe ôxi Kai Ttdpa Ttollol dvOpœTtoi Ttoo épxovxai anô eKel éxoove
17 pia TTaiôeia, pia pôpcpœoq eKel xa Ttpdypaxa fjxav xelelœç ôiacpopexiKd aTtô ôxi
18 elvai oxT|v Alpavla Kai Ttioxéoœ ôxi elvai Kai dlloo elôooç dvÔpœTtoi! Tooç pléTtœ
19 p e .. .ô x i éxoove d llr j  Ttaiôela. T ooç pléTtœ pe K aldxepo pdxi!
20  K a i o e  oxéoq  pe d l lo o ç  pexavdoxeç?
21 E . . .ôev Çodve eôcb Kai Ttdpa Ttollol oxx| ©eooalovkrj Çévoi Ttoo va xooç Çépœ eycb,
22  va éxœ KdTtoia xpipfj paÇl xooç. M e avOpcbTtooç Ttoo fjpOave aTtô xt|v Ttpcbxjv
23 EoPiexiKfj 'EvœoTj éxœ KdTtoia xpipf|. Fvcbpioa Kai yovakeç Ttoo éxoov Ttdpei
24  n ô v x io o ç  Kai aoxéç f|xav P œ oolôeç , Ttoo epyd^ovxai eôcb y ia  KdTtoiooç
25  pioTtopioxiKodç lôyooç Kai loiTtd .. .voplÇœ ôxi elvai oe.. .xooç éxœ péoa poo oe
26  KaldxepTj Oéorj aTtô ôxi xooç Aipavodç! ^
27  n o t a  Ttioxedexe ôxi elvai xa Ttpopifjpaxa Ttoo oTtdpxoov, Ttoo éxoov ôripioopyrjOel
28  lôyœ xrjç Ttapooolaç xœv pexavaoxcbv oxrjv ellT|viKf| Koivœvla?
2 9  N a Ttœ ôxi KdOe x(bpa éxei pia Koolxodpa! Flioxedœ oe aoxô, e . . .ôxav épxovxai aTtô
30  eKel dvôpœTtoi Kai Kapid cpopd ylvovxai Kai oiKoyéveieç e.. .pexaÇd Ellfjvœv Kai
31 Çévœv, Kapid cpopd ôrjpiodpyodvxai KdTtoia Ttpopifjpaxa e lv a i . . .eKxôç a v  OTtdpxoov
32  Ttaiôid Ttoo Çfjoave eôcb Ttdpa Ttolld xpôvia! Tcbpa ôxav pia KOTtellxoa qpOe eôcb 4
33 Kai 5 xpovœ v f| éva ayôpi, aoxô  e lv a i o lyoop o  ôxi e lva i Ttepiooôxepo 'E llx jv a ç  Ttapd
34 Çévoç. To Ttioxedœ aoxô! Arjlaôfj evoœpaxcbvovxai oxrjv ellrivncri Koivœvla.'Exoove
35 Ttaiôela ellr|viK f| e...K aK dxa ij/épaxa ôxi elpaoxe epelç, ylvovxaiK ai aoxol. Eycb éxoi
36  Ttioxedœ! E . . .ôpœç ôxav y lv o v x a i .. .ôxav OTtppxave, fjpOave anô eKel p ey d lo i Kai
37 ÔT|pioopyf|oave eôcb KdTtoieç oiKoyéveieç p e 'E llr jv eç , Ttioxedœ ôxi eKel OTtdpxs
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38 KàTtoio piKpô Ttpôpirjpa. Asv Çspo) a v  eivai acoaifj f| yvœpT| poi) fj o ^ i.. .a l la  eKei
39  pTiopel va OTcdpxei KdTioio 7cpôp lr|pa , d l l o  Tipopiripa t io o  va OTcdpxei.. .?Aev Çépco,
4 0  ôev vopiÇ© ôxi 0 a  . . .  .Ôev voplÇco ÔTi i)7cdpx£i T ipôplripa...
41 Ti Ttioxedexe ôxi 0 a  pTtopodoav va Kdvoov oi pexavdoxeç yia va yivoov Ttio aTtoôeKxol
4 2  aTto XT|v ellrjviKfi Koivcovla? Ti Ttioxedexe ôxi 0a  pTtopodoav va Kdvoov anô xo pépoç
43 xooç, anô xTj ôncrj xooç Ttleopd..
4 4  ÀTtô xTjv ôiicrj xooç Ttleopd? Me evôiacpépei Ttio Ttold ôxav évaç dvOpcoTtoç Çei oxrjv
45 Elldôa va TtpooTtaOel va pdOei K ald  r t \ \  e llq v iK fj  y lœ o o a , va  aTroKTfjooove p ia
4 6  Ttaiôeia, yvcoplÇ© lôyco xrjç ô o o le id ç  poo Tteldxiooeç poo, o i OTtoieç fjpGav pTtô eKel
4 7  e...Ttf|yave oe xœpooç TtaveTtioxrjpiaKodç ÔTtoo pTtopelç v a  pdGeiç xqv ellT|viKf|
48 ylcùooa Kaldxepa, OTtdpxoov aoxol oi xœpoi edv Gelfjooov oi lôioi xooç va xo
4 9  Kdvoove, pTtopodvîM a, pe evôiacpépei Kai eKel aKÔpa v a  prjv Ttdve ôxav éx si p ia
50  xpipfj p e 'E llr jv eç  pTtopelç v a  pdGeiç Ttio K a ld  xtjv ellrjviK fj y lœ o o a !  M e evôiacpépei
51 acpod Çodve oxtjv E l ld ô a ,  va p ilo d v e  ellrjviK d, y iax l xooç aTtoôéxsoai Kai K aldxepa!
52  'Oxav pTtalveiç o e  évav % é p o . . .e lv a i  o a v  v a  o e  . . .y iaxl xo Kdvav Ttalid Kai o i
53 'E llr jveç  aox ô ..a o x o l Ttoo Ç lepav p ia  Ç levq y lœ o o a  p ilo d o a v  pexaÇd xooç, E a lliK d ,
54  Â yyliK d, viœGeiç ôxi Ttdve va  o o o  Kpdij/oov Kdxi. Aev elvai œpalo! ÀTtô xrjv oxiypfj
55 Ttoo e lo a i oxrjv E l ld ô a ,  K a lô  elva i v a  pdG .. .v a  pdGeiç xrjv ellrjviKrj y lœ o o a , v a
56  p ild ç  ellrjviK d, v a  o e  aTtoôexxodv Ttio ed K ola  Kai o i d l l o i .  E lv a i Ttold paoïKÔ aoxô.
57 üioxedœ oe aoxô.. .e ....œ ç Ttpoç xi d llo ?  Aev voplÇœ ôxi ooxepodve x ô o o  Ttold.
58 Kovxd oe epdç ...
59 OnÔTS Geœpelxai ôxi rj y lœ ooa  elvai anô xa Ttold PaoïKd...
60 ndpa Ttold xo Geœpœ!
61 F ia  lô y o o ç  eTtiKoivœvlaç . . .
62  F ia  lô y o o ç  eTtiKoivœvlaç e . . .Kai d oxepa xo piéTteiç Kai pe Ttold K alô  pdxi Kai va
63 prjv Çépei Ttold K ald ellrjviKd, Ttioxedeiç ôxi Kdvei TtpooTtdGeia va  pdGei! Flaxl ôxav
64  paGalveiç xrjv ylœooa xrjç %œpaç Ttoo Çelç, elvai oav va  léç « Eyœ, %alpopai Ttoo
65 elpai oxrjv Elldôa Kai Gélœ va  pdGœ ôxi Çépeiç eod yia va  ylvœ oav  Kai eoéva!» Kai
66 éxoi xov aTtoôé%eoai Kalprspa!
67 npala, xœpa Ga fjGela va ooÇrjxfjooope yia aoxéç xiç opdôeç, xooç A ipavodç Kai
6 8  xooç Pcôooooç, aoxéç xiç opdôeç xœv pexavaoxcbv o e  o%éorj pe KdTtoiooç
69  ooyKeKpipévooç xopelç .. .Ttapaôelypaxoç %dprj pe xov xopéa xrjç
70 eKTtalôeooTjç.. .H ioxedexe ôxi o i A ip a v o l pexavdoxeç Ga éTtpeTte va  éxoov  xa  ôiKd
71 xooç o x o le la ?
72 N a i, xo Ttioxedœ! T o Ttioxedœ Ttdpa Ttold! F la x l .. .edv o i dvGpœTtoi ao x o l ôev Çépoov
73 xrjv ellrjviK fj y lœ o o a  K ald , Ttoo ôev Ga xrjv Çépoov ôxav TtpœxoépGoov, Ga e lv a i
74  K a lô .. . e . . .p ilo d p e  y ia  o% olela Ttoo va paGalvoov K aldxepa xrjv ôiicfj xooç y lœ o o a  fj
75 xrjv ôncfj paç?
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180 N a éxoov oxolela Ttoo va ôiôdoKOVxai xt|v ôncfj xooç Koolxodpa...
181 Aev elvai KaKÔ! Fiaxl ôxav oi ôikoI paç'Ellrjveç, va Ttdpoope xo ôikô paç
182 Ttapdôeiypa yiaxl KdTtoxe Kai epelç fjpaoxav oiKovopiKol pexavdoxeç. Oedyave Ttdpa
183 T to llo l'E llîjv e ç  oxo eÇcoxepiKÔ, o e  T to lléç  x^peç! Exxjv EopœTtrj, oxrjv ApepiKfj,
184 Ttavxod Ttxjyalvave ! Flioxedœ ôxi av  e lx a v e .. .xov..oxxjv apxfj ôxav Ttfjyave ôev OTtfjpxe
185 aoxô, apyôxepa ôrjpioopyrjOfjKave, o x o le la  y ia 'E llr jv e ç  Kai loiTtd. flioxed œ  ôxi xooç
186 porjGdei Ttdpa Ttold! A eôv elva i œ palo  v a  ÇeKOTtodv aTtô xrjv prjxpiKfj xooç y lœ o o a !
187 A sv e lv a i K aG ôloo K alô! Axjlaôfj x i..éva  Ttaiôl ôxav épxsxai eôœ, eKxôç aTtô x o . . .xooç
188 p ilo d v  01 yovelç! Eyœ aKodœ prjxépeç Ttoo éxoov Ttold piKpd Ttaiôid Kai xooç p ilo d v e
189 o x a  Pœ ooiK a, xooç p ilo d v e  ox a  A ip av iK d . D p œ ç ôev e lv a i KaKÔ e . . .Kai aoxo l v a  pxjv
190 aTtoKOTtodv x e le lœ ç  anô xxjv Ttaxplôa xooç. F iax l KaKd xa  \(/épaxa, piéTtoope ôxi o i
191 'E llîjv e ç  Ttoo Çfjoave oxrjv ApepiKfj, Ttoo Çfjoav oxxjv F ep p av la , G élo o v e  xa Ttaiôid
192 xooç v a  Çépoov xa  ellxjViKd. G é lo o v e  v a  éxoove e.. eTtacpfj pe xrjV E l ld ô a !  A v  xa
193 Ttaiôid ÇeKOTtodve xelelœç Kai ôev pilodv odxe Kav xrjv ylœooa, oiyd-oiyd Ga
194 ÇeKOTtodv! Aev e lv a i œ palo! Flioxedœ ôxi o i dvGpœTtoi Ttoo..rj K axay.. .Ttoo ypdcpoov
195 ôxi elvai A ipavol, oxrjV xaoxôxrjxa xooç, oxo ôiapaxfjpio xooç, Ga TtpéTtei va éxoov
196 KdTtoia eTtacpfj pe xrjV Ttaxplôa xooç Kai vopIÇœ ôxi r\ y lœ o o a  PorjGdei Ttdpa Ttold o e
197 aoxô!
198 Eoelç Ttioxedexe ôrjlaôfj ôxi Ga porjGodoe va OTtdpxoov Çexœpioxd oxo lela  ÔTtoo
199 aoxol va paGdivoov xrjv ylœ ooa xooç?
200 'Ox^ - oxolelo xooç va Kdvoove KdTtoieç œpeç AipaviKd fj PœooiKa a l ld  va
201 Kdvoov Kai ellrjviK d! N a  pdGoov Kai xa  ellrjviK d!
2 0 2  ÛTtôxe ôrjlaôfj évaç oovôoaop ôç!
203  T v a ç  o o v ôoaop ôç! ATtô xrjv oxiypfj Ttoo Çodve oxrjv E l ld ô a ,  Ttioxedœ ôxi Ga TtpéTtei
2 0 4  v a  xGiplÇovxai xrjv ellrjviKfj y lœ o o a  oTtôxe.. .v a  xooç avxipexœTtlÇoov Kai o i'E llr jv e ç
205  eôœ  Kaldxepa! Elvai Kalô Kai yia aoxodç! Dx^ yia epdç!
2 0 6  AiacpopexiKd.. . avxipe..avxipexœTtlÇeiç ôxav Çépeiç v a  cpepGelç, v a  avxipexœTtloeiç xov
2 0 7  'E llr jv a  oxa  ellrjv iK d  Kai ôiacpopexiKd edv ôev Çépeiç! K dvei Ttioxedœ K a lô  Kai o e
2 0 8  aoxodç Kai oe epdç!
2 0 9  Ee oxéorj pe xa oxolsla Kai xooç Pœooooç pexavdoxeç?
210 Eycb Ttioxedœ oe aoxô Kai Ttioxedœ ôxi OTtdpxoov oxolela. To Çépœ ôxi OTtdpxoov
211 oxolela ÔTtoo Ttdve Ttaiôid e.. .pexavaoxcbv.
2 1 2  Ee oxéorj pe xrjv OTtrjoôxrjxa, Ttioxedexe ôxi o i A ip a v o l  pexavdoxeç TtpéTtei va
213  Ttalpvoov xrjv ellrjviKfj OTtrjKÔoxrjxa?
Na Ttœ Kdxi...?
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Xppp...
214 BléTto).. .(pÉTOç 7cposio)\|/s sva oopapô 0spa Kai aTiô îiépoi aKÔpa, ps évav Aipavô
215 Ttoo 0 a  K paxodos xrjv sIItiv ik ti oripaïa . Ilicjxsda) 6 xi dvGpcoTtoi Ttoo yswf|Gr|Kav oxov
216 XÔTto paç, ÔTtœç yivsxai ps spdç, yia xooç'Ellrjvsç Ttoo Çoôvs oxo sÇcoxspiKÔ Kai
21 7  Ttaipvoovs xrjv rsppaviK fj OTtTjKOÔxrjxa, xt|v ApspiKàvncrj OTtx|Koôxr|xa, yiaxl spsiç
218  Ttpéîrsi v a  o o x sp o d p s  o s  a o x ô ?  I lo o  sp slç  ôcboaps xa  (pœxa xoo Ttolixiopod! T lax i
2 1 9  v a  prjv ôev pTtopodv v a  xxjv Ttdpoov xx|v sllr ivncfj oTtr|Koôxr|xa? A sv  vopiÇco ôxi Ga
220 paç Kdvsi KaKÔ.. .pTtopsi oiyd-oiyd va viœGoovs Kai aoxol oiyd-oiyd av éxoov xTjv
221 sllTjvncri OTtx|KoôxT|xa v a  viœG oovs 'E llT jvsç Kai v a  Ttpoocpépoov y ia  aoxôv  xov xÔTto.
222 Fiaxl.. .anô xx|v oxiypfj Ttoo fjpGav sôœ, Ga ylvoov STtioxfjpovsç, pTtopsl va elvai Kai
223 oTTOOôaloi dvOpcoTtoi a o x o l Kai v a  Ttpooôedoei Kai o xÔTtoç p aç anô aoxodç! Eyœ ôev
224 xo piéTtœ KaKÔ.
225 Fia xooç Pœooooç pexavdoxeç?
226 Kai yia ao .. .yia ôlooç!
227 Fia ô lo o ç  . . .
228  Aev xo piéTtœ KaKÔ! KaGôloo KaKÔ! Exo xépi paç elvai va, oxo xspi paç elvai va
2 2 9  x o o ç  ô o d p e  K a ld x ep a  K ai a o x o l v a  p a ç  ôod ve K a ld x ep a  Kai va  Ttpooôedooov oxov
330 XÔTto Kai va Kdvoov Kalô oxov xÔTto. As..ôev vopIÇœ ôxi TtpéTtei va OTtdpxsi aoxô.
331 Tœpa Ga fjGela va ooÇrjxfjooope Kdxi d llo , xo OTtolo xo avacpépaxe Kai eoelç Ttio
332  pTtpooxd.. .y ia  xooç peiKxodç yd p ooç pexaÇd pexavaoxœ v Kai E llf jv œ v . f lo ia  e lv a i rj
333 dTtovj/rj oaç?
334 KdTtoxe Ga ylvei! 0 é lo o p e  ôe G éloope! ÜTtoia Kai v a  e lv a i rj dTto\|/rj rj ôiKfj p oo ,
335 Ttioxedœ ôxi Ga ylvei. Na Ttœ eôœ Kdxi.. .eyœ fjpoova Flovxla, éx o i.. .OTtfjpxe péoa
336 oxrjv E lld ôa  Kai aoxô aKÔpa, oi Bld%oi ôev Ttavxpeoôvxoooav pe d llooç
337 avGpœTtooç skxôç aTtô Bld%ooç. Ci Hôvxioi xo elxave oav apxfj va Ttaipvoovs
338 n ô v x io o ç . E ...G éla v e .. .OTtfjpxs aoxôç o . . .
339NaKpaxdç ...
340 Nai! Na pqv OTtap/si avdpeiÇq anô (p..pdxoa oe pdxoa, yiaxl pdxoeç xiç lépe oxrjv
341 E lldôa, ôev xiç lépe (poléç, yiaxl ôev elvai cpoléç, pdxoeç xiç léyape,e.. .Ttioxedave
342 ôxi éxoi Ga Kpaxfjooove oi B ldxoi pe xooç Bldxooç Kai Ga eÇaTtlœOodv oi B ldxoi
343 ôrjlaôfj Kai Ga y lv o o v .. .Kai ôev e lv a i K a lô  aoxô! KdTtoxe, xœ pa pTtopel v a  prjv
344 y lvexai Kai v a  xooç piéTtoope KdTtœç! K a i ep éva  o y iôç poo  elxe oxéorj pe p ia  KOTtéla
345 Ttoo ôev.. .Ttoo elxe épGei aTtô sksI! ATtô xrjv Pœoola. Aev xrjv éplsTta pe Ttdpa Ttold
346 Kalô pdxi! nioxeoa ôxi OTtdpxei pia Ttovrjpid, OTtap/ei Kdxi, OTtdpxei Kdxi! Aev
347 OTtdpxGi ôpœç. Aev Ttioxedœ ôxi OTtdpxei. MTtopel Kai aoxol va Géloov va Ttdpoov
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348 'Ellrjveç. Na..va t o  Tcpoxipodv! Dpcoç KotTcoxs 0a yivei! Elpai alyooprj yia aoxô. Kai
349  epéva pe épleTiav ooo léœ pe d llo  pdxi e7ieiôf| fjpoova Hôvxia. Aev Çépœ yia tio iooç
35 0  lôyooç? AiKoi tooç fjrav oi lôyo ï. Eyœ eôœ yewfjOxjKa eôœ peydlœoa.
351 Aôyœ Kaxayœyfjç . .. .
352  Oi yovelç poo Tipooôedoav eôœ, Kdvav Kdxi ôiK..opyavœOfjKave ox..oxxjv ellxjviKfj
353 Koivœvla, Çfjoav eôœ, ôpœç xooç piéTiav pe kôtio io  pdxi. 'O y \  ôlo i! Tooç piéTiav
35 4  ôpœç! riiox..ôev Ttioxedœ ôxiyia T to lld  xpôvia 0 a  io%dei aKÔpa aoxô! F lax l éva
355 ayôpi fj p ia KOTtéla ôxav yvœplÇei éva Ttaiôl, Ttoo Çépei ÀyyliKd, Ttoo é%ei oTtooôdoei
35 6  eôœ, cote (palvexai ô ti f |p 8 e aTto ekeI! T i 0 a  é%ei x ap T téla  Ttdvœ x o o  o dvGpœTtoç
357  Kai Ga léei «Eyœ fjpGa aTtô eKel»? 'Eva Ttaiôl ôxav yvœplÇei pia KOTtéla, Çépei aTtô
358 xTjv œpa Ttoo xrjv yvœpioe Kai xrjv aydTtxjos ô ti fjpGe attô cKel? Flioxedœ ôxi oe llya
359  xpôvia  ôev Ga OTtdpxoov aoxd!
360  A rjlaôfj xœ pa Ttioxedexe ôxi oTtdpxei KaTtoio Ttpôpirjpa pe xooç peiKxodç ydpooç?
361 Tœpa, Ttioxedœ, ôxi.. .Ttdpa Ttollol ôev Géloov va ylvovxai peiKxol ydpoi.
362 Fla Ttoiooç lôyooç Ttioxedexe?
363 Fiaxl Ttioxedoope oe aoxô. Arjlaôfj..Géloope ôloi va éxoope oxéoeiç pe
36 4  oiKoyéveieç Ttoo e lv a i o a v  Kai epdç. E . . .Kai y lvexai ooxô oxrjv ellrjviK fj Koivœvla.
365  Eloai aTtô yiaxpô, Géleiç va Ttdpeiç Kdxi avdloyo pe aoxô Ttoo eloai. Aev Gélsiç va
3 6 6  Ttdpeiç Kdxi Kaxœxepo. © é le iç  v a  Ttdpeiç Kdxi K aldxepo! K a i ô l o i  G éloov v a  Ttdpoov
367  Kdxi K aldxepo! Ee éva  ETtlTteôo! F lioxedoope ôxi o i dvGpœTtoi, éxoi Ttioxedoope ep e lç ,
368  ôxi 01 dvGpœTtoi aoxol ôsv éxoov xo ETtlTteôo Ttoo éxoope epelç, e . . .Ttœç Ga xooç
3 6 9  Ttapoooidooope? To éxoope aoxô, va prjv xo Kpdpoope! To éxoope! Flioxedœ ôpœç
370 ôxi oe l ly a  xpôvia aoxol Ga ylvoov ÔTtœç Kai epelç Kai ôev Ga OTtdpx i^ aoxô. Tœpa
371 OTtdpxGiTtdvxœç!
372 Arjlaôfj edv rj KÔpq oaç fj yioç oaç Ga épxoxave aç oTtodpe Kai Ga oaç léyave
373 «Mapd, rj KOTtéla Ttoo Gélœ va Ttavxpeoxœ elvai Algavlôa» Ttœç Ga avxiôpodoaxe?
374  'Oxi Kai x ôoo  Kald! Aev Ga xaipôpoova!
375 Fia Ttoiôv lô y o ?
3 7 6  A éve éva  Ttold œ p a lo . . .  »riaTtodxoi aTtô xov xÔTto ooo Kai aç elv a i pTtalœ pévo!»
(she laughs)
377 Arjlaôfj?
378 E ...ElvaiKdTtoioi ..ek a p e  e lva i éva Ttpôpirjpa Ttoo oe aTtaoxolsl. Aeç «Ga
37 9  xaipidÇei pe aoxôv xov ocvOpcono?» . OooiKd, edv ôev xrjv yvœ ploeiç xrjv KOTtéla fj xo
38 0  ayôpi, ôev pTtopelç v a  Çépeiç. E . . .va  o o o  Ttœ Kai xrjv a lfjG eia  éxœ epTtioxoodvrj oxrjv
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381 87iiloyf| Tcov Tiaiôicbv poo e . . .to o ç  s%0) pdGei, anô piKpd Ttoo fjiave , o^i xœ pa Ttoo
382  p sy a lœ o a v e  va s%oov xrjv ôncfj xooç TtpoocoTtiKÔxrjxa Kai aoxoi aTtocpaoiÇoov a lld
383 éxoope pdGei oxo OTtlxi, xov KdGe dvGpcoTto va xov oepôpaoxe yia aoxô Ttoo eivai!
38 4  Aev Ttioxedœ ôxi Ga eTtiléyave évav  oKdpxo dvGpœTto.. . ô k l a  xooç! A l l d  pe x ô o a
385 T to lld  Ttoo aKodpe, eTtrjpea^ôpaoxe! KaKd xa  \j/épaxa! A ép e  « K aldxepa, ppe Ttaiôl
386 poo va elxe oxéorj pe évav'Ellrjva! 'Hxav avdyicrj Ttia va fjxav Aipavôç?» Ga xo
387 Tteiç! Kai av ôev xov yvœploeiç xov dvGpœTto, eyœ xooldxioxov Ga fjpoov apvrjxncfj!
388 Exrjv apxfj! Aev Ga xo eKÔfjlœva .. .Ga Tteplpeva va xov yvœploœ yia va eKcppaoxœ.
389 A lld  rj Ttpœxrj poo OKé\|/rj Ga fjxav apvrjxiKfj, ôev xo Kpdpœ!
390 Me éva Pœooo pexavdoxq?
391 To lôio Ga éviœGa! Alyo, llyo Kaldxepa!
392  A lyo  Kaldxepa? F ia  Ttoio lôyo?
393 F ia  aoxd  Ttoo e lxap e TteiTtpiv. 0 eœ p œ  ôxi e lv a i dvGpœkoi pe . . .o i  K a lo l xooç, y iax l
39 4  OTtdpxoov Kai p éo a  oxrjv E l ld ô a  KaKol. Aev p ild p e  ôxi o i'E llr jv e ç  ô l o i  e lv a i K a lo l
395 Kai ô l o i  01 Çévoi e lv a i KaKol! F la  aoxô Kai o i cpolaKéç e lv a i yepdxeç! Aev fjxav ô lo i
396  aTtô Çévooç. 'Hxav Kai anô 'Ellrjveç! Flioxedœ... ôxi eKelvoi éxoov pia lôialxeprj
397  K oolxodpa!
398 Oi Pœoooi pexavdoxeç ...
399  Oi Pœoooi.. . 0 a  xo épieTta lly o  ôiacpopexiKd.
4 0 0  0 a  fjG ela v a  croÇrjxfjooope Kai y ia  p ia  d llr j  o p d ô a  avGpcoTtœv Ttoo Çoov oxrjv
401 Elldôa, rj peiovôxrjxa xrjç 0pdicrjç Ttoo Çodve oxrjv Kopoxrjvfj, oxrjv HdvGrj, oxrj
402 PoôÔTtrj.. .Hoia elvai rj dTtovj/rj oaç yia aoxodç xooç avGpœTtooç?
403 Ti va Ttœ.. .epelç .. .Ttépoi OTtrjpexodoe o yiôç paç eTtdvœ Kai evcb ôev elxape cpxdoei
404 œç eKel vj/rjld, Ttapôloo Ttoo elpai Kai 50 xpovœv, elxape cpxdoei péxpi
405 AleÇavôpodTtolrj, ôev elxa xaÇiôéij/ei péxpi xôoo ij/rjld, en..o yiôç paç OTtrjpexodoe
40 6  0 X0  Eoocpll Kai avepfjKape péxpi Ttold \|/r |ld  oxrjv SdvGrj Ttoo Çodve T to llo l Kai oxrjv
407 Kopoxrjvfj e...Ttioxedœ ôxi aoxol cpxalve? epelç cpxalpe? Aoxô ôev xo Çépœ, Ttoioi
408 cpxalve, a l ld  elvai Ttold OTtofaOpiopéva xa Ttpdypaxa eKel œç Ttpoç xrj ôiK..œç Ttpoç
4 0 9  xrjv peiovôxrjxa aoxfj! M e x ô o a  T to lld  xp’o v ia  Ttoo Çodve oxrjv E l ld ô a ,  Ttioxedœ ôxi
410 Ga éTtpeTte v a .. .lo œ ç  ôev poqOdei r\ OprjOKela tooç. Flioxedœ ôxi aoxô elvai Ttoo
411 ..e ...o o x e p e l Kai ôev xooç eTtixpéTtei va evoœpaxœG odve pe epdç e . . .Ttdpa Ttold
4 1 2  Ttioxedœ o e  aoxô, loœ ç Kai y ia  aoxô é le y a  y ia  xooç P œ o o o o ç  pexavdoxeç eTteiôfj Kai
413  aoxoi oxrjv Ttleiovôxrjxa xooç elvai Xpioxiavol OpGôôoÇoi, TtalÇei Ttdpa Ttold peydlo
4 1 4  p o lo  OTTiv ô q p io o p y la  o iK oyéveiaç, y ia  va Ttdpe Kai oxrjv Ttporjyodpevrj epœxrjorj
415 Ttoo el%ape K dvei...
4 1 6  F ia  xooç peiKxodç yd p ooç . . .
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4 1 7  F ia  TOOÇ psiKxodç yd p ooç 6 xi TtaiÇei Ttdpa Ttold p o lo  aoxô. Kai skeI Ttiaxedco Ttdpa
41 8  Ttold eyœ! Flioxedœ ôxi TtpéTtei va elvai opôGprjoKoi oi dvGpœrtoi Ttoo Ga..Ttoo Ga
41 9  ôrip ioopyf|ooov p ia  oiK oyéveia. A v  prjv é%oov peGadpio Ttpoplf|paxa xa  Ttaiôid xooç,
420 ôoo Kai va  prjV OTtdp%ei péoa oxrjV oiKoyéveia, va  px|v avaKaxedexai o évaç pe xov
421 dH o Kai va xooç a(pf|vei ..o KaGévaç va Ttpeo^edei Kai va Ttioxedei aoxô Ttoo Gélei,
4 2 2  Ttioxedœ ôxi Ga 0Ttdp%ei Ttpôpirjpa pexd oxrjv oiKoyéveia Kai Ttioxedœ Kai oe aoxô. Ee
423  aoxô Ttoo lép e  xœpa..ôxi Kai rj peiovôxrjxa ôev avaTtxd%GrjKe eKel Ttépa ôoo Ga éTtpeTte
4 2 4  va avaTtxo%Gel, yiaxl Kai aoxol ôev Ga xo Gelfjoave yiaxl elxave xqv ôiKf| xooç
425  K oolxodpa, y ia x l Ttloxeoav oe  Kdxi d l l o  ttoo Ttioxedoope epelç, p aç piéTtave, p aç
42 6  piéTtoove x e le lœ ç  ôiacpopexiKd. Av fjpaoxav opôGpqoKoi, o ly o o p a  ôev 0a oTtfjpxe
42 7  aoxô Ttoo OTtdp%ei o fjp e p a  eKei!
428  A rjlaôfj piéTtexe xrjv GprjcjKela o a v  éva  oxoi% elo...
429 BePalœç! To pléTtœ Ttdpa Ttold paoïKÔ oxoi%elo, eyœ! Aev Çépœ av elvai aoxô rj
4 3 0  aixla, a l ld  Ttioxedœ ôxi Ttdpa Ttold eTtrjpedÇei rj GprjoKela oe aoxô Ttoo ooppalvei oxrj
431 0pdicrj. Av oi dvGpœTtoi fjxav Xpioxiavol Ga paç épieTtav Kai epdç pe d llo  pdxi!
4 3 2  M a ç  pléTtoo allôO pT joK ooç, p a ç  piéTtoove ...ôev p a ç  piéTtoove pe Ttold K a lô
433  pdxi! E . . .pTtopel Kai aTtô xrjv ôiktj paç Ttleopd va oopPalvei aoxô. Aev léœ  ôxi oi
434 dvGpœTtoi cpxalve Kai epelç ôev cpxalpe. Fidvxœç, xo ôxi péivave OTtoPaGpiopévoi
435  cpxalei Ttdpa Ttold aoxô! D x i rj Gprjcncela xooç e lv a i ôiacpopexiKfj! Fldpe y ia
4 3 6  Ttapdôeiypa xooç Pcoooooç Ttioxedœ ôxi é%oov evoœpaxœG el K aldxepa oxrjv ellrjviK fj
437 Koivœvla lôyœ xo ôxi é%oov xrjv lôia Gprjcncela pe xooç'Ellrjveç...
438 Hoia elvai xa crovaioGfjpaxa oaç yia aoxodç xooç avGpcoTtooç? Ti aioGdveoxai?
439 Aev xooç piéTtœe pe KaKÔ pdxi. Aev xooç pléTtœ pe KaKÔ pdxi. Fia va pelvoov xôoa
440 xpôvia eôœ, Ttioxedœ ôxi Gélave va pelvoov oxrjv E lldôa. Av ôev xrjv ayaTtodoav
441 KaGôloo xrjv E lldôa, Ga el%av cpdyei. Kaxapxfjv, OTtrjpexodv oxo oxpaxô xov
4 4 2  ellrjviKÔ! 0  yiôç  poo  elxe Ttaiôid eôœ, ôxav OTtrjpexodoe oxov AayKaôdTtoo fjxav anô
443  eKel Kai poo éleye, ôxi Ôev xooç avxipexœTtlÇoov xo lôio pe xooç'Ellrjveç Kai ôev xo
4 4 4  Geœpœ eycb Ttold K alô! A ttô xq v  oxiypfj Ttoo éva Ttaiôl Ttqyalvei o x o v  e llq v iK Ô
445 oxpaxô e . . .Ttioxedœ Kai yew fjG qK e oxqv E lldôa , TtpéTtei va avxipexœTtlÇexai
44 6  K aldxepa! T o Ttioxedœ aoxô Ttdpa Ttold!
447 Arjlaôfj Ttioxedexe ôxi xooç cpepôpaoxe ôiacpopexiKd?
448 Ae xooç cpepôpaoxe Kai xéleia, Ttioxedœ! Tooç piéTtoope peioveKxiKd.
449 Fiaxl Ttioxedexe ôxi xooç cpepôpaoxe éxoi?
4 5 0  K axapxfjv, OTtdp%ei aoxô xo Ttold p e y d lo  KaKÔ, Ttoo paç xo epcp..Kai aTtô piKpd Kai
451 0X0 o x o le lo  paç, éx o o p e  y a lo o x ïlG e l pe aoxô , ôrjlaôfj « o i TodpKoi e lv a i KaKol,
4 5 2  elvai exGpol paç, elavi éxoi, elvai allicbç!». E . . .'Exoope cpôpo aTtô eKel, ôxi KdTtoxe
453  Ga ylvei Ttôlepoç, oi peydloi dvGpœTtoi aKÔpa xo lève! A x, va éxoope eipfjvrj va prjv
454 éxoope Ttôlepo pe xooç TodpKooç! Eycb, ôev xo avxipexœTtlÇœ éxoi! Ae piéTtœ ôxi
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455  n à v z a  " o n à p x s i  p sya lr; aTCGilf; a n o  tt]v ToupKia! D a o  Kai a v . . .a K o v y sr a i avTÔ,
45 6  aKovyETai! D ^ a  xa  xpovia . Attô piKpoi Kai xœ pa, aKovyexai. A X k a  ô sv  xovç plÉTCco
45 7  cûç pGyalx| a7C£iX,f| m a! D a o  oTidpxei avro xT|v Bo'üT.yapla aTTGiXfj, av  xo Tiapoops sxa i,
458  Ô8V Çépoope xi y lv sxa i peGaopio Kai é t o i  ôttcoç E ivai afjpE pa x a  Trpdypaxa ôcv
45 9  pTTOpEiç v a  ÇépEiç x i a e  TrepipévEi a v p io ! K a i aTiô xooç yeixoveç Kai a n o
46 0  o7ioi)8f|7iox6! AKÔpa Kai p é a a  axov x®po, xov 8?iXt|vik6 . OavxaÇôxav Kavelç 6 xi aoxô
461 0 a  y iv si axx|v F io o K o a la p ia ?  I lo x é  ôev p n o p o d a a p c  v a  x o  (pavxaaxodpEl MTiopei
46 2  01 lô io i 01 r lo o K o a ld p o i KdTioxe v a  xo cpavxaÇôvxooaav, sp s iç  a a v  ^G..ôi7i:la, a a v
463 ysixovGç, ôgv xo (pavxaÇôpaaxav ttoxg! riiaxeocû ôxi £...éxoi)pG  p ia  KaKfj ôid0G oii
4 6 4  aTüGvavxi axooç TodpKooç Kai spGiç a a v  dvOpcoTioi Kai ôgv pjiopodpG v a  xooç ôodpG,
465  xGlGia! Agv Çép© p ép aia , xi aoppaivGi axx|v SdvOx), axx|V Kopoxrivf), ttoo o i
46 6  dv0 p©7io i ÇodvG paÇi pG aoxodç, p£ aoxodç gkgI. A X k a  GpGiç . . .p s ç  xrjv..axov xôtio
46 7  xooç, SKGi axrjv SdvOxj, axrjv Kopoxr|vr|, tccoç Çoovg pG aoxodç? Hmç xooç
468  avxipsxœTclÇoov? Ilcoç xooç plÉTioov?
46 9  ü o o  éxoov G7ia(pf|. . .
4 7 0  Dpcûç TiiaxGoco ôxi ooxe Kai gk si yiv ivxai pGiKxoi ydpoi. Agv 0a  OÉTuOov o i TodpKOi v a  
4 7 1 7cavxp8oxodv'EX.X,T|V£ç, y iax i OTcdpxsi Kai aoxô xo axoixGio xx|ç OprjaKGiaç! Aivco ttoT-o
4 7 2  pdarj a s  aoxô!
473  A oxf| f|xav p ia  aviô xiç GpcoxfjaGiç tioo f|0G la v a  a a ç  Kdvœ y ia  xooç pGiKxodç y d p ooç
47 4  pExaÇd x(ov'E llx |va)v  Kai xcov E llf)v o )v  MooaooTupdvcov xxjç 0pdKX)ç ..
475  niaxGoco ôxi ôgv TipGTtGi v a  yivovxai! niaxGOCO ôxi ôgv ttpgtügi v a  y ivovxai Xôym
4 7 6  OprjaKGiaç! E iva iT io ld  PaaiKÔ! E ...ô id p a a a  éva  pipMo g. . . . tioo lÉGi «lïoxG, tcoxg
4 7 7  axTjv KôpTj poo»? ...KdTcœç éxai. Agv xo Oopdpai xœ pa aKpiPmç a X k à  Kdîicoç éxa i
478  Givai! M ia  A yyM ôa TcavxpGoxrjKG é v a .. .g . . .t io o  fjxav d llr jç  OprjaKGiaç a n o  aoxfjv
47 9  K ai.. . avxipGXWTTiaG x ô a a  nolXa jrp o p lfjp a x a  axrjv pGxayGvéaxGprj Çœrj xrjç y ia  éva
4 8 0  xpoviKÔ ôidaxrjpa tioo pTiôpGOG Kai ÇécpoyG a n o  aoxô, tioo TtiaxGo...pG..G..
4 8 2  axiypdxiaG a o x ô ! Agv éxei %dpa n o l X a  xp ôv ia  tioo xo ô id p a a a  a X ld  fjxavG rj apxfj
483  poo Kai Gpéva, TiiaxGoa og aoxô, ôxi ôgv TipéTCGi v a  y ivovxai pGiKxoi y d p o i, y iax i
4 8 4  éxoovG xgTæIcoç ôiacpopGxiicrj XoyiKfj Kai XoyiKfj! E iv a i dvOpcoTioi xg^^Icoç
485  ôiacpopGxiKoi aTiô xooç .. ..OpOôôoÇooç, ô x i p ôvo  xooç OpOôôoÇooç Kai xooç
4 8 6  KaOoiiKodç! O i EopœTialoi éxoovG p ia  d)ilrj g. . .loyiKfj ax a  Tipdypaxa, gkgw oi
4 8 7  éxoov xGlGimç p ia  d îlr j  loyiK ij, xr%v yova iK a  r t \ \  pXéjroov xGlGiœç ôiacpopGxiKd,
488  éxoovG d llr j  Tcaiô...Kairj TiaiÔGiaxooç Givai a?tk 6 xiKfj! QçTcpoçxrjv oiKoyévGia
4 8 9  p ilm .
4 9 0  M ildxG y ia  xooç M o o a o o lp d v o o ç?
491 N a i, y ia  xooç M o o a o o lp d v o o ç . N a i, y ia  xo la ld p !  E iva i xGlGimç ôiaipopGxiKoi!
4 9 2  Arjlaôfj p ia y o v a iK a  GdvTtavxpGoôxavG évav G...TodpKO, p ia E llr jv iô a , voplÇco ôxi
493 Oa avxipGxcoTci^G Tcpoplfjpaxa! EipaaxG gvxgXwç ôiacpopGxiKd paOrjpévoi, Tria! O i 
4 9 4 'EXlrjVGç . . .rj EXlrjviôa, GpydÇGxai.. .Oa poo tcgixg Kai gkgi GpydÇovxai o i KOTcéX ç^
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495  aTXà e iv a i jro ld  xapi^lÔTGpa, rj y o v a k a  c . . .r| T oopK dla  ano ôxv e lv a i x| EX.À,T|viôa. 
4 9 6 'Ex£i aTroKxfjaei p ia  aveÇapxrjaia oiKOvopncr], éx£i Aôyo, E...avxipsxcùmÇ8X8 XGWcog
49 7  ôiacpopexiKd aTiô xrjv ellxiviKT) Koivcovia, Tcaipvei Géori axa TiolixiKd Ttpdypaxa.
498  T e^ lco ç  ôiacpopsxiKd Tciaxsdco dxi s iv a i Kai aoxô  m axed©  ôxi 0a  s iv a i Tcpoç
49 9  KaK.. .Tipoç . . . 8 a  e iv a i p ia  OTropdOpioï] y ia  tt^v yova iK a .. v a  Travxepoxei év a  ^évo,
500  évav TodpKo. Iliaxed© Tiold, ôxi ôev Tipém va yivovxai aoxoi oi ydpoi pe aoxodç.
501 0 a  OélaxG aoxoi oi dv0p©7roi v a  éxoov xa ôiKd xooç axolsia?
502  NopiÇ© ôxi Oa TcpéTcei v a  paO alvoov xa GllxjviKd Kai xTjv ellT |viK f| K oolxodpa éxa i
503  ©axe va prjv aTcopovcbvovxai aXXà va paOalvoov Kai xx|v Koolxodpa xt|ç x©paç
504  Kaxay©yf|ç xooç.Dxi ôr|^aôf| yivexai x©pa tioo éxoov Kai'E^X-rjvéç Kai TodpKooç
505 ôaaK dlooç!
506 ETieiôfi xT)v OTcrjKoôxrixa xrjv éxoov aoxoi oi dvOp©Tuoi, eivai'EXX.xjveç OTif|Kooi eô©
507 Kai Tcdpa noXkà xpôvia...
508 Nai....
509 0 a  fjO ela v a  aoÇrjxfjaoops Kai éva  âXko Oépa a e  axéarj pe aoxodç Kai TiokxiKd
510 ÇTjxfjpaxa ôtt©ç xo va.. .xo yeyovôç, pdlXov x| mOavôxxjxa aoxoi oi dvOp©Tcoi va
511 eixav, va ôrjpioopyodaav xo ôikô xooç tco^ixikô KÔppa. n©ç Oa aiaOavôaaaxav?
512 N a  eixav  éva  ô ik ô  xooç TiolixiKÔ KÔppa y iaxi aoxf| xx|V axiypfj, aTiô ôxi aop P aivei, pe
513 xa arjpepivd ôsôopéva, OTtdpxoove pooXeoxéç aTcô xrjV peiovôxpxa xrjç 0pdKj|ç ...
N ai..vai...
514 A tc M  p p iaK ovxa i. . .
515 Se..a8 ôiKd paç KÔppaxa. Txoov avapoxO£Ü
516 n©ç Oa aiaO avôaaaxav , tt© ç Oa xo pXéTiax8 ..aoxô xo evôsxôpevo?
517 N a  éxoov éva  ô ik ô  xooç tcoX,ix ik ô  KÔppa ? D x i ey© m axed©  ôxi TcpéTiei v a  e iv a i
518 8va©pax©pévoi pe épaç! To va  Kdvoov Çex©piaxd Tipdypaxa, Oa eivai aav  va
519 e iva i...% © p oi axrjv Koiv©via aoxfj! Ey© maxed© ôxi TipéTiei va eivai e . . .Doia
520 TiolixiKd KÔppaxa éxoope epeiç, xi xooç apéaei, ae Ttoio TiolixKÔ xd)po eivai tiio
521 Kovxd, EKei Kai pe aoxôv va aaxo)vï|8odv! Ae..ôev vopiÇ© ôxi Oa TcpéTcei va éxoov
522 xov ÔIKÔ xooç Tio^ixiKÔ x(dpo, yiaxi? A oxô Oa xooç aTiopov©aei Myo. 0 a  vi©Ooov ôxi
523 eivai Çéx©po Koppdxi! Ey© ôev maxed© ae aoxô. Fliaxed© ôxi TtpéTcei va
524 eva©pax©Oodve péaa ae epdç yia va yivoope ô)vOi p ia  peydXi] Koiv©via! Aev eivai
525 KaKÔ va éxoov aoxoi.. .va Kdvoov ydpooç pexaÇd xooç, va éxoov xa ÔiKd xooç r|Or|
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526 Kai 80ipa, ôev e iv a i KaKo! K aO oloo  KaKo! K a i epeiç v a  ^ ep oope y ia  aoxd! K a i otccoç
527 Kai aoToi v a  Çépoov y ia  xa ôiKd p aç eGipa. Aoxô Ôev e iv a i KaKÔ! Méaa aTtô ô l a
528 aoxd  ...e^dl^uoo pe xt|v TtayKoapiOTioirjori tioo Oé^coov v a  ..eTtixeox0ei..aoxô 0 a  yivei!
529  D l o i  ôpœ ç Oa TupeTiei v a  Çépoove y ia  xooç d l lo o ç .  K a i a oxo i v a  Çepoove y ia  epdç! S e
530  aoxô Tcicjxed©. Aev Oa f|O ela  v a  aTiopovcoOodve Kai v a  8%oove ôikô xooç tcoXixikô
531 KÔppa.
532 E.. .xooç epTTiaxedeaxe?
533 N a  Tcco xrjv alfjO eia, ôev Ç6  paÇi xooç Kai ôev Çep© av  Oa xooç epTiioxeoôpoova av
534  f|xav yeixovaç poo ..?  Aev pTcopœ v a  xo Çep© x6 pa. 0 a  Tc©..Oa aTiavxf|o© tüoX-o
535 d oxoxa vopiÇ© a v  tc© ô x i il v a i . . .A p a  ôev  Çfjoeiç pe kôtcoiooç av0p©TCOoç, ôev
536 pTTOpeiç v a  Çepeiç.
537 O k o o ç  pexavdoxeç exsxe? ArjXaôf) ...Kdvexe Ttapéa pe kôtcoiooç pexavdaxeç?
538 Na Ti©.. .eô©  oxrjv yeixovid  p aç ..t| prjxépa poo eiôiKd, e . . .ô o o i, ô a o i  iipOav KOVxd
539  p aç éox©  fjxave ITôvxioi, éox© fjxave P © aao i, ôxi Kai v a  fjx a v e .. .xooç PoTjOfjaape
540 Tidpa TioÀ-d, xooç ôdboape ôxi Koko eixape, ôxi ôxi oKooTciôi, ôxi KaXô eixape Kai ôev
541 xo xpsiotÇôpaoxav, xooç poriOfjaape pe ôtioio xpôîio p% opodoape. H  p ap d  p oo
542  pTtop© v a  Ti© ôxi xooç PorjOdei Kai oiKovopiKd Kai xo Çep©! D a o  pTiopei, xooç
543 PoTjOdei! E...aXXà Kai KdTioieç TrepiTcx©aeiç tioo fjxave dvOp©Tcoi TioXô K a lo i Kai xo
544 Kax..Tj papd poo eix£ axéoeiç pe aoxodç. Kai axo oTiixi xrjç xooç épaA^ Kai xooç xaiae
545  Kai xooç Tcpôaçepe, KdTcoia axiypfj, oxi noXXovq pe ôoo  xpeiç tioo yv©piaa, xooç
546  KdT^aa Kai axo OTiixi poo, xooç Tipôacpepa Kacpe...
X p p p ... .
547 Eixape pia eTca(pfj. D x i, KaOrjpepivfj.. .yiaxi Kai ey© epydÇopai Kai ôev ex© xov xpôvo
548 v a  xo Kdv©, aXXà fjpOave axo OTiixi poo, xooç K d lea a , xooç eKava év a  Kaq>é, xooç
549 Tipôa(pepa ôxi pTtopodaa, ©axôao xooç PorjOfjaape Tidpa Tiold!
550 T©pa va aoÇxjxfjaoope Kdxi àXXo, e . . .ôx i a e  axéarj pe xiç Koiv©viKéç op d ôeç tioo
551 aoÇrjxodaape Tcpiv... .yia xrjv eXlrjviKÔxrjxa. 0 a  fjOela va aaç p©xfja© xi eivai yia
552  éaaç rj ellrjviKÔxrjxa? Ti orjpaivei yia eadç Ttpoa©TciKd xo ôxi eiaxe EXlrjviôa?
553 N i© 0©  Tidpa TioX-d Tiepfjcpavrj! YjrepPoXiKd Trepfjipavii! E . . .vi©0©  ôxi e ip aaxe  Kdxi
554  Çex©piaxô! 'O x h  ôxi ôev eivai oi otiôàoitioi la o i aXXà e . . .Tiiaxed© Tidpa Tiold axrjv
555 OprjOKeia paç. H iaxéo© T tdpaT iold  axovT io lix iap ô  paç. I liaxed©  e .. .ô x i ,  ôx i
556  ô x i .. .ôxav  fjpoova piKpfj xo Tiiaxeoa Kai tiio évxova y ia  v a  tt© xrjv alfjO eia, d axep a
557  éxai p aç pdOave Kai axo axoX^io, ôxi fjpaaxav noXXà xp ôvia  Kdx© ano xov Çoyô Kai
558 PyfjKape O a o p d a ïa ... pTiopéaape Kai ^ecpdyape aTiô aoxô , pe T io llo d ç  ay© veç, pe
559  Ooaieç, pe aoxoOoaieç! E ...K a i épT^Tiaxo e^lrjviKÔ axoixeio  xôxe, oTiooÔaio !
5 6 0  B ép a ia , a e  KdOe x© pa Kai KdOe évaç y ia  xrjv Tiaxpiôa xoo éxa i Tiiaxed© ôxi vi©Oei,
561 y ia x iô lo i  o ila o iT te p d a a v e  p é a a  aTiô aoxô e . . .y ia  v a  cpxiaxxei e . . .p ia  x ^ p a , Tcépaae
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562 ttTCÔ Ôidcpopa oxdôia! AXkà axov £>uX,tivikô ;ro> i^Tiapô, Tiiaxeu© Ttdpa Ttold, évxova,
563 TiiaxeocD ÔTtcoç eiTta axT]v G pijaK sia p a ç  . . .
564  ü x a v  léxE GprjaKeia... ?
565 Ewod) XTjv OpGoôoÇia paç. SxT|v OpGoôoÇia Ttiaxed© Ttdpa Ttold Kai av xtjv xTjpodps
56 6  ÔTtœç TtpéTtsi.. .Ttiaxed© 6 xi 0a fjp aaxav KaX,i3xEpoi Kai ©ç Ttpoç xooç Çévooç, Ttoo ôsv
567  GipaaxE dvj/oyoi ps xooç Çévooç, e.. .xxjv OprjaKEia paç xrjv xxjpodaape ôxi aoxfj
568 TtpEapEOEi, 0a  e ip a a x a v  KaXdxepoi a a v  dv0p©Ttoi Kai a a v  la o ç !  A I M . . .^Eçdyape
569  Ttold...aTtô aoxô. Hvaps Eop©Ttaioi ...pe xxjv appaaia x©v Eop©Ttai©v.
570 ArjMôfj?
571 niaxEooops Ttio TtoM axo ôxi TtpéTtsi va yivoope e . . .dv0p©Ttoi Ttoo va pTtopoôpe va
572  axaOodpe ô m M  a e  évav  Eop©Ttaio, Ttio Ttold. Ey© Ttiaxeoa Ttio TtoXd a e  aoxô xo
573 ellxjviKÔ. r io o  fjp a a x a v .. .Ttio Ttold xxjç oiK oyéveiaç, x© pa pléTtoope ôxi acpfjvoope xa
574 Ttaiôid paç cpedyoov éÇ© eÔKola, eva©pax©vovxai axxjv Çévq koiv. . .pévoov éÇ©,
575 e...ev© Ttaliôxepa, aoxô..%d8ïiKe! H oiKoyéveia dpxiae Myo va xdvexai...
576 rioioi Ttiaxeôexe ôxi eivai oi Xôyoi yia aoxéç xiç allayéç axrjv éwoia xrjç
577  ellxjviKÔxTjxaç?
578 A iyo...aM oi© 0TjK e! F iax i pMTtoope dv0p©TtoiTtoo Çfjaave axxj F ep p a v ia  épxovxai
579  axTjv E M d ô a  Kai lève « A . . .epeiç axrjv F eppavia» Ôev eivai KaKÔ Ttoo xo lè v e  yiaxi
560 Çfjaave SKsi Ttdpa Ttolld xpôvia. Dp©ç pléTtoove ôxi xo ellrjviKÔ axoixeio ôev eivai
561 xôao  K a lô  Ttia..yia aoxô  ey© Ttiaxed© xôao ôovaxd axxjv ellrjviKÔxrjxa. E...Ttiaxed©
562  ôxi éxoope Ttdpa Ttolld Kald Ttoo ôev xa PydÇape Ttpoç xa éÇ©. Aoxô Ttoo eixape
563 epeiç, xo  ô é a ip o  x i]ç  o iK oyéveiaç, e...Ttoo fjpaaxav Ttdpa Ttold KOvxd axa Ttaiôid
564 paç, Ttdvxa! FIoo Ttavxpeoôvxooaav Kai xa PorjOoôaape Kai.. .aoxô ôev OTtdpxsi é^©.
565 Ta Ttaiôid pôliç  yivoov 18 xpov©v, Çecpedyoove liyo  aTtô xrjv oiKoyéveia. Xdvovxai!
566 BpiaK ovxai Ttoo Kai Ttoo Kai Ttoo.. .O i dv0p©Ttoi o i p e y d lo i pTtaivoov axrjv
567 aTcopôv©arj, pTtaivoov a e  yrjpoKopeia, a e  oikoôç eoyxjpiaç, apxiÇsi Kai y ivexai Kai
568 eô©! Aoxô pe evoxleiepéva! Hiaxeoa axxjv e...axxjv ellxjviKÔxTjxaxrjv...xo axoixsio
569  aoxô. Txjç oiKoyéveiaç, xoo ôeaipaxoç Ttoo apxiÇei liyo Kai eô© va eicliTtei! Na
570  EKliTtei! E . . .Ttiaxeoa axa  Ttio Ttalid Ttpdypaxa Ttoo OTtfjpxav axxjv E l ld ô a .  Moo d p eae
571 K aldxepa ÔTt©ç fjxav xj E l ld ô a  Ttalid e . . .Ttpiv l iy a  xp ôv ia  ô x jlaô fj...
Nai..Vai...
572  MTtopei x© pa v a  e ip aaxe oiKovopiKd KdTt©ç K aldxepa axxjv oiK oyéveia, xa  Ttaiôid
573 paç epydÇovxai ano piKpd, e. . .Kdvoove ôxi Kaldxepo. . .Géloove va Kdvoov xo
574 Kaldxepo attô ôxi eipaaxe epeiç, ôp©ç e . . .apxiaape v a  xdvoope Kai aoxô xo..ôéaipo
575 Ttoo eixape! F iax i KaKd xa  \j/épaxa ôxav o dv0p©Ttoç aTtô piKpôç y ivei oiKovopiKd
576  aveÇdpxTjxoç, ôev eÇapxdxai xôao Ttold ano xrjv oiKoyéveia xoo. Aoxô eivai Kai Kalô
577  Kai KaKÔ! Aev eivai Ttdvxa Kalô!H xexvoloyia éxsi xa Kald Kai xa KaKd xtjç. D la
578 aoxd  éxoov éva  avxkxoTto axo Tt©ç v i© 0ei o dv0p©Ttoç. B léTtoope Ttalid ôxi ôev
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579  OTtfjpxG Tj TiepiTiTCOori v a  proxfjasiç c v a v 'E llr jv a  xi éyive xo 1940 Kai v a  pi]V ^épsi!
580 Tœpa apxiÇsi aoxô va px|V xo yvœpiÇei o'Ellrjvaç Kai aoxô ps oxsvaxœpei! Fliaxeo©
581 Tioid oxrjv sllT|viKÔxT|xa Kai Oa fjOsla xo Tiaiôl poo, épxexai o yiôç poo aç Tiodps xoo
582 lé©  ayôpi poo xi éyivs xo 1940? Ti éyivs xo 1967? Ti éyivs xo 1974? Asv pTcopsi évaç
583 'E llr jv a ç  v a  pijv ô s  yv©piÇsi xi éyivs axov  xôtüo xoo! T ijv la x o p ia  to o ! 0 s© p ©  ôxi
584 évaç dv0p©7ioç tcoo ôsv yv©plÇsi xiç plÇsç xoo, xt|v laxopia xoo, xi va lé s i ôxi sivai
585 T llx jv a ç , xi v a  l é s i  ôxi s iv a i . . .Çévoç! A v  ôsv  Çépsi xrjv s i . . .xo xi s iv a i o  'E llr jv a ç , xo
586 XI Ttépaas o 'Ellrjvaç, xo xi sivai afjpspa X| E lld ô a .. .Na prjv Çépsiç ôxi sivai axTjv
587 Ev©pévr| Eop© 7tr|..va pr|v Çépsiç xi ..a s  xi PofjOrias rj E l ld ô a  a s  a o x ô .. .y iaxi Kai o i  
5 8 8 'E llr iv s ç  s ...p o fj0 r |a a v  a s  aoxô  ttoo lé y s x a i Ev©pévr| Eop© 7rr|, 8 ..7iaiÇ oops kôtio io
589 p ô lo  a s  aoxô. 0 a  fjO sla  v a  xa  yv©piÇsi o  "Ellrjvaç y ia  v a  Çépsi Kai xi s ip a a x s .. .a v
590  ôsv  Çépsiç xrjv la x o p ia  a o o . . .ô sv  pTCOpsiç v a  Çépsiç, ô sv  pTiopsiç v a  vicbOsiç Ttold
591 "Ellrjvaç!
592  A rjlaôfj STtiypappaxiKd a v  a a ç  p© xodaa v a  poo  Ttsixs xi év a i sllrjviKÔxrjxa?
593 E iva i o Ttolixiapôç, s iv a i rj OprjOKsia paç. "E%oops p ia  Ttpoiaxopia a a v  la ô ç  Ttdpa
594  Ttold psydlrj..sivai.. .Ttspdaaps xrjv a p x a ià x r \x a , Ttpiv aTtô spdç, yia va (pxdaoops va
595 sipaaxs spsiç aoxoi! Hiaxsd© ôxi ôcbaaps xa (p©xa, axov Ttolixiapô! To Ttiaxsd©
596 Ttdpa Ttold aoxô! Asv xo lé© sy©, xo aTtoôsncvdsi rj laxopia... Aa%£xa av KdTtoioi ôsv
597  O éloov v a  xo TtapaÔE%xodvs!
598 Hoisç Ttiaxsdsxs ôxi éivai oi aÇisç Ttoo %apaKxrjpi(oov xrjv sllrjviKÔxrjxa?
599  E . . .xa  %apaKxrjpiaxiKd xoo " E llr jv a .. .©ç Ttpoç xi?
600  O i aÇ isç... .KdTtoisç aÇisç Ttoo 0s© psixai ôxi s iv a i aovsicpaapévsç p s  xrjv é w o ia  xrjç
601 sllrjviKÔxrjxaç...
602  üiaxsd©  Ttdpa Ttold ôxi OTtdpxsi aKÔpa aoxô xo ôéaipo xrjç oiKoyévsiaç. Iliaxsd©
603 Ttdpa Ttold a s  aoxô! E .. .a v  ôev ôcbaoope pdarj ae aoxô 0 a  xdaoope Ttdpa Ttolld aTtô
604  aoxd  Ttoo fjpaaxav. K a i o i dv0p©Ttoi.. .Ttoo ôev ô ivoov pdarj a e  aoxô , a e  ôlrj xrjv
605 o(pfjlio e...aiyd-aiyd %dvoov %©piç va xo Kaxalapaivoove! Eivai rj pdarj, rj
6 0 6  oiKoyéveia! E iv a i e ...ô iv o o v e  afjpepa, Ttiaxed©, aÇieç a e  ôeoxepopdO piaTtpdypaxa
607  Kai ô%i axrjv ooiK oyéveia! Iliaxed©  Ttdpa Ttold a e  aoxô..ETtiarjç, Ttiaxed© ôxi e ip aaxe
608 Ttdpa Ttold (pilôÇevoç aav laôç. To Ttiaxed© aoxô...E...Eipaaxe Ttold
609  ôovap iK oi...A ev  Ttiaxed© ôxioTtdp%ei la ô ç  Ttoo ôev ayaTtdei xrjv Ttaxpiôa xoo, a l l d
610  epeiç aTtoôeiÇape ôovapiK d a a v  dv0p©Ttoi e . . .Kai Ttapôloo ôxi rj E l ld ô a ,  fjxav p ia
611 (px©xfj x©pa, (px©xoi eipaaxav...e . . .Kdvape, Kaxacpépape va Kdvoope Ttolld
612  Ttpdypaxa!E.. .e ip aaxe  ôovapiKÔç la ô ç  Ttiaxed© Kai ôxav PpeOodpe ax a  ô ’o a K o la
613 yiv’opaaxe aKÔpa Ttio ôovapiKoi..Kai xaipopai yia aoxô Kai xaipopai y ia  xooç
6 1 4  OlopTtiaKodç Ttoo 0a  épOoov axrjv E l ld ô a ,  y iax i 0 a  ôeiÇoope a e  ô lo o ç , ôxi e ip aaxe
615  d ^ io i Ttoo xooç Ttfjpape Kai ôev pe evÔiacpépei Ttoo aoxô 0a éxei éva KÔaxoç yia  epdç
616  xooç"E llrjveç, y iax i Ttiaxed© ôxi TtpéTtsi v a  (pavei a e  ô l o  xov KÔapo xi e iv a i rj
6 1 7  E lld ô a !  Iliaxed©  a e  ô l a  a o x d ...
641
618 Ta 80 ip a  Kai o i Ttapaôôaeiç tioo s iv a i avxiTcpoacoTtsoTiKd xxjç ellrjviKÔxrixaç?
619 Oi psyàlsç paç yiopxéç, t| Xpiaxiavoauvrj. Ta Xpiaxodyewa, xo Tldoxa.. .01 ydpoi
620  paç, TTOi) op ia p év o i ttoo xrjpodv xr|v Tcapdôocyrj a K o lo O o w  xov TcapaôooiaKÔ xpÔTio!
621 H pooaiKfj paç. Ta f|0r| KdOe xotcoo paç, ôr|laôf| axa vrjaid paç 01 %opoi paç, x|
622  poi)aiKf| p aç  m axed©  6 x1 p aç avTi7ipoa©7iedoi)ve e . . .aoxd ô la !
623 Dpaïa...avacpepOfjKaxe Tipiv ôxav a a ç  p©xr|aa y ia  xpv é w o ia  xxjç ellT|iKÔxT|xaç,
624  ava(pep0f|Kaxe Kai axrjv OprjaKela, m axedexe ôxi ...e ...07idpxeiK dT ioia  a^éari
625 avdpeaa axrjv ellrjviKÔxTjxa Kai axrjv OprjaKeia?
626 Nai, maxed© ôxi fjpaaxav xo^epoi! Fiaxi 0a pTcopodaape va prjv fjpaaxav
627  X p ia x ia v o i a l l d  v a  fjpaaxav Kdxi d l l o !  D%i, ôxi ôev Ttiaxed© ôxi KdOe OprjaKeia é%ei
628 Kai x a  K a ld  xrjç, Ttiaxed© a e  aoxô, ôxi KdOe OprjaKeia, ôxi Ttiaxedei o  KaOévaç p éa a
629  é%oovxo Kalô ôev é%oov xo KaKÔ...Fliaxed© ae aoxô a l ld . . . . e . . .Ttdpa Ttold xo
6 3 0  Ttiaxed© K iô la ç  Ttoo é v a v  dv0p©Tto Çévo Ttoo Ttiaxedei Kdxi d l l o ,  xo  eKxip© a o x ô  Ttoo
631 Ttiaxedei. F laxi m axed©  ôxi a iyoop a  p éa a  é%ei xo K alô! Aev OTtdp%ei OprjaKeia Ttoo
632  v a  Ttpeapedeixo KaKÔ!Dp©ç £ . ..é%© Kdxi p éa a  p o o ...ô e v  Çép© yaloo%fjOrjKa
633 é x a i.. .Ttoo Ttiaxed© ôxi rj OprjaKeia p aç é%ei T to lld  K a ld  p éa a  xrjç Kai xrjv é%©
634  aoveicpaapévrj pe xrjv ellrjviKÔxrjxa!
635 Aoxfj rj a%éarj a v d p ea a  axrjv OprjaKeia, axrjv OpOoôoÇia d p a  O élexe Kai axrjv
636 ellrjviKÔxrjxa é%ei alldÇei xa xeleoxaia xpôvia?
637 A v  é%ei a l ld Ç e i x a  x e le o x a ia  x p ô v ia .. .N a i, KdTt©ç Kai ocpeilexai p ép a ia  a e  aoxodç
638 Ttoo aaxolodvxai pe xrjv OprjaKeia paç Ttoo...e ....p aç  poodv ae aoxfj. . .Fliaxed© ôxi
639 Ttdvxa OTtfjpxav aoxd, a l l d  xeleoxaia  ôoOfjKave KdTtoia .. .prjvdpaxa KaKd ae axéarj
640  pe xrjv OprjaKeia.. .A o x o i Ttoo OTtrjpexodv xrjv OprjaKeia, aKodaxrjKav KdTtoia
641 Ttpdypaxa KdTtoo, epéva pe evoxlsü Fldpa Ttold! 0 a  fjOela aoxoi Ttoo OTtrjpexodve
642 xrjv OprjaKeia, v a  e iv a i Ttio aK épaïoi a a v  dv0p©Ttoi, Ttio K a O a p o i....0 a  poo Tteixe
6 4 3  Ttavxod OTtdpxoove e ...aoxoi01 KaKoiKai pyaiveiKapid (popdt o  k œ k ô  avxiva
644  pyaivei xo K a lô .. .E . . .ôp© ç Oa fjO ela ..ev© rj OprjaKeia l é e i  ôxi ôxav Kdveiç xo K a lô ,
645 rjôeÇid aoo ôev Oa TtpéTtei va Çépei xi Ttoiei rj apiaxepd aoo, ey© Ttiaxed© ôxi TtpéTtei
646 v a  (pavei Ttio Ttold xo épyo xrjç E iclrjaaiaç y iax i KdTtoioi dv0p©Ttoi ôev xo
647 yv©pi^oove.. .O i yoveiç ôev aaxolodvxai Ttdpa Ttold pe xa Ttaiôid xooç ôaov acpopd
648 xrjv OprjaKeia. "Exoov x ô a a  T to lld  v a  aaxolrjO odve.. .Ttpoxipodve v a  xa  Ttdve a e  p ia
649  TtaiôiKfj xapd yia..yiaxi ôev xa pléTtoov xa Ttaiôid xooç Kai Oéloov va xa Ttdve KdTtoo
650  v a  ÇeaKdaoove, v a  Çecpdyoove, v a ’pOodve l iy o  Ttio Kovxd xooç. STtdvia Oa ôeiç p ia
651 prjxépa v a  xo Ttaipvei xo Ttaii v a  xo Ttrjyaivei axrjv E K lrjaaia, y iax i l é e i  ô lrj xrjv
652  ep ôop d ôa  ÇoTtvdei v©piç Kai eycb ÇoTtvd© v© piç y iaxi epydÇopai. Aev TtpéTtei v a
653 orjK©Oei Ttp©i Kai v a  xo xpéx© axiç E K lrjaaieç. Flpoxipdei xo aTtoyeopaxdKi v a  xo
654  Ttdei ae pia TtaiôiKfj xotpd, v a  xo Ttdei eôcb, v a  xo Ttdei eKei.. .ae  éva  d l l o  oTtixi v a
655 Ttepdaei K a ld  xo Ttaiôi.. .Kai éxsi aTtopaKpovOei rj oiK oyéveia aTtô xrjv é w o ia , aoxfj
656  xrjç OprjOKeiaç! Fliaxéo©  ôxi Oa TtpéTtei v a  Ttîjyaivoope axrjv E K lrja a ia .. .v a  to
65 7  VKoOoope kœi v a  Ttr^yaivoope, ôxi éxai va  Ttrjyaivoope.. .ôp©ç avayKaaxrjKd aTtô xrjV
658 ep y a a ia  paç, éxoope Çeipdyei aTtô xrjv OprjaKeia. UpéTiei v a  eip aaxe Kovxd axrjv
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659  OprjaKeia..yiaxt p aç ôivei pdaeiç! A ev e ip a i Ttold OprjOKÔlrjTtxrj prjv vopiÇ eiç.. .A oxéç
660  xiç 10 ev x o léç  .. .'Oxav fjpoov axo ôrjpoxiKÔ.. .e iv a i Ttold y ia  v a  xo né?
Oxi...6xi!
661 Oxav fjpoov axo ôrjpoxiKÔ o ôdaKaloç paç, xexdpxrj, TtépTtxrj Kai éKxrj eixape xov iôio
6 6 2  ôdaK alo, paç épaÇe Kai ôxav eixape xip©pia yia KdTtoio lô y o  péaa axrjv xdÇrj Kai
663 p i lo d a a p e .. .p a ç x o  éKave oKÔTtipa T tiaxed© ...éleye Oa y p d y e iç x iç  10 e v x o léç  a a v
664 xip©pia! Kai xiç eixape pdOei an’é^œ xiç 10 evxoléç! Iliaxed© ôxi o dvOp©Ttoç ôxav
665 xrjpei aoxôv xov ÔeKdloyo Ttoo eivairj apxfj xrjç X piaxiavoadvrjç .. .é x s i p ia  pdarj xoo
666 Xpiaxiaviapod péaa xrjç oi ôéKa evxoléç, Ttiaxed© ôxi av xo Oopôpaaxe axrjv Ttopeia
667 xrjç Ç©fjç paç, xrjvKaOrjpepivfj e...yivôpaaxeKaldxepoidvOp©Ttoi. Se(peo...ôxi
6 6 8  K aldxepoi ôev y ivôp aaxe a l l d  Çecpedyoope ano KdTtoieç dxoTteç Kivfjaeiç Ttoo
669  pTtopodpe va K d voope...
670  n ô a o  arjpavxiKÔ Oe©peixai v a  ôiaxrjpfjaoope a a v 'E llr jv e ç  aoxfj xrjv axéarj a v d p ea a
671 axrjv OpOoôoÇia Kai axrjv ellrjviKÔxrjxa?
67 2  Ey© Ttiaxed© ôxi aoxd Ttdve paÇi.. .Flfjya axa vrjaid paç .. .axrjv Tfjvo Ttoo éxei
673  Ttolléç KaOoliKéç eKlrjaaieç.. .Ey© ôev Ttiaxed© ae aoxô, ôxi d llo  Ttiaxedoov aoxoi
67 4  Kai d l l o  epeiç ...ô x i!  A l l d  e . . .e ip a a x e  ô ep év o i p e  a o x ô  x o  Ttpdypa! "Exai
675  peyal©aape? Aoxô pdOape? E . . . eivai ..x©pa ey© va alldÇ© K d xi...axo  Ttiaxed©
676 poo xo OpTjOKeoxiKÔ aav a . . .aav va Kdv© éva axônrjpa. Iliaxed© ôxi aoxd xa
677 Ttpdypaxa eivai ôepéva paÇi!
678 Iloia eivai aoxd xa Kpixfjpia Ttoo évaç pexavdaxrjç TtpéTtei va Ttlrjpei yia va xov
679 ôexxeixe ©ç'Ellrjva...
680 Aev Oa e iv a i ÔdaKolo va xov aTtoôexx©.. .edv e iv a i K a lôç  oiKoyeveidpxrjç. E p éva
681 aoxô pe evôiacpépei.. . Na eivai Kalôç oiKoyeveidpxrjç, va Ttpoaéxei xa Ttaiôid xoo,
682 e .. .va epydÇexai e.. .va prjv eTtexei, va prjv Çrjxiavedei. Na eivai Kdpioç! Me liya
683 lôyia .. .Na aoxô Ttoo eKTtépTtei ...pe liya lôyia va ôei%vei ôxi eivai aoxdpicrjç! Na
684 ayaTtdei xrjv oiKoyéveia xoo, va voidÇexai yia aoxfjv, do%exa xi Ttioxedei oxrjv
685 OprjOKéia xoo.. .av ayaTtdei xrjv oiKoyéveia xoo Kai ay©viÇexai yia xo K alô x©v
686 Ttaiôicûv xoo, vopiÇ© ôxi Oa xov ô© ÔTt©ç eipai ey©!
687 Ilioxedexe ôxi rj Ttapoooia x©v pexavaax©v le%ei eTtrjpedoei xrjv éw oia xrjç
688 ellrjviKÔxrjxaç?
689 Aev vopiÇ© ôxi paç eTtrjpéaoe! Edv ôev Oéloope epeiç va paç eTtrjpedoei, ôev paç
690 eTtrjpedÇei! Ti paç Kdvoov oi dvOp©Ttoi..? Fia va paç eTtrjpedoei apvrjxiKd..? A..ôxi
691 yivovxai opiopévoi ôfjOev Ttdpa Ttolloi'Ellrjveç Kai ôev Oéloov va Kpaxodv xrjv
692 ellrjviKfj orjpaia..©ç Ttpoç aoxô...Aev (Jop(p©v© Ttdpa Ttold! Aev aop(p©v©...Gi 
693'EllrjveçôiéTtpe\|/avaxo eÇ©xepiKÔKaiOélavv a TtdpoovKaiOéaeiçva ...va
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694  ôioiK odvs TÔTtooç axrjv Apepncfj a ç  Tcodpe.. .Kai ôsv  xo Gsœp© k o k ô  aoxô. D lr j aoxfj
695  T| (paaapia tioo éyivs y ia  KaKO Tciaxsdœ ôxi éyivs, ô%i y ia  K alô! A sv s iv a i K a lô  v a  xa
696  piéTioope éxai... Av oi àvOpcoTcoi aTiooôdÇoov sôd), epydÇovxai Kai sivai acoaxoi,
697  yiaxi va prjv Ttdpoov aoxô Ttoo xooç aÇiÇei.. .Ttiaxed© KdTtoioç ÔTtoo Kai av eivai ..Kai
698  oi'EllTjveç Ttoo eivai éÇ© Kai oi'E llr|veç Ttoo eivai eô© .. .av aÇiÇoove Kdxi va xo
699  Ttdpoove!'Exai Ttiaxed©!
700  O p a ia ..a a ç  eo%apiax© Ttdpa p a  Ttdpa T to ld ....
678  riapaKal©...
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Appendix II
1. Pilot Study 1 Questionnaire (Greek and English versions)
2. Pilot Study 2 Questionnaire (Greek and English versions)
3. Main Study Questionnaire (Greek and English versions)
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Pilot Study 1 Questionnaire (Greek version)
646
AyaTcriTS crupp8Tda%0VTa,
To o v o p a  p oo  e iv a i 0 eo7iioxr| Xpoaav0dicr| Kai e ip a i ÔoiôaKxopncf) (poixfjxpia oxo  
Ttavemoxfipio xoo Surrey, axri M eydlr) B p e x a w ia . To TiapaKdxco epcoxrjpaxoloyio e iv a i  
pépoç xrjç ôiôaKxopncfjç poo  ep yao iaç  tioo p e lex d  xiç aTco\i/eiç xoo KÔapoo o e  KdTcoia 
KoivroviKd Oepaxa. Aev oTidpxoov offioxéç f| IdGoç aTcavxfjoeiç axiç epcùxfjoeiç ttoo 
ep(paviÇovxai a e  aoxô  xo eproxripaxolôyio. Evôiacpepôpaaxe y ia  xrjv ôiKfj aoo yvœprj. 
Se TiapaK alodpe v a  ô ia p d a siç  KdOe Tcpôxaarj TtpoaeKxiKd Tipiv aTuavxfjaeiç a e  aoxfj. 
ATcdvxTjae OAES xiç epœxfjaeiç a e  Kd0e pépoç xoo epœ xrjpaxoloyioo Tipiv Tipo%©pfjaeiç 
axo eTcôpevo. Acpoô é%eiç aopTilrjpcDaei éva  pépoç ep©xfjae©v Ttpo%©prjae axo eTtôpevo, 
a e  TcapaKalodpe va piiv yopiaeiç aeliôa pe aKOTiô v a  a lld Ç e iç  xiç aTtavxfjaeiç a o o . Ci 
aTcapaixrjxeç oôrjyieç y ia  xrjv aopTclfjpœarj xtjç ép eovaç PpiaKovxai axrjv ap%fj KdOe 
pépooç xoo epœxTjpaxoloyioo.
0 a  fjG ela v a  a e  ô iapeP aiœ a©  ôxi o i aTcavxfjaeiç a o o  Ga Tiapapeivoov avcbvopeç Kai 
epTciaxeoxiKéç. E av  oTidpxoov Tiepaixép© epmxfjaeiç fj eTciGopeiç v a  pdGeiç y ia  xa  
aTcoxeléapaxa xrjç épeovaç pTtopeiç v a  eTtiKoivcovfjaeiç paÇi poo  axrjv xjleKxpoviKfj poo  
ôieôGovarj: t.chrvsanthaki@ surrey.ac.uk
SE EYXAPISXn riA THN SYMMETOXH SOY
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M E P O S  A
Xpi]oipo7roi(ovTaç t iç  TiapaKdT© KlipaKsç a^iolôyî|aT]ç, a^ioloytias t o  ttôoo 
oop(p©vsiç fj ôia(pœv8iç ps t iç  TrapaKdT® jrpoTdosiç.
1. To ysyovôç ôxi eipai Xpiaxiavôç OpGôôoÇoç /  t| pe Kdvei va viœGco povaôiKoç/ rj.
Aiacpcovô ATtôXuTa Aiacpcovô apKexd Aiaq)0 v é  Aev É%m Svpcpcovœ Supcpcovd) apKExd Supcprovd) Attôadxo
2. To yeyovôç ôxi eipai Xpiaxiavôç OpGôôoÇoç /rj pe ÇexœpiÇei ano avGpœTtooç 
d llœ v GpriaKeimv.
Avacpcové A 7tôX,uxa Aiacpcovd) apKExd Amcpcovd) Aev É%(o SDucpcovô Supcpœvô apKExd Supçcovd) A n o k m a
aTroxi/Ti
3. To yeyovôç ôxi eipai Xpiaxiavôç OpGôôoÇoç /rj pe ôiaKpivei aTiô xooç d llooç.
Aia(pcûv6  AudXuxa Aiacpcovœ apKExd Aiacpfflvé Aev éyco Si)p(pcovô Zvprocovffl apKExd Zuixcpcov© ATtoADxa
a7io\|/îi
4. To yeyovôç ôxi eipai Xpiaxiavôç OpGôôoÇoç/îj pe ôiacpopOTioiei aTiô xooç 
dllooç.
Amcpcovd) ATiôXvxa Amcpcovd) apKExd Amcpcové Aev É%co Supcpcovd) Svpcpcovd) apKExd Eupcpcovco A n o k o x a
5. To yeyovôç ôxi eipai Xpiaxiavôç OpGôôoÇoç/ rj pe Kdvei va Kaxala^aiv© aTiô tioo 
Tcpoépxovxai 01 aÇieç poo.
Amcpcovd) A 7tôÀ.Dxa Aiacpcovd) apKExd Amcpcovd) Aev É%co Eupcpcové Eupcpcovd) apKExd lupcpcovd) AnoÀDxa
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6. To yeyovôç ôxi eipai Xpiaxiavôç OpGôôoÇoç /rj pe Kdvei va Kaxalapaivco tccoç 
éyiva ôxi eipai afjpepa.
Aiacpcovœ A 7rôX,VTa Aiacpcovœ apKexd Aiacpcovd) A ev é%co
, drtOlJ/Tl
Zupcpcovô Evpcpcovô apKexd 2i)pcpcovô A noX iixa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. To yeyovôç ôxi eipai Xpiaxiavôç OpGôôoÇoç/ T j, ôivei vôrjpa axo t io i o ç  eipai 
afjpepa Kai t k û ç  Ga fjGela va fjpoov axo péllov.
Aiacpcovd) A 7iôX,i)xa Aiacpcovd) apKexd Aiacpcovô Aevé%co
d7lO\|/îl
Supcpcovô SDpcpcovô apKexd Zi)pcpcovô A iiô X vx a
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. To yeyovôç ôxi eipai Xpiaxiavôç OpGôÔoÇoç/ rj 7cpoa(pépei éva ôeapô avdpeaa 
axo TtapelGôv Kai axo Tcapôv poo.
Aiacpcovd) AndÀDxa Aiacpcovô apKexd Aiacpcovô Aevéxco
dTioipri
Svpcpcovô Supcpcovô apKexd Supcpcovô A 7i6X,Dxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. To yeyovôç ôxi eipai cpoixrjxfjç/ xpia pe Kdvei va viœG© povaôiKÔç/ rj.
Aiacpcovô AnôXma Aiacpcovô apKexd Aiacpcovô Aevéxco
dTioipii
Supcpcovô Supcpcovô apKexd Sopcpcovô AnoÀDxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10. To yeyovôç ôxi eipai (poixrjxfjç/ xpia pe e^%©pi e^i aTcô avGpÔTcooç 
dllœ v Kldôwv.
Aiacpcovô A n d lD x a  Aiacpcovô apKexd Aiacpcovô Aevéxco
duoipTi
Svpcpcovô Svpcpcovô apKexd Supcpcovô A 7tôX,Dxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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11. To yeyovôç ôxi eipai (poixrjxf|ç/ xpia pe ôiaKpivei ano xooç d llo o ç .
Amcpcovd) ATrôXura Amcpcovd) apKexd Amcpcovd) A ev É%co Supcpcovd) Supcpcovd) apKexd Supcpcovcb ATtÔÀDxa
12. To yeyovôç ôxi eipai (poixTjxfjç/ xpia pe ôia(pop07ioiei ano xooç d llo o ç .
Amcpcovd) A 7iôA,uxa Aiacpcovô apKexd Aiacpcovô A ev évco Svucpcovô Suucpcovô apKexd Zoacpcovô ATiôÀDxa
13. To yeyovôç ôxi eipai (poixrjxfjç/ xpia pe Kdvei va KaxalaPatvœ ano nov 
Tupoépxovxai 01 aÇieç poo.
Aiacpcovô A 7rôX,Dxa Aiacpcovô apKexd Aiacpcovô A ev é%co Svpcpcovô Ziopcpcovô apKexd Supcpcovô AndADxa
14. To yeyovôç ôxi eipai (poixrjxf|ç/ xpia pe Kdvei va  KaxalaPaiv© nœç éyiva ôxi eipai 
(jnpepa.
Aiacpcovô A 7iôX,Dxa Aiacpcovô apKexd Aiacpcovô A ev é%co Supcpcovô Supcpcovô apKexd Supcpcovô ATiôÀvxa
15. To yeyovôç ôxi eipai (poixr|xf|ç/ x p i a , ôivei vôrjpa axo ttoioç eipai afjpepa Kai Tiœç 
0a fjOela va  fjpoov axo p é llo v .
16. To yeyovôç ôxi eipai (poixrjxfjç/ xpia Tipoacpépei éva ôeapô avdpeaa axo TiapelGôv 
Kai axo Tiapôv poo.
Aiacpcovô A 7ï6X.Dxa Aiacpcovô apKexd Aiacpcovô Aev é%co Supcpcovô Siipcpcovô apKexd Supcpcovô A n d A v ra
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17. To yeyovôç ôxi eipai "Ellxjvaç/iôa pe Kotvei va vi©0© povaôiKÔç/ rj.
Aiacpcovd) AnôA,Dxa Aiacpcovd) apxExd Aiacpcovd) A ev é%co Supcpcovd) Svpcpcovd) apKexd Supcpcovd) A noX o xa
18. To yeyovôç ôxi eipai'Ellxjvaç /lôa pe Çex©piÇei ano avOpénovç dllcov 
eOviKOxfjxœv.
Aiacpcovco A iroA uxa Aiacpcovd) apKexd Aiacpcovô Aev é/co Lvpcpcovô Svpcpcovô apKexd Evpcpcovô ATiôXwxa
19. To yeyovôç ôxi eipai'Ellrjvaç/iôa . pe ôiaKpivei ajiô xooç d llooç.
Aiacpcovô AnoÀDxa Aiacpcovô apKexd Aiacpcovô A ev e%co Svpcpcovô Svpcpcovô apKexd Svpcpcovô A noX iixa
a7lOV|/Tl
20. To yeyovôç ôxi eipai'EllTjvaç/iôa pe ôiacpopoTcoiei aTcô xooç dllooç.
Aiacpcovô AndX/Dxa Aiacpcovô apKexd Aiacpcovô Aevéxco Svpcpœvô Svpcpcovô apKexd Ziipcpcovô A noXD xa
aTTOipTj
21. To yeyovôç ôxi eipai 'Ellxjvaç/iôa pe Kdvei va Kaxalapaiv© aTtô Ttoo 
Tipoépxovxai 01 aÇieç poo.
Aiaq)covô ATiôAuxa Aiacpcovô apKexd Aiacpcovô A ev éxco Supcpcovô Supcpcovô apKexd Svucpcovô A n d X iix a
22, To yeyovôç ôxi eipai 'Ellx|vaç/iôa pe Kdvei va KaxalaPaiv© Tiœç éyiva ôxi eipai 
orfipepa.
23 . T o yeyovôç ôxi e lp a i'E llT |v a ç /iô a , ô lvei vôrjpa axo Ttoioç etp a i a fjpepa Kai Ttœç 0a  
fj0 e l a  v a  fjpoov axo p é l lo v .
Aiacpcovô AnôXDxa Aiacpcovô apKexd Aiacpcovô Aevéxco
dTioipTi
Supcpcovô SDpcpcovô apKexd Svpcpcovô AndlDxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
24 . T o yeyovôç ôxi e ip a i 'E llr jv a ç /iô a  Ttpoacpépsi éva  ô eap ô  a v d p ea a  axo Ttapel0ôv  
Kai axo Ttapôv poo.
Aiacpcovô AndXvxa Aiacpcovô apKexd Aiacpcovô Aevéxco
diroij/ri
SDpcpcovô Ivpcpcovô apKexd Siipcpcovô ATiôXuxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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M E P O S  B
S e  aoTÔ TO p é p o ç  t o o  E p W T tip aT o loy ioo  TrEpipévoope ajro E oéva  v a  aTravTrjaEiç o e  
p ia  OElpd Ep©TfjOE©V p a o io p é v o ç  lx\ OTIÇ EpTIElplEÇ K a i OTIÇ a7TÔ\|/ElÇ OOO. 
X p i]o ip o 7 io i(o v T a ç  T iç jtap aK d T ©  K lip aK E ç 7rpooM 0T|OE v a  a ^ io lo y f jo E iç  ttô o o  
OTjpavTiKd E iv a i T a jrapaK dT ©  OTOi%Eia y ia  o é v a  TrpoowjriKd. S e  T r a p a n a lo o p E  v a  
K0K16oEIÇ t o  v o d p s p o  tto o  o e  aVTlTrpOOWTTEOEl TTEpiOOÔTEpO.
25. Se Ttoio Pa0pô aia0dv£oai Xpioxiavôç OpGoôo^oç/ p;
Es DTCSpPoXlKd p iK pÔ Es 7toX,Û piK p Ô Es piK p Ô OÛTE as pv K p ô  / peyâXo Es psydlo Es TioXô psydXo Es wspPoliKd psydXo
BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
26. Se Tioio Pa0pô aioGdveoai 6xi é%Eiç ôovaxodç ôeopodç ps xooç Xpioxiavodç
Es U7tSpPo>.VKd piKpÔ Es TCOX.0 piKpÔ Es piKpÔ OÛTS as piKpô / psydXo Es psydXo Es TcoX.'ô psydXo Es u7cepPoX,iKd psydlo
BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Es DJlSpPoXvKd piKpÔ Es TCoXÔ piKpÔ Es piKpÔ OÔTE 08 piKpÔ / psydXo Es psydXo Es noX\> psydXo Es DirspPoXiicd psydlo
BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
28 . n ô o o  ôp o ioç  /a  m oxeoEiç ôxi Etoai p s éva  p éoo  X p iox iavô  O p0ô5o^o/ r|
Es UTIEpPoXlKd piKpÔ Es 7toX,Ô piKpÔ Es piKpÔ OÔTS OE piKpô / psydXo Es psydXo Es 7toX.ô psydXo Es DTCspPoXiKd psydlo
BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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29. nôao OTjixavTiKÔ slvai yia aéva xo yeyovôç ôxi etaai Xpiaxiavôç OpGôôoÇoç / rj ;
Ee DTiepPoXiKà piKpô Es %oXv pVKpÔ Es piKpÔ OÔTS 06 piKpô / psyôXo Es psyôXo Es TtoXô psydXo Es oTispPoXiKd psydXo
BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
30. nôao Tiiaxsdsiç ôxi oi aTcôij/eiç aoo yia xrjv OpGoôoÇla oopcpœvodv pe xmv dllœv;
Es OTtSpPoXlKd piKpÔ Es TCOXÔ piKpÔ Es piKpÔ OÔTS OS pvKpô / psydXo Es psydXo Es TCoXô psydXo Es OTispPoXiKd psydXo
BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
31. 'Oxav aKodç KdTioio t t o o  ôev e iv a i X piax iavôç OpOôôoÇoç v a  KpixiKdpei xooç  
O pO oôôÇ ooç, a e  t i o i o  PaOpô aiaO dveaai ôxi KpixiKdpoov ea év a  TipoacûTiiKd;
Es OTCSpPoXlKd piKpÔ Es TTOXÔ pVKpÔ Es piKpÔ OÔTS OS pvKpô / psydXo Es psydXo Es TtoXô psydXo Es OTcspPoXiKd psydXo
BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
32. Se Tüoio paGpô aiaOdveaai (poixTjxfjç/ xpia;
Es OTtSpPoXlKd piKpÔ Es TIOXÔ piKpÔ Es piKpô OÔTS OS piKpô / psydXo Es psydXo Es TioXô psydXo Es uTtspPoXiKd psydXo
BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
33. Se Tioio PaGpô aiaOdveaai ôxi é%eiç ôovaxodç ôeapodç pe xooç (poixrjxéç ;
Es OTISpPoXlKd piKpÔ Es TioXô piKpô Es piKpô OÔTS OS piKpô / psydXo Es psydXo Es TToXô psydXo Es OTTspPoXiKd psydXo
BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
34. Se Tcoio PaGpô aiaOdveaai eo%apiaxripévoç t io o  eiaai (poixTjxfjç;
Es VTlSpPoXlKd piKpÔ Es TTOXÔ piKpÔ Es piKpÔ OÔTS OS piKpô / psydXo Es psydXo Es TtoXô psydXo Es oTtsppoXiKd psydXo
BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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35. nôao 6)LioiGç/a Tciaxedsiç ôxi elaai jne éva |xéao (poixrjxfi;
Es OTlSpPoXlKd piKpÔ Es TtoXô piKpÔ Es piKpÔ OÔTS OS piKpô / psydXo Es psydXo Es TtoXô psydXo Es oTtspPoXiKd psydXo
BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
36. nôao oniLiavxiKÔ eivai yia aéva xo yeyovôç ôxi eiaai (poixr|xf|ç/ xpia;
Es OTtSpPoXVKd piKpÔ Es TtoXô piKpô Es piKpÔ OÔTS as piKpô /  psydXo Es psydXo Es TtoXô psydXo Es VTtspPoXiKd psydXo
BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
37. nôao Tciaxedeiç ôxi oi a7iô\|/eiç aoo yia xo Tcavemaxfinio oopicpmvodv p.e xœv 
dllœv;
Es OTtSpPoXlKd piKpÔ Es TtoXô piKpÔ Es piKpÔ OÔTS OS piKpô / psydXo Es psydXo Es TtoXô psydXo Es oTtspPoXiKd psydXo
BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
38. D xav aKoôç Kdîioio tioo ôev eivai q)OixT|xf|ç va  KpixiKdpei xooç (poixxjxéç, ae tio io  
PaGpô aiaGdveaai ôxi KpixiKdpoov eaéva TipoacoTiiKd;
Es OTtSpPoXlKd piKpÔ Es TtoXÔ piKpÔ Es piKpÔ OÔTS OS piKpô / psydXo Es psydXo Es TtoXô psydXo Es OTtspPoXiKd psydXo
BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
39. Ee Tcoio PaGpô aiaGdveaai'Ellrjvaç/iôa;
Es OTtSpPoXlKd piKpÔ Es TtoXô piKpÔ Es piKpÔ OÔTS OS piKpô /  psydXo Es psydXo Es TtoXô psydXo Es oTtspPoXiKd psydXo
BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
40. Ee Tcoio PaGpô aiaGdveaai ôxi é%eiç ôovaxodç ôeapodç pe xooç'Ellrjveç;
Es VTtSpPoXlKd piKpÔ Es TtoXô pVKpÔ Es piKpÔ OÔTS OS piKpô / psydXo Es psydXo Es TtoXô psydXo Es OTtsppoXiKd psydXo
BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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41. Ss Tcoio Pa0|Liô aiCT0àvsaai euxapiaxruxévoç nov elaai'Ellrjvaç/iôa;
Ee UTiepPoXiKd piKpô Ee TtoXô piKpô Ee piKpô 0ÔT8 as piKpô /  peydXo Ee peydXo Ee TtoXô peydXo Ee oTtepPoXiKd psydXo
Ba0p6 BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
42. nôao opoicç /a Tciaxsdeiç ôxi eiaai pe éva jxéao 'Ellrjva/iôa;
Es OTtSpPoXlKd piKpÔ Es TtoXô piKpÔ Es piKpÔ OÔTS as piKpô /  psydXo Es psydXo Es TtoXô psydXo Es OTtspPoXiKd psydXo
BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
43 . n ô a o  axjiLiavxiKÔ stv a i y ia  a év a  xo ysyovôç ôxi s la a i'E llr jv a ç  /  lô a  ;
Es OTtSpPoXlKd piKpÔ Es TtoXô piKpÔ Es piKpô OÔTS as piKpô /  psydXo Es psydXo Es TtoXô psydXo Es OTtspPoXiKd psydXo
BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
44. nôao Tüiaxsdsiç ôxi oi a7rô\|/8iç aoo yia xrjv "Elldôa aupopmvodv ps xcov dllœv;
Es UTtSpPoXlKd piKpÔ Es TtoXô piKpÔ Es piKpô OÔTS as piKpô /  psydXo Es psydXo Es TtoXô psydXo Es OTtspPoXiKd psydXo
BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
45 . 'Oxav aKoôç KdTioio tioo ôsv  s iv a i'E llr jv a ç , v a  KpixiKdpsi xooç ‘'E llr jv sç  a s  Ttoio 
pa0|xô a ia 0 d v sa a i ôxi KpixiKdpoov ea év a  TcpoaœTciKd;
Es OTtSpPoXlKd piKpÔ Es TtoXô piKpÔ Es piKpÔ OÔTS as piKpô / psydXo Es psydXo Es TtoXô psydXo Es OTtspPoXiKd psydXo
BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
46 . Eoxvd pexavicbv© Ttoo avfjK© ae  aoxfj xrjv 0prjaKsta.
Aiacpcovô AttoXoto Aiacpcovô Aiacpcovô Kdjicog Aevéxco Eupcpcovô Kciiicoç Svpcpcovô Eupcpœvô ATiôXota
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47. Ee ycviKéç ypaji^éç, eipai eu%apiaTT|pévoç ttou eipai péloç aniod tou 
Gppcnceupaxoç.
Aiacpcovd) ATiôXoTa Aiacpcovro Aiacpcovœ KdTicoç Asv Éxco
dTlO\|/T|
Evpcpcovô KdTicoç Evpcpcovô Epcpcovô ATtôXvxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
48. FeviKd, ou%vd viœG® 6xi x| GprjOKeia axrjv oTcoia avfjK© ôev é%ei peydlxj aÇia.
Aiacpcovô ATiôXoxa Aiacpcovô Aiacpcovô Kducoç Asv Éxco 
dTioipti
Eupcpcovô KdTicoç Eupcpcovô Epcpcovô ATiôXuxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
49. AioGdvopai Kald yia xo ôxi avf)K© oe auxf| xrjv GppoKeia.
Aiacpcovô ATiôXoxa Aiacpcovô Aiacpcovô KdTicoç Asv éxco 
dTioipTi
Supcpcovô KdTicoç iDpCpCOVÔ Epcpcovô ATiôXuxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5G. Ee yeviKéç ypappéç, rj GprjOKeia pou Geœpeixai Kalf) ano xouç dllouç.
Aiacpcovô ATiôXoxa Aiacpcovô Aiacpcovô KdTicoç Asv éxco 
dTcoipri
Svpcpcovô KdTicoç Supcpcovô Epcpcovô ATiôXDxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
51. Oi 7110 Tiolloi Gempouv 6xi p GpTjOKeia pou Kaxd péo© dpo eivai liyôxepo 
a7coxeleopaxiKf| ano âXkeq GprjOKeieç.
Aiacpcovô ATidXoxa Aiacpcovô Aiacpcovô KdTicoç Asv éxco
dTioipii
lupcpcovô KdTicoç SDpcpcovô iDpcpcovô ATiôXuxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
52. FeviKd, oi d llo i  oépovxai xrjv GprjOKeia oxpv oTioia avfjK©.
Aiacpcovô ATiôXuxa Aiacpcovô Aiacpcovô KdTicoç Asv éxco 
dTioyii
iDpcpCOVÔ KdTicoç Zvpcpcovô iDpcpcovô ATiôXvxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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53. reviK d, 01 d l l o i  m a x su o u v d x i rj GprjCKsia oxT|v oTcoia avf|Kco e iv a i ava^ioTuiaxri.
Aiacpcovd) ATiôXuxa Aiacpcovd) Aiacpcovd) k c ï t i c o ç  Aev é%co Supcpcovœ k c ï t ï c o ç  Si)pcpcovdb Supcpcovd) ATiôXuxa
aTlOWT)
54. Ei)%vd pexavimv© t c o u  avf|KCO axo (poixrjxiKO am pa.
Aiacpcovô AnôXuxa Aiacpcovô Aiacpcovô koticoç Aev é%co Eupcpcovô KdTicoç Eupcpcovô Eupcpcovô ATidXvxa
aTlOVlTl
55. Ee yeviKéç ypappéç, e ip a i eu%apiaxT|pévoç tcou e ip a i p é lo ç  xou (poixrjxiKod 
aœ paxoç.
Aiacpcovô ATiôXuxa Aiacpcovô Aiacpcovô KdTicoç Aev é%co Ei)pcpcovô KdTicoç Evpcpcovô Ei)pcpcovô ATioXi)xa
56. FeviKd, au%vd viœGco ôxi xo (poixpxiKÔ aœpa axo OTcoio avfjK© ôev é%ei peydlrj 
aÇia.
Aiacpcovô ATiôXuxa Aiacpcovô Aiacpcovô KdTicoç Aevéxco Eupcpcovô KdTicoç Eiipcpcovô Eupcpcovô ATiôADxa
57. A iaG dvopai K a ld  y ia  xo 6 xi avf|K© a e  auxô xo (poixrjxiKÔ a© p a.
Aiacpcovô ATiôXuxa Aiacpcovô Aiacpcovô KdTicoç Aev éxco Eupcpcovô KdTicoç Eupcpcovô Spcpcovô ATiôXuxa
aTioipn
58. Ee yeviKéç ypappéç, xo (poixrjxiKÔ a © p a  axo OTioio avfjK© Ge©peixai K a lô  aTcô 
xouç d l lo u ç .
Aiacpcovô ATiôXuxa Aiacpcovô Aiacpcovô KdTicoç Aev éxco Ei)|icpcovô KdTicoç Ei)|icpcovô Ei)|icpcovô ATiôXuxa
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59. Oi 7C10 Tiollot Geœpouv on to (poiTTjiiKO aœpa axo otioIo avfiKco Kaxd peoco opo 
eivai liyoxepo ajioxeleopaxiKo ajio d l la  .
Aiacpcovô AnoXoxa Aiacpcovô Aiacpcovô KdTicoç Aevéxco
dTiovpTi
El)|XCpCOVÔ KdTicoç Eopcpcovô Sojicpcovô ATiôXuxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
60. r eviKd, 01 d l lo i  oépovxai xo (poixrjxiKÔ oœpa axo OTioio avfjK©.
Aiacpcovô ATioXoia Aiacpcovô Aiacpcovô KdTicoç Aevéxco
dTlOlj/Tl
Eo^icpcovô KdTicoç Evjxcpcovô Eu^cpcovô ATiôXoxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
61. r eviKd, 01 d l lo i  maxedouv ôxi xo (poixrjxiKÔ a©pa axo OTioio avfjK© eivai 
avaÇiÔTiiaxo.
Aiacpcovô ATiôXoTa Aiacpcovô Aiacpcovô KdTicoç Aev éxco 
dTioipii
Eopcpcovô KdTicoç Eoncpcovô Ei)|xcpcovô ATiôXoxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
62. Ei)%vd pexavi©v© t c o u  avfjK© ae auxô xo éGvoç.
Aiacpcovô ATiôXuta Aiacpcovô Aiacpcovô KdTicoç Aev éxco 
dTlOl|/T|
Soncpcovô KdTicoç Eopcpcovô Eopcpcovô ATiôXuxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
63. Ee yeviKéc; ypappéç, eipai eu%apiaxrjpévoç t c o u  eipai péloç auxou xou éGvouç.
Aiacpcovô ATiôXoxd Aiacpcovô Aiacpcovô KdTicoç Aev éxco 
dTioipii
Eopcpcovô KdTicoç Eopcpcovô Sojxcpcovô ATiôXDxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
64. FeviKd, au%vd vi©G© ôxi xo éGvoç axo OTioio avfjK© ôev é%ei peydlrj aÇia.
Aiacpcovô ATiôXuxa Aiacpcovô Aiacpcovô KdTicoç Aev éxco
dTlO\j/T|
El)|ICpCOVÔ KdTicoç Si)|xcpcovô So^icpcovô ATiôXuxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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65. AiaGdvopai Kald yia to on  avfjK© as auxô xo éGvoç.
Amcpcové A tioXuto Amcpcové Amcpcové KotTicoç Aev é%co
dTioipTi
Eopcpcovô KdTicoç Eo^cpcovô Eo^icpcovô ATiôXuxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
66. Es ysviKéç ypappéç, xo éGvoç pou Gsœpslxai Kalô ano xouç d llou ç.
Amcpcové ATtôXvxa Aiacpoové Amcpcové KCïTicoç Aev éxco 
dTioipil
Eo^icpcovô KdTicoç Eopcpcovô Epcpcovô ATiôXoxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
67. Oi Tiio TTollot Gsœpouv ôxi xo éGvoç pou Kaxd péa© ôpo sivai liyôxspo 
aTtoxslsapaxiKÔ ano d l la  éGvrj.
Amcpcové A tioXuxo Amcpcové Amcpcové KciTicoç Aev éxco 
dTio\|/r|
Eo|icpcovô KdTicoç Eoncpcovô SDHcpcovô ATiôXoxa.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
68. r sviKd, 01 d l lo i  aépovxai xo éGvoç axo otioio avfjK©.
Aiacpcovô ATiôXuxa Amcpcové Amcpcové KciTicoç Aev éxco
dTioipii
Eopcpcovô KdTicoç Si)|j.cpcovô Ei))xcpcovô ATiôXoxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
69. r sviKd, 01 d l lo i  Tciaxsuouv ôxi xo éGvoç axo OTIOIO avfjK© sivai avaÇiÔTtiaxo.
Amcpcové ATiôXoxa Amcpcové Amcpcové KCÏTICOÇ Aevéxco
dTioipri
Ei)|icpcovô KdTicoç Eu^icpcové Eopcpcovô ATiôXoxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7G. ÜÇ Xpiaxiavôç OpGôÔoÇoç /rj, KaxopGœvco Ttdvxa va luv© ôôaKola Tipopippaxa
EvxeXôç avaXi^Géç AXi]0ivô |ie ôuoKoXia ExeBdv aXiiGivd EvxeXôç aXîiGivô
1 2 3 4
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71. Xpiaxiavôç OpGôôoÇoç /tj, av KdTioioç pou svavxicoGsl, pTcopé va ppiaK© xa
péaa Kai xouç xpÔTCouç va Tiaipvco auxô tiou Gélco.
EvteXôç avaXriGéç AXt|Givô |X8 ôuoKoXia ExeSôv aXiiGivô EvxeXôç aXîiGivô
1 2 3 4
72. üç  Xpiaxiavôç OpGôôoÇoç /p , sivai sukoIo yia péva va eTcipévœ axouç aKOTcouç 
pou Kai va STcixuyxdv© xouç axô%ouç pou.
EvxeXôç avaXx|Géç AXîiGivô pe ôuoKoXfa Zxeôôv aXîiGivô EvxeXôç aXriGivô
1 2 3 4
73. nç Xpiaxiavôç OpGôôoÇoç /t|, é%© auxoTrcTiolGrjari axo va avxipexœmÇ© 
iKavoTcoiTjxiKd xa aTcpôapeva yeyovôxa.
EvxeXôç avaXîiGéç AXîiGtvô pe ôuoKoXia ExeSôv oXtiGivô EvxeXôç aXrjGivô
1 2 3 4
74. Xdprj axTjv euprjpaxiKÔxrixa pou ©ç Xpiaxiavôç OpGôôoÇoç /rj, Çép© nœç va 
XsipiÇopai aTipôpisTcxsç Kaxaaxdasiç.
EvxeXôç avaXîiGéç AXîiGivô pe ôuoKoXia SxeSôv aXriGivô EvxeXôç aXiiGivô
1 2 3 4
75, Qç Xpiaxiavôç OpGôôoÇoç /xj, pTcop© va luv© xa Tispiaaôxspa Tcpoplppaxa edv 
Kaxapdl© xTjv a7capa(xT|XTj TipoaTidGeia.
EvxeXôç avaXiiGéç AXt|6ivô pe ôvoKoXia Exs5ôv aXTjGivô EvxeXôç aXrjGivô
1 2 3 4
661
76. Qq Xpiaxiavôç Op0ô5oÇoç /t| pTtopcb va psvco \|/6%paipoç ôxav avxipsxcomÇ©
ôvoKoMeç, yiaxi pTcopœ va PaolÇopai axrjv iKavôxrjxa pou.
EvxeXôç avaX.Ti0éç AlT]8iv6 |X8 ÔDOKoMa Sxeôôv aX,îi0iv6 EvxeXmg aX,îi0iv6
1 2 3 4
77. Xpiaxiavôç OpGôôoÇoç /rj ôxav avxipsxcoTciÇœ éva npôpknpa, pTiopm 
ouvr)0(og va ppiaKco 5id(pop8ç luasig.
Evte^ôç avaX,Ti0sç AÀT101VÔ pE ÔUCTKOMa Sxe5ôv aXîi0ivô EvteXcoç aX,T|0ivô
1 2 3 4
78. Qç Xpiaxiavôç Op0ô5oÇoç x| ôxav ppiaKopai as ôuaKolia pTiopo) auvr)0coç va 
aKsipxœ KdTCOia luar;.
EvTGXég avaX,Ti08ç AX.T|01VÔ |i8 Ô\)CTKOX,îa Zxeôôv aA,T)0ivô EvteXôç a>ir|0ivô
1 2 3 4
79. Oç Xpiaxiavôç Op0ô5oÇoç /t| , p7cop6 auvf)0coç va %sipiax(U ôxi spxsxai pjipoaxd 
pou.
EvteXôç ava^Ti08ç AA.T101VÔ ^ 8 ôyoKoWa ExeSov a>,Ti0ivô EvteX&ç aÀT|0iv6
1 2 3 4
80. ü ç (poixT|xf|ç/ xp ia , Kaxop0œvco Tcdvia va luvm ôvcncoXa 7ipopif|paxa sdv 
7ipoa7ia0f|aco apKsxd.
EvT8X,d)ç avaX,Ti08ç AX.r|0ivô H8 ôucTKoWa Zxe5ôv aXîi0ivô Evt8X,ôç aX,Ti0ivô
1 2 3 4
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81. Hç (poiTTjTfiç/ Tpia, av KdTioioç pou evavTio)0Ei, pTiop© va ppioKco xa péaa Kai
xouç xpÔTiouç va Tialpvco auxô Ttou 0s^ co.
EvTGÀmg ava>tîi08ç AX.T101VÔ (X8 ÔDOKOMa SxeSôv alT]0iv6 EvT8>.œç aXT|0ivô
1 2 3 4
82. Qq  (poixrixfjç/ x p ia , s lv a i suK olo  y ia  p éva  v a  empsvco axouç okotcouç pou Kai v a  
STcixuyxdvo) xouç axo^ouç pou.
EvteXôç avaX,Ti08ç AlT|0iv6 ^ 18 ôuoKoWa SxeSôv aX,T|0ivô EvteXôç aA,ri0ivô
1 2 3 4
83. Ü ç (poixTjxfiç/ x p ia , éxœ auxo7i87ioi0T|aT| axo va  avxipexcoTciÇco iKavoTcoirjxiKd xa 
aTTpôapsva yeyovôxa.
EvTGlmq avaX,T|08ç AXti0iv6 |i8 ôuoKoWa Sxs56v aX,îi0ivô EvT8X,d)ç aX,T|0ivô
1 2 3 4
84. Xdprj oxT|v EuprjpaxiKÔxrjxa pou œç (poixx|xf|ç/ x p ia , Çspo) tkoç v a  
avipoplsTixGç K axaoxdoeiç.
XeiplÇopai
EvT8>,â)ç avaX,Ti08ç AX,t]0iv0 p8 ôucTKoXia ZxeSôv aX,Ti0ivô EvT8Xd)ç aXîi0ivô
1 2 3 4
85. O ç (poixrjxfjç/ xp ia  ,.p 7iopo) v a  luvco xa  Tcepiaoôxspa 7cpopÀ,f|paxa sd v  Kaxapdlco  
xTjv a 7iapa(xr|XT| 7ip o a 7cd0£ia.
EvT8>.d)ç ava>.îi0éç AX.ti0ivô p8 ôdotcoWo Sxe5ôv aXîi0ivô EvT8>,éç aX,Ti0ivô
1 2 3 4
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86. (poixrjxfiç/ xpia, pTtopœ va pévœ \|/uxpaipoç ôxav avxipsxcûTclÇœ ÔuaKoMsg,
yiaxt pTcopd) va paoiÇopai oxrjv iKavôxxjxa pou.
Evt8>.6ç avaX.ii0éç AX,ti0ivô p8 ëvmcoMa 
1 2
SxeSôv aÀï]0iv6 
3
EvT8X,éç alT]0iv6 
4
87. Qq (poixrjxfiç /xpia, ôxav avxipsxcoTclÇco sva 7cpôpX.r|pa, pTiopœ cjuvfjOœç 
ôidcpopsç Xuosiç.
va pptoKCO
Evt8^ôç avaX,Ti08ç AA,ti0ivô ji8 ôdokoWo Zx^Sôv aA,îi0iv6 EvT8l6g aX,Ti0ivô
1 2 3 4
88. Hç cpoixrjxf|ç/ xpia, ôxav ppioKopai as ôuoKoMa pTcopœ ouvr|0a)ç va oKsipxco 
KdTtoia luoT|.
Evt8A,6ç avaX,Ti08ç AX.T101VÔ |X8 ôumcoMa ExeSov aA,îi0ivô EvT8l6g aXïi0iv6
1 2 3 4
89. Çlq (poixrjxfiç/ xpia, pTiop© (juvf|0Q)ç v a  xeipioxm  ôxi épxexai pTcpoaxd pou.
Evt8Xôç ava?^Ti08ç AX.T101VÔ |I8 ÔUCTKO^ia SxeSôv a^T|0ivô EvT8>.d)ç aX,îi0ivô
1 2 3 4
90. ngTlX,T|vag/ l ô a , KaxopOœvco Tidvxa v a  X,uv(o ô u o K o la  7ip o p if |p a x a  sd v  
7ip o o 7ia 0f|am  apKsxd.
Evt8>,©ç avaX,Ti08(; AXîl0ivô p8 ôuoKoWa ZxeSôv a>.r|0ivô EvT8l6g aXîi0ivô
1 2 3 4
91. Oç'EXX.Tivaç/ lÔ a , av  KdTioioç pou svavxicoOsi, pTiopœ v a  ppioKco xa  p é o a  Kai xouç  
xpÔTtouç v a  Tialpvco auxô tiou 0 é?iCû.
EvT8ldbg ava>.Ti08ç AXîi0ivô |i8 6i)(TKoMa Zxeôôv a^Ti0ivô EvT8À6g aX,r]0iv6
1 2 3 4
664
92. ^2ç'E>.À,Tivaç/ l ô a , s iv a i su K olo  y ia  péva  v a  STcipévco axouç okotcouç pou Kai v a  
STcixuyxdv© xouç axôxouç pou.
EvieXèç avaÀ,Ti0éç AX,îl0ivô us ôvcjKoMa Z%s66v aX,îi0ivô EvxsXcbg aXT|0iv6
1 2 3 4
93. n ç T l lT jv a ç /  l ô a , éxco auxo7i67ioi0T;ar| axo v a  avxipexcoTtiÇco iKavoTcoirjxiKd xa  
aTtpôapeva yeyovôxa.
EvxsXég avaXr|0Ég AX.T101VÔ p,E Su0KoX,va Z%s66v aX,îi0ivô Evt8^6ç aÀT|0iv6
1 2 3 4
94. Xdpri axTjv euprjpaxiKÔxrjxa pou (o çT llT jv a ç / lô a  , Çépco tkoç v a  xeipiÇopai 
aTcpôpA^Tcxeç K axaaxdaeiç.
Evts^ ç ava>.Ti08ç AX.Î101VÔ H8 ôuoKoX.va Z%866v aXîi0ivô EvT8>.d)ç aXT|0ivô
1 2 3 4
95. nçT lX ,T |vaç/ l ô a , pîiop© v a  À,uv(o xa Tcspiaaôxepa 7cpopX,f|paxa edv K axapdlm  
xTjv aTcapatxrjxrj 7rpoa7cd0sia.
EvtsXôç avaX,Ti08ç AA,îi0iv6 ps ôuoKoXia Z%886v aÀTi0ivô EvTsXmg aÀTi0ivô
1 2 3 4
96. ( l ç T l l r |v a ç /  lôa , pTiopd) v a  pévœ \j/uxpaipoç ôxav avxipsxcoTclÇû) SuaK olieç, y iaxi 
pTcopœ v a  PaaiÇ opai axxjv iKavôxxjxa pou.
Evxslmg avaX,T]08ç AlT|0lv6 |X8 ÔDOKoWa E%8Ô6v aX.Ti0iv6 Evts^ôç aX.îi0ivô
1 2 3 4
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97. ( I g T llr iv a g /  lôa , ôxav avxipsxcoTctÇû) sv a  7ipôpX,ripa, pTcopd) at)vf|0coç v a  
PptaKû) ôidcpopsç Xuosiç.
Evxelmq avaX.îi0éç AX,ti0ivô ne ôuoKoWa 
1 2
Z%866v aX,Ti0iv6 
3
EvT8X.d)ç aA,Ti0ivô 
4
. 98. n ç T l lT jv a ç /  lôa , ôxav  pptoK opai a s  ôuaKoM a pTiopcb auvf|0coç v a  cjKscpxcb 
KdTcoia Xuar).
EvxeXxbç avaA,r|08(; AX.ti0ivô iis ôvmcoXîa Z%886v a^Ti0ivô EvTsAxaç alT|0iv6
1 2 3 4
99. nç'ElX,T|vaç/ l ô a , pTiopœ auvr)0coç v a  xsipm xm  ôxi ép%sxai pTipooxd pou.
EvxsXfflç avaX,T]08ç A>wT|0iv6 p8 8u(JKoWa Sxe5ôv alx|0iv6 EvxsXœç aXx|0iv6
1 2 3 4
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M E P O S T ^
EOviKOTiixa:
OûXo:.............
HXiKia;..........
ETrdyyslpa:.
2 e  evxapioTW noXv yia t î j v  avpperoxil cou
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Pear participant,
My name is Theopisti Chrysanthaki and I am a PhD student in the University of Surrey, 
United Kingdom. The following questionnaire is part of my doctoral research 
investigating the public’s opinion on some social issues. There are no right or wrong 
answers to the questions that appear here. We are only interested in your opinions. 
Please make sure that you read each question or statement carefully before you respond 
to it. Answer ALL the questions in each section before you move to the next one. Once 
you have completed one set of these questions and gone to the next one, please do not go 
back and change any of your previous responses. All the instructions necessary for you 
to complete the survey are provided in the beginning of each section of the administered 
questionnaire,
I would like to reassure you that your responses will be kept strictly confidential and 
anonymous. If you have any further questions and/or if you would like to be informed 
about the results of the present study, you can contact me in my email address: 
t.chrvsanthaki@surrev.ac.uk
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION
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P A R T A
In th is section  w e  w ou ld  like you to an sw er a series o f  questions based  on you r  
beliefs and experiences. U sing th e scales provided, try to eva lu ate how  im portant the  
fo llow ing statem ents are to you as a person. P lease, circle the num ber th at applies to  
you the m ost.
1. To what extent do you feel Christian Orthodox?
Not at all Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. To what extent do you feel strong ties with other Christian Orthodox?
Not at all Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. To what extent do you feel pleased to be Christian Orthodox?
Not at all Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. How similar do you think you are to the average Christian Orthodox person?
Not at all Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. How important to you is being Christian Orthodox?
Not at all Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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6. How much are your views about Christian Orthodoxy shared by other Christian 
Orthodox people?
Not at all Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. When you hear someone who is not Christian Orthodox criticise the Christian 
Orthodox people, to what extent do you feel personally criticised?
Not at all Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. To what extent do you feel student?
Not at all Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. To what extent do you feel strong ties with other students?
Not at all Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10.To what extent do you feel pleased to be student?
Not at all Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
11 .How similar do you think you are to the average student?
Not at all Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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12. How important to you is being student?
Not at all Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
13. How much are your views about the University shared by other students?
Not at all Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
14. When you hear someone who is not a student criticise the students, to what 
extent do you feel personally criticised?
Not at all Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
15. To what extent do you feel Greek?
Not at all Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
16. To what extent do you feel strong ties with Greek people?
Not at all Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
17. To what extent do you feel pleased to be Greek?
Not at all Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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18.How similar do you think you are to the average Greek person?
Not at all Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
19.How important to you is being Greek?
Not at all Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
20.How much are your views about Greece shared by other Greek people?
Not at all Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
21 .When you hear someone who is not Greek criticise the Greek people, to what 
extent do you feel personally criticised?
Not at all Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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P A R T E
U sing the scales below , p lease ind icate the extent to w h ich  you agree or d isagree  
w ith  the fo llow ing statem ents.
2 2 .Being Christian Orthodox makes me feel unique
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 .Being Christian Orthodox distinguishes me from people o f other religions.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2 4 .Being Christian Orthodox makes me stand out from others.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2 5 .Being Christian Orthodox makes me different from others.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2 6 .Being Christian Orthodox makes me understand where my values derive from.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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27.Being Christian Orthodox makes me understand how I came to be the person I
am today.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2 8 .Being Christian Orthodox helps me make sense of who I am today and how I 
would like to be in the future.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2 9 .Being Christian Orthodox provides a link between me in the past and me in the 
present.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3 0 .Being student makes me feel unique.
Strongly disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly agree 
7
31 .Being student distinguishes me from people o f other sectors.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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3 2 .Being student makes me stand out from others.
Strongly disagree
: 1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly agree 
7
3 3 .Being student makes me different from others.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3 4 .Being student makes me understand where my values derive from.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3 5 .Being student makes me understand how I came to be the person I am today.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3 6 .Being student helps me make sense o f who I am today and how I would like to
be in the future.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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37.Being student provides a link between me in the past and me in the present.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3 8 .Being Greek makes me feel unique.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3 9 .Being Greek distinguishes me from people o f Other nationalities.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4 0 .Being Greek makes me stand out from others.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
41 .Being Greek makes me different from others.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4 2 .Being Greek makes me understand where my values derive from.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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43.Being Greek makes me understand how I came to be the person I am today.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4 4 .Being Greek helps me make sense o f who I am today and how I would like to 
be in the future.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
45 . Being Greek provides a link between me in the past and me now.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
46.1 often regret that I belong to this religious group.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
47 . In general, I'm glad to be a member o f this religious group I belong to.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4 8 .Overall, I often feel that my religious group o f which I am a member is not 
worthwhile.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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49.1 feel good about the religious group I belong to.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5 0 .Overall, my religious group is considered good by others.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
51 .Most people consider my religious group, on the average to be more ineffective 
than other religious groups.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5 2 .In general, others respect the religious group I am a member of.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5 3 .In general, others think that the religious group I am member o f is unworthy.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
54.1 often regret that I belong to this student group.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 - 4  5 6 7
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55.In general, I'm glad to be a member of this student group I belong to.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
56. Overall, I often feel that my student group o f which I am a member is not 
worthwhile.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
57.1 feel good about the student group I belong to.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5 8 .Overall, my student group is considered good by others.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5 9 .Most people consider my student group, on the average to be more ineffective 
than other student groups.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6 0 .In general, others respect the student group I am a member of.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 , 3  4 5 6 7
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61 .In general, others think that the student group I am a member of is unworthy.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
62.1 often regret that I belong to this national group.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6 3 .In general. I'm glad to be a member o f this national group I belong to.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2  3 4 5 6 7
64. Overall, I often feel that my national group o f which I am a member is not 
worthwhile.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
65.1 feel good about the national group I belong to.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6 6 .Overall, my national group is considered good by others.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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67.Most people consider my national group, on the average to be more ineffective 
than other national groups.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
68.In general, others respect the national group I am a member of.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
69.In general, others think that the national group I am member of is unworthy.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
70. AS a Christian Orthodox I can always manage to solve difficult problems if I try 
hard enough.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
71. AS a Christian Orthodox if someone opposes me, I can find the means and ways 
to get what I want.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
72. AS a Christian Orthodox it is easy for me to stick to my aims and accomplish 
my goals.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
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73. AS a Christian Orthodox I am confident that I could deal efficiently with 
unexpected events.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
74.Thanks to my resourcefulness as a Christian Orthodox, I know how to handle 
unforeseen situations.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
75. AS a Christian Orthodox I can solve most problems if I invest the necessary 
effort.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
76. AS a Christian Orthodox I can remain calm when facing difficulties because I 
can rely on my coping abilities.
Not at all true
1 2 3
Exactly true 
4
77. AS a Christian Orthodox when I am confronted with a problem, I 
find several solutions.
can usually
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
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78. AS a Christian Orthodox if I am in trouble, I can usually think of a solution.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
79. AS a Christian Orthodox I can usually handle whatever comes my way.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
80. AS a student I can always manage to solve difficult problems if I try hard 
enough.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
81. AS a student if someone opposes me, I can find the means and ways to get what 
I want.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
82. AS a student it is easy for me to stick to my aims and accomplish my goals.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
83.AS a student I am confident that I could deal efficiently with unexpected events.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
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84.Thanks to my resourcefulness as a student, I know how to handle unforeseen
situations.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
85. AS a student I can solve most problems if I invest the necessary effort.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
86. AS a student I can remain calm when facing difficulties because I can 
my coping abilities.
rely on
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2  3 4
87. AS a student when I am confronted with a problem, I can usually find several 
solutions.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
88.AS a student iff am in trouble, I can usually think of a solution.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
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89. AS a student I can usually handle whatever comes my way.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
90. AS a Greek I can always manage to solve difficult problems if I try hard 
enough.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
91. AS a Greek if someone opposes me, I can find the means and ways to get what I 
want.
Not at all true 
1 2
Exactly true 
3 4
92. AS a Greek it is easy for me to stick to my aims and accomplish my goals.
Not at all true 
1 2
Exactly true 
3 4
93.AS a Greek I am confident that I could deal efficiently with unexpected events.
Not at all true 
1 2
Exactly true 
3 4
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94.Thanks to my resourcefulness as a Greek, I know how to handle unforeseen
situations.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
95. AS a Greek I can solve most problems if I invest the necessary effort.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
96.AS a Greek I can remain calm when facing difficulties because I can rely on my 
coping abilities.
Not at all true
1 2  3
Exactly true 
4
97. AS a Greek when I am confronted with a problem, I can usually find several
solutions.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
98. AS a Greek if I am in trouble, I can usually think of a solution.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
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99.AS a Greek I can usually handle whatever comes my way.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
P A R T C
N A T IO N A L IT Y :
A G E : ......................
G E N D E R :............
O C C U PA T IO N :
Thank you very much fo r  your participation
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s
AyaTcrixé (Tupixeidaxovia,
To ô v o p a  pou £ ivai ©eoTitaxri XpuoavGdTcri Kai s tp a i ôoiôaKxopiicfi (poixf|xpia axo  
7cav87cicjxf|pio xoo) Surrey, oxrj MsydX-rj B p sx a w ia . To TiapaKdxco epœxrjpaxoXôyio Eivai 
pépoç xrjç 5i5aKxopiKT|ç pou sp y a a ïa ç  Trou p e lex d  xiç a7iô\|/8iç xou KÔapou 08 KdTioia 
KoivœviKd Gépaxa. Aev U7idp%ouv oœ oxéç fj IdGog a7tavxf|aEiç oxiç 8pcoxr|0 8 iç Trou 
EprpaviÇovxai oe auxô xo Epmxripaxoloyro. EvôiaçEpôpaaxE y ia  xrjv ôiK fj ctou yvd)pr|. 
Ee TrapaKttloupE v a  ôiapdoEiç xdGE Trpôxaori TrpooEKxiKd Trpiv aTravxfjoEiç oe auxf|. 
ATrdvxxjOE O A E E  xiç EpcoxpoErç oe xdGE pépoç xou Epcoxripaxoloyrou Trpiv Trpo%o)pf|OEiç 
0X0 ETrôpEvo. Acpou EXEiç oupTrlripmoEi éva  pépoç Epcoxf|OECOV %po%mp^oE oxo ETrôpEVO, 
0 8  napaK oloupE  v a  pi^v yupioEiç G s k i ô a  pE OKOTrô v a  aXXd^Eiç xiç aTravxpoEiç oou . O i 
aTraparxT|XEç oôrjyiEç y ia  xt|v oupTrlf)pcoor| xpç épEUvaç ppioKovxai oxrjv ap%fi KdGE 
pépouç xou Epcoxppaxoloyrou.
0 a  f|GE?ta v a  oe ôiapEpaicboco 6xi o i aTravxfjOEiç oou  Ga TrapapEWouv avœvupEç Kai 
EpTrioxEuxiKEç. E av  UTrdpxouv TrEpaixépco EpcoxfjOEiç f| ETriGupEiç v a  pdGEiç y ia  xa  
aTroxEÀéopaxa xrjç épEuvaç pTropEiç v a  ETriKoivœvrioEiç paÇi pou oxT|V rjXEKxpoviKfi pou  
ôiEuGuvorj: t.chrvsanthaki@ surrev.ac.uk
E E  E Y X A P IE T H  F IA  T H N  E Y M M E T O X H  EO Y
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M E P O E  A'
Xpr|CJipo7ioiœvTaç xiç TiapaKdxco K^ipaKeç aÇioXôyrjariç, a^ioloyT |08 xo n ô o o  
(Tupcpcoveiç f| ôiacpœvelç pe xiç TcapaKdxco Tipoxdoeiç.
1. To yeyovôç ôxi sipai ■"EÀ,À,r|vaç/iôa ps Kdvsi va vi60co povaôiKÔç/ Tj.
Aia(pcovü) ATTÔXuTa Aiacpcové apKsxâ Aiacpœvd) Aev éx® Sup(p® v6 Supcpavd) apKexd 
d7tO\|/Tl
Zup(p®v® AvtoXuxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. To yeyovôç ôxi elpaiTllxivaç /lôa pe ÇexcoplÇei aTcô avGpœTcouç dllcov 
8GviKOXf|XCOV.
Aiacpcûvd) ÀviôXuTa Aiacpcovd) apKexd Amcprovd) Aev ex® Sup(p®vro Sup(p®v® apxexd  
dTTOVj/Tl
Sup(p®vffl A7rôX,uxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. To yeyovôç ôxi 8(pai'E^À,rjvaç/ lôa pe ôiaKplvei aTcô xouç dXlouç.
Aiacpffivd) A7iôX,uxa Aiacptovô apKexd Aiacpcovœ Aev éx® Sup(p®v® Su|X(p®v® apxexd
d7C0\|/Tl
Zup(p®v® Avroluxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. To yeyovôç ôxi 8ipai"E?iX,riva05a ps ôiacpopoTtoiel aTiô xouç dÀ,A.oo)ç.
Aia(p®vffl AnôXvra Aia(p®vé apxexd Aia(p®v® 
1 2 3
Aev éx® 
d7to\i/ri
4
Zup(p®VM Sup(p®v® apKexd 
5 6
So)p(p®vffl AjroXuxa 
7
5. To yeyovôç ôxi8ipai'E?tÀ,T|vaç/iôa pe Kdvei va KaxaA.aPaivco aTUÔ tcou  
Tcpoépxovxai 01 aÇleç pou.
Aiaq)®vffl ATiôXuxa Aia(p®vô apxexd Aia(p®v® Aevéx®
d;rov(iTi
Sup{p®v6 Sup(p®vd) apKexd S\)|x(p®v6 A7tôX,uxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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6. To yeyovôç ôxi eipai'E^^xjvaç/iôa pe Kdvei va KaxaXaPaivco tücûç éyiva ôxi etpai 
oripepa.
Amcprovd) AvtoÀuxa Avaçœvro apKexd Aiacprovô Aev é%ro 
dTioipi]
Supcprovro Supcprovd) apKexd Supcprovô A n d lu xa
1 2 . 3 4 5 6 7
7. To yeyovôç ôxi etpai TllT|vaç/i8a, ôivei vôqpa axo t io io ç  eipai ofjpepa Kai tkdç  0a 
f|0ela va f|poi)v oxo péllov.
Aia(p®vd) ATcôXuxa Aiacpcovro apKexd Aiacprovd) A evéx®
duoipTl
Zupcprovd) Supcprovd) apKexd Supcprovô A n o lu x a
1 2  3 4 5 6 7
8 .  To yeyovôç ôxi etpai'E^À,r|vaç/iôa Tipoocpépei éva ôeopô avdpeoa oxo TiapelGôv | 
Kai 0 X 0  Tcapôv pou.
Aiacprovd) A n d lu xa  Aiacprovro apKexd Aiacprovd) Aev éx® 
dTioipn
Zupcprovd) Supcprovd) apKexd Supcprovd) A n d lu xa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ee TtapaKoXôvpe yvpiae Twpa aeXiôa Kai ôiapaae ro Keipevo nov aKoXovdsL
692
EUROPEAN CULTURAL COMMISSION 
EYPOUAIKH nOAITIETIKH EUITPOnH
0EM A ; « EupcoTTii Kai TToXiTiopôç»
»**♦
* « » *
BRUSSELS 10.5.2002
H laxopia evôç sOvouç aTcoxs^i KaOopiaxiKO Tiapdyovxa axxj ôiapopcpcoarj xrjç eOviKfjç 
cTüveiÔTjcrriç xcov Tiolixmv xou, oxrj Sidocoorj, oxrj ôiaicoviori Kai axTj ôidôoori xou 
Tiolixiopou xou.
O poÀog xTjç loxopiaç coç cruvôexiKOU KpiKOU avdpeoa oxo Tcape^Oôv Kai oxo p é l lo v  
evôç eOviKOu Kpdxouç Kai ri Géorj xrjç oxo eKTiaiôeuxiKÔ ouoxrjpa xcov Kpaxcbv-peTvcbv xrjç 
EupcoTiaïKfjç'Evcooriç UTcpp^e lôiaixepo Gépa ou(f|xr|or)ç Kai Tcpopippaxiopou oe  
TcpôocpaxTj ouvdvxrjorj xpç Eupco7caïKf|ç IIolixioxiKrjç E7cixp07if|ç .
Exrj cyuvdvxrjOTj tcou 7ipaypaxo7ioif|GriKe oxiç 5.5.2GG2 oxiç B p u ^ élleç, avdpeoa oe àXka 
Çr|xf|paxa, eTiicyripdvGrjKe o apvpxiKÔç p ô lo ç  xxjç eOviKf|ç loxopiaç xTjç EXXàbaq oxrjv 
ÔTipioupyia xTjç eupco7caïKf|ç 7iolixioxiKf|ç xauxôxrjxaç.
H ÏIolixioxiKTi ETCixpOTcf) OTcocpdoioe Kaxd TrXeioxj/rjcpia va  Tiapéppei oxov xpÔTio 
ôiôaOKaMaç xx|ç loxopiaç oxa eKTiaiôeuxiKd oüoxfjpaxa xcov eOviKcbv Kpaxcov -peXcbv xxjç 
EupcoTiaïTcriç'Evcoot|ç.
lôialxepTj avacpopd UTcfjpÇe oxo e^lx|viKÔ eKTtaiôeuxiKÔ ouoxx|pa ,xo otcoio pe pdorj 
Kupicoç xTjv ôiôaoKaMa xrjç loxopiaç, opiopéva péÀ,T| xt|ç E7iixp07if|ç xo xapaKxppioav 
coç 7coÀ,u eOviKioxiKÔ. Ext| ôiôaoKaMa xrjç loxopiaç oxo ellT|viKÔ o x o le io  e7cior|pdvGT|Kav 
Kpauyaléeç Tiepmxœoeiç eOviKioxncriç 7ipoKaxdlT|i|/T|ç, o i OTioleç aTiocpaoioOriKe ôxi 
TipéTieiva KaxapyrjOouv.
Fla va evioxuoei xx|V avdTcxuÇrj xt|ç eupcoTiaïKfjç eOviKpç ouvei6T|OT|ç, t| ETcixpOTcf) 
aTcocpdoioe ôxi TcpéTcei va  yivouv piÇiKéç aXXajéq oxrjv ouyypacpfj xcov loxopiKcbv 
eyxeipiôicov, pe évxovri avacpopd oxrjV loxopia xxjç EupœTcrjç, xa OTcoia aTcô xx|v eTcôpevrj 
oxoliKTi Tiepioôo Ga ôiôdoKovxai UTioxpecoxiKd o  ôXa xa Kpdxx|-pélT| pe ôm M oieç  
ôiôaKxiKéç cbpeç Kai xa OTioia Ga avxiKaxaoxpoouv xa pipMa loxopiaç tiou ôiôdoKovxav 
pé%pi (jripepa oxa oxoXeia..
F ia xo 7repie%ôpevo xou o%oX,ikou ey^eipiôtou xT|ç loxopiaç ôôOrjKav o i eÇfjç KaxeuOuvoeiç
1. ETciGexa n.% loxopiKcbv TcpoodÔTicov tcou eKcppdÇouv évxovo eOviKiopô ôtccoç 
BoulyapOKxôvoç, ToupKOCpdyoç KplOr|Kav aTcapdôeKxa ôtccoç Kai r\ ovop aoia  
ToupKOKpaxia yia xa 4GG xpôvia xoupKiKXjç Kaxoxpç, aTco(paoioxT|Ke va  
pexovopaoGei Tcepioôoç xxjç OOcopaviKfjç AuxoKpaxopiaç.
2. H Koivri EupcoTcaïTcfj Tcolixioxucf; Tcapdôoorj ôrjpioupyfjGrjKe oxrjv Kevxpncrj 
EupœTcrj Kai tj ap^f; xpç loxopiaç xrjç EupcoTcaÏKf|ç 'Evcoorjç xoTcoOexelxai oxiç
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ap%8ç TOD 9°  ^ p.X.ai©va pe t t |v  lôpuori t t |ç  Ayiaç PcopaïTcfjç AuxoKpaxoplaç ano 
xov Kaplopdyvo, loxopiKÔ yeyovôç axo otcoio TcpéTcei va ôivexai épcpaarj.
3. H PcopaïKTi laxop ia  ,T| OTCoia aTCOxelet éva  lapTcpô TcapeXGôv y ia  xrjv Tcleio\|/T|(p{a 
' xcov ôuxiKcbv xœpcûv xxjç EupcoTCT|ç %apaKXT|p{(exac axo a%oA,iKÔ ey%eipiôio coç
npcoxoiaxopia xrjç EupcoTcriç Kai TcpéTcei eTcopévcoç va eivai xo eiaaycoyiKÔ 
Kecpdlaio KdGe oxoXïkov pi^Mou laxopiaç ôlcov xcov EupcoTcaïKcbv Kpaxcov.
4. H ETCixpOTcri eTcior|ç Tcpoxeivei xrjv Kaxdpyrjarj xou eTciGéxou Méyaç yia laxopiKéç 
TcpoacoTciKÔXTjxeç ,01 OTCoieç cTUVÔéGrjKav pe ipTcepiaXiaxiKéç TcolixiKéç ôtccoç o 
Méyaç AXôÇavôpoç Tj o Méyaç NaTcolécov Kai va KaxapyrjGouv eGviKéç eopxéç tcou 
é%ouv axéarj pe TcolepiKéç ouyKpouaeiç xcov EupcoTcaïKcbv Xacbv (tc.%. EalM a- 
ATceleuGépcooTi xou lïapiaiou , E lld ô a  - 28^ ÛKxcopplou).
5. Téloç, yia Tcapdôeiypa r\ EXkâba, KaXeixai va UTCoPaGpiaei axa a%oliKd 
eyxEipiôia eGviKfjç laxopiaç xrjv eGviKf) xrjç Tcapdôocrrj, t| OTcoia xx|V ouvôéei pe xo 
paKpivô loxopiKÔ TcapeXGôv xx|ç Kai va xoviaei xrj (juvôeorj xrjç pe xrjv EupcoTcrj 
axTjplÇovxaç xrjv EupcoTcaïKT| lôéa ,x| OTcoia ôev PaaiÇexai axo TcapelGôv aXkâ 
eTcevôuei oxo pé^Xov.
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AiapdÇovxaç xo TcapaTcdvco dpGpo Tiôao aTreiXTiTiKfj Gsœpsiç xrjv axdar| xr|ç Eupd)7rr|ç:
• yia xTjv ouvéxsia xrjç eGviicfiç oou xauxoxTjxaç avdpeoa oxo TcapelGov Kai oxo 
péllov;
KaGolou ITdpa 7ioÀ,u
yia XTjv ôiacpopeTiKÔTiiTa oou coç "EXA,T|vag;
KaGolou ndpa noXo
yia  xxjv auTÔ-eKTipiioTi tcou é%eig coç "ElX,T)vag
1 2 
KaGolou ndpa Tcolu
yia xxjv auTeTcdpKeia (xo va pTcopeiç va À-uveiç Tcpopif)paxa Kai va xeipiÇeoai 
Kaxaoxdoeiç cog'EXlT|vag) t c o u  éx£iç coç "EÀXrivaç;
1 2 
KaGolou ndpa T c o lu
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XprjaipoTTOiœvxaç xr|v TcapaKàxco K ltp a x a  o e  jcapaK aloupe v a  p aç Tueiç n ô a o  n i o x s v e i ç  
ôxi xo Ketpsvo TCOU ô id p aaeç  etvai aX,T|0cv6 T| 9 xia%xô.
1 5 6
K aG olou
aÀ,Tj0 ivô
ndpa Tcolu 
a lx |0 cv6
EGviKÔTiiTa:
0 u)vO:
Ee eü/apiaré noXv yia rtjv avppsTO/tj aov.
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Pilot Study 2 Questionnaire (English version)
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Unis
Dear participant,
My name is Theopisti Chrysanthaki and I am a PhD student in the University of Surrey, 
United Kingdom. The following questionnaire is part of my doctoral research 
investigating the public’s opinion on some social issues. There are no right or wrong 
answers to the questions that appear here. We are only interested in your opinions. 
Please make sure that you read each question or statement carefully before you respond 
to it. Answer ALL the questions in each section before you move to the next one. Once 
you have completed one set of these questions and gone to the next one, please do not go 
back and change any of your previous responses. All the instructions necessary for you 
to complete the survey are provided in the beginning of each section of the administered 
questionnaire.
I would like to reassure you that your responses will be kept strictly confidential and 
anonymous. If you have any further questions and/or if you would like to be informed 
about the results of the present study, you can contact me in my email address: 
t.chrvsanthaki@surrev.ac.uk
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION
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P A R T A
U sing the scales below , p lease ind icate the extent to w h ich  you agree o r  d isagree  
w ith  the fo llow ing statem ents.
1 Being Greek makes me feel unique.
Strongly disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly agree 
7
2. Being Greek distinguishes me from people of other nationalities.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Being Greek makes me Stand out from Others.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Being Greek makes me different from others.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. Being Greek makes me understand where my values derive from.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. Being Greek makes me understand how I came to be the person I am today.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. Being Greek helps me make sense of who I am today and how I would like to 
be in the future.
Strongly disagree
1 2 3 4
Strongly agree 
5 6 7
8. Being Greek provides a link between me in the past and me in the present.
Strongly disagree
1 2 3 4
Strongly agree 
5 6 7
Please, now turn the page and read the following article^.
 ^This is one of the three versions of the questionnaire that was used for piloting the 
administered scenarios. The present questionnaire aimed to pilot the vignette threatening 
national continuity. The other versions included the scenario threatening national 
distinctiveness and the text administered to the control group respectively.
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E U R O P E A N  C U L T U R A L  C O M M ISSIO N
B R U SSE L S 10-5-2002
SUBJECT: “Europe and civilisation”
The history of a nation is a key factor in shaping the national consciousness of its citizens 
and in preserving, maintaining and disseminating its culture.
The role of history as a connecting link between the past and the future of a nation-state 
and its position in the educational system of the European Union member-states was an 
issue of particular debate and consideration at a recent meeting of the European Cultural 
Commission.
During this meeting, which was held in Brussels on 5-5-2002, among other things, the 
negative role of the national history of Greece in the process of creating a European 
cultural identity was highlighted. The Cultural Commission decided by majority voting to 
intervene in the delivery of teaching history in the educational systems of national 
member-states of the European Union.
Special mention was made for the Greek educational system which, on the basis of 
teaching history in particular, was described by some members of the Commission as 
highly nationalistic. Extreme cases of nationalistic prejudice were pointed out in the 
teaching of history in Greek schools, and it was decided that these cases need to be 
abolished.
In order to reinforce the development of a European national consciousness, the 
Commission decided that there need to be radical changes in the authoring of history 
textbooks, with particular emphasis in the history of Europe. These books will be 
compulsory reading with the beginning of the following academic year in all member- 
states, with increased teaching hours (double), and they will replace history textbooks 
that have been in use for teaching in schools so far.
With regard to the content of this history textbook, the following guidelines have been 
issued:
Epithets, for example those used for historical figures, such as Bulgar-Slayer or Turk- 
Eater, are deemed unacceptable. Additionally, the term used to describe the 400-year of 
Turkish occupation, Tourkokratia, will be renamed to “era of the Ottoman Empire”.
1. The common European cultural tradition was created in Central Europe and the 
beginnings of European Union history date to the early 9^ cent. AD with the 
establishment of the Holy Roman Empire by Charles the Great (Charlemagne), an 
historical fact on which particular emphasis must be placed.
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2. Roman history, which forms an illustrious past for the majority of western 
European countries, features in the textbook as the Protohistory of Europe and it 
therefore needs to be the introductory chapter of every school history textbook in 
all European states.
3. The Commission also recommends the abolishment of the epithet ‘Great’ for 
historical figures that have been linked with imperialist policies, such as 
Alexander the Great or Napoleon the Great. It also recommends the abolishment 
of national public holidays that commemorate military conflicts among European 
peoples (e.g. France -  liberation of Paris, Greece -  28* October).
4. Finally, Greece, as an example, is asked to make appropriate changes in textbooks 
of national history in order to demote its national tradition which links to its 
distant historical past and to emphasize its links with Europe by supporting the 
European ideal, which is not based on the past but rather invests in the future.
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After reading the previous article, using the scales from 1 to 7 please indicate how 
threatening would you consider Europe’s position to be regarding:
• the continuity of your national identity across time (national continuity)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all A great deal
• ' your distinctiveness as a Greek? (national distinctiveness)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all A great deal
• your self-esteem as a Greek? (national self-esteem)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all A great deal
• your self-efficacy as a Greek (to be able to solve problems and handle 
situations as a Greek)?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all A great deal
Using the scale below please indicate the extent to which do you believe that the article 
you read is real or fictional.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not factual Extremely factual
at all
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A G E :.......
GENDER:
Thank you for your participation
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Questionnaire Main Study Part A (Greek version)
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M E P O E  A
XpTjcrinoTTOicbvTag tiç TrapaKdTW KlipaKeg a^ioXôyqmiç, a^ioloyqcTE to ttocto 
<n)p(pœv8iç f| ôia(pcov8iç p8 tiç TrapaKdTCO 7rp0Tdo8iç.
1. To yeyovôç ôxi eiuai Xpiaxiavôç Op8ô6oEoç /ri us Kdvsi va viœGco povaôiKÔç/ t|
Amcprov® AvtôXuTa Aiacprovœ apKexd Aiaçrovœ Aev é%® Supcprov® Siipcprovd) apKexd Zvpçrov®  A7iôA,x)xa
2. To yeyovôç ôxi etpai Xpiaxiavôç OpGôôoÇoç /xj pe ÇexœplÇei anô avGpcoTüooç dllcov 
GpriaK8id)v.
Aiaçm vm  A7i6Xi)xa Aiacprov® apKexd Aiacprové Aev é%® S\)p(p® v6 So)p(p®v6 apKexd Zi)p(p®v® ATiôADxa
3. To yeyovôç ôxi eipai Xpiaxiavôç OpGôôoÇoç /p pe ôiaKplvei aTcô xouç àXXovq.
4. To yeyovôç ôxi eipai Xpiaxiavôç OpGôôoÇoç /x| pe ôiaipopOTioiel anô xouç dX,looç.
Aiacprovffl A7iôX,Dxa Aiaçrovda apKexd Aiacprov® Aev é%® Supiprovd) Eup(p®v® apKexd Supcprov® A7iôA,uxa
5. To yeyovôç ôxi eipai Xpiaxiavôç OpGôôoÇoç/ x| pe Kdvei va KaxaXaPaivm aTiô tioo 
TTpoepxovxai oi aÇieç pou.
Aiamrov® A7côX.i)xa Aiaorovô apKexd Aia(p®v(b Aev é%® S\)p(p®vd) Si)p(p®v6 apKexd Zupcprové A7tôÀ,uxa
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6. To yeyovôç ôxi etpai Xpiaxiavôç OpGôôoÇoç/rj pe Kdvei va Kaxa?taPatvco Ttcoç éyiva 
ôxi etpai afjpepa.
Amiprovo) A7tôA,DTa Aiaipravw apKexd Aiaipœvro Aev Suprarovd) Suurorovro apKexd Zvufflœvo) A7rôX.i)xa
aTiowri
7. To yeyovôç ôxi etpai Xpiaxiavôç OpGôôoÇoç/rj, ôtvei vôqpa axo t io io ç  etpai appepa 
Kai Tcœç Ga fjGeÀa va f|poi)v axo péllov.
Aiacpmvm Anokma Aiacpmvd) apKexd Aiacpmvd) Aev é%® Zupipcûvd) ZDpcpmv® apKexd 
dTTOVl/TI
Si)p(p®vffl ATTÔX.’uxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 . T o yeyovôç ôxi etp a i X p iax iavôç OpGô5oÇoç/rj npoaçép& i éva  ôeap ô  a v d p ea a  axo  
TiapelOôv Kai axo Tiapôv pou.
Aiaipfflvd) A7iôX,Dxa Aiacpœvw apKexd Aiaçmv® Aev É%® iDpipcovœ Supiprovd) apKexd 
drto\|/ri
Si)p(p®v® A7iôX,Dxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. To yeyovôç ôxi etp a i (poixrjxfjç/xpia pe Kdvei v a  vkdGcû povaôiKÔç/ x|.
Aiaiprov® A7t6X,uxa Avacpffivd) apKexd Aiaçrovd) Aev éx® So)p(p®v(b 2vp(p®v6 apKexd
d7lO\)/Tl
Zi)p(p®v6  AirôÀDxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10. To yeyovôç ôxi etp a i (poixrjxfjç/ xp ia  pe ÇexcoptÇei a n ô  avOpœTcouç â X k c o v  K ldôm v.
Aiacpwvd) ATiôXvxa Aiacpœvœ apKexd Ava(p©v6 Aev éx® Eup(p®vd) Sup{p®vd) apKexd 
dnovi/Ti
Sup(p®VM ATlOÀDXa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
11. To yeyovôç ôxi etp a i (poixx|xf|ç/ xpia pe ôiaKptvei aTiô xouç d l lo u ç .
Aiacpfflvd) A7iôX,Dxa Aiaq)Mv6  apKexd Aiacpmvdb Aev éx® 2up9®v6  Sup9®v6  apKexd 
d7to\j/r|
Z\)p(p®v6  AvidXuxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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12. To yeyovôç ôxi etpai (poixrjxfjç/xpia pe ôiacpopOTCoiet anô xouç dllouç.
Aiaiprovœ ÀTiôXuTa Aiaipœvd) apKexd Aiacprov© Aev é%® Eupipwvd) Supiprovro apKexd Eupcpmv® A7ioA.vxa
13. To yeyovôç ôxi etpai (poixrjxfiç/xpia pe Kdvei va KaxaXapatvœ anô nov Tcpoépxovxai oi 
aÇteç pou.
A iaipœ vô A iro lu xa  A iaçm v®  apKexd Aiacpmvm Aev é%® Eupiprovd) Supipœ vô apKexd Zupcpmvô ATrôÀuxa
aTlOl/TI
14. To yeyovôç ôxi etpai (poixx|xf|ç/xpia pe Kdvei va KaxaXapatvœ nœç éyiva ôxi etpai 
gfipepa. __________________________________________________________
15. To yeyovôç ôxi etpai (poixrjxfiç/xpia, ôtvei vôppa oxo ttoioç etpai oppepa Kai nœç 0a 
f|0eXa va f|pouv oxo péXXov.
Aiaipcovd) A iid lu x a  A iaçm v®  apKexd Aiacpmv® Aev é%® Supipœvd) Supipcovd) apKexd Svpcprov® A7côA,\)xa
16. To yeyovôç ôxi etpai (poixx|xf|ç/xpia Tupooipépei éva ôeopô avdpeoa oxo TiapeXOôv Kai 
0 X 0  Tiapôv pou.
Aiacpœvd) AndlDxa Aiacpmv® apKexd Aiaipfflvd) Aev é%® Supiprovd) Zvpcpœvd) apKexd SDpipœvé ATtôÀDxa
17. To yeyovôç ôxi etpai "EXXrjvaç/iôa pe Kdvei va viœGœ povaôiKÔç/p.
AiaipMvd) A7i6X,uxa Aiammvm apKexd Aia(pœv6 Aev é%® Lvp(p®vc& Evpipœvô apKexd Eupcprovd) AxcôAuxa
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18. To ysyovôç 6xi stpai'EXXrjvaç /lôa pe e^xcoplÇei anô avOpénovç dXXœv eGviKoxpxcov.
Avacpœv® AxcoÀDxa Amcpmvco apKexd Aiacpœv® Aev é%CD Supipcov® ZDp(p®v6 apKexd Svpq)® v6 ATtoADxa
aTtOVTl
19. To yeyovôç ôxi elpaiT X X rjvaç/iôa pe ôiaKpivei anô xouç dXXouç.
Aia(p®vm ATioÀDxa Aia(p®v® apKexd Aiaq)®vd) Aev é%® Zvp(p®v® Sup(p®vro apKexd Zi)p(p®v6 ATtÔÀDxa
aTIOVj/Tl
20. To yeyovôç ôxi elpaiT X X x|vaç/iôa pe ôiacpopOTioiel ajiô xouç dXXouç.
Aia(p®v® ATtôA-uxa Aia(p®v® apKexd Aia(p® vô Aev é%® Sup(p®v® Sup(p®vcb apKexd Sup(p®v® AnoÀDxa
21. To yeyovôç ôxi eipai'EXXrjvaç/ lôa pe Kdvei va KaxaXapatvœ anô nov Tipoépxovxai oi 
aÇteç pou.
Aia(p®v® ATiôÀuxa Aia(p®vd) apKexd Aiacp®v® Aev é%® Sup(p®v6 Sup(p®vd) apKexd ZDp(p®v® AvroÀDxa
22. To yeyovôç ôxi etpai TXXpvaç/ lôa pe Kdvei va KaxaXapatvœ Tcœç éyiva ôxi etpai 
ofipepa.
23. To yeyovôç ôxi etpai'EXXqvaç/ lô a , ôtvéi vôxjpa axo ttoioç  etpai oppepa Kai Tiœç 0a 
r|0eXa va f|pouv axo péXXov.
Aia(p®v® ATiôÀuxa Aia(p®v® apKexd Aiacp®v® Aev e%® Si)p(p®vd) SDp(p®vd) apKexd Zi)p(p®v® ATiôÀDxa
aTiowîi
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24. To yeyovôç ôxi eipai'EXXrjvaç/ lôa 7ipoa(pépei éva ôeapô avdpeaa axo TcapeXGôv Kai 
axo Tcapôv pou.
Aiacpœvœ A ttoA-'uto A iaipœvô apKeid Aiaipwvdb Aev éx® Si)pq)®vrô Svp(p®vd) apKexd Si)p(p®vro AiiôADxa
MEPOE B '
Ee auTÔ TO pépoç tou epornpaToXoyiou Trepipévoupe ajrô eaéva va aTravTfjaeiç ae 
pia aeipd epcoTfjaecov paaiapévoç lx[ gtiç epTreipieç Kai otiç anô\\/eiq aou. 
XpqaipoTTOKÔVTaç tiç  TrapaKdTCO KXipaKeç TrpoajrdGqae va a^ioXoyfjaeiç Trôao 
oqpavTiKd eivai Ta TrapaKdTCO aToi%eia yia aéva TrpoacoTriKd. Es jrapaKaXoupe va 
KUKXcoaeiç to  voupepo ttou ae avTiTrpoacoTreuei TrepiaaÔTepo.
25. Ee Tioio PaGpô aiaGdveaai Xpiaxiavôç OpOôôo^oç/ r|;
Ee D7tepPoX,VKd piKpô Ee TtoX-d piKpô Ee piK pô Odxe ae piKpô / peydXo Ee peydTvO Ee 7toX.d peydXo Ee DTtepPo^ oïKd peydlo
BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô BaGpô
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
26. Ee Tcoio paGpô aiaGdveaai ôxi é%eiç ôuvaxouç ôeapouç pe xouç Xpiaxiavouç
Ee DTtepPoXiKd piKpô Ee TtoXd piKpô Ee piKpô Odxe oe piKpd / peydXo Ee peydXx) Ee TtoXd peydXo Ee mepPoliKd peydXo
BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ee UTtepPoXiKd piKpd Ee %oX,d piKpd Ee piKpd Odxe oe piKpd / peydXo Ee peydXo Ee 7toX,d peyd)vO Ee DTcepPoliKd peydÀo
BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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28. nôao ôpoioç /g TTigxeusiç ôxi stgai ps éva péao Xpiaxiavo Op0ô5o^o/ r| ;
Ee D7tepPoX,VKâ piKpô Ee Tiold piKpd Ee piKpd Odxe oe piKpd /  peyôlo Ee peydk) Ee 7coX,d peydXo Ee DnepPoXiKd peyôXo
BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd , BaGpd BaGpd
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ee vvrepPoXiKâ piKpd Ee 7toX.d piKpd Ee piKpd Odxe oe piKpd /  peycâo Ee peydXo Ee 7toX,d peyôXo Ee DTcepPoliKd peyôXo
BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ee DTtepPoXiKÔ piKpd Ee 7ToX,d piKpd Ee piKpd Odxe oe pvKpd /  peydXo Ee peyôXo Ee 7coX,d peyctXo Ee DTiepPoliKâ peyôXo
BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
31. Dxav aKouç k o i t io io  t t o u  ô s v  eivai Xpiaxiavôç OpGôôoÇoç va KpixiKdpsi xouç 
OpGoôôÇouç, as t i o i o  PaGpô aiaGdvsaai ôxi KpixiKdpouv saéva TipoacoTiiKd;
Ee mepPoliKâ pucpd Ee 7toX,d piKpd Ee pvKpd Odxe oe piKpd / peyàXo Ee peyoXo Ee 7to>.d peydXo Ee ujtepPoXiKd peydXo
BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
32. Es Tcoio paGpô aiaGdvsaai (poixT]xf|ç/xpia;
Ee OTcepPoXiKd piKpd Ee TcoXd piKpd Ee piKpd Odxe oe piKpd /  peydXo Ee peydXo Ee TioXd peydXo Ee OTtepPoXiKd peydXo
BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
33. Es Tioio PaGpô aiaGdvsaai ôxi é%siç ôuvaxouç ôeapouç pe xouç (poixrjxéç
Ee OTiepPoXiKd piKpd Ee TcoXd piKpd Ee piKpd Odxe oe piKpd /  peydXo Ee peydXo Ee TtoXd peydXo Ee OTcepPoXvKd peydXo
BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd BaGpd
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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34. Se 7Ü01Ô Pa0|j,6 aiaGdveaai e^xapiairnievog nov eiaai (poixr|Tf|ç/ xpia;
Se U7tepPo?tiKd piKpô Se 7ioX.i3 piKpô Se piKpô Oljxe (je piKpô / peydXo Se peydXo Se jcold peyd>^ Se D7repPoX,iKd peydlo
Ba0pô Ba0pô Ba0pô Ba0pô Ba0p6 Ba0p6 Ba0pô
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
35. nôao ôpoioç /a 7ciaT8i3eiç 6xi eiaai pe éva péao (poixx|xf|/ xpia;
Se UTiepPoÀiKd piKpô Se ndkô piKpô Se piKpô Oi3xe ae piKpô / peydXo Se peydlo Se 7ioX,d peydXo Se DTtepPoXiKd peydÀo
Ba0pô Ba0pô Ba0pô Ba0p6 Ba0pô Ba0pô Ba0pô
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
36. nôgo çyripavxiKÔ elvai yia gsva xo yeyovôq 6xi etaai (poixrixiiq/ xpia;
Se T)7tepPo?iiKd piKpô Se noXx) piKpô Se piKpô Ouxe oe piKpô / peydXo Se peydA.0 Se TcoXd peydXo Se DTiepPoXiKd peydXo
Ba0pô Ba0pô Ba0pô Ba0pô Ba0pô Ba0pô Ba0pô
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
37. nôao Tciaxeôeiç ôxi ci a7iô\}/8iç aoo yia xo 7iav87ciaxf|pio oupcpcovoov 
pe xœv àXkcûv;
Se UTiepPoXvKd pvKpô Se 7ioX,i3 p iK p ô Se p iK p ô Ouxe ae p iK p ô  /  peydÀo Se peydXo Se 7toX,i3 peydXo Se DjrepPoXiKd peydlo
Ba0pô Ba0pô Ba0pô Ba0pô Ba0pô Ba0pô Ba0pô
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
38. D xav aKoôç kotioio tcoo ôev eivai (poixT|xf|g va  KpixiKdpei xooç (poixr|xéç, ae tioio 
pa0pô aiaGdveaai ôxi KpixiKdpoov eaéva TcpoacoTiiKd;
Se u%eppoXxKd pvKpô Se TioXi) piKpô Se piKpô Oûxe ae pvKpô / peydXo Se peydX.0 Se 7roX.d peydXo Se D7cepPoX,iKd peydlo
Ba0pô Ba0p6 Ba0pô Ba0pô BaOpô Ba0pô Ba0p6
1 2  3 4 5 6 7
39. Se 71010 Pa0p6 amGdveaai'ElX,T|vag/iôa;
Se VTcepPoXiKd piKpô Se Jiold piKpô Se piKpô Ouxe ae piKpô /  peydXo Se peydXo Se Ttolu peydXo Se uTieppoÀiKd peydXo
Ba0pô Ba0pô Ba0p6 Ba0p6 Ba0pô Ba0p6 Ba0pô
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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40. Ss 71010 PaOpô aiaOdveoai ôxi éxsiç ôovaxodç ôeapodç pe xoogTXlxiveg;
Se u%epPoliKd piKpô Se 7ioX,u piKpô Se piKpô Ouxe ae piKpô /  peyd^o Se peyd).o Se 7ioX,u peydXo Se unepPoÀiKd peydXo
BaGpô Ba0pô Ba0pô Ba0pô Ba0pô Ba0pô Ba0pô
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
41. Ss 7C010 PaOpô aïoOdveoai EOxapiaxTjpevog 7[oo eloai Tllr|vag/i6a;
Se UTtepPokKd piKpô Se noko piKpô Se piKpô Ouxe ae piKpô / peydXo Se peydXo Se 7I0ÀU peydAx) Se uTiepPoXiKd peydXo
Ba0pô Ba0pô Ba0pô Ba0pô Ba0p6 Ba0pô Ba0pô
1 2 . 3 4 5 6 7
42. nôao ôpoioç /a 7ciax8Ô8iç ôxi siaai p8 éva péao 'EllT|va/i6a;
Se U7iepPoX,iKd piKpô Se 7ioX,u piKpô Se piKpô Ouxe ae piKpô / peydXo Se peydX-o Se TioXu peyd)vO Se UTtepPoÀiKd peyd>.o
Ba0pô Ba0p6 Ba0pô Ba0pô Ba0p6 Ba0|xô Ba0pô
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
43. nôao orjpavxiKÔ 8ivai yia asva xo yEyovôç ôxi Elaai'EAlrjvaç / lôa ;
Se UTtepPoXiKd piKpô Se 7ioX,u piKpô Se piKpô Oûxe ae pvKpô / peyd%x) Se peyd)vO Se 7C0X.Û peydXo Se uTiepPoliKd peydXo
Ba0p6 Ba0pô Ba0p6 Ba0p6 Ba0p6 Ba0pô Ba0pô
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
44. nôao 7ciax8i38iç ôxi oi anô\\fEiq aoo yia xrjv "Elldôa aopcpcovoôv p8 xcov àXkaw;
Se U7tepPoT.iKd piKpô Se TioXû pvKpô Se piKpô Oûxe ae pucpd / peydlo Se peydXo Se 7toX.û peydXo Se U7iepPoX,iKd peydlo
Ba0pô Ba0pô Ba0pô Ba0pô Ba0pô Ba0p6 Ba0pô
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
45 .Dxav aKoôç Kd7coio 7too Ô8V 8 lv a i 'E l lT |v a g ,  va KpixiKdpEi xooç ''EXlT)V8g a8 7toio 
paOpô aia0dv8aai ôxi KpixiKdpoov 8aéva 7tpoaco7i:iKd;
Se uvrepPoXiKd piKpô Se 7ioX,û piKpô Se piKpô Ouxe ae piKpô / peydXo Se peydXo Se 7toX,û peyd^o Se uTcepPoXiKd peydXa
Ba0pô Ba0p6 Ba0pô Ba0pô Ba0p6 Ba0pô Ba0pô
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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46.Zo%yd pexavirovco tcoo avfiKco a s  aoxfj xx|v 0pr|aK8la.
Amcpcovd) A7i6A,UTa Aiacpcovco Aiacpcov© Kanmg Aevéxcû
dTtovpT]
Supcpcovd) KdTtcoç Supcpcovd) Supcpcovd) ATtdluxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
47 . Is ysviKéç yp ap p sç , s lp a i soxapiaxripévoç tcoo s lp a i p s lo g  aoxoo xoo  
0pT|aK8Ôpaxoç.
Aia<pcovd) ATtoXuia Aiacpcovro Amcpcovœ Kdîrœç Aev G%co 
dTtoipn
Supcpcovd) KdTtcoç Supcpcovdb Spcpcovô ATtoXuxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
48 . rsviK d, ao%vd vi60co 6xi rj OprjaKsia axTjv OTCoia avr|Kco ôsv  s^sc psydlx; a ^ i a .
Amcpcovd) Ajidluxa Avacpcové Amcpcovd) KdTtcog Aevex®
dTtoipp
Supcpcovd) KdTtcoç Supcpcovd) Spcpcov® ATtdluxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
49 . A iaO dvopai KaXd y ia  xo oxi av^Kco a s  aoxf| xx|v OprjaKsia.
Amcpcovco ATcdXuxa Aiacpcovro Amcpcovd) KdTtcoç Aevéx®
dTtO\j/Tl
Supcpcové KdTtcoç Supcpcové Spcpcov® ATtdluxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
50. Is ysviKéç ypappsg, x| OprjaKsla poo Oscopsixai K alf| a n o  xooç d l lo o ç .
Amcpcovd) A7tôX.uxa Amcpcovd) Amcpcovcb KdTtcoç Aevéxco
dTtO\|/T]
Supcpcovd) KdTtcoç Supcpcovd) Spcpmvd) ATtdluxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
51. O i Tcio TcolXoi Osmpodv 6xi x| OppaKsia poo Kaxd psaco opo s lv a i liy o x sp o  
aTcoxsXsapaxocfi OTco a X k e q  OppaKsisç.
Amcpcovd) AvtdXuxa Aiacpcovd) Amcpcovcb KdTtcoç Aev. éxco 
dTtovpri
Supcpcovd) KdTtcoç Supcpcovd) Supcpmvcb ATtdXuxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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52. PeviKd, 01 d llo i aépovxai xx|v GprjOKSia axrjv OTCola avf|K(o.
Aiacprovd) ÂTiÔÀUTa Aiacprov® Aiammvô KctTtcoç Asv É%® Suurarov® Kdnmc Supmmv® Supcpmvd) ATtoAuxa
a7tO\J/T1
53. PsviKd, 01 d lX o i Tiioxedoov oxi X| GprjOKeta oxT|V OTCoia av^Kœ elv a i avaÇiÔTCiaxri.
Aiacpœvô ATtôAuxa Aiacpcovœ Aiacpmv® KdTiroç Aev e%® Supcprovd) KdTtcoç Supcpwvô Supcprov® ATtoAuxa
aTtoij/ri
54. Io%vd pexaviœvco tioo avf|Kco oxo cpoixrjxiKO oœpa.
Aiacpmvd) ATtôX-uxa Aiacpwvd) Amcpœvcb KdTtmç Aev 6%® Suucp®v(b Kd%®ç Supcp®v(b Suucp®vd) ATtôÀuxa
GTtown
55. E s ysviKÉç ypappéç, sipai soxapiaxrjpévoç tcoo sipai psXog xoo (poixr|xiKoô 
aœpaxoç.
Aiacp®v6 ATtdXuxa Aiacp®vdo Aiacp®v® Kd%®ç Aev A%® Supcp®v® Kd%®ç Supcp®vra Supcp®và ATtoAuxa
56. PsviKd, cro%vd viœGco oxi xo (poixrjxiKÔ o œ p a  oxo otcoIo avrjKco Ôsv É^si psydA-rj 
aÇia.
Aiacp®v6 ATtdXuxa Aiacp®v(b Aiacp®v(b Kd%®ç Aev é%® Supcp®v® Kd%®ç Supcp®v® Supcp®vcb ATtôAuxa
57. A ioG dvopai K a ld  y ia  xo oxi avfjKco o s  aoxô xo (poixrjxiKÔ oœ p a.
Aiacp®v(b ATtoXuxa Aiacp®v® Aiacp®vô Kd%®ç Aev É%® Supcp®v(b KdTt®ç Supcp®vcb Spcp®vcb ATtoÀuxa
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58. Se yeviKéç ypappéç, xo (poixrjxiKÔ aœ pa oxo otioIo avf|KO) Gecopeixai K olo anô 
xooç d llo o ç .
Aiacprovd) ATtéluxa Aiacpcovd) Aiacprovd) KdTiœç Asv É%® Supcpmvd) KdTtcoç Supcprové Supcpmvd) ATtoAuxa
aTtOVj/TI
59. Oi 7110 Tiolloi Geœpoôv ôxi xo cpoixrixiKÔ oœpa oxo otcoio avfjK© Kaxd péoco opo 
elvai liyoxepo aTioxeAeopaxiKÔ aTcô aXka .
Avacprov® ATtôX,uxa Avacpcovdb Aiacpav® KdTtcoç Asv s%co Supcp®v6 KdTtcoç Supcpmvcb Supcpœvé ATtôAuxa
60. PeviKd, 01 d l l o i  oépovxai xo (poixrjxiKÔ ocbpa oxo otcoIo avf|KCO.
Aiacpmvd) ATtôAuxa Aiacprovô Aiacpmvcb KÔTtraç Asv s%co Supcpcovœ KdTtcoç Supcpcov© Supcpœvro ATtoAuxa
aTtoYp
61. r eviKd, 01 dA/loi Tiioxedoov oxi xo (poixpxiKÔ oœ pa oxo otcoIo avr|K© elvai 
avaÇiÔTiioxo.
Aiacpwvcb ATtôluxa Aiacpœvcô Aiacprov© KdTtmç Asv É%® Supcpcov6 KdTtcoç Supcpcovcb Supcpcovd) ATtôAuxa
62. So%vd pexaviœvœ tioo avf|Kco oe aoxô xo eGvoç.
Aiacprov© ATtôX,uxa Aiacpœvcü) Aiacpcovcb KÔTtœç Asv É%® Supcpcov® KdTtcoç Supcprovd) Supcpmvcb ATtôAuxa
aTtowîi
63. Se yeviKéç ypappéç, elpai eoxapioxppévoç tüoo elpai péXoç aoxoô xoo éGvooç.
64. PsviKd, (Jüxvd viœGco ôxi xo eGvoç oxo o tio io  avf|Kco ôev é%ei peydlx) aÇia.
Aiaçœvd) ATtoluxa Aiacpfflvœ Aiacprovcb KdTiroç Aev é%ro 
dTtoipri
Supcprovô KdTtcoç Supcprovcb Supcprovcb ATtoluxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
65. AioGdvopai Kald yia xo oxi avf|KO) oe aoxô xo éGvoç.
Aiacpcûvd) AnoXuxa Aiacpœv® AiacprovcB Kdnroç Aev é%ro 
dTtovpri
Supcprovro KdTtcoç lupcprovro Supcprovffl ATtôX,i)Ta
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
66. Se yeviKéç ypappéç, xo éGvoç poo Gecopeixai Kalô aviô xooç dlAooç.
Aiaçcovd) ArcôX,UTa Aiacprov® Aiacprov® KdTiroç Aev é%ro
dTtovpt]
Supcprovcb KdTtcoç Supcprovcb Spcprovro ATtôXuxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
67. Oi 7110 7 io llo i Geœpoôv ôxi xo éGvoç poo Kaxd péoco ôpo elvai ?tiyôxepo 
a7toxeXeopaxiKÔ a7cô àXka éGvrj.
Aiacprov® AnéluTa Aiacprov® Aiacprovcb KdTiroç Aev É%ro 
dTtoipTi
Supcprovcb KdTtcoç Supcprovro Supcprovcb ATtôX,i)xa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
68. PeviKd, 01 d l lo i  oépovxai xo éGvoç oxo 07iolo avrjKCO.
Aiacprov® AnôXma Aiacprovcb Aiacprovcb KdTtcoç Aev éx® 
dTtovpri
Supcprovcb KdTtcoç Supcprovcb Supcprovcb ATtoluxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
69. PeviKd, 01 d l lo i  7cioxeôoov ôxi xo éGvoç oxo oxcolo avf|Kco elvai avaÇiÔ7Cioxo.
Aiacprovcb AitoluTa Aiacprovcb Aiacprovcb KdTtcoç Aev éx® 
dTtoipil
lupcprovcb KdTtcoç Supcprovcb Supcprovcb ATtdXuxa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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70. Og XpioTiavôç OpOôôoÇoç /rj, KaxopOcbvco Tcdvxa va lôvco ôdoKola Tcpoplppaxa 
edv TcpoaTcaOfjaco apKexd.
Evxelcbg avaXriGéç AXîiBivô pe ôuoKoWa 
1 2
SxeSôv aX,Ti0ivô 
3
EvT8>.éç aXî]0ivô 
4
71. Dç Xpioxiavôç OpGôôoÇoç / t|, av kôtcoioç poo evavxi©Gel, pjiop© va pploK© xa 
péoa Kai xooç xpÔTcooç va Tcalpv© aoxô tcoo Gél©.
EvTGlcbg ava?iTi0Éç AA,ti0ivô pe ôdokoWo SXEÔôv a^îi0ivô EvTE^ vCbç alT|0iv6
1 2 3 4
72. (Iç Xpiaxiavôç Op0ô5oÇoç/ri, elvai eÔKolo yia péva va eTcipévo) axooç oKOTiodç 
poi) Kai va emxoyxdvco xooç axôxooç poo.
EvxeWbç avaX,Ti0éç AX,îl0iv6 pe ôuoKoMa SxeSôv aXï]0iv6 EvxeA,ôç a?tTi0ivô
1 2 3 4
73. Hç Xpioxiavôç OpGôôoÇoç/rj, éx© aoxo7ce7iolGr|ari oxo va avxipexœTilÇco 
iKavoTcoiTjxiKd xa aTipôopeva yeyovôxa.
EvxeXroç avaX,îi0éç AX.T101VÔ pe ôuoKoMa SxGÔôv aX,T|0ivô EvxeXéç aX.Ti0ivô
1 2 3 4
74. Xdprj oxTjv eopripaxiKÔxTjxa poo ©ç Xpioxiavôç OpGôôoÇoç/rj, Çép© 7c©ç va 
XsiplÇopai a7cpôpÀ£7cxeç Kaxaoxdoeiç.
Evxelôç avaXr|0éç AX,T|0iv6 pe ÔDOKoA-îa Sxeôôv a>^ Ti0ivô Evxelcbg aXx|0iv6
1 2 3 4
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75. Qç Xpioxiavôç OpGôôoÇoç /t|, pTcopœ va lôv© xa Tiepiooôxepa 7cpopA.f|paxa edv 
KaxapdX© xT|v a7iapalxr|xr| 7ipoo7td9eia._______________ _____________________
Evt8^6ç avaXT|8Éç AXï]8iv6 pe ôuoicoWa S%e66v aXrjBivô EvxeAxbg aX,T|8iv6
76. ü ç  Xpioxiavôç OpGôôoÇoç /ri pTcopœ va pév© ij/oxpaipcç ôxav avxipexœmÇ© 
ôooKoHeç, yiaxi pTcop© va paoiÇopai oxrjv iKavôxpxa poo.
EvxeXroç ava?.r|0éç AX.Î101VÔ pe ôucTKoMa S%eô6v aXr|0ivô EvxeXcbç aX,Ti0ivô
1 2 3 4
77. Qç Xpioxiavôç OpGôôoÇoç /p ôxav avxipexco7it(^ (o éva mpôpkqpa, pTcop© 
oovfjGcoç va ppioK© ôidcpopeç lôoeiç.
EvxeXcbç avaXiiBéç AA,r|0ivô pe 5ucrKoA,ia S%e66v a^îi0iv6 Evxelroç aÀT]0w6
1 2 3 4
78. Qç Xpioxiavôç OpGôôoÇoç/ rj ôxav ppioKopai oe ÔooKolia pTcop© oovfjGmç va 
oKecpx© KÔTcoia lôor).
EvxeXôç avaX,T]0éç AX,ti0ivô pe 6uoKoMa SxEÔôv aXx|0iv6 Evxeléç aÀx|0iv6
1 2 3 4
79. Dç Xpioxiavôç OpGôôoÇoç /rj, pTiop© oovrjGcoç va %eipiox© ôxi ép%exai pTcpooxd
EvxeXmç ava>.Ti0éç Alx|0iv6 pe ôucjKoWa S/eSév alx|0iv6 Evxelcbç aX,T]0ivo
1 2 3 4
719
80. Qç (poiTTiTf|ç/Tpia, KaTop0d)vcû Tcdvxa va Idv© ôôoKola 7cpopA,f|paxa edv
EvTGÀéç avalï^GÉç AA,îi0ivô pe ôucncoMa S%e66v a^î]0iv6 EvteXôç alT]0iv6
1 2 3 4
81. Qç (poixT)xf|ç/xpia, av KdTcoioç poo evavxiroOel, pTCopœ va  PpioK© xa péoa  Kai xooç 
xpÔTcooç va  Tcaipv© aoxô tioo Oélm.
EvxeXmç avaÀT|0Gç AA,ti0iv6 pe ôucjKoMa S%e66v aX,Ti0ivô EvxeA,d)ç aX,p0iv6
1 2 3 4
82. Qç (poixT|xf|ç/xpia, elvai eÔKolo yia péva va eTcipév© oxooç okotcoôç poo Kai va 
eTcixoyxdv© xooç oxô^ooç poo.
EvxeXdàç avaX,Ti0éç AX.Î101VÔ pe SuoKoWa S%e66v aX.Ti0vvô EvxeXôç aXp0iv6
1 2 3 4
83. Qç cpoixTjxfjç/ xpia, éx© aoxoTieTcol0r|or| oxo va avxipex©TclÇ© iKavoTTOirjxiKd xa 
aTipôopeva yeyovôxa.
EvxeXroç avalï]0eç AX,x|0iv6 pe ôuoKoA,(a 
1 2
S%e66v aÀx|0iv6 
3
EvxeXroç a^îiGivô 
4
84. XdpTj oxTjv eoprjpaxiKÔxTjxa poo ©ç (poixTjxfjç/xpia, Çép© n œ ç  v a  x£iplÇopai 
aTcpôpAeTixeç K axaoxdoeiç.
EvxeM)ç ava>.r|0éç AX,îi0ivô pe SumcoMa S%e66v aX,r|0ivô EvxeXcbç aX,Ti0ivô
1 2 3 4
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85. Qç (poiTrjTfiç/Tpia,.p7iopd) va A.'üvcû xa Tiepioaoxcpa 7rpopAf|paxa edv Kaxapdl© 
xTjv a7capaixr|XT| TcpooTcdGsia.
Evxe^véç avaA.ri0éç AX.T101VÔ pe ôuoKoWa Sxsôôv aX,T|0ivô EvxeXrôç aXîiGivô
1 2 3 4
86. Qç (poixTjxfjç/xpia, pTiopœ va pév© \i/6xpaipoç ôxav avxipexœTiiÇœ ôooKoMeç, yiaxi 
 pTtopro va Paal^opai axr|V iKavôxrjxa poo.______________________________________
Evxelcbç avalTiGéç AX,îi0ivô pe ôuoKoWa S%e66v alT|0iv6 EvxeXxbç aXt|0ivô
87. Qç (poixr|xf|ç /xpia, ôxav avxipexcoTiiÇco éva npôpiqpa, pjiop© oovr|0©ç va ppioK© 
ôidcpopsç lÔOGlÇ.
Evxelroç ava^0éç AXîlGivô pe ôuoKO v^a SxEÛôv aX,Ti0ivô Evxelôç aXr|0ivô
1 2 3 4
88. Qç cpoixT|xf)ç/xpia, ôxav ppioKopai oe ôooKoMa pTiopd) oovfjOmç v a  0 K8 (px© 
KÔTlOia lÔOT|.
Evxelroç avaXîiGéç A)vT|0iv6 pe ÔDOKoMa SxE66v aÀï]0iv6 EvxeX,éç aXx|0iv6
1 2 3 . 4
89. Qç (poixr|xf|ç/xpia, pTiopœ oovrjGcoç va XGipioxdb ôxi épxsxai pTtpooxd poo.
Evxelrôç avaX.Ti0éç AX,ti0ivô pe ôucTKoWa Sxe66v aXx|0iv6 Evxe^éç alT]0iv6
1 2 3 4
90. Q ç T llr jv a ç /iô a , KaxopGœvco Tidvxa v a  A,ôv© ôôokoAxx n p o p ifjp a x a  edv  
TipooTiaOrjo© apKsxd.
EvxeXôç avaX,Ti0éç AXx|0w6 pe SumcoMa SxEÔôv aXr|0ivô Evxe>.(bç aXîiGivô
1 2 3 4
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91. QçTlA,T|vaç/iôa, av KàTioioç poo 8vavTico08t, pTcop© va ppioKco xa péoa Kai xooç
xpÔTiooç va Tcaipvco aoxô tioo 0É1©.
Evxe i^rôç avaXî]0éç AX,t|0ivô pe SuoKoMa Sxeôôv aX,Ti0ivô EvxeXrog aXx|0iv6
1 2 3 4
92. QçTllT|vaç/iôa, sivai EÔKolo yia péva va STiipévco oxooç o k o t c o ô ç  poo Kai va 
8Tcixoy%dvcû xooç oxô^ooç poo.
EvxeXcbç avaXx|0Éç A>üT10ivô pe ôuoKoWa S%e66v aX,r|0ivô Evxelcbç aX,Ti0ivô
1 2 3 4
93. QçTllT|vaç/iôa, éx© aoxoTC8Tcoi0T|OT| oxo va avxip8x©TCi^ © iKavoTcoipxiKd xa 
aTcpôouEva 78Yovôxa.
EvxeXrôg avalx|0éç AX.ti0ivô pe ôuoKoXva S%e66v alTi0iv6 Evxelroç aXx|0iv6
1 2 3 4
94. Xdpri oxTjv 80px|paxiKÔxT|xa poo ©çTllxjvaç/iôa, Çép© t c © ç  va 
aTcpôpl8Tcx8ç KaxaoxdoEiç.
XEiptÇopai
EvxeXcbç avalï]0éç ' AX,t]0ivô pe SuoKoMa S%e66v a>^ Ti0ivô EvxeXroç aXx|0iv6
1 2 3 4
95. QçTlA,T|vaç/iôa, pTcop© va lôv© xa TC8piooôx8pa Tcpopifjpaxa sàv Kaxapdl© xxjv 
aTcapalxT|XT| TcpooTcd08ia.
EvxeXroç avalx|0éç AX,ti0ivô pe Sumcolia S%e66v alx|0iv6 Evxelcbç aXr|0iv6
1 2 3 4
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96. QgTlA,T|vag/iôa, pTcopcb va pév© \|/i3xpaipoç ôxav avxipexcoTclÇœ ôooKoMGÇ, yiaxi
pTcop© va PaaiÇopai axxjv iKavôxrjxa poo.
EvTeXcbç ava^riGsç A>.ti0ivô pe ôuoKoXva Sxe66v aXïi0iv6 Evxelroç aXîiGivô
1 2 3 4
97. QgTAA,T|vag/iôa, ôxav avxipsxcoTiiÇa) éva 7tpôpX,ripa, pTiop© oovf|0©g 
ôidcpopsç À.ôasiç.
va ppioK©
Evxe>.d)ç avaX,Ti0éç Alx|0iv6 pe ôuoKoMa S%e86v a^îiGivô EvxeÀcbç aX,îi0ivô
1 2 3 4
98. Qç'EA.A,r|vaç/iôa, ôxav PploKopai oe ôomcoMa pTcop© oovf|0coç va oKEcpx© KoiTcoia 
lÔOT|.
Evxelroç avalii0éç AX,r|0ivô pe ôuoKoWa S%e66v aX,Ti0ivô Evxeléç aÀx|0iv6
1 2 3 4
99. Qç'EXA.T|vaç/ lôa, pTcop© oovf|0©g va xGipiox© ôxi spxsxai pTcpoaxd poo.
Evxe>.d)ç avaX,T|0éç. AXîiGivô pe ôucTKoWa S%e66v alx|0iv6 EvxeXmç alx|0iv6
1 2 3 4
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Questionnaire Main Study Part A (English version)
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PARTA
Using the scales below, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the 
following statements.
1. Being Christian Orthodox makes me feel unique.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Being Christian Orthodox distinguishes me from people of other religions.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Being Christian Orthodox makes me stand out from others.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Being Christian Orthodox makes me different from others.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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5. Being Christian Orthodox makes me understand where my values derive from.
Strongly disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly agree 
7
6. Being Christian Orthodox makes me understand how I came to be the person I am
today.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. Being Christian Orthodox helps me make sense of who I am today and how I 
would like to be in the future. *
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. Being Christian Orthodox provides a link between me in the past and me in the 
present.
Strongly disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly agree 
7
9. Being student makes me feel unique.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10. Being student distinguishes me from people of other sectors.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
726
11. Being student makes me stand out from others.
Strongly disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly agree 
7
12. Being student makes me different from others.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
13. Being student makes me understand where my values derive from.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
14. Being student makes me understand how I came to be the person I am today.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
15. Being student helps me make sense of who I am today and how I would like to be 
in the future.
Strongly disagree
1 2 3 4
Strongly agree 
5 6 7
16. Being student provides a link between me in the past and me in the present.
Strongly disagree
1 2 3 4
Strongly agree 
5 6 7
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17. Being Greek makes me feel unique.
Strongly disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly agree 
7
18. Being Greek distinguishes me from people of other nationalities.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
19. Being Greek makes me Stand out from Others.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
20. Being Greek makes me different from others.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
21. Being Greek makes me understand where my values derive from.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
22. Being Greek makes me understand how I came to be the person I am today.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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23. Being Greek helps me make sense of who I am today and how I would like to be 
in the future.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
24. Being Greek provides a link between me in the past and me in the present.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
PART B
In this section we would like you to answer a series of questions based on your beliefs 
and experiences. Using the scales provided, try to evaluate how important the following 
statements are to you as a person. Please, circle the number that applies to you the most.
25. To what extent do you feel Christian Orthodox?
Not at all Extremely
26. To what extent do you feel strong ties with other Christian Orthodox?
Not at all Extremely
27. To what extent do you feel pleased to be Christian Orthodox?
Not at all Extremely
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28. How similar do you think you are to the average Christian Orthodox person?
Not at all Extremely
29. How important to you is being Christian Orthodox?
Not at all Extremely
30. How much are your views about Christian Orthodoxy shared by other Christian 
Orthodox people?
Not at all Extremely
31. When you hear someone who is not Christian Orthodox criticise the Christian 
Orthodox people, to what extent do you feel personally criticised?
Not at all Extremely
32. To what extent do you feel student?
Not at all Extremely
33. To what extent do you feel strong ties with other students?
Not at all Extremely
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34. To what extent do you feel pleased to be student?
Not at all Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
35. How similar do you think you are to the average student?
Not at all Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
36. How important to you is being student?
Not at all Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
37. How much are your views about the University shared by other students?
Not at all Extremely
1 2 3 4 5, 6 7
38. When you hear someone who is not a student criticise the students, to what extent 
do you feel personally criticised?
Not at all Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
39. To what extent do you feel Greek?
Not at all Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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40. To what extent do you feel strong ties with Greek people?
Not at all
1 2 3 4 5 6
Extremely
7
41. To what extent do you feel pleased to be Greek?
Not at all Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
42. How similar do you think you are to the average Greek person?
Not at all Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
43. How important to you is being Greek?
Not at all Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
44. How much are your views about Greece shared by other Greek people?
Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5
Extremely 
6 7
45. When you hear someone who is not Greek criticise the Greek people, to what 
extent do you feel personally criticised?
Not at all Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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46.1 often regret that I belong to this religions group.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
47. In general, I'm glad to be a member of this religious group I belong to.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
48. Overall, I often feel that my religious group of which I am a member is not 
worthwhile.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
49.1 feel good about the religious group I belong to.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
50. Overall, my religious group is considered good by others.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
51. Most people consider my religious group, on the average to be more ineffective 
than other religious groups.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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52. In general, others respect the religious group I am a member of.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2- 3 4 5 6 7
53. In general, others think that the religious group I am member of is unworthy.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
54.1 often regret that I belong to this student group.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
55. In general. I’m glad to be a member of this student group I belong to.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
56. Overall, I often feel that my student group of which I am a member is not 
worthwhile.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
57.1 feel good about the student group I belong to.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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58. Overall, my student group is considered good by others.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
59. Most people consider my student group, on the average to be more ineffective 
than other student groups.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
60. In general, others respect the student group I am a member of.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
61. In general, others think that the student group I am a member of is unworthy.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
62.1 often regret that I belong to this national group.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
63. In general. I'm glad to be a member of this national group I belong to.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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64. Overall, I often feel that my national group of which I am a member is not 
worthwhile.
Strongly disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly agree 
7
65.1 feel good about the national group I belong to.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
66. Overall, my national group is considered good by others.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
67. Most people consider my national group, on the average to be more ineffective 
than other national groups.
Strongly disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly agree 
7
68. In general, others respect the national group I am a member of.
Strongly disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly agree 
7
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69. In general, others think that the national group I am member of is unworthy.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
70. AS a Christian Orthodox I can always manage to solve difficult problems if I try 
hard enough.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
71. AS a Christian Orthodox if someone opposes me, I can find the means and ways 
to get what I want.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
72. AS a Christian Orthodox it is easy for me to stick to my aims and accomplish my 
goals.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
73. AS a Christian Orthodox I am confident that I could deal efficiently with
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
74. Thanks to my resourcefulness as a Christian Orthodox, I know how to handle 
unforeseen situations.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4.
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75. AS a Christian Orthodox I can solve most problems if I invest the necessary 
effort.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
76. AS a Christian Orthodox I can remain calm when facing difficulties because I can 
rely on my coping abilities.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
77. AS a Christian Orthodox when I am confronted with a problem, I can usually 
find several solutions.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
78. AS a Christian Orthodox if I am in trouble, I can usually think of a solution.
Not at all true 
1 2 3
Exactly true 
4
79. AS a Christian Orthodox I can usually handle whatever comes my way.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
80. AS a student I can always manage to solve difficult problems if I try hard enough.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
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81. AS a student if someone opposes me, I can find the means and ways to get what I 
want.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
82. AS a student it is easy for me to stick to my aims and accomplish my goals.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
83. AS a student I am confident that I could deal efficiently with unexpected events.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
84. Thanks to my resourcefiilness as a student, I know how to handle unforeseen 
situations.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
85. AS a student I can solve most problems if I invest the necessary effort
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
86. AS a student I can remain calm when facing difficulties because I can rely on my
Not at all true Exactly true
I 2 3 4
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87. AS a student when I am confronted with a problem, I can usually find several
solutions.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
AS a student if I am in trouble, I can usually think of a solution.
Not at all true , Exactly true
1 2 3 4
89. AS a student I can usually handle whatever comes my way.
Not at all true 
1 2
Exactly true 
3 4
/
90. AS a Greek I can always manage to solve difficult problems if I try hard enough.
Not at all true 
1 2
Exactly true 
3 4
91. AS a Greek if someone opposes me, I can find the means and ways to get what I 
want.
Not at all true 
1 2
Exactly true 
3 4
92. AS a Greek it is easy for me to stick to my aims and accomplish my goals.
Not at all true 
1 2
Exactly true 
3 4
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93. AS a Greek I am confident that I could deal efficiently with unexpected events.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
94. Thanks to my resourcefulness as a Greek, I know how to handle unforeseen
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
95. AS a Greek I can solve most problems if I invest the necessary effort.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
96. AS a Greek I can remain calm when facing difficulties because I can rely on my 
coping abilities.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
97. AS a Greek when I am confronted with a problem, I can usually find several 
solutions.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
98. AS a Greek if I am in trouble, I can usually think of a solution.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
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99. AS a Greek I can usually handle whatever comes my way.
Not at all true Exactly true
1 2 3 4
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Main Study Questionnaire Part B (Greek version)
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Zim Eicoai]; T o epcDTrmaToXoyio airiv  ôsoxepri cpdcrri xriç ép svvaç fjxav to 
(Ô10 jis TT|Ç TlpÔTTlÇ. T o ÔSOTSpO pépOÇ ÔpCÛÇ SpTTSpiElXS Kttl TIÇ TCapaKClTCO 
K M paK sg.
AiapdÇoviaç t o  TiapaTrdvco dp0po t i ô o o  a ; r £ iX T |T iK f |  Gecopstç t t | v  aidarj T p g  EupcbTCTjç:
• yia TTjv avvéxsia TTjç sOviicriç aou TaoTOxriTag avdpeoa oto vrapelGov Kai oxo 
pÉTvlov;
1 2 3 4 5
ndpa TüoX-d
• yia xrjv ôiatpopETiKÔTîiTa aou œç Tllrivag;
7
KaGôXou
1
ndpa TTolu KaGo^ou
yia TTjv auTÔ-EKTipTiCTTi 7C0U 8%8i(; (oç "E?cA,rivaç ;
ndpa TioXo KaGolou
y ia  TTjv at)T87TdpK8ia (xo v a  pTcopsiç v a  luvGig 7rpopif|paxa x a i  v a  %8ip{(6oai 
K a x a o x d a e iç  coç'E7,X,T|vaç) t io u  8%Gig coç "EÀXxjvaç;
ndpa TTolu KaG6)vOU
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EGviKÔTiiTa:
0 6 X0 :
Ï I 01) pévsiç;
Ze eüyaûKTTcb ttoàv yia rtiv avuusToyii aov.
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Main Study Questionnaire Part B (English version)
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NOTE: Participants completed the same questionnaire as before. However, 
the second part of the questionnaire also included the manipulation check 
measures and the demographic characteristics of the participants. See below:
After reading the previous article how threatening would you consider Europe’s position 
to be regarding:
• the continuity of your national identity across time ? (national continuity)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all A great deal
• your distinctiveness as a Greek? (national distinctiveness)
1 2  3 4 5 6 7
Not at all A great deal
• your self-esteem as a Greek? (national self-esteem)
1 2  3 4  5 6 7
Not at all A great deal
• your self-efficacy as a Greek (to be able to solve problems and handle 
situations as a Greek)?
1 2  3 4  5 6 7
Not at all A great deal
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N ationality:........................................
G en d er:........... ..........................................
A g e : ................. ......................... ........
W here do you l iv e : ..........................................
Thank you very much for your participation
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Appendix III
Questionnaire Study 3 (Greek and English versions)
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Questionnaire Study 3 (Greek version)
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MEPOZA
l e  auTÔ TO epcoTniJaTOÂÔYlo nepi|j£vou|je an ô  eaéva va onavinaE iq  a e  pic ae ipà  
epcûTnoECûv paoiopÈvoq /n  cmq EpnEipÎEq kgi cjtic; anôipEiq ao u . Aev unàpxouv acocrrÈq n 
Âà0oq onavTnaEiç XpnaiponoicbvTOc; tic; ncpOKàTO) KÂlpoKEc; npoonôGnoE va 
a^ioÀOYncJEiq nô ao  anpavriK à dvai Ta napaKÔTCü cnroixeia Yia aéva npoacüniKà, KùkAcüoe 
TO voùpEpo nou OE avTinpoacünEÙEi nEpiaaÔTEpo.
nôao anyâvTiKÔ slvci yiq aéva t o  va aiaSôveaai ôiacpopETiKÔq coq 'EAArjvaq;
KaBôAou
ZnMCIVTIKÔ
1
2 3
OÙTE 
onM QVTiKÔ/ 
OÙTE a a n p a v T O  
4
5 6
n ù p a  noAù 
a n p a v T iK Ô  
7
• nôao anpovTiKÔ dvai yiq aéva t o  va aiaBôveaai ô ti  unôpxei auvéxeia Tnq eAAnviKiiq aou 
TOUTÔTriToq ovôpeaa crro nopeABôv koi o t o  péAAov;
KaGôAou
ZniJavT iK Ô
1
2 3
OÙTE 
ariM avT iK Ô / 
OÙTE a a n p a v T O  
4
5 6
n ù p a  noAù 
a n p a v T iK Ô  
7
[p n a i|Jo n o i(b v T a ç  Tiq napOKàTco KÀipaKcq a^ io A o y n t^n ^  n p o a n à 9 r |a £  v a  aÇ ioÀ oY nasiç  o £  
1010 p o O p ô  oupcpcovsiç  f |  S iacpcovdq  p s  t i ç  napoKÔTW  n p o x à o E iç . Ze napaKaÂoùpE va 
làÂEic; V OTO voùpEpo nou oe  ovTinpooconEÙEi nEpiooÔTEpo.
Ze
unEpPoAiKÙ
piKpÔ
paBpô
1
Ze
noAù
piKpô
PaBpô
2
Ze piKpô 
PaBpô 
3
OÙTE OE 
piKpÔ/ 
OÙTE OE 
PEYÔAo  
PaBpô 
4
Ze
PEYÔAo
PaBpô
5
Ze noAù 
PEYÔAo  
PoBpô 
6
Ze
u h e p P o Aik ô
PEYÔAo
PoBpô
7
n o lo  paG pô aioB ôvE aai 'EAAqvaq/ iôa;
n o io  paG pô a iaG ôveaai ô i i  éyeiq 
iroTOÙq ô sa ijo ù q  me Touq 'EÂAnvEq;
n o io  poG pô QiaGôvEaai 
(GpicjTriMévoq nou  Eiaoi 'EÂAnvoq/ iôo;
0 0  ÔMOioq/ 0  niOTEÙEiq ôti Eiooi p e  évo  
jo  'EAÂnvo/ i5o;
0 0  onMQVTiKÔ Eivoi y io  o é v o  to 
fovôq ÔTI EÎooi ’EAAnvoq/i5o;
0 0  niOTEÙEiq ÔTI 01 onôi|iEiq o o u  y io  tqv 
\ ô 5 o  ouMcpcovoùv ME TCüv àÂAü)V;
o v  OKOÙq KÔnoio n o u  5 e v  e îv o i 
Aqvoq, v o  KpiTiKÔpEi TOuq 'EAAnvEq, o e  
10 PoGpÔ OIOGÔVEOOI ô t i  KpITIKÔpOUV 
:V0 npoocùniKÔ;
n o io  poG pô o ioG ôveoo i XpiOTiovôq 
QàboiocJ n;
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Ze
unEppoAiKà
piKpô
PaGpô
1
Ze
noAù
piKpô
Pa0pô
2
Ze piKpô 
PaGpô 
3
OÙTE OE 
piKpÔ/ 
OÙTE OE 
pEyàAo 
PaGpô 
4
Ze
PEYÔAo
PaGpô
5
Ze noAù 
PEYÔAo 
PoGpô 
6
Ze
unEpPoAiKÔ
PEYÔAo
poGpô
7
n o io  po0|JÔ OIOGÔVEOOI ôti éxeiq  
voTOÙq ôEôjJOÙq |je TOuq XpiOTiovoùq 
)Gô5oÇouq;
n o io  poG pô oioG ôveooi 
XOpiOTHMÈvoq nou  eîoo i XpiOTiovôq 
>Gô5o^oç/ n;
100 ôjjo ioq / 0  niOTEÙEiq ô t i  e îoo i [je évo  
00 X pioTiovô OpGôôoW n ;
100 oripovTiKÔ EÎVOI y io  o é v o  t o  
/o v ô q  ÔTI EÎOOI XpiOTiovôq O pG ôôo^oq/
lOO niOTEÙEiq ÔTI 01 onôijJEiq o o u  y io  Tr|v 
iGoôoQo oupcpcùvoùv me t (üv ôAAcüv;
o v  OKOÙq KÔnoio nou  5 ev eîvoi 
lOTIOVÔq OpGÔÔoÇoq/ n , v o  KpiTIKÔpEl 
jq  O pG ôôoÇ ouq, oe n o io  PoGmô 
rGôvEOOi ÔTI KpiTiKÔpouv Eoévo  
oooaniKÔ;
Aiaqxovo)
AnôAuTa
1
Aiaqxûvù
ApKETÔ
2
Aiaqxûvô
3
OÙTE
Zuptpwvw
OÙTE
5iaq>(ov(b
4
Zupq){ûvd)
5
Zupq)wvw
ApKETÔ
6
Zupqxovci)
AnôAuTa
7
yEyovôq ôti EÎpoi 'EAAnvoq p e kôvei vo 
)Go) MOVOÔiKÔq/ ri.
yEyovôq ôti EÎpoi 'EAAnvoq/ î5o  me 
[copi^Ei o n ô  ovG pw nouq ôAAcüv
flKOTlÎTWV.
yEyovôq ôti EÎpoi 'EAAnvoq/ î5o  me 
KpîvEi o n ô  Touq ôAAouq.
yEyovôq ôti EÎpoi 'EAAnvoq/ î5o  me 
(poponoiEÎ o n ô  TOuq ôAAouq.
yEyovôq ôti EÎpoi 'EAAnvoq/ î5o  me 
'El v o  KOToAopoîvo) o n ô  noù  
DÊPXOVTOI 01 oEÎEq MOU.
yEyovôq ôti EÎpoi 'EAAnvoq /  î5o  me 
'El v o  kotoAoPoîvw nwq éy ivo  ôti EÎpoi
JEpO.
yEyovôq ôti EÎpoi 'EAAnvoq/ î5o , ôîvei 
IMO OTO noioq EÎpai aiÎMEpo koi nwq Go 
A o v o  lÎMOUv OTO MéAAov.
yEyovôq ôti EÎpoi 'EAAnvoq/ î5o
)Q(pépEI év o  ÔEOpÔ OVàpEOO OTO 
)eAGôv KOI OTO n o p ô v  p ou .
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Aiaqxovd)
AnôAuxa
1
Aiaqxavcb
ApKETÔ
2
Aiaqxûvû
3
OÙTE
Zupqxovw
OÙTE
Siaqxovd)
4
lupqxovd}
5
Zupqxovd)
ApKETÔ
6
Zupqxovd)
AnôAuTQ
7
YEyovôq ô t i  eipai XpiOTiavôq 
B ôèo^oq/ n ME KÔVEI v a  vicüGcü 
/aôiKÔq/ n.
yEyovôq ôti Eipoi XpiOTiovôq 
Gôôo^oq/ n me ÇEXwpi^Ei o n ô  
îp w n ou q  ôAAcùv GpnoKEicbv.
yEyovôq ôti Eipoi X p icm ovôq/ n me 
KpivEi o n ô  Touç ÔAAouq.
yEyovôq ôti Eipoi XpioTiavôq/ n me 
(poponoiEÎ o n ô  TOuq ÔAAouq.
yEyovôq ôti Eipoi XpiOTiovôq/ n ME 
rEi v a  KGTaAapaivcü o n ô  noù
DÈPXOVTGI 01 oEÎEq MOU.
yEyovôq ôti Eipoi XpiOTiovôq 
Gôôo^ocY n |JE KÔVEI v a  KGTGAapaiva) 
q éyivG ÔTI eîmoi oiÎMEpa.
yEyovôq ôti Eipoi XpiOTicvôq/ n , SivEi 
IMO OTO noioq d p o i onpE pa kgi nwq Go 
Â o  v a  lÎMOuv OTO meAAov .
yEyovôq ôti Eipoi X p io n o v ô q / n 
DOCpÈpEl EVO ÔEOpÔ aVOpEOG OTO 
DEAGÔV KOI OTO n o p ô v  p ou .
Aiatpcûvà)
AnôAuTQ
1
Aiaqxovù
ApKETÔ
2
Aiaqxûvw
3
OÙTE
Zupqxovd)
OÙTE
Siaqxovû
4
Zupqxovd)
5
Zupq)(ovd)
ApKETÔ
6
Zupq)covd)
AnôAuTO
7
<VÔ METOVIWVW nou  ovi^ kw  o e  o u t ô  t o  
'oq.
yEviKÈq ypoppÈq. Eipoi EUXOpioriiMEVoq 
j  Eipoi péAoq o u t o ù  t o u  ÈGvouq.
'iK à, o u x v ô  viwGw ÔTI TO ÊGvoq o t o  
DÎO OVHKW 5 e v  è x e i MEyôAn 0 # 0 .
iGovopoi koA ô yio  t o  ô t i  o v h k w  o e  
rô TO ÈGvoq.
yEviKÈq ypOM péq, t o  ÈGvoq pou  
opEÎTOi koA ô o n ô  TOuq ÔAAouq.
nio noAAoi GEwpoùv ô t i  t o  ÈGvoq pou  
rô p é o w  ô p o  EÎVOI AiyÔTEpo 
d teA eo m o tik ô  o n ô  ôAAo éGvn.
'iKÔ, 01 ôAAoi oépovT oi TO ÈGvoq o t o  
DÎO OVHKW.
'IKÔ 01 ôAAol nioTEÙouv ô t i  t o  ÈGvoq 
) o n o îo  OVHKW EÎVOI ovoSiôniOTO.
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Aiaqxûvd)
AnôAura
1
Aiaqxovû
ApKETÔ
2
Aiotpwvw
3
OÙTE
Zupqxovd)
OÙTE
5iaq)(ovd)
4
Zupq)(ovd)
5
Zupqxovd)
ApKETÔ
6
Zupq)(ovd)
AnôAuTQ
7
<và METOVIWVW n ou  oviîkw oe outh thv 
lOKEio.
YEViKÉq VpOMMÈç, Eipoi EUxapiOTHMÈvoq 
j  Eipoi MÈAoq OUTOÙ tou  
lOKEÙMOTOq.
•
'IKÔ, o u x v ô  VIW0W ÔTI n GpnOKEÎO OTr|V 
DÎO OVIÎKW 5 ev EXEI MEVÔAn O^lo.
G ovopoi koAô y io  to ôti ovhkw oe 
ni TM GpnoKEÎo.
yEviKÈq ypoMMÊq, n 8pr|(7KEio pou  
opEÎTOi KoAii o n ô  TOuq ÔAAouq.
nio noAAoi GEwpoùv ô t i  n GpnaKEÎo 
J KOTÔ p é o w  ô p o  EÎVOI AiyÔTEpO 
dteAeomotikh o n ô  ôAAEq GpnoKEÎEq.
NKÔ, 01 ÔAAOl oépOVTOI THV GprjOKEÎO 
IV o n o îo  OVHKW.
'iKÔ, 01 ôAAol niOTEÙouv ô t i  h Gphcjkeîo 
IV o n o îo  OVHKW EÎVOI ovoEiônioTH.
Ev t e Acûç
ovoAnGÈq
1
AAnGivô pE 
SuoKoAia 
2
Zx e S ô v  aAnGivô 
3
EvTEAd>q aAnGivô 
4
'EAAnvoq/ î5o  KOTopGwvw nôvTO v o  
'w  ôùokoAo npopAiipoTO eôv 
DOnoGlioW OpKETÔ.
'EAAnvoq/ î5 o , o v  KÔnoioq pou
IVTIWGEÎ, p n op w  v o  ppîOKW to pÈOO KOI
iq Tpônouq v o  no îpvw  outô  nou  GeAw .
'EAAnvoq/ î5 o  , eîvoi eùkoAo y io  pÊvo 
EnipÈvw OTOuq OKonoùq pou  koi vo 
ruyxôvw  TOuq OTÔxouq p ou .
'EAAnvoq/ î5 o , éx w  ouTonEnoîGnoH GTO
OVTipETWnîqW IKOVOnOlHTIKÔ TO 
3ÔOMEVO VEVOVÔTO.
3H C7THV EupHpoTiKÔTHTO pou  wq  
^nvoq/ i5o  , ^Epw nwq v o  XEipî^opoi 
îÔPAEOTEq KOTOOTÔOEiq
'EAAnvoq/ i5 o , p n o p w  v o  Aùvw to 
IlOOÔTEpO npOPAlipOTO EÔV KOTOpÔAw 
' onopoÎTHTH npoonôGEio
'EAAnvoq/ î5 o , p n op w  v o  pévw  
Kpoipoq ÔTOv ovTipETwnîqw ôuoKoAÎEq, 
rî p n op w  v o  pooîqopoi o r n v  ikovôthto
J.
'EAAnvoq/ î5 o , ôtov ovTipETwnîqw Évo 
)pA npo, p n o p w  v o  ppîoKW ouviiGwq  
cpopEq AùoEiq.
'EAAnvoq/ î5 o , ô t o v  ppîoK opoi o e  
jkoAîo p n o p w  ouviiG wq v o  OKEÇTW 
1010 Aùon.
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Ev t e Aû ç
avaAnBÊq
1
AAnGivô ME 
SuoKoAia 
2
Zx e S ô v  aAnGivô 
3
EvTEAwq aAnGivô 
4
'EAAnvoq/ iôo , p n o p w  ouviiG wq v o  
piOTw ÔTI épxETOi pnpooTÔ p ou .
XpiOTiovôq O pG ôôo^oq/ n, 
ropGwvw nôvTO v o  Aùvw ôùokoAo 
pgAiipoTO EÔV n p oon oG iiow  opketô .
XpiOTiovôq OpGôôoÇoq/ n, o v  KÔnoioq 
J evovtiwGeI, p n o p w  v o  PpioKW to 
JO KOI TOuq T pônouq v o  no ipvw  outô 
J GÈAw.
XpiOTiovôq OpGôôoÇoq/ n, d v o i 
coAo Yia pÈvo v o  Enipévw OTOuq 
3noùq pou  KOI v o  EniTuyxôvw TOuq 
jyouq p ou .
XpiOTiovôq OpGôôoÇoq/ n , Éxw 
ronEnoIGnon oto vo ovTipETwniqw
VOnOinTIKÔ TO OnpÔOPEVO VEVOVÔTO.
Dn OTnV EUpnpOTIKÔTHTO pOU Wq 
OTiovôq OpGôôoÇoq/ n , ^Èpw nwq v o  
pi(opoi onpôpAEnTEç kotootôoeiç
XpiOTiovôq O pG ôôo^oq/ n, p n op w  v o  
^W TO nEplOOÔTEpO npOpAlipOTO EÔV 
ropôAw Tnv onopoiTHTn npoonôGEio
XpiOTiovôq O pG ôôo^oq/ n, p n op w  v o  
'W qjùxpaipoq ôtov ovnpETwni^w  
JKoAlEq, yiOTl p n op w  v o  pooiqopoi o th v  
VÔTPTO p ou .
XpiOTiovôq OpGôôoÇoq/ n, ôtov 
npETwniqw EVO npô(3Anpo, p n op w  v o  
OKW ouviiG wq ôiôcpopEq AùoEiq.
XpiOTiovôq O pG ôôo^oq/ n, ôtov 
OKo p o i OE ôuokoAIo p n op w  ouviiG wq  
OKECPTW KÔnOlO A ùon.
XpiOTiovôq O pG ôôo^oq/ n, p n op w  
/ liô œ q  v o  XEipiOTW ôti épxETOi 
DOOTÔ pou .
Aiaqxùvd)
AnôAura
1
Aiaqxûvw
ApKETÔ
2
Aiaqxovd)
3
OÙTE
ZuMqxovw
OÙTE
Biaqxûvw
4
ZuMtpwvw
5
ZuM<pcûvd)
ApKETÔ
6
ZuMcpwvw
AnôAura
7
p n o p o ù o o  v o  o n o K o A éo w  t o v  eo utô  
J'EAAn v o  PE Ôuo k oAIo ,  eô v  ô ev  r ip o u v  
O Tiovôq O pG ôôoE oq .
rTEÙw ÔTI n EAAnviKÔTHTÔ p o u  KOI n 
G oôoÇ io e Ivoi oAAnAsvÔETO.
'EAAnvoq/ iô o  niOTEÙw ôti to  
OTIOVIKÔ p o u  lÔEWÔn EÎVOI OHPOVTIKÔ 
jpÔTI Tnq TOUTÔTHTÔq p o u .
'EAAnVIKÔ lÔEWÔn EÎVOI TOUTÔOnpO pE 
XpiOTIOVIKÔ lÔEWÔn.
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aÇieq pou  o o v  'EAAnvoq/ iôo  
UTiqovTOi OE PEyàAo PoGpô pE Tiq 
iOTioviKÈq pou  oÇlEq.
ÈGipo KOI 01 nopoôôoE iq  pou  wq 
A n v o q /iô o  ouvÔEOVTOi oe  pEyôAo 
Gpô PE Tnv OpGoôoEio.
nGn pou  wq 'EAAnvoq/iôo EKcppôÇovTOi 
PEyôAo poG pô pÈoo o n ô  Tiq 
lOTioviKEç pou  oEieq.
KÙKÂœae t o  v o u p e p o  n o u  oe a v T in p o a c ü n e ù e i n ep ia a Ô T E p o .
• Z e noio poGpô oiodàveoai ôpoioq / a  pE TOuq MouoouApôvouq Tnq ©pÔKnq ;
YnEppoAiKÔ OÙTE ôp oloq  / YnEppoAiKÔ
A vôpoioq 2 3 OÙTE A vôpoloq 5 6 'Opoioq
1 4 7
Z e  n o io  B a 9 u ô  a ia B à v E g a i  ô u o i o c / a  u s  t o u c  A A B a v o ù c  ; fÔYi BooEionnEioÙTEC 1
YnEppoAiKÔ
A vôpoioq
1
2 3
OÙTE ôp oloq  /  
OÙTE A vôpoloq  
4
5 6
YnEppoAiKÔ
'Opoioq
7
• Ze noio PoGpô aioGôvEoai ôpoioq /a  pE TOuq Pwoouq ; (ô x i P w a a o n ô v r i o u ç )
YnEpPoAiKÔ
A vôpoioq
1
2 3
OÙTE ôp oloq  /  
OÙTE A vôpoloq  
4
5 6
YnEpPoAiKÔ
'Opoioq
7
Ze YEviKÔTEpEq ypappÈq, npoonàSnoE  va  a^ioAoynoEiq Tiq opoiÔTriTEq o ou  pE TOuq 
M o u a o u A |jà v o u q  r n ç  O p à K n q  pc pàar|:
•  AÇîeç
/nEppoAiKÔ
A vôpoioq
1
2 3
OÙTE ôpoloq  /  
OÙTE A vôpoloq  
4
5 6
YnEppoAiKÔ
'Opoioq
7
# OpncJKEUTiKEc; r iE n o iG n a E iç
l'nEppoAiKÔ
A vôpoioq
1
2 3
OÙTE ôp oloq  /  
OÙTE A vôpoloq  
4
5 6
YnEppoAiKÔ
'Opoioq
7
• (D um oY vw piK Ô  X apaK T npK T T iK à
l'nEppoAiKÔ
A vôpoioq
1
2 3
OÙTE ôp oloq  /  
OÙTE A vôpoloq  
4
5 6
YnEppoAiKÔ
'Opoioq
7
• H 9 n  KOI "EG ipo
YnEppoAiKÔ
A vôpoioq
1
2 3
OÙTE ôp o loq  /  
OÙTE A vôpoloq  
4
5 6
YnEppoAiKÔ
'Opoioq
7
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A ia V O n T lK é ç  iK a V O T ilT E Q
YnepPoAiKà
Avôpoioç
1
2 3
OÙTE ôpoloq /  
OÙTE Avôpoloq  
4
5 6
YnEppoAiKÔ
O p oioq
7
# E k h o i S e u t i k o  E n in E S o
YnEppoAiKÔ
Avôpoioq
1
2 3
OÙTE ôpoloq /  
OÙTE Avôpoloq  
4
5 6
YnEppoAiKÔ
D po ioq
7
# n o A iT iŒ T iK Ô  E n in E S o
YnEppoAiKÔ
Avôpoioç
1
2 3
OÙTE ôpoloq /  
OÙTE Avôpoloq  
4
5 6
YnEppoAiKÔ
O p oioq
7
• O iK o v o u iK n  K a T O O T o a n
YnEppoAiKÔ
Avôpoioq
1
2 3
OÙTE ôpoloq /  
OÙTE Avôpoloq 
4
5 6
YnEppoAiKÔ
D jjo io q
7
l e  YEviKÔTEpcq y p a p p é q , n p o a n à G n o E  v a  aÇ io A oyn aE iq  Tiq opciÔ TriTEq a o u  pE TOuq A À p o v o ù q  pE
p ô o n :
• A Ç Ie ç
YnEppoAiKÔ
Avôpoioq
1
2 3
OÙTE ôpoloq /  
OÙTE Avôpoloq  
4
5 6
YnEpPoAiKÔ
O p oioq
7
• O p n O K E U T IK E C  n E n O lB f jO E IC
YnEppoAiKÔ
Avôpoioq
1
2 3
OÙTE ôpoloq /  
OÙTE Avôpoloq  
4
5 6
YnEppoAiKÔ 
O p oioq  , 
7
# (D u o iO Y V w u iK Ô  X a p O K T n p ic r r iK à
YnEppoAiKÔ
Avôpoioq
1
2 3
OÙTE ôpoloq /  
OÙTE Avôpoloq  
4
5 6
YnEpPoAiKÔ
O jjo io q
7
•  'H 0 n  K O I 'E O iu a
YnEppoAiKÔ
Avôpoioq
1
2 3
OÙTE ôpoloq /  
OÙTE Avôpoloq  
4
5 6
YnEppoAiKÔ
D p o io q
7
•  A ia V O n T IK E Ç  iK Q V Ô T IlT e Ç
YnEppoAiKÔ
Avôpoloq
1
2 3
OÙTE ôpoloq /  
OÙTE Avôpoloq  
4
5 6
YnEpPoAiKÔ
O jjo io q
7
• E K n a iS E U T iK Ô  E n in E S o
YnEppoAiKÔ
Avôpoloq
1
2 3
OÙTE ôpoloq /  
OÙTE Avôpoloq  
4
5 6
YnEppoAiKÔ
OjJOioq
7
• n o A iT iO T iK Ô  E n in E S o
YnEppoAiKÔ
Avôpoioq
1
2 3
OÙTE ôpoloq /  
OÙTE Avôpoloq  
4
5 6
YnEppoAiKÔ
O p oioq
7
•  O iK O v o iJ iK H  K a T à o r a a n
YnEppoAiKÔ 
Avôpoioq  
. 1
2 3
OÙTE ôpoloq /  
OÙTE Avôpoloq  
4
5 6
YnEppoAiKÔ
O p oioq
7
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Ze YEViKÔTEpeq ypapiJEq, npoanàG noe va  a^ioAoynaeiq Tiq opoiÔTriTeq a ou  pe TOuq P c b a o u q  pe 
pàon:
•  A Ç ie ç
YneppoAiKà
Avôpoioq
1
2 3
OÙTE ôpoloq /  
OÙTE Avôpoloq  
4
5 6
YnEpppAiKÔ
O poioq
7
• B p n o K E U T iK Ê q  n E n o iB n a E iq
YneppoAiKÔ
Avôpoioq
1
2 3
OÙTE ôpoloq /  
OÙTE Avôpoloq 
4
5 6
YnEppoAiKÔ
O poioq
7
•  O U Q IG Y V C O p iK à  X a p a K T n P IO T IK à
YneppoAiKÔ
Avôpoioq
1
2 3
OÙTE ôpoloq /  
OÙTE Avôpoloq  
4
5 6
YnEppoAiKÔ
O poioq
7
'H 9 n  KOI *E 9 ipg
YnEppoAiKÔ
Avôpoioq
1
2 3
OÙTE ôpoloq /  
OÙTE Avôpoloq  
4
5 6
YnEpPoAiKÔ
D po ioq
7
•  A ia v o r |T iK è q  iK a v Ô T i iT E ç
YnEppoAiKÔ
Avôpoioq
1
2 3
OÙTE ôpoloq /  
OÙTE Avôpoloq  
4
5 6
YnEppoAiKÔ
'Opoioq
7
• E k h o i S e u t i k o  E n in E S o
YnEppoAiKÔ
Avôpoioq
1
2 3
OÙTE ôpoloq /  
OÙTE Avôpoloq  
4
5 6
YnEppoAiKÔ
D p o io q
7
• n o A iT iO T iK Ô  E n in E S o
YnEpPoAiKÔ
Avôpoioq
1
2 3
OÙTE ôpoloq /  
OÙTE Avôpoloq 
4
5 6
YnEppoAiKÔ
D p o io q
7
•  O iK O V o p iK n  K a T Ô O T a a n
YnEppoAiKÔ
Avôpoioq
1
2 3
OÙTE ôpoloq /  
OÙTE Avôpoloq 
4
5 6
YnEppoAiKÔ
O p oioq
7
n ô a o  an e iA riT iK n  B e w p e iq  thv n a p o u a i a  Twv pETOvaorwv ornv E A A ôS a;
l£
uncpPoAiKÔ
yiKpô
PaGpô
1
Ze
noAù
piKpô
PaGpô
2
Ze piKpô 
PaGpô 
3
OÙTE OE 
piKpÔ/ 
OÙTE OE 
PEyôAo 
PaGpô 
4
Ze
PEyôAo
PoGpô
5
Ze noAù 
PEyôAo 
PoGpô 
6
Ze unEpPoAiKÔ 
PEyôAo PoGpô 
7
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n ô a o  aneiA nT iK H  G e w p e lq  T r |v  n a p o u a i a  tc o v  M o u a o u A p à v c o v  T t\q  G pÔ K nq  a r n v  E A A àSa:
n à p a  noAù 
Aiyo 
1 2 3
OÙTE
Aiyo/
OÙTE
noAù
4
5 6
n ù p a  noAù 
7
•  v 'Q  T n v  
pÊAA ov
a u v È x E io  T n q  sO v iK n q  a o u  T o u ro T n T o q  o v à p e a a  a r p  n o p e A G o v  k o i o t o
n à p a  noAù 
Aiyo 
1 2 3
OÙTE
Aiyo/
OÙTE
noAù
4
5 6
n ù p a  noAù 
7
n ù p a  noAù 
Aiyo 
1 2 3
OÙTE
Alyo/
OÙTE
noAù
4
5 6
n ù p a  noAù 
7
• Y'o Tnv auTsnàpKEia ( n  iKavÔTiiTa aou wq 'EAAnvoq o t o  va Aûvsiq t o  npopAnpora 
KOI va xcipii^ccrai SuoKoAsq KOTaaràaEiq) nou cx£iq wq EAAnvoq;
nàpa noAù 
Aiyo 
1 2 3
OÙTE
Alyo/
OÙTE
noAù
4
5 6
nàpa noAù 
7
nôao oneiAnTiKn Gswpsiq xnv napouaia 
• via xnv SiocpopETiKÔxnxa aou wq EA
xwv AApovwv arnv EAAôSo: 
\nvaq;
nàpa noAù 
Alyo 
1 2 3
OÙTE
Alyo/
OÙTE
noAù
4
5 6
nàpa noAù 
7
• Via xnv 
yêAAov
auvÊXEio xnq EGviKfjq aou xouxôxnxoq ovôpEaa aro nopEÀGôv
nàpa noAù 
Alyo 
1 2 3
OÙTE
Alyo/
OÙTE
noAù
4
5 6
nàpa noAù 
7
759
Y ia  T n v  a u T Ô - E K T iy n a n  n o u  é x e iq  w q  E A A n v a q ;
n à p a  noAù 
Alyo 
1 2 3
OÙTC
Aiyo/
OÙTe
noAù
4
5 6
n à p a  noAù 
7
•  V ia  T n v  o u T E n à p K E io  ( n  iK O V Ô T n T O  a o u  w q  E A A n v o q  a r o  v 
K O I v a  X E ip i^ E o o i S û a K o A E q  K O T a o T à a E iq )  n o u  è x E iq  w q  E l
0 A ù v E iq  x o  n p o p A n p o x o  
V A n v o q ;
n à p a  noAù 
Aiyo 
1 2 3
OÙTE
Aiyo/
OÙTE
noAù
4
5 6
n à p a  noAù 
7
n ô a o  o n E iA n T iK n  G E W p E iq  x n v  n a p o u a i a  
•  v i a  x n v  S io c p o p E T iK Ô x n x a  a o u  w q  E A
x w v  P w a w v  a r n v  E A A ô ô o :  
\ n v o q ;
n à p a  noAù 
Aiyo 
1 2 3
OÙTE
Aiyo/
OÙTE
noAù
4
5 6
n à p a  noAù 
7
•  V ia  x n v  
p Ê A A o v
a u v E X E io  x n q  E O v iK n q  a o u  x o u x ô x n x a q  a v à p E o a  o x o  n o p E A G ô v  k o i  a r o
n à p a  noAù 
Aiyo 
1 2 3
OÙTE
Aiyo/
OÙTE
noAù
4
5 6
n à p a  noAù 
7
•  V ia  x n v  o u x ô - E K x ip n G n  n o u  é x E iq  w q  E A A n v o q ;
n à p a  noAû 
Aiyo 
1 2 3
OÙTE
Aiyo/
OÙTE
noAù
4
5 6
n à p a  noAù 
7
•  Y 'o  x q v  a u T E n à p K E iG  ( n  iK O v o T n T O  a o u  coq 'E À A q v a q  a r o  v a  A ù v E iq  r a  n p o p A n y a r a  
K O I v a  X E ip i^ E o a i  S ù o K o A E q  K a r a a r à a E i q )  n o u  é x c iq  w q  E A A n v o q ;
OÙTE
n à p a  noAù 
Aiyo 
1 2 3
Aiyo/
OÙTE
noAù
4
5 6
n à p a  noAù 
7
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MEPOZB’
► Eivai aniJavTiKÔ yio TOuq MouGOuApàvouq in q  ©pÔKnq va pÊvouv ae ^excopiorèq 
YEiTOVièq, ôiÔTi poipàc^ovTGi nio noAAô k g i auvGVGorpècpovTGi KGAÙTepa peTG^ù TOuq anô 
ÔTI VG pévouv OTiq iSieq yeiTOViéq pe 'EAArjveq.
Aiaqxûvù
AnôAuTQ
1
Aiacpfûvd)
ApKETÔ
2
Aiaqxovd)
3
OÙTE
Zupcpuvù/OÙTE
Aiaqxûvib
4
Zupqxovd)
5
Zupq)(ovd)
ApKETÔ
6
Zupq)(ovd)
AnôAura
7
• ©ecüpcü ÔTI n Koivcüvio poq eivoi ôôiKn onévovri crrouq MouoouApôvouq in q  ©pÔKriq.
Aïoqxovw
AnôAura
1
Aiaqxovw
ApKETÔ
2
Aiatpcovà)
3
OÙTE
Zupqxûvû/OÙTE
Aiaqxovw
4
Zupq)(ovd)
5
Zupq)(ovd)
ApKETÔ
6
Zupq)(ovd)
AnôAura
7
•  ©G npènei vo eivoi nio eÙKoAo vo onoicrnoeiq t h v  eAArjviKiî unr) KOÔTriTG.
AiaqxûVb)
AnôAuja
1
AiaqxDvù
ApKETÔ
2
Aiaqxovd)
3
OÙTE
Zupqxovû/OÙTE
Aiaqxovd)
4
Zupq)(ovd)
5
Zupq)(ovd)
ApKETÔ
6
Zupq)(ovd)
AnôAura
7
Ynôpxouv eAôxioroi (BouAeuTèq nou vo eKnpoacünoùv TOuq MouaouApôvouq Tnq 
©pÔKnq OTO eAArjviKÔ KOivopoùAio nou oripoivei ô t i t g  g o A it ik ô  KÔppoTG npènei vo 
Aàpouv TG OnopoiTnTG pÈTpG YIO VG ÔIGOCpoAii^ OUV TQV GÛ^nori OUppeTOXnq GUTCbv 
TCÜV pouAeuTCüv crro KoivopoùAïo.
Aiaq)(ûvd)
AnôAura
1
Aiaq)(ovd)
ApKETÔ
2
Aiaq)covd)
3
OÙTE
Zupq)(ovd)/OÙTE
Aiaq)(ovd)
4
Zupq)(ovd)
5
Zupq)covd)
ApKETÔ
6
Zupq)cov6
AnôAura
7
• Eivoi nio niGovô y iQ t h v  MouoouApoviKii peiovÔTrjTO TPjq ©pÔKnq vo npooSeùoei o t o  
pèAAov eôv KÔvei unopovf) k g i g v  ôev nié^ei èvrovo y iq  oAAoYéq.
Aiaq)covd)
AnôAura
1
Aiaq)(ovd)
ApKETÔ
2
Aiaqxovd)
3
OÙTE
Zupq)(ovd)/OÙTE
Aiaq)uvd)
4
Zupq)(ovd)
5
Zupq)wvd)
ApKETÔ
6
Zupq)(ovd)
AnôAura
7
•  A ôycü TOU peYÔAou nooooroù ovepYioq, oi MouoouApôvoi Tnq ©pÔKnq npènei vo 
cpÙYOUV onô Tnv EAAôôo.
Aiaq)(ovd)
AnôAura
1
Aiaqxovd)
ApKETÔ
2
Aiaq)(ovd)
3
OÙTE
Zupq)(ovd)/OÙTE
Aiaq)0)vd)
4
Zupq)wvd)
5
Zupq)(Ovd)
ApKETÔ
6
Zupqxovd)
AnôAura
7
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Ta SiKOicbiJCTa t c ü v  M ouaouA|jàv(üv tp iç  ©pÔKric; npénei:
Na
ncpiopiOTOÙv
1
2 3
Na pEivouv (oç
EXOUV
4
5 6
Na EnEKTaGoùv 
7
• Aev Ba pe evoxAoliqe eàv peraKopi^av oe piKpô xpoviKÔ ôiàcrrripa noAAoi
MouaouApàvoi in ç  ©pàKnç crniv yeiTOVià pou, oAAâ^ovraq Tqv eBvikh in q  aùcrraari.
Aiacpcovd)
AnoAura
1
Aiaqxovd)
ApKCTà
2
Aiaqxdvô)
3
OÙTE
Zupq)0)V(b/OÙTE
Aiaq)(ovd)
4
Zupqxovû
5
ZupqxDvd)
ApKETÔ
6
Zupqxovû
AnôAuTa
7
• E(pôoov 01 MouoouApàvoi r r  
eniipèneiai va ô iainpouv rn
\q ©pÔKriq ôiapÈvouv OTr|v EAAùôa, npÉnEi va Touq 
V napàôoon Touq.
Aiacpcûvù
AnôAuTQ
1
Aiaqxovù
ApKETÔ
2
Aiaqxdvû
3
OÙTE
Iupq>cûV(b/OÙTE
Aiaqxûvô)
4
ZupqKûvù
5
Zupqxûvû
ApKETÔ
6
Zupqxovû
AnôAuTa
7
• 'O iav 01 MouoouApàvoi in ç  ©pÔKriç Bo opxioouv va PpioKOUV ôouAEiÉq Aoyco to u  to  
Eivoi pEiovÔTriTa, o u tô  Bo KOToAn^ei oiyoupa o to  va unàpxouv AiyoTEpEq ôouAEiÊq y '° 
Touq 'EAAnvEq.
Aiaqxovû
AnôAuTQ
1
Aiaqxovcb
ApKETÔ
2
Aiaqxovd)
3
OÙTE
Zupqxovû/OÙTE
Aïoqxovà)
4
ZupqMovû
5
Zupqxovû
ApKETÔ
6
Zupqxovd)
AnôAuTa
7
• AuToi nou 5ev exouv àôEio nopopovnq OTrjv xwpo, Bo npÊnEi va anEAàooovTai.
Aiaqxovù
AnôAuTQ
1
Aiaqxovô)
ApKETÔ
2
AiaqxûVb)
3
OÙTE
Zupqxûvû/OÙTE
Aiaqxovô)
4
Zupqxovû
5
Zupqxovd)
ApKETÔ
6
Zupq>covd)
AnôAuTa
7
Kànoioi M ouaouÂpàvoi Tr|q OpàKnç nou p évou v  a rn v  EÂAàôa k q i A cppâvouv  
oiKOvopiKn unoOTiipi^n c n ô  t o  Kpàrcç, 0 c  p n o p o ù a a v  va  aviene^èA Bouv ywpiq in v  
ev ioxuan  s à v  n poan aB où aav .
Aiaqxovù
AnôAuTa
1
Aiaqxûvû
ApKETÔ
2
Aiaqxovd)
3
OÙTE
Zupqxûvû/OÙTE
Aiaq)CûV(b
4
Zupqxdvô)
5
Zupqxovô)
ApKETÔ
6
Zupqxavd)
AnôAuTa
7
•  YheBeoe ô ti t o  noiôi o ou  onoKTÔEi noiôi pE KÙnoio ÙTopo pE noAù ôiaçopETiKÔ xp& po  
ÔEppoToq KOI cpuoiOYVcopiKà xapoKTiipiOTiKà o n ô  t o  ôikô o ou . Eàv t o  eyyôvio  o o u  5 ev  
poià^ouv pE KOVEVO 000 Tr)v oiKOYÉvEia o ou  :
0 a  EvoxAnOEiç 
OE nôpa noAù 
pEyôAo paGpô 
1
2 3 4 5 6
Aev 0 a  
EVOxAnGEÎq 
KaGôAou 
7
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Eivai àôiKO yia Touq avBpcbnouq piaq EÔv oi MouoouApàvoi Tr|q ©pÔKriq 
noipvouv Tiq ôouAeiéq k g i Touq oiKOVopiKOÙq nôpouq.
Aiapwvw
AnoAura
1
Aiaqxûvû
ApKETÔ
2
Aiaqxovcb
3
OÙTE
Zupqxûvû/OÙTE
Aiaqxovd)
4
Zupqxovrâ
5
Zupqxovd)
ApKETÔ
6
Zupqxovd)
AnôAura
7
« Aev 0 0  ovrjouxoùoo eàv oi nio noAAoi oupcpoiTrjTéq pou crro novenioTiipio n oi 
ouvepYÔTEq pou orrj ôouAeià h to v  MouoouApàvoi Tnq ©pàKnq.
Aiaqxovd)
AnôAura
1
Aiaqxovô)
ApKETÔ
2
Aiaqxûvd)
3
OÙTE
Zupqxovû/OÙTE
Aiaqxovd)
4
Zupqxûvw
5
Zupq)cov(d
ApKETÔ
6
Zupcpcovd)
AnôAura
7
Oi napoKàTCü npoTàaeiq avacpépovrai qe anôqjEiq oxeriKà ps Touq MouaouApàvouq inq 
©pÔKriq nou éxouv EYKaTaaraèd orpv EAAàôa sôcb kqi noAAà xpôvia. Oi nio noAAci 
MouoouApàvoi Tr)q ©pàKpq Eivoi ÔTopo nou éxouv YewrjÔd orpv EAAàôa, nou 
KaTàyovTOi onà Tr|v Toupda kqi Tr|v BouAyopia koi nou k g tè x o u v  nôr| Trjv EAAriviKii 
unr|KOÔTr|Ta. Ze napaKaÀoùpE va anavrnoEiq éxovraç o t o  puoAô oou 
(oKEnTÔMEVoç/n) pôvo Tr|v oüYKEKpi|j£vr| opàSa kgi vg  KGTGSéoEiq Tr|v ànoipp oou 
Yia Kà0E pia onô Tiq npoiàoEiq, xpnGiponoicbvroq Tiq nopoKàTO) KAipoKEq.
Aiaqxovd) Aiaqxovd) Zupqxovd) Zupq)(ovd) Zupq)covcb
AnôAura ApKETÔ Aiaqxovd) Kuncoq Zupq)(ovd) ApKETÔ AnôAura
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
)i MouoouApàvoi TPiq ©pàKriq ôev 0a npénei va éxouv t o  ôiKoiwpa oùoTOoriq ô ik c ü v  TOuq 
o A it ik c û v  KoppàTcov npoKEipévou va éxouv t o  ôiKoicopa EvepYnç ouppETOxnq o t o  
apôvTo eAArjviKà noAiTiKà KàppoTo.
Il MouoouApàvoi Tnq © p à K p q , 8o pnopoùv va éxouv t o  ôiKoicopo oùoTOonq t c û v  ô ik c ü v  
ouq noAiTiKCüv KoppàTCüv ecpôoov ô e v  éxouv t o  ôiKoicüpo evepYnq ouppETOxnc; o t o  
opàvTO EAArjviKà KoppoTO.
H M ouoouApàvoi Tnq ©pàKqq 00  p nopoùv va  éxou v  t o  ôiKOicbpo oùcrraorjq t c ü v  ô ik c ü v  
ouq noAiTiKCüV KoppÔTCüv k o i EvepYH ouppETOxn KOi erra n ap ôvra  eAArjviKà KÔppoTO.
0  ov 01 MouoouApàvoi TPjq © p à K p q  éxouv t o  ôiKoicüpo o u o T O o n q  ô ik c ü v  TOuq noAiTiKcbv 
OppàTCüV n TO ÔIKOiCüpO EVEpYHt; OUppETOXnÇ OTO nOpÔVTO EAArjviKà KOppOTO ÔEV éxei 
npoolo, yiotî TO Kà0E ÔTopo EÎvoi eAeù0epo va ouppETéxei crro KÔppo nou ouTÔq f) 
éAei.
Il MouoouApàvoi Tpq ©pàKnq ô e v  0 o npénei va éxouv t o  ôiKoicüpo oùcnraonq t c ü v  ô ik c ü v  
ouq noAiTiKCüv KoppàTCüv o ù t e  k o i t o  ôiKoicüpo evepYnq o u p p e T O x n ç  cnro nopàvra 
\Ar|viKà KoppoTO yiotî oÙTCoq n àAAcoq 0o npénei va unàpxouv AiYÔTepeq peiovÔTriTEq 
Tfiv EAAàôa._____________
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Aiaqxovw Aiaqxûvw Zupqxovd) Zupqxovd) Zupq)(ovd)
AnoAura ApKCTà Aiaqxovû Kancoq Zupq)(ovd) ApKCTà AnôAura
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
)i MouoouApàvoi Tnq ©pàKnq npénEi va OTapaTiioouv va nnyaivouv oe oxoAeia nou 
iiôàoKOUv Tnv noiôEio Tnq x^ poq KOTaywYnq TOuq, npoKEipévou va ôiôàoKOVTai Tnv 
AAnviKn naiôEia. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
)i MouoouApàvoi Tnq ©pàKnq pnopoùv va ouvExioouv va ôiôàoKOVTai Tnv naiôda Tnq 
(bpaq KaTaycûYnç Touq, Ecpàoov 5 e v  o u y x ê o u v  OTOixeio Tnq pe Tnv eAAnviKn naiôeia 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 a v  01 M ouoouApàvoi Tnq ©pàKnq 8 a  ouvExioouv va  ôiôàoKOvrai Tnv naiôeia Tnq 
cbpaq KaTaycoYnq Touq n 8 a  ôiôàoKovTai Tnv EAAnviKii naiôeia  5 ev  éxei Kapia o n p a o ia , 
lOTÎ TO Kà0E àTOpO EÎVOI EAEÙ0EpO VO ÔIÔàOKETOI TnV nOIÔEÎa nOU OUTÔq/ n 0êAei. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
)i M ouoouApàvoi Tnq ©pàKnq npénEi va  ouvexIoouv va ôiôàoKOvroi Tnv naiôEÎa Tnq 
(bpaq KOTOYCOYiif; TOuq, Evcb ôiSàoKOvroi ô p u q  koi Tnv eAAnviKii noiôEÎa. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
)i M ouoouApàvoi Tnq ©pàKnq Gev npênEi va  ôiôàoKOVTOi Tnv naiôEÎa Tnq X^poq  
OTOYCOYnq TOuq, oAAà oùte va  ôiôùokovtoi koi Tnv EAAnviKii naiôEÎa, yiotI oÙTwq n 
lAAcoq 00  ÈnpEnE va  unàpxei AiyÔTEpn pETOvàoTEUon crrnv EAAàôa. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
)i M ouoouApàvoi Tnq ©pàKnq npénEi va  OTopoTnoouv va navrpEÙovrai pe opoE0VEÎq 
ouq npoKEipévou tou va navrpEÙovTOi pe 'EAAnveq. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
)i M ouoouApàvoi Tnq ©pàKnq p nopoùv  va  ouvexIoouv va novTpEÙovrai OTnv EAAàôa 
(pàoov ÔEV novTpEÙovTOi PE 'EAAnveq. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
)i M ouoouApàvoi Tnq ©pàKnq npénei va  navTpeùovTOi ôxi pôvo  pe opoE0VEÎq Touq oAAà 
01 pe 'EAAnveq. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
)i M ouoouApàvoi Tnq ©pàKnq oùte npénei va  navTpeùovrai pàvo  pe opoE0VEÎq TOuq, 
lAAà OÙTE KOI va novTpeùovTOi p àvo pe 'EAAnveq, yiotI oÙTwq n àAAœq 0 o  én p en e va  
inàpxei AiYÔTEpn pETOvàoTEUon O Tnv EAAàôa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 eAAnviKÔ KpàToq ô ev  0o  npénei va  napaxw pel OTOuq M ouoouApàvouq Tnq ©pàKnq t o  
IIKOICOPO OÙOTOOnq ÔIKCÜV TOUq noAlTIKCüV KOPpàTCÜV. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 eAAnviKÔ KpàToq npénei va  napaxcüpei cnrouq M ouoouApàvouq Tnq ©pàKnq t o  
iiKoicüpo oùoTOonq tcüv ôikcüv TOuq noAiTiKcbv KoppàTCüv, pàvo eà v  npoooppooTOÙv koi 
inoôEXTOùv TO ekAoyikô oùoT npo ouTnq Tnq X(bpoq. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Aiaqxûvû Aiaqxovd) Zupcpcovà) Zupq)(ovd) Zupqxovd)
AnoAura ApKCTà Aïoqxovà) Koncoç Zupq)(ûvà) ApKCTà AnôAura
1 . 2 3 4 5 6 7
10 va napaxwpeiToi to ôiKoiwpa oùcrraariq véou noÂiTiKoù KÔppoToq 6a npénei va 
^ETà^EToi ov 0 oiTcbv éxEi TO onapalTnTO vopiKÔ KOI noAiTiKÔ ôiKaiwpoTa aveÇàpTnTa 
nô TO ov eivoi MouoouÂpàvoq Tnq ©pÔKnq. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ô  EÂÂnviKÔ KpoToq 00 npénei va napaxwpei eQoou to ôiKoiwpo ouoTOonq noÂiTiKOÙ 
ôppoToq (jTouq MouoouApàvouq Tnq ©pàKnq, ove^àpTnTO onô Tiq noAiTOTiKéq TOuq 
ruvn0Eieq. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ô  eAAnviKà KpàToq 0o npénei va nopéxEi to ôiKoicüpo oùoTOonq KàppoToq pôvo oe 
lAAnveq noAÎTeq eAAnviKiiq KOTaywYnq Evw OTOuq MouoouApàvouq Tnq ©pÔKnq to 
iKoiwpa oùoTOonq KÔppoToq 0o npénei va nopéxETOi pôvo OTiq xwpeq KOTOYWYnc; TOuq. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ô  eAAnviKÔ KpÔToq ôev 0o npénei va nopéxEi Tnv eAAnviKii noiôeia oe Kovévo 
louoouApàvo Tnq ©pÔKnq. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ô  eAAnviKÔ KpÔToq 00 npénei va nopéxEi Tnv eAAnviKii noiôeia OTOuq MouoouApàvouq 
nq ©pÔKnq pàvo eàv npoooppôZ^ovToi OTnv eAAnviKn KOuATOÙpo. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ô  eAAnviKÔ KpÔToq npénei va nopéxei Tnv eAAnviKii noiôeia oe oAouq, ove^àpTnTO onô 
0 EÔV eivoi MouoouApàvoi Tnq ©pÔKnq. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b  eAAnviKÔ KpÔToq 0o npénei va nopéxEi Tnv eAAnviKii naiôeia e^ioou OTOuq 
louoouApôvouq Tnq ©pÔKnq ônwq OTOuq 'EAAnveq, ove^ôpTnTO onô Tiq noAiTiOTiKéq 
ruvr|0eiéq Touq. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b  eAAnviKÔ KpÔToq 0o npénei va nopéxEi Tnv eAAnviKii naiôeia pôvo oe 'EAAnveq k o i  
TOuq MouoouApàvouq Tnq ©pÔKnq Tnv noiôeia Tnq X^poq KOTOYCûYnq TOuq. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b  eAAnviKÔ KpÔToq ôev 0o npénei va ev0appùvei TOuq YÔpouq peTO^ù EAAnvwv k o i 
louoouApôvœv T n q  ©pÔKnq. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b  eAAnviKÔ KpÔToq 0o npénei va ev0appùvei TOuq YÔpouq peTO^ù EAAnvwv k o i  
louoouApôvœv T n q  ©pÔKnq, pôvo eàv oi MouoouApàvoi Tnq © p Ô K n q  npoooppooTOÙv 
01 onoôexToùv nAnpwq T n v  eAAnviKii KOuATOÙpo.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TO puoTiipio TOU YÔpou ÔEV éxEi onpoolo OV 0 YQjJnpàq n n vùcpn eivoi onô Tnv 
louoouApoviKn peiovÔTnTO Tnq ©pÔKnq. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
)i Y Ô p oi pETO^ù EAAfjvwv k o i MouoouApôvwv T n q  © p Ô K n q  npénei va Yivovrai pe T n v  iôio 
ruxvÔTnTO ônwq k o i o i  ôAAoi Y Ô p oi k o i va ev0appùvovTai onô t o  eAAnviKÔ KpÔToq 
ive^ôpTnTO onô Tiq noAiTiOTiKéq ouvn0eieq t w v  MouoouApôvwv Tnq ©pÔKnq.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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)i 'EAAnveq 6a npénei va navTpeùovTai yôvo ye 'EAAnveq koi oi MouoouApàvoi Tnq
DpÔKnq pôvo pe MouoouApàvouq Tnq OpÔKnq. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Eivai anyavTiKÔ yia TOuq AÂpavoùq va pévouv ae e^xwpiareq yEiTovieq, ôiôti 
yoipà^ o^vrai nio noAAà koi ouvovacn-pécpovroi KoAurepo yETO^ ù TOuq onô ôti va 
yévouv cnriq iôieq yEiTOViÊq ye 'EAAnveq.
Aiaqxûvû
AnoAura
1
Aiaqxûvd)
ApKETÔ
2
Aiaqxovd)
3
OÙTE
Zupq)wvw/OùrE
Aiaqxûvû
4
Zupqxovb)
5
Zupq)(ovd)
ApKETÔ
6
Zupq)(ûvd)
AnôAura
7
• 0ecop(b ÔTI n Koivœvio poq eivoi ôôiKn anévavn OTOuq AApovoùq.
Aiaqxdvû
AnôAura
1
Aiacpcovcb
ApKETÔ
2
Aiaqxovw
3
OÙTE
£upq>cov(b/OùrE
Aiaqxovd)
4
Zupqxovd)
5
Zupq)(ovd)
ApKETÔ
6
Zupqxovd)
AnôAura
7
0 a  npénei va eivai nio eùkoAo va anoicrnaeiq Tnv eAAnviKii unnKOÔTnTa.
OÙTE
Aiaq)(ovd) Aiaq)(ovù Zupq)(ovd)/OùrE Zupqxovd) Zupqxovd)
AnôAura ApKETÔ Aiaq)(ovd) Aiaq)(ovd) Zupq)(ovd) ApKETÔ AnôAura
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ynôpxouv eAôxicrroi pouAeuTéq aA(3aviKnq KaTaywynq oto eAAnviKÔ KOivopoùAio nou 
onyoivei ôti to noAiTiKÔ KoyyoTO npénei va Aôpouv Ta anapaiTpTa yéTpa yia va 
5iao(paAiÇouv Tnv aù^n^n cjuyyeToxnq auTwv tcov pouAeuTWV oto koivoPoùAio.
Aiaq)(ovd)
AnôAura
1
Aiaq)(ov(b
ApKETÔ
2
Aiaqxovd)
3
OÙTE
Zupq)(ovd)/OùrE
Aiaqxovd)
4
Zupqxovd)
5
Zupqxovd)
ApKETÔ
6
Zupqxovd)
AnôAura
7
e Eivoi nio niGovà yio Tnv oApoviKii peiovÔTnTO va npooôeùoei o t o  péAAov eàv kôvei 
unopovii KOI ov ôev nié^ ei évrovo yio oAAoyéq.
Amq)(ovd)
AnôAura
1
Aiaqxovû
ApKETÔ
2
Aiaq)(ovd)
3
OÙTE
Zupq)(ovd)/OùrE
Aiaq)(ovd)
4
Zupqxovû
5
Zupqxovd)
ApKETÔ
6
Zupqxovd)
AnôAura
7
Aoyo) TOU yeyôAou nooooroù ovepyiaq, oi AApovoi npénei va yupioouv OTnv noTpiôa 
TOuq.
Aiaq)(ovd)
AnôAura
1
Aiaqxovd)
ApKETÔ
2
Aiaq)(ovd)
3
OÙTE
Zupqxovd)/OùrE
Aiaq)(ovd)
4
Zupq)(ovd)
5
Zupq)(ovd)
ApKETÔ
6
Zupq)(ovd)
AnôAura
7
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Ta ôiKaiœpaTa tw v  AApavwv peTavaoTwv npénei:
Na
nE p iop iaro ùv
1
2 3
Na pEÎvouv wq 
EXOUV 
4
5 6
Na EnEKraGoùv 
7
•  A e v  0 0  p e  e v o x A o ù o e  e à v  peTO K àpiÇ ov o e  p iK p à  x p o v iK à  ô ià o T n p o  noAAoi A A p o vo i 
O T nv yeiTO Vià p o u , oA A à^ovToq T n v  eS v iK ii Tnq  o ù o T O o n .
Aiaqxovw
AnôAura
1
Aiaqxovà)
ApKErô
2
Aiaqxûvû
3
OùrE
Zupqxovw/OùrE
Aiaqxûvd)
4
Zupqxovd)
5
Zupq)(ovd)
ApKETÔ
6
Zupqxovd)
AnôAura
7
• Eàv 01 AApovoi peTovooTeùouv oe Kànoio xwpo, npénei va TOuq eniTpéneToi va 
ôiOTHPoLiv Tr|v napàôoon TOuq.
Aiaq)(ovd)
AnôAura
1
Aiaqxovd)
ApKETÔ
2
Aiaq)wvd)
3
OÙTE
Zupq)wvd)/OûrE
Aiaqxovd)
4
Zupqxovd)
5
Zupq)(ovd)
ApKETÔ
6
Zupq)(ovw
AnôAura
7
•  'O to v  01 AApovoi 0 a  o p x io o u v  v a  ppioKOUV ôouAeiéq Aôyw Tnq e0viKàTnToq TOuq, o u tô  
00  KOToAn^ei o iy o u p o  o t o  v a  u n à p x o u v  AiyÔTepeq ôouA eiéq y ia  TOuq 'EAAnveq.
Aiaq)(ovd)
AnôAura
1
Aiaqxovd)
ApKETÔ
2
Aiaq)wvd)
3
OÙTE
Zupq)b)vd)/OùrE
Aiaq)(ûvd)
4
Zupq)(ûvd)
5
Zupqxovd)
ApKETÔ
6
Zupq>cov6
AnôAura
7
•  Oi AApovoi p eT o v ào req  n o u  ôev  éx o u v  à ô e io  n o p o p o v iiq  o r n v  x w p o , 0 o  npéne i v a  
oneA àooovT oi.
Aiaq)(ovd)
AnôAura
1
Aiaqxovd)
ApKETÔ
2
Aiaqxûvd)
3
OÙTE
Zupq)(ûvd)/OùrE
Aiaq)0)vd)
4
Zupq)(ovd)
5
Zupqxovd)
ApKETÔ
6
Zupq)(ovd)
AnôAura
7
•  K ànoloi AApovoi n o u  p év o u v  o r n v  EAAàôa koi A o p p àv o u v  oiKOVopiKn u n o o rn p i^ n  o n ô  
TO KpàToq, 00  p n o p o ù o o v  v a  ovTene^éA 0ouv x ^ p iq  Tnv ev io x u o n  e à v  n p o o n a 0 o û o a v .
Amq)(ovd)
AnôAura
1
Aiaqxovd)
ApKETÔ
2
Amqxovd)
3
OÙTE
Zupq)(ovd)/OûrE
Aiaqxùvd)
4
Zupq)(ûv6
5
Zupq)(ovd)
ApKETÔ
6
Zupq)(ovd)
AnôAura
7
•  Y né0eoe ôti to  noiôi o o u  onoKTÔei noiôi p e  KÔnoio ÔTopo p e  noAù ôiocpopeTiKÔ x p w p o  
ôéppoT oq KOI cpuoioyvwpiKÔ xapaicrnpioT iK à o n ô  to  ôikô o o u . E àv to  evYÔvia o o u  ô ev  
poiôc^ouv p e  Kovévo o n ô  Tnv oiKoyéveio o o u  :
0a  EVOxAnBeiq 
OE nôpa noAù 
pEyôAo paGpô
1
2 3 4 5 6
Aev Ga 
EVOxAnGEiq 
KaGôAou 
7
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Eivoi àôiKO yia t o u ç  ovGpwnouq picq x^üpoq eàv oi AApovoi noipvouv Tiq ôouAeièq k g i  
TOuq oiKOVopiKoùq nôpouq.
Aiaqxovd)
AnoAura
1
AiaqxDvd)
ApKErô
2
Aiaqxovd)
3
OùrE
Zupqxovû/OùrE
Aiaq>cûV(û
4
Zupqxovd)
5
Zupq)(ovd)
ApKErô
6
Zupq)(ovd)
AnôAura
7
• Aev 0 0  ovrjouxoùoo eàv oi nio noAAoi oupcpoiTrjTéq pou o t o  noveniOTHpio n  oi 
ouvepyÔTeq pou o t h  ôouAeiô h t o v  AApovoi.
Aiaqxovù
AnôAura
1
Aiaqxovb)
ApKErô
2
Aiaqxdvô)
3
OùrE
Zupqxûvrâ/OùrE
Aiaqxovù
4
Zupq)wvd)
5
Zupq)wvd)
ApKErô
6
Zupq)COvd)
AnôAura
7
)i napaKÔTW npoidasiq avacpépovrai oe anoipsiq oxeriKà pe louq AApavoùq psTavdoreq nou 
Xpuv EyKQTaaTaSd orrnv EAAàôa. Oi nio noAAoi AApovoi peravàoTeq dvai àiopo nou éxouv 
EwnGd ornv AApavio, nou éxouv pETavaoreùaei crrriv EAAàôa koi nou KOTéxouv f)ôr| Tr|v 
AAnviKH unr|KOÔTr|Ta n nou 0a inv anoKrnoouv o t o  kov tivô  péAAov. Ze napaKOÀoùpE va  
inovTnaEiç Exovjaç o to  puaAô oou pôvo Tqv auYKEKpipèvri opàSo koi va KOToGéoEiq inv 
inoipr) cjou KUKAcbvovraq t o  voùpEpo nou o e  avrinpooconEÙEi nEpiooÔTpo yia KÔ0E pia onô Tiq 
ipOTooEiq, xpncJijJonoicbvTaq Tiq napOKàTCO KAipoKEq.
Aiaq)(ovd)
AnôAura
Aiaqxovd)
ApKETÔ Aiaq)(ovd)3
Zupq)(ovd)
KÔncoq Zupq)(ovd)5
Zupq)(ovd)
ApKETÔ
Zupqxovd)
AnôAura
1 2 4 6 7
)i AApovoi peTGvôoTeq npénei va eyKOToAeiijJOUv Trjv oApoviKii unrjKOÔTrjTO npoKeipévou 
0 uio0eTnoouv Trjv eAArjviKn unrjKOÔTrjTO. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
)i AApovoi peTOVôoTeq pnopoùv va ôiOTrjpnoouv Trjv oApoviKii unrjKOÔTrjTO TOuq 
(pàoov ôev Tnv ouyxéouv pe Tnv eAAnviKÔ unnKOÔTnTO. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b ov 01 AApovoi peTovàcrreq ôiOTnpoùv T n v  oApoviKn unnKOÔTnTO TOuq n uio0eTOÙv 
nv eAAnviKn unnKOÔTnTo ôev éxEi Kopio onpaoia, yiod t o  KÔ0e ÔTopo Eivoi eAeù0Epo va 
niAé^ ei T n v  unnKOÔTnTO nou ouTÔq/ n 0éAei. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
)i AApovoi peTOVôcjTeq npénei va ôiOTnpoùv T n v  oAPoviKii TOuq unnKOÔTnTO  
io0eT(bvToq ôpwq k o i T n v  eAAnviKii unnK O Ô TnTO .
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
)i AApovoi peTovôoTeq ôev npénei va ÔiOTnpoùv T n v  oApoviKn unnK O Ô TnTO  Touq oAAô 
ÙTe va uio0eTOÙv T n v  eAAnviKn unnK O Ô T nT O , yioTi oÙTwq n ôAAcoq 0o énpene va unôpxEi 
lyÔTepn peTOvàcrreuon O T n v  EAAàôa. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
)i AApovoi peTOvôoTeq npénei va OTopoTnoouv va nnyoivouv oe oxoAeio nou ô i ô ô o k o u v  
nv noiôeio Tnq x^poq KOToycoynq TOuq, npoKeipévou va ô i ô ô o k o v t o i  Tnv eAAnviKn 
oiôeio. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
)i AApovoi peTOvàoreq pnopoùv va ouvexioouv va ô i ô ô o k o v t o i  Tnv noiôeio Tnq X^poq 
OToywynq TOuq, ecpôoov ôev ouyxéouv OTOixEio Tnq pe Tnv eAAnviKn noiôeio. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Aiaqxovd)
AnôAura
Aiaqxûvù
ApKErô Aiaqxovô)3
Zupqxovw
KÔnuq Zupqxovd)5
Zupq)(Ovd)
ApKETÔ
Zupq)wvd)
AnôAura
1 2 4 6 7
ro av 01 AApovoi peTavàoreq 0a ouvexioouv va ôiôàoKOvrai Tnv noiôeio Tnq x^ ipoq 
[OTOYWYnq Touq n Ga ôiôàoKOvrai Tnv eAAnviKii noiôeio ôev éxei Kopio onpaoia, yiOTi to 
:ô0e ÔTopo eivoi eAeù0epo va ôiôàoKeToi Tnv noiôeio nou ouTÔq/ n 0èAei. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
)i AApovoi peTovôoTeq npénei va ouvexioouv va ôiôàoKOvroi Tny noiôeio Tnq xwpas 
[OToywynq TOuq, evd) ôiôôokovtoi ôpwq koi Tnv eAAnviKn noiôeio. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
)i AApovoi peTOVÔOTeq ôev npénei va ôiôôokovtoi Tnv noiôeio Tnq xwpoq KOToycoynq 
ouq, oAAù oÙTe va ôiôôokovtoi koi Tnv eAAnviKii noiôeio, yiOTi oÛTwq n ôAAwq 0o 
;npene va unôpxei AiyÔTepn peTovôoTeuon OTnv EAAùôa. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
)i AApovoi peTOvùoTeq npénei va OTopoTiioouv va novTpeùovToi pe opoe0veiq Touq 
ipoKeipévou TOU va novTpeùovToi pe 'EAAnveq. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
)i AApovoi perovôoTeq pnopoùv va ouvexioouv va novTpeùovToi oTnv EAAôôo ecpôoov 
iev novrpeùovToi pe 'EAAnveq. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b ov 01 AApovoi peTOvèoreq navrpeùovrai pe opoe0veiq Touq n novTpeùovTOi pe 
EAAnveq ôev éxei Kopio onpooio, yioTi to KÔ0e ÔTopo eivoi eAeù0epo va novrpeuTei 
inoiov/ 0 0éAei. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
)i AApovoi peTOVùoTeq npénei va navrpeùovTOi ôxi pôvo pe opoe0veiq TOuq oAAô koi pe 
EAAnveq. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
)i AApovoi peTovàcrreq oÙTe npénei va novTpeùovroi pôvo pe opoe0veiq Touq, oAAù oÙTe 
01 va novTpeùovTOi pôvo pe 'EAAnveq, yioTi oÙTCoq n ôAAcoq 0o énpene va unôpxei 
lyÔTepn peTOvàoTeuon crrnv EAAùôa. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b eAAnviKÔ KpÔToq ôev 0o npénei va nopoxcopei Tnv eAAnviKii unnKOÔTnTO OTOuq 
lApovoùq peTovàcrreq. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b eAAnviKÔ KpÔToq npénei va nopoxcopei Tnv eAAnviKii unnKOÔTnTO crrouq AApovoùq 
leTOvàcrreq, pôvo eàv npoooppocrroùv koi onoôexTOÙv TOuq vôpouq ouTiiq Tnq x^ poq. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10 va nopoxcopeiToi n eAAnviKii unnKoÔTnTO, 0o npénei va eÇeTÔÇeTOi onô to KpÔToq ov 
' oiTcbv éxei vopiKÔ koi noAiTiKÔ ôiKoicopo va Tnv onoicrnoei, ove^ ôpTnTO onô to ov eivoi 
lApovôq/iôo. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Aiacpcovd)
AnoAura
Aioqxdvci)
ApKErô Aioqxavw3
Zupqxovd)
Kôncoç Zupq)covd)5
Zupq)0)vd)
ApKErô
Zupq)(Ovd)
AnôAura
1 2 4 6 7
b eAAnviKÔ KpÔToq 0a npénei va napaxwpei e^ iaou inv eAAnviKn unnKOÔTnTa orouq 
lApavoùq peTovàcrreq, ônwq crrouq 'EAAnveq, ove^ ôpTnTO onô Tiq noAiTKJTiKéq ouvf|0eiéq 
ouq. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 eAAnviKn unnKOÔTnTO npénei va nopéxETe pôvo crrouq 'EAAnvEq koi n AApaviKti 
innKOÔTnTO pôvo cjTOuq AApovoùq. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b eAAnviKÔ KpÔToq ôev 0o npénei va nopéxEi Tnv eAAnviKn noiôeio oe Kovévo AApovô 
leTovôcrrn. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b eAAnviKÔ KpÙToq 00 npénei va nopéxei Tnv eAAnviKii noiôeio OTOuq AApovoùq 
leTovôoTeq pôvo eôv npoooppô^ ovToi OTnv eAAnviKn kouAtoùpo. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b eAAnviKÔ KpÙToq npénei va nopéxEi Tnv eAAnviKn noiôeio oe ôAouq, ove^ ôpTnTO onô 
0 eôv eivoi AApovoi. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b eAAnviKÔ KpÔToq 0o npénei va nopéxei Tnv eAAnviKii noiôeio e^ ioou OTOuq AApovoùq 
leTOvacrreq ônwq crrouq 'EAAnveq, ove^ ôpTnTO onô Tiq noAiTioriKéq ouvn0eiéq TOuq. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b eAAnviKÔ KpÔToq 00 npénei va nopéxei Tnv eAAnviKn noiôeio pôvo oe 'EAAnveq koi Tnv 
ApoviKn noiôeio oe AApovoùq peTovôoTeq. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b eAAnviKÔ KpÙToq ôev 0o npénei va ev0oppùvei TOuq yopouq peToÇù EAAnvwv koi 
Apovwv. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b eAAnviKÔ KpÔToq 00 npénei va ev0oppùvei TOuq yopouq peTO^ù EAAnvwv koi 
Apovwv, pôvo eôv oi AApovoi npoooppocrroùv koi onoôexroùv nAiîpwq Tnv eAAnviKii
OUATOÙpO. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TO pucrrnpio tou yôpou ôev éxEi onpooio ov o yopnpoq n n vùcpn eivoi onô Tnv 
Apovio. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
)i YÔpoi peTo^ ù EAAnvwv koi AApovwv npénei va yivovTOi pe Tnv iôio ouxvÔTnTO ônwq 
01 01 ôAAoi yôpoi koi va ev0appùvovToi onô to eAAnviKÔ KpÙToq oveÇôpTnTO onô Tiq 
oAiTiOTiKéq ouvn0eieq twv AApovwv. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Il 'EAAnveq 0o npénei va novTpeùovTOi pôvo pe 'EAAnveq koi oi AApovoi pôvo pe 
APovoùq. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Eivai aripavriKO yio t o u ç  Pùaouq va pÈvouv a s  Çexwpicrréq yeiTovièq, ô i ô t i  poipô^ovTai 
nio noAAô k o i auvavaoTpécpovToi KoAuTepo peTo^ù Touq onô ô t i  va pévouv OTiq iôieq 
yeiTOviéq pe'EAAnveq.
Aiatpcovd)
AnoAura
1
Aiaqxovcb
ApKErô
2
Aiaqxovû
3
OÙTE
Zupqxovû/OÙTE
Aiaqxûvd)
4
Zupq>cûV(b
5
Zupqxovd)
ApKETÔ
6
Zupq)(ovd)
AnôAura
7
•  Oewpcb ÔTI n Koivcüvio poq  eivoi ôôiKn o n é v o v n  o ro u q  Pcboouq.
Aiaqxovd)
AnôAura
1
Aiaqxovû
ApKErô
2
Aiaqxovù
3
OÙTE
Zupqxûvû/O ùrE
Amcpcûvd)
4
Zupqxovd)
5
Zupqxovd)
ApKETÔ
6
Zupq)(ovd)
AnôAura
7
•  0 0  npénei v a  eivoi n io  eÙKoAo v a  ono icrnoeiq  r n v  eAAnviKn unnKOOTnro.
Aiaqxûvù
AnôAura
1
Aiaqxovù
ApKETÔ
2
Aiaqxovcb
3
OÙTE
Zupqxovù/OÙTE
Aiaqxovw
4
Zupqxovd)
5
Zupq)(ovd)
ApKETÔ
6
Zupq)(ovd)
AnôAura
7
•  Y nôpxouv  eAôxiOTOi pouA euréq  pœoïKÔq Koroycoyiiq o t o  eAAnviKÔ k o iv o P o ù A io  n o u  
onpo ivei ÔTI TO noAiTiKÔ KÔppoTO npénei v a  A ôpouv t o  onopaiTnTO  p é rp o  yio v a
ôioocpoAi^ouv r n v  o ù ^ n a n  o u p p e ro x n q  ouTWV tcüv pouA eurcüv o t o  k o iv o P o ù A io .
Aiaqxûvù
AnôAura
1
Aiaqxûvw
ApKETÔ
2
Aiacpcovd)
3
OÙTE
Zupqxavû/O ùrE
Aiaqxovd)
4
Zupq)tovd)
5
Zupq)(ovd)
ApKETÔ
6
Zupq)(ovd)
AnôAura
7
Eivoi nio niSovô yio Tnv pwoïKii peiovÔTnTO va npooôeùoei o t o  péAAov eôv KÔvei 
unopovn KOI ov ôev nié^ei évrovo yio oAAoyéq.
Aiaq)(Ovd)
AnôAura
1
Amqxovd)
ApKETÔ
2
Amq)(ovd)
3
OÙTE
Zupq)(ovd)/OùrE
Amq)(ovd)
4
Zupq)(ovd)
5
Zupq)(ovd)
ApKETÔ
6
Zupq)(ovd)
AnôAura
7
•  Aôycü TOU peyôA ou n o o o o ro ù  ovepyioq , oi Pcbooi npénei v a  y u p io o u v  o r n v  n o rp iô o  
TOuq.
Aiaq)(ov(û
AnôAura
1
Amq){ovd)
ApKETÔ
2
Amqxovw
3
OÙTE
Zupq)(0vd)/OùrE
Amqxovd)
4
Zupqxovd)
5
Zupqxovd)
ApKETÔ
6
Zupq)(ovd)
AnôAura
7
•  T a  ôiKOicbpoTO TCÜV Pcüocüv perovooTCüV npénei:
Na
nEpiopiaroùv
1
2 3
Na PEÎVOUV coq
EXOUV
4
5 6 Na EnEKraBoùv 7
•  Aev 0 a  p e  evoxA oùoe eô v  peroK opi^ov  o e  piKpô xpoviKÔ ô iôcrrnpo  noAAoi Pcüooi o rn v  
yeiTOViô p o u , oAAôc^ovraq r p v  e0viKiî rn q  o ù o ro o n .
Aiaq)(ov(ô
AnôAura
T
Amqxovd)
ApKETÔ
2
Amq)covd)
3
OÙTE
Zupq)covd)/OùrE
Amq)wvd)
4
Zupq)(ovd)
5
Zupq)(ovd)
ApKETÔ
6
Zupq)(ovd)
AnôAura
7
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Eàv 01 Pcüooi PETOVOOTEÙOUV OE KOHOio x^ po, npÈnEi va Touq EniTpÈneTOi va 
ÔiOTnpoùv TrjV napàôoon TOuq.
Aiaq>uvd}
AnoAura
1
Aiaqxovw
ApKErô
2
Aiaqxûvû
3
OÙTE
lupqxovù/OÙTE
Aiaqxovù
4
Zupqxovd)
5
Zupq)wvd)
ApKETÔ
6
Zupqxovd)
AnôAuTa
7
•  'O to v  oi Pc 
00 KOTOAli
oool 00 opxioouv va PpioKOuv ôouAeiéq Aoyco rnq e0viKÔTnToq Touq, o u tô  
e^i oiyoupa o to  va unàpxouv Aiyôrepeq ôouAeiéq yio TOuq 'EAAnveq.
Aiaqxovd)
AnôAura
1
Aiaqxovû
ApKETÔ
2
Aiaqxovw
3
OÙTE
Zupqxùvû/OÙTE
Aiaqxûvcb
4
Zupq)(ovd)
5
Zupq)(Ovd)
ApKETÔ
6
Zupq)(ovd)
AnôAuTa
7
Oi Pwooi pETovôoTEq nou ÔEV éxouv àôeio nopopoviiq ornv  x&pa, Go npénei va 
aneÂàooovTOi.
Aiaqxovd)
AnôAuTa
1
Aiaq)wvd)
ApKETÔ
2
Aiaqxovd)
3
OÙTE
Zupq)ù)vd)/OÙTE
Aiaqxovd)
4
Zupq)(ovd)
5
Zupq)(ovd)
ApKETÔ
6
Zupq)(ovd)
AnôAuTa
7
• Kànoloi Pcbooi nou pévouv crrnv EAAàôa koi Aoppàvouv oiKovopiKii unocmipi^n onô 
TO KpÔToq, 00 pnopoùoov va avrene^éA0ouv xwpiq rnv evioxuon eôv npoono0oùoav.
Aiaq)(ovd)
AnôAuTa
1
Aiaq)a)vd)
ApKETÔ
2
Aiaq)covd)
3
OÙTE
Zupq)0)vd)/OÙTE
Aiaq)(ûvd)
4
Zupq)covd)
5
Zupqxovd)
ApKETÔ
6
Zupq>covd)
AnôAuTa
7
• Yné0eoe ô ti t o  noiôi oou onoicrôei noiôi pe KÔnoio ÔTopo pe noAù ôiacpopeTiKÔ xpwpa 
ôéppoToq KOI cpuoioyvcopiKÔ xopoKTnpiOTiKÔ onô TO ÔIKÔ oou. Eôv TO eyyôvio oou ôev 
poiô^ouv pe KOvévo onô rnv oiKoyéveio oou :
©a EvoxAnBeiq 
GTE nôpa noAù 
PEYÔAg paGpô
1
2 3 4 5 6
Aev Ga 
EvoxAnGElq 
KaGôAou 
7
• Eivoi ôôiKO yia TOuq av0pcbnouq piaq xwpaq eôv oi Pcbooi noipvouv Tiq ôouAeiéq koi 
TOuq oiKOVopiKOÙq nôpouq.
Aiaq)covd)
AnôAuTa
1
Aiaqxovd)
ApKETÔ
2
Aiaq>fûvd)
3
OÙTE
Zupqxûvd)/OÙTE
Aiaq)0)vd)
4
Zupqxûvd)
5
Zupq)(ovd)
ApKETÔ
6
Zupq)COvd)
AnôAuTa
7
• Aev 00 ovnouxoùoo eôv oi nio noAAoi oupcpoirnréq pou o to  novenicmipio n oi 
ouvepyÔTeq pou cnrn ôouAeiô lirov Pcbooi.
Aiaq)(ûvd)
AnôAuTa
1
Aiaqxovd)
ApKETÔ
2
Aiaqxûvd)
3
OÙTE
Zupqxûvd)/OÙTE
Aiaq)wvd)
4
Zupqxovd)
5
Zupq)covd)
ApKETÔ
6
Zupqxovd)
AnôAuTa
7
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)i napaKàiü) npoiàaeiq avacpépovrai ae anôipeiq oxsriKà pe TOuq Pcbaouq peravàareq nou éxouv 
■YKaTaoToSei orriv EAAàôa. Oi nio noAAoi Pcbooi peTovàoreq eivoi àropo nou éxouv yewriGei crrr)v 
’cûoio, nou éxouv perovooreùoei orr|v EAAàôo k o i nou KOiéxouv nôn rpv eAApviKn unnKOOinro n  
lou 00 rpv onoKTpoouv o t o  k o v t i v ô  péAAov. Ze napaKaÀoù|j£ va anavrnaEiç e x o v tg ç  o t o  
jucAô oou pôvo Tqv ouYKEKpipÈvn opà5a k o i v o  Koro0éoeiq rpv ànoipr) oou Y'Q KÔ&E pia 
inô Tiq npOTÔoeiq, xPHGiponoicbvToq nq nopoKÔTW KAipoKeq.
Aiaqxovù Aiaq)CdV(û Zupqxovd) Zupq)wvd) Zupqxovw
AnoAura ApKETÔ Aiaqxovw Kanuç Zupqxovd) ApKETÔ AnôAura
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
)i Pcbooi peTovàcjTeq npénei va eYKaTaAeiipouv Trjv pcooiKii unriKoÔTriTa npoKeipévou va 
noOsTqoouv rpv eAAnviKii unnKOÔTr|Ta. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
)i Pcbooi peTovàoreq pnopoùv va ôioTripiioouv Trjv pcooiKii unnKOOTnra rouq ecpôoov 
iev Tr|v ouyxéouv pe rnv eAArjviKii unr|K0ÔTr|Ta.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b  ov 01 Pcbooi peTOVôcrreq ôiornpoùv rnv pcooiKii unrjKOÔTriTa rouq n uioSeroùv rnv 
AArjviKii unnKOOTnra ôev éxei Kopia onpooio, yiori ro KÔ0e ôropo eivai eAeù0epo va 
niAé e^i rnv unnKOÔrnra nou aurôq/ n 0éAei. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
)i Pcbooi perovôcTTeq npénei va ôiornpoùv rnv pcooiKn rouq unnKOornro uio0eTcbvToq 
ipcüq KOI rnv eAAnviKiî unnKOÔrnra. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
)i Pcbooi perovôoreq ôev npénei va ôiornpoùv rnv pcooiKii unnKoornro rouq oAAô oùre 
0 uio0eroùv rnv eAAnviKii unnKOÔrnra, yiori oÙTCoq n ôAAcoq 0a énpene va unôpxei 
jyôrepn peravôcrreuon crrnv EAAôôo. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
)i Pcbooi perovôoreq npénei va OTaparnoouv va nnyaivouv oe oxoAeia nou ôiôôokouv 
nv noiôeio rnq xcbpaq Karaycùynq rouq, npoKeipévou va ôiôôokovtoi rnv eAAnviKii 
laiôeia. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
)i Pcbooi perovôcrreq pnopoùv va ouvexioouv va ôiôôokovtoi rnv  noiôeio rnq xcüpaq 
araycüynq rouq, ecpôoov ôev ouyxéouv oroixeia rnq pe rnv eAAnviKii noiôeio. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b  av 01 Pcbooi perovôoreq 0a ouvexioouv va ôiôôokovtoi rnv noiôeio rnq xcüpaq 
OToycoynq rouq n Go ôiôôokovtoi rnv  eAAnviKii noiôeio ôev éxei Kopio onpooio, yiori ro  
ô0e ÔTopo eivoi eAeù0epo va ôiôôoketoi rnv noiôeio nou aurôq/ n 0éAei. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
)i Pcbooi perovôcrreq npénei va ouvexioouv va ôiôôokovtoi rnv  noiôeio rnq xcüpoq 
araycûynq rouq, evcb ôiôôokovtoi ôpcüq koi rnv eAAnviKii noiôeio. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Aiaqxovd) Aiaqxûvcû Zupqxovd) Zupq)(ovd) Zupqxovd)
AnôAura ApKETÔ Aiaqxovd) Kancoq Zupqxovd) ApKETÔ AnôAura
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Di Pcbaol pETOvàoTEq ôev npénei va ôiôàaKOvrai inv naiôeia Tnq xwpaq KaTaywynq Touq, 
]AAà OÙTE va ôiôàoKOvrai k o i rnv eAAnviKii naiôeia, yiOTi oÙTwq n àÂAwq 0a énpene va 
jnàpxei AiyoTepn peTavàoTeuan orpv EAAàôa. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Di Pwooi peTavàcrreq npénei va crrapaTnaouv va navrpeùovrai pe opoe0veiq Touq 
ipOKEipévou TOU va navrpeùovTai pe 'EAAnveq. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
)i Pcbooi peTOvàoTeq pnopoùv va ouvexioouv va navTpeùovrai crrnv EAAàôa ecpôoov ôev 
lOVTpeùovTOi pe 'EAAnveq. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ro ov 01 Pcbooi peravôoreq navrpeùovrai pe opoe0veiq rouq n navrpeùovrai pe 'EAAnveq 
)ev éxei Kopio onpooio, yiari ro KÔ0e ôropo eivoi eAeù0epo va novTpeurei onoiov/ a 
)éAei. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
)i Pcbooi peravôoTeq npénei va navrpeùovToi ôxi pôvo pe opoe0veiq rouq oAAô k o i  pe 
EAAnveq. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
)i Pcbooi perovôoTeq oùre npénei va navTpeùovrai pôvo pe opoe0veiq rouq, oAAô oùre 
:oi va navTpeùovTOi pôvo pe 'EAAnveq, yiori oùrcoq n ôAAcoq 0o énpene va unôpxei 
jyôrepn pETavôoreuon ornv EAAôôo. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
"0 eAAnviKÔ KpÔToq ôev 0o npénei va nopoxcopei rnv eAAnviKii unnKOornra crrouq 
>cboouq peTOVÔoreq. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b  eAAnviKÔ KpÔToq npénei va nopoxcopei rpv eAAnviKn unnKOornra crrouq Pcboouq 
leTovôoreq, pôvo eôv npoooppooroùv k o i onoôexroùv rouq vôpouq ournq rnq x^poq. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10 va napoxcopeirai n eAAnviKii unnKoornro, 0o npénei va e^erô^erai onô ro Kpôroq ov 
) oiTcbv éxei vopiKÔ KOI noAiTiKÔ ôiKoicopo va rnv onoicrnoei, ove^ôpTnra onô ro ov eivoi 
’cbooq/ iôo. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b  eAAnviKÔ KpÔToq 0o npénei va nopoxcopei e^ioou rnv eAAnviKn un nK O Ô rnT O  crrouq 
*cboouq peTOVÔoreq, ôncoq orouq 'EAAnveq, ave^ôprnra onô nq noAiTicrriKéq ouvn0eiéq 
ouq. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
\ eAAnviKn unnK O Ô rnT O  npénei va nopéxere pôvo orouq 'EAAnveq k o i n PcooiKii 
in n K O Ô rn ra  pôvo orouq Pcboouq. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Aiaqxovû Aiaqxovcb lupqxovd) Zupq)(ovd) Zupq)(Ovd)
AnôAuTQ ApKCTà Aiaqxûvù Koncoq Zupqxovd) ApKCTà AnoAura
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ro EÂAnviKÔ KpQToq ÔEV 00 npEHEi VO nopÈxEi Tnv eAAnviKii naiôEic oe kgvevg Pcboo 
JETOVàOTn. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
"0 eAAnviKÔ KpÔToq 0o npênei va nopéxEi rnv eAAnviKiî noiôeio crrouq Pcboouq 
lETOvôoTeq pôvo eôv npooappôc^ovroi ornv eAAnviKii kouAtoùpo. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b  eAAnviKÔ KpÔToq npénei va nopéxEi rnv eAAnviKi] noiôeio oe ôAouq, ove^ôpTnTO onô 
0 eôv eivoi Pcbooi. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b  eAAnviKÔ KpÔToq 0o npénei va nopéxEi rnv eAAnviKii noiôeio e^ioou OTOuq Pcboouq 
lETOVÔcrreq ôncoq crrouq 'EAAnveq, oveÇôpTnTO onô Tiq noAiTiOTiKéq ouvii0eiéq TOuq. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b  eAAnviKÔ KpÔToq 0o npénei va nopéxEi rnv eAAnviKn noiôeio pôvo oe 'EAAnveq koi rnv 
icboïKn noiôeio oe Pcboouq peTovôcrreq. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b  eAAnviKÔ KpÔToq ôev 0o npénei va ev0oppùvei TOuq yôpouq pero^ù EAAnvcov koi 
>cbocov. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b  eAAnviKÔ KpÔToq 0o npénei va ev0oppùvei TOuq yôpouq pero^ù EAAnvcov koi Pcbocov, 
lôvo eôv 01 Pcbooi npoooppocrroùv koi onoôexroùv nAnpcoq rnv eAAnviKii kouAtoùpo 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TO pucrrnpio tou yôpou ôev éxei onpooio ov o yopnpôq n n vùcpn eivoi onô rnv Pcooio.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
)i yôpoi peToÇù EAAnvcov koi Pcbocov npénei va yivovroi pe rnv iôio ouxvÔTnro ôncoq koi 
Il ôAAoi yôpoi KOI va ev0appùvovTOi onô to eAAnviKÔ KpÔToq ove^ôpTnTO onô Tiq 
loAiTiOTiKéq ouvn0eieq tcov Pcbocov.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
)i 'EAAnveq 00 npénei va navrpeùovTOi pôvo pe 'EAAnveq koi oi Pcbooi pôvo pe Pcboouq.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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loia noAiTiKti lôeoAovia ae avrinpoacüneùei; 
CaniToAiapôq | |
Coppouviapôq | ~|
îoaiaAiapôç I— I 
Wapxia □  
bppia onô auieq | |
:6viKÔTiiTa : ____________________________
DÙÀO:___________________________________
'ônoç ijoviunc; KOTOiKiaq orriv EAAàSa:.
lô a o  Kaipô fjévEiç e k e î; ________________
inÔYYEApa :______ _________________
I v  E Îa a i  (poiTHTnÇf t i  a n o u S à ^ E iç ; .  
1 AïKÎa :___________________________
1opq)CûTiKÔ EninsSo (pàAe V ae ôAa ôaa ae cvrinpoacüneCiouv); 
LripoTiKÔ Aùkeio navEniOTHPio 'AAAn oxoAq
Ze  euYaoiCTToùue Osouà v ia  rn v  auuuEToyn ao u
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Questionnaire Study 3 (English version)
111
PARTA
In this questionnaire we would like you to answer a series of questions based on your 
beliefs and experiences. There are no right or wrong answers. Using the scales 
provided, try to evaiuate how important the following statements are to you as a 
person. Piease, circle the number that applies to you the most.
How important is to you to feel different as a Greek?
Not Neither
mportant important or Extremely
at all unimportant important
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
How important is to you to feei that that there is a iink between the past and 
future of your Greek identity?
Not Neither
mportant important or Extremely
at all unimportant important
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ising the scales provided below try to evaluate the extent you agree with the following 
tatements. Please, put V next to the number that describes your answer best.
Not at 
all 
1 2 3 4 5 6
Extremely
7
» what extent do you feei 
eek?
> what extent do you feel strong 
IS with Greek peopie?
1 what extent do you feei 
Based to be Greek?
)w similar do you think you are 
the average Greek person?
778
Not at 
all 
1 2 3 4 5 6
Extremely
7
ow important to you is being 
reek?
ow much are your views about 
reece shared by other Greek 
Bople?
'hen you hear someone who is 
)t Greek criticise the Greek 
Bopie, to what extent do you 
ei personally criticised?
) what extent do you feei 
iristian Orthodox?
3 what extent do you feel strong 
BS with Christian Orthodox 
Bople?
3 what extent do you feel 
eased to be Christian Orthodox?
Dw similar do you think you are 
' the average Christian Orthodox 
Brson?
3W important to you is being 
iristian Orthodox? ^
3w much are your views about- 
rthodoxy shared by other. 
iristian Orthodox peopie?
hen you hear someone who is 
)t Christian Orthodox criticise 
e Christian Orthodox people, to 
hat extent do you feel 
îrsonally criticised?
779
Strongly
Disagree
1 2 3
Neither
agree
or
disagree
4 5 6
Strongly
Agree
7
Bing Greek makes me feel 
lique.
Bing Greek distinguishes me 
Dm people of other nationalities.
Bing Greek makes me stand out 
Dm others.
Bing Greek makes me different 
Dm others.
Bing Greek makes me 
iderstand where my values 
Brive from.
Bing Greek makes me 
iderstand how I came to be the 
Brson I am today.
Bing Greek helps me make 
inse of who I am today and how 
/vould like to be in the future.
Bing Greek provides a iink 
Btween me in the past and me
)W.
Strongly
Disagree
1 2 3
Neither
agree
or
disagree
4 5 6
Strongly
Agree
7
Bing Christian Orthodox makes 
e feei unique.
Bing Christian Orthodox 
stinguishes me from people of 
her religions.
Bing Christian Orthodox makes 
e stand out from others.
Bing Christian Orthodox makes 
e different from others.
Bing Christian Orthodox makes 
e understand where my values 
Brive from.
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Strongly
Disagree
1 2 3
Neither
agree
or
disagree
4 5 6
Strongly
Agree
7
Bing Christian Orthodox makes 
e understand how I came to be 
le person I am today.
Bing Christian Orthodox helps 
e make sense of who I am 
day and how I would like to be 
the future.
Bing Christian Orthodox provides 
iink between me in the past and 
e in the present.
Strongly
Disagree
1 2 3
Neither
agree
or
disagree
4 5 6
Strongly
Agree
7
often regret that I belong to this 
Btional group.
1 general. I'm glad to be a 
lember of this national group I 
Blong to.
verall, I often feel that my 
ational group of which I am a 
lember is not worthwhiie.
feel good about the national 
'oup I belong to.
verall, my national group is 
insidered good by others.
ost people consider my national 
'oup, on the average to be more 
effective than other national 
'oups.
) general, others respect the 
ational group I am a member of.
781
Strongly
Disagree
1 2 3
Neither
agree
or
disagree
4 5 6
Strongiy
Agree
7
1 general, others think that the 
ationai group I am member of is 
iworthy.
often regret that I belong to this 
iligious group.
1 general. I'm glad to be a 
ember of this religious group I 
along to.
verall, I often feel that my 
iligious group of which I am a 
ember is not worthwhile.
Peel good about the religious 
oup I belong to.
verall, my religious group is 
insidered good by others.
ost peopie consider my religious 
oup, on the average to be more 
effective than other reiigious 
oups.
1 general, others respect the 
iigious group I am a member
general, others think that the 
Iigious group I am member of is 
iworthy.
Not at all 
true 
1 2 3
Exactly true 
4
) a Greek I can aiways manage 
solve difficult problems if I try 
ird enough.
) a Greek if someone opposes 
e, I can find the means and 
ays to get what I want.
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Not at all 
true 
1 2 3
Exactly true 
4
5 a Greek it is easy for me to 
ick to my aims and accomplish 
y goals.
5 a Greek I am confident that I 
)uld deai efficiently with 
lexpected events.
lanks to my resoureefuiness as 
Greek, I know how to handle 
iforeseen situations.
5 a Greek I can solve most 
oblems if I invest the necessary 
fort.
5 a Greek I can remain calm 
hen facing difficulties because I 
m reiy on my coping abilities.
5 a Greek when I am confronted 
ith a problem, I can usually find 
Bveral soiutions.
5 a Greek if I am in troubie, I 
m usuaiiy think of a soiution.
5 a Greek I can usuaiiy handle 
hatever comes my way.
5 a Christian Orthodox I can 
ways manage to solve difficult 
'oblems if I try hard enough.
5 a Christian Orthodox if 
)meone opposes me, I can find 
le means and ways to get what 
want.
5 a Christian Orthodox it is easy 
>r me to stick to my aims and 
xompiish my goais.
S a Christian Orthodox I am 
Dnfident that I could deal 
ficiently with unexpected 
/ents.
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Not at all 
true 
1 2 3
Exactly true 
4
lanks to my resourcefulness as 
Christian Orthodox, I know how 
1 handle unforeseen situations.
5 a Christian Orthodox I can 
)ive most problems if I invest 
le necessary effort.
5 a Christian Orthodox I can 
‘main calm when facing 
fficuities because I can reiy on 
ly coping abilities.
5 a Christian Orthodox when I 
Ti confronted with a problem, I 
m usually find several solutions.
5 a Christian Orthodox if I am in 
oubie, I can usuaiiy think of a 
)lution. -
5 a Christian Orthodox I can 
suaiiy handle whatever comes 
ly way.
Strongly
Disagree
1 2 3
Neither
agree
or
disagree
4 5 6
Strongiy
Agree
7
would hardly call my self Greek 
■ I wasn't Christian Orthodox.
believe that Greekness and 
)rthodoxy are interwined.
IS a Greek I believe that my 
Christian ideas are an important 
lart of my national identity.
îreek ideals are identical to 
:hristian ideals.
ly  values as a Greek are by and 
arge identical to my Christian 
deals.
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Strongly
Disagree
1 2 3
Neither
agree
or
disagree
4 5 6
Strongiy
Agree
7
ly  customs and traditions as a 
îreek are closely linked to 
)rthodoxy.
ly ethics as a Greek are by 
arge expressed with my 
ihristian values.
Please circle the number that best represents your answer.
• To what extent do you feel similar to the Albanians? (not North Epirots)
Not Neither Very
similar •5 "3 similar or c much
at all dissimilar D O similar
1 4 7
To what extent do you feei similar to the Russians? (not Pontic-Greeks)
Not Neither Very
similar "3 simiiar or c c much
at all z <5 dissimilar 3 O similar
1 4 7
To what extent do you feel similar to the Moslems of Thrace?
Not Neither Very
similar ■3 similar or c much
at all Z a dissimilar D O similar
1 4 7
In broad lines, try to assess your similarities to the Albanians based on: 
•Values
Not Neither Very
similar >> ■3 similar or c much
at all z a dissimilar a 0 similar
1 4 7
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Religious beiiefs
Not Neither Very
simiiar •7 3 similar or c much
at all Z a dissimilar a D similar
1 4 7
Physical Characteristics
Not Neither Very
similar 3 3 simiiar or much
at all Z a dissimiiar a O similar
1 4 7
• Ethos-Customs
Not Neither Very
similar 3 3 similar or c £ much
at all Z a dissimilar a D similar
1 4 7
Inteiiectual abilities
Not Neither Very
similar 3 3 similar or c fZ much
at all Z a dissimilar a o similar
1 4 7
Educationai status
Not Neither Very
similar 3 3 similar or c much
at all Z a dissimilar a D similar
1 4 7
Cultural status
Not Neither Very
similar 3 3 similar or c £ much
at all Z a dissimilar a o similar
1 4 7
• Economic status
Not Neither Very
similar 3 3 simiiar or c much
at all Z a dissimilar a o similar
1 4 7
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In broad lines, try to assess your similarities to the Russians based on:
•Values
Not 
similar 
at all 
1
2 3
Neither 
similar or 
dissimilar 
4
5 6
Very
much
similar
7
• Religious beiiefs
Not 
simiiar 
at ail 
1
2 3
Neither 
simiiar or 
dissimilar 
4
5 6
Very
much
similar
7
• Physical Characteristics
Not 
simiiar 
at all 
1
2 3
Neither 
similar or 
dissimilar 
4
5 6
Very
much
similar
7
• Ethos-Customs
Not 
similar 
at all 
1
2 3
Neither 
simiiar or 
dissimilar 
4
5 6
Very
much
similar
7
Intellectual abilities
Not 
similar 
at all 
1
2 3
Neither 
similar or 
dissimilar 
4
5 6
Very
much
similar
7
• Educational status
Not 
similar 
at all 
1
2 3
Neither 
similar or 
dissimilar 
4
5 6
Very
much
similar
7
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Cultural status
Not 
similar 
at all 
1
2 3
Neither 
similar or 
dissimilar 
4
5 6
Very
much
similar
7
• Economic status
Not 
similar 
at all 
1
2 3
Neither 
similar or 
dissimilar 
4
5 6
Very
much
similar
7
In broad lines, try to assess your similarities to the Moslems of Thrace based on: 
•Values
Not Neither Very
similar 3 3 simiiar or c 6 muchat all dissimiiar 3 similar
1 4 7
Religious beliefs
Not Neither Very
similar similar or c much
at all 2 3 dissimilar 3 o similar
1 4 7
Physical Characteristics
Not Neither Very
similar simiiar or c c much
at all z dissimiiar D O simiiar
1 4 7
Ethos-Customs
Not Neither Very
similar 9 similar or c much
at all Z a dissimilar 3 D similar
1 4 7
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Intellectual abilities
Not 
similar 
at all 
1
2 3
Neither 
similar or 
dissimilar 
4
5 6
Very
much
similar
7
# Educational status
Not 
similar 
at all 
1
2 3
Neither 
simiiar or 
dissimilar 
4
5 6
Very
much
similar
7
Cultural status
Not 
similar 
at all 
1
2 3
Neither 
similar or 
dissimilar 
4
5 6
Very
much
similar
7
• Economic status
Not 
simiiar 
at all 
1
2 3
Neither 
similar or 
dissimilar 
4
5 6
Very
much
similar
7
How threatening do you consider the presence of immigrants in Greece?
Not at A great
all 2 3 4 5 6 deal
1 7
789
How threatening do you consider the presence of Albanians in Greece: 
• For your national distinctiveness
Not at A great
all 2 3 4 5 6 deal
1 7
For you national continuity
Not at A great
all 2 3 4 5 6 deal
1 7
• For you national self-esteem
Not at A great
all 2 3 4 5 6 deal
1 7
For your national efficacy
Not at A great
all 2 3 4 5 6 deal
1 7
How threatening do you consider the presence of Russians in Greece: 
• For your national distinctiveness
Not at A great
all 2 3 4 5 6 deal
1 7
• For you national continuity
Not at A great
all . 2 3 4 5 6 deal
1 7
For you national seif-esteem
Not at A great
all 2 3 4 5 6 deal
1 7
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For your national efficacy
Not at A great
all 2 3 4 5 6 deal
1 7
How threatening do you consider the presence of Moslems of Thrace in 
Greece:
• For your national distinctiveness
Not at A great
all 2 3 4 5 6 deal
1 7
For you nationai continuity
Not at A great
all 2 3 4 5 6 deal
1 7
• For you nationai seif-esteem
Not at A great
all 2 3 4 5 6 deal
1 7
For your nationai efficacy
Not at A great
all 2 3 4 5 6 deal
1 7
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Part B
I t  makes sense for Albanians to live in their own neighbourhoods because they 
share more and get along better than when mixing with the Greeks.
Strongly
Disagree
1
2 3 4 5 6
Strongly
Agree
7
• I consider our society to be unfair to Albanians.
Strongly
Disagree
1
2 3 4 5 6
Strongly
Agree
7
»It should be made easier to acquire Greek citizenship.
Strongly Strongly
Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
1 7
The number of Albanian origin Members of Parliament (MPs) is too low, and 
political parties should take active steps to increase it.
Strongly Strongly
Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
1 7
The Albanian minority is more likely to make progress in the future by being 
patient and not pushing so hard for change.
Strongly Strongly
Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
1 7
Given the presence of high levels of unemployment, Albanians should go back to 
their country.
Strongly Strongly
Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
1 7
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The rights of the Albanians should be:
Restricted
1 2 3
Be as 
they are 5 6 Extended7
4
I f  many Albanians moved to my neighbourhood in a short period of time, thus 
changing its ethnic composition, it would not bother me.
Strongly Strongly
Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
1 7
• I f  Albanians move to another country, they should be allowed to maintain their 
own traditions.
Strongly Strongly
Disagree
1
2 3 4 5 6 Agree
7
Once Albanians start getting jobs because of their ethnicity, the result is bound to 
be fewer jobs for Greeks.
Strongly Strongly
Disagree
1
2 3 4 5 6 Agree
7
Albanians who do not have immigration documents should be sent back to their 
country.
Strongly Strongly
Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
1 7
Some Albanians living in Greece who receive support from the state could get 
along without it if they tried.
Strongly Strongly
Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
1 7
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Suppose that a child of yours had children with a person of very different colour 
and physical characteristics than your own. If  your grandchildren did not physical 
resemble the people on your side of the family, you would be:
Not
Bothered
1 2 3 4 5 6
bothered 
at all 
7
I t  is unfair to people of one country if Albanians take jobs and resources.
Strongly Strongly
Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
1 7
• I would not be concerned if most of my peers at the university or at work were 
Albanians.
Strongly Strongly
Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
1 7
The following statements deal with opinions concerning Albanian immigrants who have 
settled in Greece. Albanian immigrants are individuals born in Albania who have 
immigrated to Greece, and who have received the Greek citizenship or will receive it in 
the near future. Please answer thinking about this specific immigrant group 
only. For each statement, please provide your opinion using the following scale, 
circling the number that applies to you the most.
Strongly Somewhat Strongly
Disagree 2 3 agree 5 6 Agree
1 4 7
Albanian immigrants should abandon their 
Albanian citizenship for the sake of adopting the 
Greek citizenship.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Albanian immigrants can maintain their Albanian 
citizenship as long as they do not mix it with the 
Greek citizenship.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Whether Albanian immigrants wish to retain their 
Albanian citizenship or adopt the Greek 
citizenship makes no difference, because every 
individual is free to choose the citizenship that 
he/she desires.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Strongly Somewhat Strongly
Disagree 2 3 agree 5 6 Agree
1 4 7
Albanian immigrants should maintain their 
Albanian citizenship while also adopting the Greek 
citizenship.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Albanian immigrants should not maintain their 
Albanian citizenship nor adopt the Greek 
citizenship because, in any case, there should be 
less immigration to Greece.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Albanian immigrants should stop attending 
schools which provide the education of their 
country of origin, so that they receive Greek 
education.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Albanian immigrants should continue receiving 
the education of their country of origin, provided 
they do not confuse elements of that education 
with those of Greek education.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Whether Albanian immigrants will continue 
receiving the education of their country of origin 
or receive Greek education is not important, 
because every person is free to receive the 
education he or she chooses.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Albanian immigrants should continue receiving 
the education of their country of origin, however 
they should also be receiving Greek education.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Albanian immigrants should not be receiving the 
education of their country of origin, and neither 
should they be provided with Greek education, 
because either way there should be less 
immigrants in Greece.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Albanian immigrants should stop getting married 
to people of the same ethnic origin so that they 
get married to Greeks.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Albanian immigrants may continue getting 
married in Greece as long as they do not get 
married to Greeks.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Strongly Somewhat Strongly
Disagree
1
2 3 agree
4
5 6 Agree
7
Whether Albanian immigrants get married to 
people of the same ethnic origin or to Greeks is 
not important, because every person is free to 
get married to anyone he or she chooses.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Albanian immigrants should not only get 
married to people of the same ethnic origin but 
also to Greeks.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Albanian immigrants should neither get married 
to people of the same ethnic origin nor to 
Greeks because, in any case, there should be 
less immigration to Greece.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Greek state should not grant the Greek 
citizenship to Albanian immigrants. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Greek state should grant Albanians Greek 
citizenship only if the latter conform and accept 
the laws, and participate in the national culture, 
of this country.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
For Greek citizenship to be granted, the Greek 
state should investigate the applicant's legal 
and political rights irrespective of whether 
he/she is an Albanian.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Greek state should be as likely to grant the 
Greek citizenship to Albanian immigrants as to 
Greeks, regardless of cultural habits of the 
Albanian immigrants.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Greek citizenship should be granted only to 
Greeks and the Albanian citizenship only to 
Albanians.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Greek state should not provide the Greek 
education to any Albanians. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Greek state should only provide Greek 
education to Albanian immigrants who adopt 
the Greek culture.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Greek state should provide the Greek 
education to everyone regardless of them being 
Albanian.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Greek state should provide the Greek 
education to Albanian immigrants as well as to 
Greeks, regardless of cultural habits of the 
Albanian immigrants.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Strongly Somewhat Strongly
Disagree 2 3 agree 5 6 Agree
1 4 7
The Greek state should provide 
the Greek education to Greeks 
and the Albanian education to 
Albanian immigrants.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Greek state should not 
encourage intermarriages 
between Greeks and Albanians.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Greek state should 
encourage intermarriages 
between Greeks and Albanians 
only if Albanians conform and 
adapt fully to the Greek culture.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Greek state should not 
intervene in a marriage as it 
should not make a difference 
whether the groom or the bride 
comes from Albania.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Intermarriages between Greeks 
and Albanians should be as 
frequent and be encouraged by 
the Greek state regardless of the 
cultural habits of Albanians.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Greeks should get married 
only to Greeks and Albanians only 
to Albanians.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I t  makes sense for Russians to live in their own neighbourhoods because they 
share more and get along better than when mixing with the Greeks.
Strongly Strongly
Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
1 7
I consider our society to be unfair to Russians.
Strongly Strongly
Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
1 7
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It should be made easier to acquire Greek citizenship.
Strongly Strongly
Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
1 7
The number of Russian origin Members of Parliament (MPs) is too low, and 
political parties should take active steps to increase it.
Strongly Strongly
Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
1 7
The Russian minority is more likely to make progress in the future by being patient 
and not pushing so hard for change.
Strongly Strongly
Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
1 7
Given the presence o f high levels of unemployment, Russians should go back to 
their country.
Strongly
Disagree
1
2 3 4 5 6
Strongly
Agree
7
• The rights of the Russians should be:
Restricted
1 2 3
Be as 
they are 
4
5 6 Extended7
I f  many Russians moved to my neighbourhood in a short period of time, thus 
changing its ethnic composition, it would not bother me.
Strongly Strongly
Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
1 7
798
I f  Russians move to another country, they should be allowed to maintain their own 
traditions.
Strongly Strongly
Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
1 7
Once Russians start getting jobs because of their ethnicity, the result is bound to 
be fewer jobs for Greeks.
Strongly Strongly
Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
1 7
Russians who do not have immigration documents should be sent back to their 
country.
Strongly Strongly
Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
1 7
• Some Russians living in Greece who receive support from the state could get along 
without it if they tried.
Strongly Strongly
Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
1 7
• Suppose that a child of yours had children with a person of very different colour 
and physical characteristics than your own. I f  your grandchildren did not physical 
resemble the people on your side of the family, you would be:
Bothered
1 2 3 4 5 6
Not 
bothered 
at all 
7
• It is unfair to people of one country if Russians take jobs and resources.
Strongly
Disagree
1
2 3 4 5 6
Strongly
Agree
7
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I would not be concerned if most of my peers at the university or at work were 
Russians.
Strongly Strongly
Disagree
1
2 3 4 5 6 Agree
7
The following statements deal with opinions concerning Russian immigrants who have 
settled in Greece. Russian immigrants are individuals born in Russia who have 
immigrated to Greece, and who have received the Greek citizenship or will receive it in 
the near future. Please answer thinking about this specific immigrant group 
only. For each statement, please provide your opinion using the following scale, 
circling the number that applies to you the most.
Strongly Somewhat Strongly
Disagree 2 3 agree 5 6 Agree
1 4 7
Russian immigrants should abandon their 
Russian citizenship for the sake of adopting the 
Greek citizenship.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Russian immigrants can maintain their Russian 
citizenship as long as they do not mix it with the 
Greek citizenship.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Whether Russian immigrants wish to retain their 
Russian citizenship or adopt the Greek 
citizenship makes no difference, because every 
individual is free to choose the citizenship that 
he/she chooses.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Russian immigrants should maintain their 
Russian citizenship while also adopting the 
Greek citizenship.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Russian immigrants should not maintain their 
Russian citizenship nor adopt the Greek 
citizenship because, in any case, there should 
be less immigration to Greece.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Russian immigrants should stop attending 
schools which provide the education of their 
country of origin, so that they receive Greek 
education.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Strongly Somewhat Strongly
Disagree
1
2 3 agree
4
5 6 Agree
7
Russian immigrants should continue receiving 
the education of their country of origin, 
provided they do not confuse elements of that 
education with those of Greek education.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Whether Russian immigrants will continue 
receiving the education of their country of origin 
or receive Greek education is not important, 
because every person is free to receive the 
education he or she chooses.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Russian immigrants should continue receiving 
the education of their country of origin; 
however they should also be receiving Greek 
education.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Russian immigrants should not be receiving the 
education of their country of origin, and neither 
should they be provided with Greek education, 
because either way there should be fewer 
immigrants in Greece.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Russian immigrants should stop getting married 
to people of the same ethnic origin so that they 
get married to Greeks.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Russian immigrants may continue getting 
married in Greece as long as they do not get 
married to Greeks.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Whether Russian immigrants get married to 
people of the same ethnic origin or to Greeks is 
not important, because every person is free to 
get married to anyone he or she chooses.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Russian immigrants should not only get married 
to people of the same ethnic origin but also to 
Greeks.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Russian immigrants should neither get married 
to people of the same ethnic origin nor to 
Greeks because, in any case, there should be 
less immigration to Greece.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Strongly Somewhat Strongly
Disagree 2 3 agree 5 6 Agree
1 4 7
The Greek state should not grant the Greek 
citizenship to Russian immigrants. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Greek state should grant Russians Greek 
citizenship only if the latter conform and accept 
the laws,and participate in the national culture, 
of this country.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
For Greek citizenship to be granted, the Greek 
state should investigate the applicant's legal 
and political rights irrespective of whether 
he/she is a Russian.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Greek state should be as likely to grant the 
Greek citizenship to Russian immigrants as to 
Greeks, regardless of cultural habits of the 
Russian immigrants.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Greek citizenship should be granted only to 
Greeks and the Russian citizenship only to 
Russians.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Greek state should not provide the Greek 
education to any Russian. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Greek state should only provide Greek 
education to Russian immigrants who adopt the 
Greek culture.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Greek state should provide the Greek 
education to everyone regardless of them being 
Russian.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Greek state should provide the Greek 
education to Russian immigrants as well as to 
Greeks, regardless of cultural habits of the 
Russian immigrants.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Greek state should provide the Greek 
education to Greeks only and the Russian 
education to Russian immigrants.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
802
Strongly Somewhat Strongly
Disagree
1
2 3 agree
4
5 6 Agree
7
The Greek state should not 
encourage intermarriages 
between Greeks and Russians.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Greek state should 
encourage intermarriages 
between Greeks and Russians 
only if Russians conform and 
adapt fully to the Greek culture.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Greek state should not 
intervene in a marriage as it 
should not make any difference if 
the groom or the bride comes 
from Russia.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Intermarriages between Greeks 
and Russians should be as 
frequent and be encouraged by 
the Greek state regardless of the 
cultural habits of Russians.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Greeks should get married 
only to Greeks and Russians only 
to Russians.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
'I t  makes sense for Moslems of Thrace to live in their own neighbourhoods because 
they share more and get along better than when mixing with other Greeks.
Strongly Strongly
Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
1 7
I consider our society to be unfair to Moslems of Thrace.
Strongly Strongiy
Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
1 7
I t  should be made easier to maintain Greek citizenship.
Strongly Strongly
Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
1 7
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The number of Moslems of Thrace Members of Parliament (MPs) is too low, and 
political parties should take active steps to increase it.
Strongly Strongly
Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
1 7
The Moslems of Thrace minority is more likely to make progress in the future by 
being patient and not pushing so hard for change.
Strongly Strongly
Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
1 7
Given the presence of high levels of unemployment, Moslems of Thrace should 
leave the country.
Strongly
Disagree
1
2 3 4 5 6
Strongly
Agree
7
• The rights of the Moslems of Thrace should be:
Restricted
1 2 3
Be as 
they are 
4
5 6 Extended7
I f  many Moslems of Thrace moved to my neighbourhood in a short period of time, 
thus changing its ethnic composition, it would not bother me.
Strongly Strongly
Disagree
1
2 3 4 5 6 Agree
7
• I f  Moslems of Thrace move to another country, they should be allowed to maintain 
their own traditions.
Strongly Strongly
Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
1 7
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Once Moslems of Thrace start getting jobs because of their minority status, the 
result is bound to be fewer jobs for Greeks.
Strongly Strongly
Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
1 7
Moslems of Thrace who do not have immigration documents should be sent back 
to their country.
Strongly Strongiy
Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
1 7
Some Moslems of Thrace living in Greece who receive support from the state could 
get along without it if they tried.
Strongly Strongly
Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
1 7
• Suppose that a child of yours had children with a person of very different colour 
and physical characteristics than your own. I f  your grandchildren did not physical 
resemble the people on your side of the family, you would be:
Not
Bothered
1 2 3 4 5 6
bothered 
at all 
7
I t  is unfair to people of the country if Moslems of Thrace take jobs and 
resources.
Strongly Strongly
Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
1 7
I would not be concerned if most of my peers at the university or at work were 
Moslems of Thrace.
Strongly Strongiy
Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
1 7
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The following statements deal with opinions concerning the Moslems of Thrace who live 
in Greece for good few centuries now. Moslems of Thrace are individuals born in 
Greece, whose ethnic origin is either Turkish or Bulgarian, and have the Greek 
citizenship. Please answer thinking about this specific minority group only.
For each statement, please provide your opinion using the following scale, circling the 
number that applies to you the most.
Strongly Somewhat Strongiy
Disagree
1
2 3 agree
4
5 6 Agree
7
The Moslems of Thrace should not have the 
right to establish their own political parties in 
order to be eligible to participate in the current 
Greek political parties.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Moslems of Thrace should have the right to 
form their own political parties, provided they 
don't have the right to actively participate in the 
current Greek political parties.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Whether the Moslems of Thrace have the right 
to form their own political parties or the right to 
actively participate in current Greek political 
parties is not important, because every person 
has the right to participate in any party he or 
she chooses.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Moslems of Thrace should have the right to 
be involved both in the current Greek political 
parties and in their own political parties.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Moslems of Thrace should not have the 
right to form their own political parties or to be 
actively involved alongside the current Greek 
political parties because, in any case, there 
should be fewer minorities in Greece.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Moslems of Thrace should stop attending 
schools which provide the education of their 
country of origin, so that they receive Greek 
education.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Moslems of Thrace should continue receiving 
the education of their country of origin, 
provided they do not confuse elements of that 
education with those of Greek education.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Strongly Somewhat Strongly
Disagree 2 3 agree 5 6 Agree
1 4 7
Whether Moslems of Thrace will continue 
receiving the education of their country of origin 
or receive Greek education is not important, 
because every person is free to receive any 
education he or she chooses.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Moslems of Thrace should continue receiving 
the education of their country of origin; 
however they should also be receiving Greek 
education.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Moslems of Thrace should not be receiving the 
education of their country of origin, and neither 
should they be provided with Greek education, 
because either way there should be fewer 
minorities in Greece.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Moslems of Thrace should stop getting 
married to people of the same ethnic origin so 
that they get married to Greeks.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Moslems of Thrace can get married in 
Greece as long as they don't get married to 
Greeks.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Whether Moslems of Thrace get married to 
people of the same ethnic origin or to Greeks is 
not important, because every person is free to 
get married to anyone he or she chooses.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Moslems of Thrace should not only get married 
to people of the same ethnic origin but also to 
Greeks.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Moslems of Thrace should neither get married 
to people of the same ethnic origin or nor to 
Greeks because, in any case, there should be 
less minorities in Greece.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Greek state should not allow the Moslems 
of Thrace to form their own political parties 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Greek state should acknowledge the right 
of the Moslems of Thrace to establish their own 
political parties only if they become accustomed 
to and accept the electoral system of this 
country.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
807
Strongly Somewhat Strongly
Disagree 2 3 agree 5 6 Agree
1 4 7
The Greek state should grant the 
right to the Moslems of Thrace to 
establish their own political 
parties, if the latter has the legal 
rights to do so, regardless of 
whether he or she is a Muslim of 
Thrace.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Greek state should be as 
likely to grant the right to form 
political parties to the Moslems of 
Thrace as to Greeks, regardless 
of cultural habits of the Moslems 
of Thrace.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Greek state should grant the 
right to form political parties to 
the Greek citizens of Greek origin 
whereas Moslems of Thrace 
should have this right in the 
country of their ethnic origin.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Greek state should not 
provide the Greek education to 
any Moslem of Thrace.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Greek state should only 
provide Greek education to the 
Moslems of Thrace who adopt the 
Greek culture.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Greek state should provide 
the Greek education to everyone 
regardless of them being 
Moslems.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Greek state should provide 
the Greek education to Moslems 
of Thrace as well as to Greeks, 
regardless of cultural habits of 
the Moslems of Thrace.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Greek state should provide 
the Greek education to Greeks 
only and to the Moslems of 
Thrace the education of their 
country of ethnic origin.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Strongly Somewhat Strongly
Disagree
1
2 3 agree
4
5 6 Agree
7
The Greek state should not 
encourage intermarriages 
between Greeks and Moslems of 
Thrace.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Greek state should 
encourage intermarriages 
between Greeks and Moslems of 
Thrace only if Moslems of Thrace 
conform and adapt fully to the 
Greek culture.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Greek state should not 
intervene in a marriage as it 
should not make a difference 
whether the groom or the bride 
comes from the Moslem minority.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Intermarriages between Greeks 
and Moslems of Thrace should be 
as frequent and be encouraged 
by the Greek state regardless of 
the cultural habits of the Moslems 
of Thrace.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Greeks should get married 
only to Greeks and Moslems of 
Thrace only to Moslems of 
Thrace.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Which political ideology represents you the most?
Capitalism
Communism
□□□
Socialism
Anarchy
None of 
the above
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Nationality:..........................
Sex:.....................
Place of residence in Greece:......................
How long have you being living there?:....
Profession:...........................
I f  you are a student, what do you study?: 
Age:.........
Educational background (Please V all the appropriate boxes)
Elementary school[ 2 ]  High school University [ 2 ]  Other school | |
Thank y o u  for vour oarticioation
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